General information
Part of Conflict: India: Bodoland
Date of first stated goals of incompatibility: 1986-10-03
Comment on date of first stated goal of incompatibility: The NDFB was established in 1986 under the name Bodo Security Force. Its stated objective was to secure a sovereign Bodoland on the north bank of the river Bramhaputra. Some sources claim that the Bodo Security Force emerged out of a faction of ABSU that wanted to apply more brutal measures of extortion and violence to attain secession from India and form a separate state.
NDFBs main demands are 1) a separate country of Bodoland outside India and 2) Roman script in writing the Bodo language.
Date of first use of armed force: 1991-12-04
First Battle Related Death: 1992-10-08
Comment on First Battle Related Death: The first death can be earlier in attacks by BSF but the in 1992 NDFB reportedly killed 10 Indian security personnel.
Date when dyad reached 25 battle releated deaths: 1994-07-23
Comment on date when dyad reached 25 battle related deaths: The dyad reached 25 battle-related deaths in 1994 on July 23 when NDFB cadres attacked a relief camp in which many Muslim families had found shelter following weeks of Bodo-Muslim/Bengali ethnic violence. Police shot dead 10 NDFB attackers.
Conflict issues
Conflict Goal Issues: The National Democratic Front of Bodoland (NDFB) was a rebel group in the North-East of India in the region Assam who fought for an independent Bodoland. According to the UCDP, they were actively fighting from 1994-2004, but smaller activities were documented from as early as 1984 under the name Bodo Security Force. The NDFB’s main goal was Bodoland’s independence. Previously, the All Bodo Student Union fought for the same goal, but they signed a peace agreement with the government in 1993. The NDFB opposed this agreement and officially launched their insurgency in 1994. The NDFB feared that settlements from ethnic Indians and Bangladeshis would change the region’s demographic and would oppress the Bodos. In addition, many Bodos were Christians, so the NDFB also fought for language rights to be allowed to use the Roman script over the Devanagari script. Furthermore, the NDFB demanded that the Indian government would repay the Bodos for the revenues of the natural resources that the government took out of Assam. The NDFB called for economic reforms and that the government stop ignoring local development and would start improving the local public services. The main conflict goal issues of the NDFB were the wish for independence and the protection of their cultural and language rights.
Conflict Dynamics Issues: As mentioned before the NDFB feared that the Bodos were targeted by forced settlements from both India and Bangladesh. They called for the removal of Bangladeshi nationals, a decrease of Indian central government influence in the region, and the withdrawal of Indian military forces out of Assam. From the 2000s, the NDFB was willing to have talks with the Indian government, but only under the supervision of the United Nations. The main conflict dynamics issues of the NDFB were the removal of foreigners, mostly Bangladeshi nationals, and the decrease of Indian influence in the region, both from a government and military perspective.
Conflict Resolution Issues: Lastly, as previously mentioned, the NDFB opposed the peace agreement between the government of India and ABSU in 1993 as they wanted full independence of Bodoland. Later, they called for their own negotiations on their terms (in a foreign country under the supervision of the United Nations, discussing the matter of an independent Bodoland), for the implementation of the 1993 peace agreement, and called for a bilateral cease-fire. The main conflict resolution issues for the NDFB were the opposition to the 1993 peace agreement and the call for new negotiations.
Type of conflict issues: Conflict Dynamics Issues: Atrocities and abuses, DFI: Removal of foreigners, IFI: Foreign mediator
Conflict Resolution Issues: Call for ceasefire, Call for negotiations, Opposition to negotiations, Opposition to peace agreement, Peace agreement implementation, Structure of negotiations
Annual information
This section contains annual information systematically collected by the UCDP.
1986
| Estimated Fatalities | |
|---|---|
| High | 0 |
| Best | 0 |
| Low | 0 |
Secondary Warring Support:
Side A (Government of India): n/a
Side B (NDFB): n/a
1992
| Estimated Fatalities | |
|---|---|
| High | 14 |
| Best | 14 |
| Low | 8 |
Secondary Warring Support:
Side A (Government of India): n/a
Side B (NDFB): n/a
1993
| Estimated Fatalities | |
|---|---|
| High | 6 |
| Best | 6 |
| Low | 6 |
Secondary Warring Support:
Side A (Government of India): n/a
Side B (NDFB): n/a
1994
| Estimated Fatalities | |
|---|---|
| High | 36 |
| Best | 36 |
| Low | 36 |
Secondary Warring Support:
Side A (Government of India): n/a
Side B (NDFB): n/a
1995
| Estimated Fatalities | |
|---|---|
| High | 16 |
| Best | 16 |
| Low | 16 |
Secondary Warring Support:
Side A (Government of India): n/a
Side B (NDFB): n/a
1996
| Estimated Fatalities | |
|---|---|
| High | 27 |
| Best | 25 |
| Low | 25 |
Secondary Warring Support:
Side A (Government of India): n/a
Side B (NDFB): n/a
1997
| Estimated Fatalities | |
|---|---|
| High | 34 |
| Best | 34 |
| Low | 34 |
Secondary Warring Support:
Side A (Government of India): n/a
Side B (NDFB): n/a
1998
| Estimated Fatalities | |
|---|---|
| High | 31 |
| Best | 31 |
| Low | 31 |
Secondary Warring Support:
Side A (Government of India): n/a
Side B (NDFB): n/a
1999
| Estimated Fatalities | |
|---|---|
| High | 33 |
| Best | 33 |
| Low | 33 |
Secondary Warring Support:
Side A (Government of India): n/a
Side B (NDFB): n/a
2000
| Estimated Fatalities | |
|---|---|
| High | 24 |
| Best | 19 |
| Low | 18 |
Secondary Warring Support:
Side A (Government of India): n/a
Side B (NDFB): n/a
2001
| Estimated Fatalities | |
|---|---|
| High | 77 |
| Best | 77 |
| Low | 77 |
Secondary Warring Support:
Side A (Government of India): n/a
Side B (NDFB): n/a
2002
| Estimated Fatalities | |
|---|---|
| High | 44 |
| Best | 44 |
| Low | 44 |
Secondary Warring Support:
Side A (Government of India): n/a
Side B (NDFB): n/a
2003
| Estimated Fatalities | |
|---|---|
| High | 122 |
| Best | 109 |
| Low | 109 |
Secondary Warring Support:
Side A (Government of India): n/a
Side B (NDFB): n/a
2004
| Estimated Fatalities | |
|---|---|
| High | 27 |
| Best | 27 |
| Low | 27 |
Secondary Warring Support:
Side A (Government of India): n/a
Side B (NDFB): n/a
2005
| Estimated Fatalities | |
|---|---|
| High | 9 |
| Best | 9 |
| Low | 9 |
Secondary Warring Support:
Side A (Government of India): n/a
Side B (NDFB): n/a
2006
| Estimated Fatalities | |
|---|---|
| High | 10 |
| Best | 10 |
| Low | 10 |
Secondary Warring Support:
Side A (Government of India): n/a
Side B (NDFB): n/a
2007
| Estimated Fatalities | |
|---|---|
| High | 1 |
| Best | 1 |
| Low | 0 |
Secondary Warring Support:
Side A (Government of India): n/a
Side B (NDFB): n/a
2008
| Estimated Fatalities | |
|---|---|
| High | 7 |
| Best | 7 |
| Low | 7 |
Secondary Warring Support:
Side A (Government of India): n/a
Side B (NDFB): n/a
2009
| Estimated Fatalities | |
|---|---|
| High | 14 |
| Best | 13 |
| Low | 13 |
Secondary Warring Support:
Side A (Government of India): n/a
Side B (NDFB): n/a
2010
| Estimated Fatalities | |
|---|---|
| High | 0 |
| Best | 0 |
| Low | 0 |
Secondary Warring Support:
Side A (Government of India): n/a
Side B (NDFB): n/a
2011
| Estimated Fatalities | |
|---|---|
| High | 17 |
| Best | 17 |
| Low | 17 |
Secondary Warring Support:
Side A (Government of India): n/a
Side B (NDFB): n/a
2012
| Estimated Fatalities | |
|---|---|
| High | 0 |
| Best | 0 |
| Low | 0 |
Secondary Warring Support:
Side A (Government of India): n/a
Side B (NDFB): n/a
2014
| Estimated Fatalities | |
|---|---|
| High | 0 |
| Best | 0 |
| Low | 0 |
Secondary Warring Support:
Side A (Government of India): n/a
Side B (NDFB): n/a
2017
| Estimated Fatalities | |
|---|---|
| High | 0 |
| Best | 0 |
| Low | 0 |
Secondary Warring Support:
Side A (Government of India): n/a
Side B (NDFB): n/a
2018
| Estimated Fatalities | |
|---|---|
| High | 1 |
| Best | 1 |
| Low | 1 |
Secondary Warring Support:
Side A (Government of India): n/a
Side B (NDFB): n/a
Dyad Archive
This section contains annual information no longer systematically collected by the UCDP.
1986 Dyad Archive
Terminated: NO
1992 Dyad Archive
Negotiations: NO
Victory: NO
Terminated: NO
1993 Dyad Archive
Negotiations: NO
Victory: NO
Terminated: NO
1994 Dyad Archive
Comment on Yearly Battle Related Deaths: As in 1992 and 1993, the majority of BdSFs targets of violence were civilians. Systematic and deliberate attacks on the Muslim settlers in Bodo-inhabited areas claim the lives of over 200 people by 1 September 1994 and created approximately 50 000 refugees. Some reports indicate that this instigation of communal violence by the Bodo militants could be seen as a tactic to alter the demographic balance in the contested areas, to strengthen the Bodo demand for self-rule.
Comment on Active: Violence by the BdSF intensified in early 1994.
Negotiations: NO
Victory: NO
Terminated: NO
1995 Dyad Archive
Negotiations: NO
Comment on Negotiations: On 25 September the Chief Minister in Assam, Mr. Saikia, announced the intention to hold talks with the National Democratic Front of Bodoland, as well as with the other major rebel outfits in Assam, such as the ULFA, without any preconditions.
Victory: NO
Terminated: NO
1996 Dyad Archive
Comment on Yearly Battle Related Deaths: Low estimate: confirmed battle-related deaths within the dyad. The vast majority of casualties are civilians killed either in non-state violence between the Bodos and Santhal tribesmen approximately 200 casualties in 1996, or in one-sided violence by the Bodo militants against non-tribesmen.
Negotiations: NO
Victory: NO
Terminated: NO
1997 Dyad Archive
Negotiations: NO
Victory: NO
Terminated: NO
1998 Dyad Archive
Negotiations: NO
Victory: NO
Terminated: NO
1999 Dyad Archive
Negotiations: NO
Victory: NO
Terminated: NO
2000 Dyad Archive
Negotiations: NO
Victory: NO
Terminated: NO
2001 Dyad Archive
Negotiations: YES
Comment on Negotiations: Times of India 13.08.01, Reuters News Service: 16.09.01Tripartiate talks between the Union Government, State government and the NDFB were again held in New Dehli on 13 July 2001, but these were inconclusive with regard to regulating the incompatibility. The ceasefire between the government and the BLTF was again extended for four months on 15 September 2001, and there were discussions to include other parties, among them the NDFB, in the talks.
Victory: NO
Terminated: NO
2002 Dyad Archive
Negotiations: NO
Victory: NO
Terminated: NO
2003 Dyad Archive
Negotiations: NO
Victory: NO
Terminated: NO
2004 Dyad Archive
Comment on Active: A major offensive by the armed forces of Bhutan to expel foreign insurgents inflicted a major defeat on NDFB. Operation All Clear was launched in late 2003 and continued in early 2004. The Indian trained Bhutanese army was assisted by the Indian armed forces in the counterinsurgency operation.
Being forced out of Bhutan NDFB lost some of its important rebel hideouts. The outfit did however maintain its presence in the border areas of Myanmar and Bangladesh, and managed to recoup its forces during the first half of the year.
A marked escalation of rebel violence took place in early October, in what analysts said was an attempt to increase bargaining power ahead of peace moves. On 15 October the group announced a unilateral truce, lasting for six months, and pawned the way for negotiations in December.
Negotiations: YES
Comment on Negotiations: In September the National Democratic Front of Bodoland (NDFB) responded positively to the governments call for a ceasefire.
In early December it was reported that the Union government had entered into direct negotiations with NDFB, after the outfit itself opted to negotiate with New Delhi and not with the state government
Victory: NO
Terminated: YES
Type of termination: No or Low Activity
Date of termination: 2004-12-31
2005 Dyad Archive
Negotiations: YES
Comment on Negotiations: The unilateral ceasefire declared by the NDFB in 2004 continued to hold and was subsequently extended through the spring of 2005. After a reported six months of negotiations, on 25 May 2005 the Indian government and NDFB signed a one-year ceasefire pact. The pact required the rebels to disarm and stay in specially-appointed camps run by the police for protection from other militant groups that oppose a ceasefire. The accord also required militants to end guerrilla attacks and soldiers to respect the ceasefire. The pact specifies that it should be monitored by a committee of government officials and rebel leaders.
Victory: NO
Terminated: NO
2006 Dyad Archive
Comment on Active: The existing ceasefire which was due to expire on 31 March was extended during the 27 March talks for 6 months. There were some sporadic acts of violence and the NDFB and the government occasionally lobbed accusations that the other side was violating the ceasefire; the level of activity, however, remained under UCDPs 25 battle-death threshold for inclusion as an active conflict.
Negotiations: NO
Comment on Negotiations: The NDFB held its first round of talks with Delhi on 27 March, which was intended to focus on extending the ceasefire and which indeed resulted in a 6 month extension. The NDFB secretary general Govinda Basumatary asserted that they would not be "formal peace talks" and larger issues were not discussed. Reuters reported that the government wants the group to present a list of demands, a step the NDFB says it will take only if the status of the talks is upgraded to a political rather than merely "bureaucratic" level.
Victory: NO
Terminated: NO
2007 Dyad Archive
Comment on Active: With the exception of a single fatality, the ceasefire between NDFB and the government of India remained in place throughout 2007.
Negotiations: NO
Comment on Negotiations: No talks took place in 2007. The NDFB expressed its frustration and stated that no talks had taken place at the political level between India and the NDFB since the start of the ceasefire. The lack of progress is in part due to Indias charter of demands establishing preconditions to the initiation of negotiations which the NDFB refuses to submit to.
Victory: NO
Terminated: NO
2008 Dyad Archive
Comment on Active: The ceasefire between the government and NDFB was extended through 2008.
Negotiations: NO
Victory: NO
Terminated: NO
2009 Dyad Archive
Negotiations: YES
Comment on Negotiations: On 23 September 2009, tripartite talks were held between the Indian government, the local Assam government and NDFB. During the negotiations, the parties discussed NDFB’s charter of demands, which included the establishment of a separate Bodo state. However, the group had dropped the demand for a sovereign state, which had previously hampered negotiation attempts, and sought only autonomy within the Indian state. After the talks, NDFB general secretary Govinda Basumatary commented that "The first round of dialogue was satisfactory”.
Victory: NO
Terminated: NO
2010 Dyad Archive
Negotiations: NO
Comment on Negotiations: During 2010, the Union Government said it was ready to hold dialogue with two of the major insurgent groups in Assam -United Liberation Front of Assam (ULFA) and National Democratic Front of Bodoland (NDFB) - even if the anti-talk factions of the groups are opposed to it.
Victory: NO
Terminated: NO
2011 Dyad Archive
Negotiations: NO
Comment on Negotiations: During 2011, the Union Government decided to extend the ceasefire with NDFB-PTF. Also the NDFB-ATF, which is the same as NDFB-RD, had declared a unilateral indefinite ceasefire with effect from August.
Victory: NO
Terminated: NO
2012 Dyad Archive
Terminated: NO
2014 Dyad Archive
Negotiations: NO
Victory: NO
Terminated: NO
2017 Dyad Archive
Terminated: NO
2018 Dyad Archive
Terminated: NO
