UCDP

Government of Sudan - Civilians

General information

Part of Conflict: n/a

First Battle Related Death: 1989-11-01

Date when dyad reached 25 battle releated deaths: 1989-12-31
Comment on date when dyad reached 25 battle related deaths: The Government of Sudan first became active as a one-sided actor in UCDP data in 1989, when the one-sided violence resulted in at least 25 civilian deaths. The threshold was reached in December that year following an attack carried out by a pro-government militia. In this massacre the militia, with government support, killed at least 1000 civilians.

Conflict issues

Annual information

This section contains annual information systematically collected by the UCDP.

1989

Estimated Fatalities
High	1150
Best	1000
Low	1000

Secondary Warring Support:

Side A (Government of Sudan): n/a

Side B (Civilians): n/a

1990

Estimated Fatalities
High	400
Best	263
Low	263

Secondary Warring Support:

Side A (Government of Sudan): n/a

Side B (Civilians): n/a

1991

Estimated Fatalities
High	350
Best	250
Low	250

Secondary Warring Support:

Side A (Government of Sudan): n/a

Side B (Civilians): n/a

1992

Estimated Fatalities
High	2898
Best	1558
Low	1358

Secondary Warring Support:

Side A (Government of Sudan): n/a

Side B (Civilians): n/a

1993

Estimated Fatalities
High	678
Best	598
Low	598

Secondary Warring Support:

Side A (Government of Sudan): n/a

Side B (Civilians): n/a

1994

Estimated Fatalities
High	551
Best	471
Low	471

Secondary Warring Support:

Side A (Government of Sudan): n/a

Side B (Civilians): n/a

1995

Estimated Fatalities
High	282
Best	208
Low	208

Secondary Warring Support:

Side A (Government of Sudan): n/a

Side B (Civilians): n/a

1996

Estimated Fatalities
High	59
Best	34
Low	34

Secondary Warring Support:

Side A (Government of Sudan): n/a

Side B (Civilians): n/a

1997

Estimated Fatalities
High	1157
Best	200
Low	200

Secondary Warring Support:

Side A (Government of Sudan): n/a

Side B (Civilians): n/a

1998

Estimated Fatalities
High	1356
Best	597
Low	397

Secondary Warring Support:

Side A (Government of Sudan): n/a

Side B (Civilians): n/a

1999

Estimated Fatalities
High	1070
Best	100
Low	100

Secondary Warring Support:

Side A (Government of Sudan): n/a

Side B (Civilians): n/a

2000

Estimated Fatalities
High	505
Best	281
Low	281

Secondary Warring Support:

Side A (Government of Sudan): n/a

Side B (Civilians): n/a

2001

Estimated Fatalities
High	135
Best	50
Low	50

Secondary Warring Support:

Side A (Government of Sudan): n/a

Side B (Civilians): n/a

2002

Estimated Fatalities
High	35
Best	35
Low	35

Secondary Warring Support:

Side A (Government of Sudan): n/a

Side B (Civilians): n/a

2003

Estimated Fatalities
High	12388
Best	1694
Low	1694

Secondary Warring Support:

Side A (Government of Sudan): n/a

Side B (Civilians): n/a

2004

Estimated Fatalities
High	15410
Best	4963
Low	4799

Secondary Warring Support:

Side A (Government of Sudan): n/a

Side B (Civilians): n/a

2005

Estimated Fatalities
High	731
Best	424
Low	324

Secondary Warring Support:

Side A (Government of Sudan): n/a

Side B (Civilians): n/a

2006

Estimated Fatalities
High	362
Best	252
Low	252

Secondary Warring Support:

Side A (Government of Sudan): n/a

Side B (Civilians): n/a

2007

Estimated Fatalities
High	144
Best	98
Low	98

Secondary Warring Support:

Side A (Government of Sudan): n/a

Side B (Civilians): n/a

2008

Estimated Fatalities
High	357
Best	186
Low	186

Secondary Warring Support:

Side A (Government of Sudan): n/a

Side B (Civilians): n/a

2010

Estimated Fatalities
High	21
Best	14
Low	14

Secondary Warring Support:

Side A (Government of Sudan): n/a

Side B (Civilians): n/a

2011

Estimated Fatalities
High	343
Best	155
Low	155

Secondary Warring Support:

Side A (Government of Sudan): n/a

Side B (Civilians): n/a

2012

Estimated Fatalities
High	65
Best	53
Low	53

Secondary Warring Support:

Side A (Government of Sudan): n/a

Side B (Civilians): n/a

2013

Estimated Fatalities
High	40
Best	27
Low	27

Secondary Warring Support:

Side A (Government of Sudan): n/a

Side B (Civilians): n/a

2014

Estimated Fatalities
High	174
Best	94
Low	94

Secondary Warring Support:

Side A (Government of Sudan): n/a

Side B (Civilians): n/a

2015

Estimated Fatalities
High	590
Best	371
Low	371

Secondary Warring Support:

Side A (Government of Sudan): n/a

Side B (Civilians): n/a

2016

Estimated Fatalities
High	500
Best	448
Low	446

Secondary Warring Support:

Side A (Government of Sudan): n/a

Side B (Civilians): n/a

2017

Estimated Fatalities
High	77
Best	65
Low	65

Secondary Warring Support:

Side A (Government of Sudan): n/a

Side B (Civilians): n/a

2018

Estimated Fatalities
High	84
Best	75
Low	75

Secondary Warring Support:

Side A (Government of Sudan): n/a

Side B (Civilians): n/a

2019

Estimated Fatalities
High	263
Best	218
Low	212

Secondary Warring Support:

Side A (Government of Sudan): n/a

Side B (Civilians): n/a

2020

Estimated Fatalities
High	58
Best	52
Low	52

Secondary Warring Support:

Side A (Government of Sudan): n/a

Side B (Civilians): n/a

2021

Estimated Fatalities
High	81
Best	81
Low	81

Secondary Warring Support:

Side A (Government of Sudan): n/a

Side B (Civilians): n/a

2022

Estimated Fatalities
High	74
Best	74
Low	74

Secondary Warring Support:

Side A (Government of Sudan): n/a

Side B (Civilians): n/a

2023

Estimated Fatalities
High	8
Best	8
Low	8

Secondary Warring Support:

Side A (Government of Sudan): n/a

Side B (Civilians): n/a

2024

Estimated Fatalities
High	465
Best	465
Low	115

Secondary Warring Support:

Side A (Government of Sudan): n/a

Side B (Civilians): n/a

2025

Estimated Fatalities
High	437
Best	437
Low	389

Secondary Warring Support:

Side A (Government of Sudan): n/a

Side B (Civilians): n/a

Dyad Archive

This section contains annual information no longer systematically collected by the UCDP.

1989 Dyad Archive

Comment on Yearly Battle Related Deaths: The best estimate is the figure for the Jebelein massacre. The high estimate also includes an incident where SPLM/A say that the government killed 150 civilians in Nuba Mountains. However, this incident could not be independently confirmed and hence just included as high. In general the reporting from the civil war in Sudan is scarce so it is probable that the real figure of one-sided deaths during the year is higher than the one reported here.
Comment on Active: After the National Islamic Front (NIF) took power in a military coup the government policy of arming different militias drawing from particular ethnic belonging increased. These militias were primarily recruited from groups with a more Arab identity. During the year gross civilian killings have been the result of this policy. The first reported large-scale took place in Jebelein a town at the White Nile, in December. Jebelein is located in a fertile region contested by two southern ethnic groups Shilluk and Dinka and Arabs from the North. As a result of the SPLM/A war against the government thousands of Shilluk fled to Jebelein from surrounding villages. In December 1989, 40 000 southerners were settled in Jebelein or preparing to go north looking for food and work.

In the end of December 1989 the local Sabaha militia entered Jebelein in vehicles supplied by local authorities. The militia were armed with automatic weapons and even a truck-mounted machine gun. Huts were torched and the Shilluk panicked. Some of them took shelter in the local police station but the police permitted the militia to enter and at least 100 civilians were killed in the police station. Others were killed when they tried to flee or as they tried to cross the Nile swimming. Within hours a settlement consisting of around 10 000 Shilluk was deserted. The survivors in Jebelein were in desperate need but the authorities that investigated the situation said that no need for food existed.

The Jebelein massacre left over a thousand Shilluk killed by the pro-government Sabaha Arab militia.

Negotiations: NO

Victory: NO

Terminated: NO

1990 Dyad Archive

Comment on Yearly Battle Related Deaths: In general the reporting from the civil war in Sudan is scarce so it is probable that the real figure of one-sided deaths during the year is higher than the one reported here. For instance some unconfirmed reports talks about thousands of people massacred in the Nuba Mountains during the year.
Comment on Active: The majority of the one-sided killings perpetrated by the government of Sudan in 1990 took place in the contested area of the Nuba Mountains. During the year hundreds of villages were levelled or burnt down and civilians massacred in the Nuba Mountains. The attacks were perpetrated both by government troops and by different government militias as Popular Defence Forces (PDF), and Missiriya Arab militias (Murahaleen). The tactic conducted by the government in the Nuba Mountains was the "scorched earth" tactic. The main reason for this was military purpose but it has been suggested that the underlying rationale could have been economic. The reason behind this suggestion is that when the victimized abandoned their area it was claimed by groups that was in support of the government. Targeted in these attacks were foremost people from the Nuba ethnic group.

Negotiations: NO

Victory: NO

Terminated: NO

1991 Dyad Archive

Comment on Yearly Battle Related Deaths: In general the reporting from the civil war in Sudan is scarce so it is probable that the real figure of one-sided deaths during the year might be much higher than the one reported here. For instance, some unconfirmed reports talks about thousands of people massacred in the Nuba Mountains during the year.
Comment on Active: Most of the one-sided incidents reported during the year took place in the Nuba Mountains and was carried out by the government militia Murahaleen. The tactic used by this militia was usually to burn down an entire village and kill many of the inhabitants in the village. The attack causing most deaths during the year took place in September in the Saburi village in the Nuba Mountains.

Negotiations: NO

Victory: NO

Terminated: NO

1992 Dyad Archive

Comment on Yearly Battle Related Deaths: The difference between best and high estimate is mostly due to unspecific reports from an incident in December in the Nuba Mountains. No exact figure could be found but reportedly hundreds were killed. In general the reporting from the civil war in Sudan is scarce so it is probable that the real figure of one-sided deaths during the year might be much higher than the one reported here. For instance, there are unconfirmed reports of as many as 20 000 villagers killed in the Nuba Mountains and dumped in mass graves during 1992.
Comment on Active: The Sudanese government declared Jihad (holy war) against the opposition in Nuba Mountains in 1992. This was a result of their failed attempts to crush the resistance in this area. This call for Jihad from the government resulted in increased attacks in the Nuba Mountains. Most of the attacks were perpetrated by Murahileen, a government militia. But also other militias as the PDF (Popular Defence Forces) and ordinary government troops carried out one-sided violence in this area. The usual tactic was to burn down villages, often with people inside the huts, and shoot the people who fled. Witnesses have reported that men, women and children all were killed.

In 1992 there were also severe atrocities taking place in Eastern Equatoria. In some of these incidents the government and its militias made ethnical divisions. People from the Dinka tribe were killed whilst people for the Nuer tribe was spared. Dinka is the most numerous ethnic group in Southern Sudan and most soldiers and officers within the SPLM/A are Dinka. An additional purpose with this ethnic differentiation was to increase fighting between different ethnic groups and fighting between different factions of SPLM/A. The SPLM/A had split in two factions in 1991, one led by Riek Machar (a Nuer) and the mainstream faction led by John Garang (a Dinka). John Garang was seen as the most potential threat towards the Government and therefore they supported Machars faction in this fighting.

In addition to the one-sided violence taking place in Nuba Mountains and Eastern Equatoria incidents were also reported from Juba, the main city in Southern Sudan. Governmental troops searched for SPLM/A soldiers but also deliberately killed civilians. This was part of heavy fighting between the government and SPLM/A led by Garang, over control of Juba. All these different tactics by the government made 1992 as a year with very high number of people killed in one-sided attacks.

Negotiations: NO

Victory: NO

Terminated: NO

1993 Dyad Archive

Comment on Yearly Battle Related Deaths: The difference between best and high estimate is mostly due to unspecific reports from two incidents from the Nuba Mountains. In general the reporting from the civil war in Sudan is scarce so it is probable that the real figure of one-sided deaths during the year is much higher than the one reported here.
Comment on Active: During 1993 most of the one-sided attacks conducted by the Sudanese government was located to the much-contested Abyei area, on the border between Northern and Southern Sudan. In previous years, most of the one-sided attacks from the government side have been conducted by militias affiliated to the government (often in cooperation with regular government troops) but in 1992 most of the attacks were carried out by regular troops. In March church sources reported of an incident from Aweil a village in the northern part of Abyei where villagers were tortured through cutting their testicles with scissors and cutting off their ears. This incident resulted in the deaths of 32 persons.

In the Nuba Mountains the government continued the killing of civilians foremost through its two militias Popular Defence Forces (PDF) and Murahaleen. Attacks were also conducted in other regions of Southern Sudan but these were not as deadly as the ones in Abyei and Nuba Mountains.

Negotiations: NO

Victory: NO

Terminated: NO

1994 Dyad Archive

Comment on Yearly Battle Related Deaths: The difference between best and high estimate is mostly due to unspecific reports from two incidents from the Nuba Mountains during 1994. In general the reporting from the civil war in Sudan is scarce so it is probable that the real figure of one-sided deaths during the year might be much higher than the one reported here.
Comment on Active: In 1994 the one-sided attacks from the Government was localised in the Nuba Mountains. These attacks included torching of homes, killing of civilians who were fleeing, destroying of harvest and looting. Moreover, abductions of women and children were an integral part of these operations. On occasions the attacks were supported by helicopters and planes. Reportedly, the ambition with these attacks was that lack of food and shelter, paralleled with growing starvation, would lead people from the Nuba ethnic group to migrate to larger towns where they could more easily be controlled by the government.

Negotiations: NO

Victory: NO

Terminated: NO

1995 Dyad Archive

Comment on Yearly Battle Related Deaths: The difference between the high and best is due to disputed figures on how many people that died in the attack on Mejmeri in West Darfur and one of the attacks in the Nuba Mountains. In general the reporting from the civil war in Sudan is scarce so it is possible that the real figure of one-sided deaths during the year might be much higher than the one reported here.
Comment on Active: The Government of Sudan continued its warfare against civilians in the Nuba Mountains in 1995. Villages were burned, civilians killed and assassination squads very active. These assassination squads received their orders from government officials and targets for these squads were teachers and other important persons who operated in areas that were controlled by the SPLM/A and Nuba leadership.

In addition to this, a government-supported Arab militia attacked the Masalit village of Mejmeri in Western Darfur, in August. The attackers stole thousands of head of cattle, burned the village and killed between 23 and 75 persons. This also forced the Masalit to move more eastwards.

Negotiations: NO

Victory: NO

Terminated: NO

1996 Dyad Archive

Comment on Yearly Battle Related Deaths: The difference between the high and best is due to disputed figures on how many people that died in an attack on seven neighbouring villages in West Darfur in June. In general the reporting from the civil war in Sudan is scarce so it is probable that the real figure of one-sided deaths during the year might be much higher than the one reported here.
Comment on Active: In 1996 the government of Sudan carried out one-sided attacks against civilians on several locations in Sudan. Nuba Mountains, West Darfur and East Equatoria were all affected. In June seven neighbouring villages in West Darfur was victimized by an attack by a government militia. All the villages were burned and at least 20 people were killed during the attack. The victims included a pregnant woman and at least two of the fatalities were thrown into a flaming hut and burned alive.

Negotiations: NO

Victory: NO

Terminated: NO

1997 Dyad Archive

Comment on Yearly Battle Related Deaths: The big difference between the best and high estimate is due to reports on two plausible extensive massacres in Darfur one in March and one in April that could not be independently confirmed. It seems like a lot of people was killed in these incidents but circumstances are unclear hence these deaths are just included in the UCDP high estimate. In general the reporting from the civil war in Sudan is scarce so it is probable that the real figure of one-sided deaths during the year might be much higher than the one reported here.
Comment on Active: In 1997 the Nuba Mountains and Abyei area were both affected of one-sided attacks by the government. Most of the attacks were conducted during the first three months of the year. PDF (Popular Defence Force) a paramilitary group raised by the government was the perpetrator of most of the attacks during the year. Extrajudicial executions and burning of villages were common tactics. Unconfirmed reports also said that two massacres were conducted in West Darfur by a government militia. However, the circumstances around these incidents are a bit fuzzy. Victims for these attacks were people from the ethnic Masalit tribe and it is said that approximately 100 villages were burned and up to 950 people killed.

Negotiations: NO

Victory: NO

Terminated: NO

1998 Dyad Archive

Comment on Yearly Battle Related Deaths: The difference between the best and high estimate is due to reports on plausible massacres in Western Darfur during the year. Since, these massacres could not be independently confirmed and the circumstances not fully straighten out therefore that figure is just put as a high estimate. In general the reporting from the civil war in Sudan is scarce so it is probable that the real figure of one-sided deaths during the year might be much higher than the one reported here.
Comment on Active: In 1998 witnesses have reported that government troops, militias, and what was believed to be Mujahedeen (Holy Fighters) went from door to door in Dinka and Jur neighbourhoods, in Wau, the capital of the West Bahr al Ghazal state. During this raids many Dinka and Jur men, women, and children were killed. This was part of the government tactic in the heavy fighting between SPLM/A and the Government of Sudan over the control of Wau that took place in 1998. Also, when civilians try to flee from the city many of them were killed by government forces.

In addition to this it was reported that government-directed Arab militias in Darfur conducted four major atrocities in Western Darfur. However circumstances around these incidents are a bit unclear.

Negotiations: NO

Victory: NO

Terminated: NO

1999 Dyad Archive

Comment on Yearly Battle Related Deaths: The extensive difference between the best and high estimate is due to some uncertainty on the circumstances of the massacres in Western Darfur during the year. Since the circumstances are not fully straighten out that figure is just put as a high estimate. In general the reporting from the civil war in Sudan is scarce so it is probable that the real figure of one-sided deaths during the year might be much higher than the one reported here.
Comment on Active: In 1999 the government of Sudan and its affiliated militias carried out deliberate attacks against civilians. These attacks were concentrated to the Bahr al Ghazal state and Darfur. In the end of February in Bahr al Ghazal 30 civilians was killed by the paramilitary group PDF (Popular Defence Force) that is part of the Sudanese army when food was distributed by aid-agencies. In addition to this many civilians was also killed in Darfur, much higher number than the ones in Bahr al Ghazal, by pro-government militias. However, the circumstances are a bit hard to detangle and reports are not independently confirmed therefore are these reported deaths just put as a high estimate for the year of 1999.

Negotiations: NO

Victory: NO

Terminated: NO

2000 Dyad Archive

Comment on Active: In the first half of 2000, the governments PDF (Popular Defence Forces) and government-allied militia were engaged in a systematic operation to clear civilians from the areas around the oilfields. Displacements of thousand of people, burning of villages and extra-judicial executions of civilians were part of this strategy. This tactic led to exodus of extensive parts of the population in the targeted area since they faced starvation if they stayed after getting their livelihood destroyed.

Negotiations: NO

Victory: NO

Terminated: NO

2001 Dyad Archive

Comment on Yearly Battle Related Deaths: The general reporting from the civil war in Sudan is scarce so it is probable that the real figure of one-sided deaths during the year might be much higher than the one reported here.
Comment on Active: In 2001 the government of Sudan carried out attacks that deliberately were targeting civilians. These atrocities were both conducted by its ordinary army and through government connected militia. Villages were burned, civilians shot when they tried to flee, and civilians was killed during raids in different villages. One area that was target was Southern Blue Nile and the purpose of attacking civilians here was to displace the population and allow a new oil concession to be developed.

Negotiations: NO

Victory: NO

Terminated: NO

2002 Dyad Archive

Comment on Yearly Battle Related Deaths: The general reporting from the civil war in Sudan is scarce so it is probable that the real figure of one-sided deaths during the year might be much higher than the one reported here.
Comment on Active: A majority of the reported one-sided deaths committed by the government in 2002 were deliberately targeting of civilians with helicopter gunship. When you attack with a helicopter you can have a higher level of precision than if you bomb by plan. Hence, the intention of a targeted is easier to examine in helicopter warfare compared with bomb planes. One of these attacks was when people waiting for food at a relief centre in Bieh Upper Nile were targeted.

Negotiations: NO

Victory: NO

Terminated: NO

2003 Dyad Archive

Comment on Yearly Battle Related Deaths: The amount of deaths in Darfur is a much contested issue and to get as accurate figure as possible is a very complicated. Darfur is the same size as France and it is hard to cover such a vast area for investigators and reporters. Moreover, transports and lack of accessibility (for a long time the Government of Sudan did not permit any journalists to visit Darfur) makes the problem further extensive. There are several organisations providing good reports about massacres etc in Darfur but because of the reason mention above it is impossible for these groups to cover all the atrocities in Darfur. The UCDP best estimate is the total figure of the one-sided incidents were we have incident coding. This means that the best estimate only include incidents were investigators have conducted research in the area to collect information about massacres etc. or other reliable sources have reported about deliberate killings of civilians. The high estimate for 2003 is taken from a scientific investigation with impeccable methodology conducted by a Danish research group called Bloodhound. The purpose with their study is to compile all existing information on the attacks on villages, in order to carry out an analysis of this data. In order to its cautious standard UCDP have used the most conservative estimate provided by Bloodhound as its high estimate. The thoroughly investigation conducted by Bloodhound gives the opportunity to provide figures for each month. Bloodhounds exploration shows that 97% of the attacks in Darfur were conducted by either, the Government, the Janjaweed or joint attacks by the Government and Janjaweed. The joint attacks between Janjaweed and Government troops are attributed to the Government of Sudan in the UCDP-coding. In the UCDP coding of high estimate half of the most conservative monthly figure provided by Bloodhound is given to the Government of Sudan and half is given to Janjaweed. The study by bloodhound covers the period from January 2001 to September 2005 but before 2003 the number of attacks is very few in comparison and the majority (69%) of attacks took place in the period from beginning April 2003 to late March 2004. Another important reason for UCDP using Bloodhound is that since they provide description of their incidents we can see that the incidents follows our definition of one-sided violence. For further information about this study see www.bloodhound.se.

The figure provided here is comparatively low to some other sources. One reason for this is that most others sources accumulate people killed in all different ways whilst UCDP have divide upon different types of violence and many people are also killed in non-state and state-based violence. However, one-sided violence is by far the most numerous one in 2003. As high figure as 250 000 to 450 000 deaths in Darfur from 2003 to 2006 also circulate around the debate. However, these figures are much disputed and include people dying of starvation and diseases and are not included in the UCDP coding since we just code direct deaths. The reason behind this UCDP standard is that the figures including these types of deaths are most often very unspecific and extremely complicated to verify.
Comment on Active: In response to the SLM/A and JEM rebellion launched in Darfur the government of Sudan armed a militia as part of its counter-insurgency. The purpose of this was to crush the rebellion, this militia is called Janjaweed. This counteroffensive did not just target the rebel groups but also civilians. The regular army often worked in tandem with the Janjaweed in these attacks. The method in these attacks was most often that first a village was surrounded by army and Janjaweed fighters. Then the village was bombed by army planes and/or shot at by automatic weapons from the surrounding forces. After this the Janjaweed went into the village and killed men, women and children indiscriminately. Following this the village was looted and finally burned.

These joint operations are coded as government one-sided killing whilst attacks were it was just Janjaweed who conducted the assaults are coded as a separate actor. Although the government denies it, the link between the government and the Janjaweed is doubtless. Official documents, statement by Janjaweed leaders, and co-operation on the ground are some of the evidence on the close relation between the regime in Khartoum and the Janjaweed. However, attacks carried out solely by the Janjaweed are kept as a separate actor since it enables to distinguish between the attacks were government troops were actively participating and where they were not. In addition to this the Janjaweed sometimes also acted on their own and not from orders by the government.

Negotiations: NO

Victory: NO

Terminated: NO

2004 Dyad Archive

Comment on Yearly Battle Related Deaths: The amount of deaths in Darfur is a much contested issue and to get as accurate figure as possible is a very complicated. Darfur is the same size as France and it is hard to cover such a vast area for investigators and reporters. Moreover, transports and lack of accessibility (for a long time the Government of Sudan did not permit any journalists to visit Darfur) makes the problem further extensive. There are several organisations providing good reports about massacres etc in Darfur but because of the reason mention above it is impossible for these groups to cover all the atrocities in Darfur. The UCDP best estimate is the total figure of the one-sided incidents were we have incident coding. This means that the best estimate only include incidents were investigators have conducted research in the area to collect information about massacres etc. or other reliable sources have reported about deliberate killings of civilians. The high estimate for 2003 is taken from a scientific investigation with impeccable methodology conducted by a Danish research group called Bloodhound. The purpose with their study is to compile all existing information on the attacks on villages, in order to carry out an analysis of this data. In order to its cautious standard UCDP have used the most conservative estimate provided by Bloodhound as its high estimate. The thorough investigation conducted by Bloodhound gives the opportunity to provide figures for each month. Bloodhounds exploration shows that 97% of the attacks in Darfur were conducted by either, the Government, the Janjaweed or joint attacks by the Government and Janjaweed. The joint attacks between Janjaweed and Government troops are attributed to the Government of Sudan in the UCDP-coding. In the UCDP coding of high estimate half of the most conservative monthly figure provided by Bloodhound is given to the Government of Sudan and half is given to Janjaweed. The study by Bloodhound covers the period from January 2001 to September 2005 but before 2003 the number of attacks is very few in comparison and the majority (69%) of attacks took place in the period from beginning April 2003 to late March 2004. Another important reason for UCDP using Bloodhound is that since they provide a description of their incidents we can see that the incidents follow our definition of one-sided violence. For further information about this study see www.bloodhound.se.

The figure provided here is comparatively low to some other sources. One reason for this is that most other sources accumulate people killed in all different ways whilst UCDP has divide upon different types of violence and many people are also killed in non-state and state-based violence. However, one-sided violence is by far the most numerous one in 2003. As high figure as 250 000 to 450 000 deaths in Darfur from 2003 to 2006 also circulate around the debate. However, these figures are much disputed and include people dying of starvation and diseases and are not included in the UCDP coding since we just code direct deaths. The reason behind this UCDP standard is that the figures including these types of deaths are most often very unspecific and extremely complicated to verify.
Comment on Active: The majority of the governmental one-sided attacks in 2004 took place in Darfur and the bulk of them were joint army/Janjaweed attacks. 2004 was a devastating year for Darfur and the one-sided killings were outspread. The standard way for an attack was bombing or shooting from the army and after that, the Janjaweed entered the village to kill, rape and loot. After that, they burned down the village they had attacked. The period when attacks by the government of Sudan and Janjaweed were most common was April 2003 to late March 2004. One reason behind the decrease of attacks after this period was that there were not so many villages left to attack and that the international community started to focus more on Darfur. A majority of the governmental attacks against civilians were done in combination with Janjaweed. UCDP attributes the joint attacks by the army and Janjaweed to the government whilst the attacks where Janjaweed acted on their own are attributed to the militia. However, the attacks that were conducted solely by the Janjaweed had a clear connection to the government of Sudan since they gave weapons to the militia, often gave order to the Janjaweed, and never conducted any serious attempts to stop them or held them responsible for their attacks.

Interviews with witnesses to massacres taking place in 2003 show that men, women, and children were all killed in large numbers. Sometimes victims were first chained and later burned alive. Moreover, rape was used in a systematic way and was part of the standard joint attack by the government and Janjaweed. Looting was also very common and all sorts of things were stealing from camels and other animals to personal belongings as clothes.

One of these attacks targeted the village of Kailek, South Darfur, in February/March 2003 and is described as followed by UN and Human Rights Watch (HRW).

UN: "Particularly shocking were the acts of torture and cruel and degrading treatment that accompanied other serious crimes committed by government forces and the Janjaweed against the civilian population during the Kailek incident in South Darfur. During the attack as well as the subsequent forced confinement of the population, several persons were subjected to severe torture in order to extract information about rebels, as punishment or to terrorize the people. Women and children were separated from the men, confined in an area around the Mosque, and later taken away by their captors to be raped. They were subjected to gang rapes which lasted for protracted periods of time. Girls as young as 10 years old were raped"

HRW: "The team found that, the numerous testimonies collected by the team, substantiated by the actual observations on the ground, particularly the longstanding prevention of access to food, alludes to a strategy of systematic and deliberate starvation being enforced by the government of Sudan and its security forces on the ground."

Targeted in these attacks were villages inhabited by different “African” tribes foremost the Fur, the Zaghawa, and the Masalit. The reason behind this was that the rebellion drew most of its support from these ethnic groups.

Negotiations: NO

Victory: NO

Terminated: NO

2005 Dyad Archive

Comment on Yearly Battle Related Deaths: The amount of deaths in Darfur is a much contested issue and to get as accurate figure as possible is a very complicated. Darfur is the same size as France and it is hard to cover such a vast area for investigators and reporters. Moreover, transports and lack of accessibility (for a long time the Government of Sudan did not permit any journalists to visit Darfur) makes the problem further extensive. There are several organisations providing good reports about massacres etc in Darfur but because of the reason mention above it is impossible for these groups to cover all the atrocities in Darfur. The UCDP best estimate is the total figure of the one-sided incidents were we have incident coding. This means that the best estimate only include incidents were investigators have conducted research in the area to collect information about massacres etc. or other reliable sources have reported about deliberate killings of civilians. The high estimate for 2003 is taken from a scientific investigation with impeccable methodology conducted by a Danish research group called Bloodhound. The purpose with their study is to compile all existing information on the attacks on villages, in order to carry out an analysis of this data. In order to its cautious standard UCDP have used the most conservative estimate provided by Bloodhound as its high estimate. The thoroughly investigation conducted by Bloodhound gives the opportunity to provide figures for each month. Bloodhounds exploration shows that 97% of the attacks in Darfur were conducted by either, the Government, the Janjaweed or joint attacks by the Government and Janjaweed. The joint attacks between Janjaweed and Government troops are attributed to the Government of Sudan in the UCDP-coding. In the UCDP coding of high estimate half of the most conservative monthly figure provided by Bloodhound is given to the Government of Sudan and half is given to Janjaweed. The study by bloodhound covers the period from January 2001 to September 2005 but before 2003 the number of attacks is very few in comparison and the majority (69%) of attacks took place in the period from beginning April 2003 to late March 2004. Another important reason for UCDP using Bloodhound is that since they provide description of their incidents we can see that the incidents follows our definition of one-sided violence. For further information about this study see www.bloodhound.se.

The figure provided here is comparatively low to some other sources. One reason for this is that most others sources accumulate people killed in all different ways whilst UCDP have divide upon different types of violence and many people are also killed in non-state and state-based violence. However, one-sided violence is by far the most numerous one in 2003. As high figure as 250 000 to 450 000 deaths in Darfur from 2003 to 2006 also circulate around the debate. However, these figures are much disputed and include people dying of starvation and diseases and are not included in the UCDP coding since we just code direct deaths. The reason behind this UCDP standard is that the figures including these types of deaths are most often very unspecific and extremely complicated to verify.
Comment on Active: In 2005 government one-sided violence continued in Darfur, although not at the same level as the two previous years. This followed a much lower level of state-based violence in 2005 compared to 2003 and 2004. There are several suggested reason for the lower amount of one-sided violence and the lesser level of fighting in 2005 and some of them is: the presence of AMIS (African Union Mission in Sudan) forces, the departure of most of the population from heavily contested areas to Internally Displaced Person (IDP) and refugee camps, pressure by the international community, and consolidation of areas of control by the warring parties.

However, the situation in Darfur in 2005 was still characterized by attacks on villages. Throughout the year the Government continued (most of the time together with Janjaweed) to attack civilians all over Darfur. Targeted in one of the bloodiest of the attacks during the year was Hamada, a village in South Darfur. Human Right Watch (HRW) reports from the incident that:

"Janjaweed militas from Niegia and Malam were identified among the attackers, who conducted the assault in a coordinated fashion with Sudanese government forces. For two days the residents of Hamada were detained in the village not allowed to flee. Men and women were separated into groups: some of the men and boys were executed; others were kept alive to guard their own livestock, looted by the Janjaweed. Women and children were killed, some while fleeing the school; other women and girls were raped, some repeatedly. Aid workers and rebels claim government planes bombed the area."

Negotiations: NO

Victory: NO

Terminated: NO

2006 Dyad Archive

Comment on Yearly Battle Related Deaths: The difference between the high and best estimate is due to different figures reported about two incidents that took place in November.
Comment on Active: In 2006 the government of Sudan was active as a one-sided violence actor. Some of these attacks targeted peaceful demonstrations and others were targeting villagers and it was reported that men, women and children were killed in some attacks. These attacks conducted solely by the government took place throughout the year and resulted in around 60 causalities.

In addition to this the government also combined with Janjaweed and committed mutual attacks with the militia. These attacks where the government and Janjaweed conducted abuses together caused more casualties than the one were the government were the sole perpetrator and resulted in around 200-300 deaths. In the mutual attacks the most common target was villages located at different places in Darfur but also camps for Internally Displaced Persons (IDPs) were targeted. In addition to this; huts, fields and grain stores were burnt and looting was standard in many of the attacks. These attacks took place during the whole year from January to December with a peak of attacks taking place in November.

Negotiations: NO

Victory: NO

Terminated: NO

2007 Dyad Archive

Comment on Yearly Battle Related Deaths: The difference between the best and high and low estimate is due to uncertainty of the number of victims in two of the joint government/Janjaweed attacks.
Comment on Active: In 2007, the government of Sudan carried out deliberate attacks against civilians at several occasions. Two of these incidents were taking place when the police fired at peaceful demonstrations against two dams being built in the far North of Sudan, resulting in eight deaths. In addition to this the army conducted joint attack with the Janjaweed militia in Darfur. The attacks were most often following the manner of that the army bombed villages or fired on them with artillery and after that the soldiers and the Janjaweed entered the village and killed indiscriminately. The attacks often also included acts of raping, looting and burning of the villages. However, these attacks were not as common as they had been in the year of 2003 and 2004 when these types of attacks peaked. One reason behind this was that there were not that many villages left to burn. NGO-workers reported that from 2003 until the end of 2007, 1595 villages had been totally burnt and many more partially.

Negotiations: NO

Victory: NO

Terminated: NO

2008 Dyad Archive

Comment on Yearly Battle Related Deaths: The difference between best and high is due to shifting figures given for combined raids by government and governmental militias in February in West Darfur.
Comment on Active: In 2008 the government of Sudan was active as a one-sided perpetrator as they both on their own and together with different government militias deliberately attacked civilians. When militias, such as Janjaweed, conducts atrocities on there own it is coded with the militia as the actor but when its part of a joint operation it is coded as the government as perpetrator. The reason behind this is that these combined attacks are led by the government and they are the ones giving orders. In 2008 one-sided violence by the government consisted of, for instance, the attack consisted of attacks on civilians in refugee camps; villages with just civilians present attacked by joint militia and government troops and intentionally killings of civilians by soldiers within the army.

Negotiations: NO

Victory: NO

Terminated: NO

2010 Dyad Archive

Negotiations: NO

Victory: NO

Terminated: NO

2011 Dyad Archive

Comment on Yearly Battle Related Deaths: The high discrepancy between the high and best estimate is due to uncertainty how many died in the incident in South Sudan carried out by the Government of South Sudan.
Comment on Active: The government of Sudan was active in 2011 as a one-sided actor due to deliberate attacks on civilians taking place at several different places. Most of the one-sided violence was carried out in the contested region of South Kordofan where the government was involved in a conflict against the SPLM/A-north. In South Kordofan gross human rights violations took place against the civilian population such as extrajudicial killings, burning of villages, and rape. This violence had an ethnic dimension as the once targeted came from ethnic groups supposedly supporting the SPLM/A-North rebel group. Primarily the Nuba ethnic group was targeted. About 100 of the one-sided deaths in 2011 took place in South Kordofan. In the neighboring state of Blue Nile similar violence took place albeit to a much lower extent. In Darfur, the government was involved in one-sided violence in which dozens of people were executed by different government organs such as the central reserve police or the army.

In South Sudan the Government of South Sudan acted as a one-sided actor in two incidents before the region gain independence on 9 July 2011. The incidents carried out before independence is coded as part of the government of Sudan as the government of South Sudan is part of the Government of National Unity. In the first incident in the state of Upper Nile soldiers from the South Sudanese army fired at civilians who fled from fighting and killed five. In April another instance of one-sided violence took place in the Jonglei state where soldiers from the South Sudanese army targeted people from the Nuer ethnic group. How many people that were killed in the incident are uncertain but at least 25 were killed but the actual number might be over 200. In the incident men, women and children were indiscriminately attacked because they allegedly supported a rebel group opposing the government of South Sudan.

Negotiations: NO

Victory: NO

Terminated: NO

2012 Dyad Archive

Comment on Active: The Sudanese government was active as a one-sided violence perpetrator in 2012 due to various atrocities taking place in different areas of the country and across the border to South Sudan. Most of the one-sided violence killings took place in Darfur. These killings were both carried out by regular army troops and militia connected to the army. Another incident took place in the state of Upper Nile when Sudanese army killed at least three innocent civilians farming. In the Blue Nile state several incidents took place during 2012. The most brutal took place in December when nine women were killed by soldiers from the Sudanese army after being raped.

Negotiations: NO

Victory: NO

Terminated: NO

2013 Dyad Archive

Comment on Active: The Government of Sudan carried out several attacks against civilians during 2013. Most of these attacks took place in Darfur but there were also incidents taking place in South Kordofan. The most severe attack during 2013 took place in April when the army and pro-government militias killed 18 civilians in Darfur. In addition to the incidents included in the UCDP one-sided coding, about 200 people were killed in anti-government protest in Khartoum. These deaths are not coded as one-sided violence since the protest included some violence from the protesters. It should be noted, however, that the government used excessive violence and shot at demonstrators. If more detailed accounts of these developments will be revealed some of these killings may meet the criterions set up for one-sided violence.

Negotiations: NO

Victory: NO

Terminated: NO

2014 Dyad Archive

Comment on Yearly Battle Related Deaths: The difference in the estimates of fatalities is due to difficulties to confirm the number of deaths on some occasions. One event that stands out took place in the Nyala district of South Darfur where there was no verification to a claim of the deaths of 58 civilians in an attack by the government’s paramilitary forces.
Comment on Active: Most of the Sudanese government’s one-sided attacks during 2014 was carried out by the paramilitary force called the Rapid Support Forces (RSF). The RSF consists to a large extent of fighters from the notorious Janjaweed and follows the same patterns, for instance the burning and looting of villages which forces the civilian population to flee. The main differences between the two paramilitary groups are that the RSF is better organized, standing under the command of the National Intelligence and Security Services (NISS). The RSF also have the official support of the Sudanese government.

Negotiations: NO

Victory: NO

Terminated: NO

2015 Dyad Archive

Comment on Yearly Battle Related Deaths: The difference in the estimates of fatalities is due to difficulties to confirm the number of deaths on some occasions. It is worth mentioning that the extensive aerial bombardment by the government of villages and towns in both Darfur and South Kordofan is not coded as one-sided violence but rather as battle-related deaths in the state-based conflict between the Sudanese government and the SRF rebel group. The reason for this are the difficulties to ascertain that the intended targets were civilians and not military installations or possible rebel troops in that area, which is required in order to be categorized as one-sided violence.
Comment on Active: The governmental paramilitary force called the Rapid Support Forces (RSF) continued to be used by the Sudanese government to attack civilians in 2015. Regular army troops and Border Guards forces took part in the one-sided violence as well. The killing of civilians, often in combination with the burning and looting of villages were widespread during the year and the estimate of fatalities reached the highest level in ten years in Sudan. The government carried through one of its largest operations against the rebel group SRF in 2015 which most likely have had some impact on their use of one-sided violence against the civilian population, in an assumed effort to diminish the support to the rebels. The one-sided violence in 2015 was concentrated to the different parts of Darfur.

Terminated: NO

2016 Dyad Archive

Comment on Active: The Sudanese government continued to attack and kill civilians throughout the regions of Darfur, Kordofan and Blue Nile in 2016. The paramilitary governmental force called the Rapid Support Forces (RSF) perpetrated most of the one-sided violence, but regular army troops, Border Guards and the Popular Defence Forces (PDF) took part as well.

Terminated: NO

2017 Dyad Archive

Terminated: NO

2018 Dyad Archive

Terminated: NO

2019 Dyad Archive

Terminated: NO

2020 Dyad Archive

Terminated: NO

2021 Dyad Archive

Terminated: NO

2022 Dyad Archive

Terminated: NO

2023 Dyad Archive

Terminated: NO

2024 Dyad Archive

Terminated: NO

2025 Dyad Archive

Comment on Active: The Government of Sudan was active in 2025 as a one-sided actor due to deliberate killings of civilians carried out by government forces and affiliated actors in several parts of the country, particularly in areas recaptured from or contested with the Rapid Support Forces (RSF), which later became part of the Sudan Founding Alliance (SFA). In Gezira state, government troops and allied militias were implicated in widespread abuses against civilians, including extrajudicial killings, especially in communities accused of supporting opposition forces. Similar patterns were reported in Khartoum and Kordofan, where civilians were subjected to unlawful killings during government security operations. These acts reflected a broader pattern of repression against populations perceived as sympathetic to rival armed groups.

Terminated: NO