General information
Part of Conflict: Angola: Cabinda
Date of first stated goals of incompatibility: 1975-11-11
Comment on date of first stated goal of incompatibility: On 25 July 1975, a faction of FLEC, which would later be named FLEC-FAC, announced the creation of a provisional revolutionary government of Cabinda, at a press conference in Paris. The stated aim of the new government was to liberate the enclave from foreign domination, organize free and democratic elections and installing a central government before independence, on 11 November.
Since Angola became an independent state on 11 November 1975, this date is used for the first stated goal of incompatibility.
Date of first use of armed force: 1975-11-11
Comment on date of first use of armed force: There were fighting between FLEC and MPLA troops throughout November. It is not clear, however, at what exact date, following independence on 11 November, the fighting started.
First Battle Related Death: 1989-08-04
Comment on First Battle Related Death: No reliable date for the first death in the FLEC-FAC dyad in the Cabindan Conflict can be found. The Portuguese news agency Lusa said the Front for the Liberation of the Enclave Cabinda (FLEC) issued a communique in the Zairean capital Kinshasa saying it launched the attack at Necuto, 90 km (55 miles) north of Cabinda town near the Zaire border. FLEC said its forces killed 118 government soldiers, took several prisoners and captured weapons and ammunition. Based on location, the faction responsible is probably FLEC-FAC, since they have their main base in neighbouring Buco Zau and are chiefly active in northern Cabinda, as opposed to FLEC-R whose main arena of operations is in southern Cabinda.
Date when dyad reached 25 battle releated deaths: 1992-12-31
Comment on date when dyad reached 25 battle related deaths: No reliable date for the first death in the FLEC-FAC dyad in the Cabindan Conflict can be found. Based on corroborating claimed deaths with refuge flows and other indicators of violence 1994 has been set as the first active year for FLEC-FAC in the Cabindan conflict. FLEC-FAC was active during the year in the Belize area. The group fought together with UNITA.
Conflict issues
Conflict Goal Issues: FLEC-FAC (Frente da Libertação do Enclave de Cabinda - Forças Armadas de Cabinda) was a rebel group in Angola’s exclave of Cabinda. The group stressed Cabinda’s identity, culture, and colonial history as distinct from that of Angola, which the group claimed illegally occupied the exclave after independence. Although the rebel group was first registered by the UCDP in 1975 when Angola became independent from Portugal, the first year in which FLEC-FAC’s conflict issues were coded was 1990. The first conflict goal issue pronounced by the group was a call for independence, stated by a group official: “We want the issue of the independence of Cabinda to be negotiated in Lisbon by the Portuguese government, the former colonial power and members of our movement.” The conflict goal issues have generally remained the same over time, centered around the group’s goal of independence. It has demanded a referendum for the Cabindan people in order to decide on the independence of the exclave, and has opposed elections as it considered these part of Angolan politics which Cabinda is not part of. While the group appeared to soften its stance on independence and briefly open up for autonomy, it later returned to its original goal of independence. FLEC-FAC’s main conflict goal issues were independence and referendum, demonstrated by their formulation as well as the long period of time during which they were called for, from 1990 to 2010. Demands for independence were coded in nine years and referendum in six years. In 2010 the group’s leader Henrique Tiago Nzita stated that “FLEC’s primary demand and reason for existing was the independence of Cabinda,” demonstrating the centrality of this goal. A 1991 statement reports that the group “demanded a referendum on self-determination for the enclave.”
Conflict Dynamics Issues: The first conflict dynamics issues were raised by the group in 1990, when it appealed to the former colonial power Portugal to involve itself in negotiations on the issue of Cabindan independence. Similar to FLEC-FAC’s continuous conflict goal of independence, the group’s conflict dynamics issues remained largely the same over time. In general, the group appealed for increased foreign involvement in the conflict through calling for foreign mediators, international monitoring as well as the use of foreign influence. The other conflict dynamics issues it has expressed have only been coded for one year each, during the early 2000s. These included an order for all foreigners to leave the exclave, an appeal to Portugal to send military forces into Cabinda to train Cabindan cadres, and a condemnation of the Angolan government for killing Cabindans. FLEC-FAC’s main conflict dynamics issues were IFI: Foreign mediator/facilitator, IFI: International monitoring and support, and IFI: Use of foreign influence. These three issues were consistently pronounced by the group, from 1990 to 2010. The call for a foreign mediator was often directed at the former colonial power, demonstrated by the statement “FLEC will only accept negotiations “mediated by Portugal”.” However, this request has also been directed towards the African Union and Nelson Mandela. The rebel group’s calls for international support have been with the purpose of overseeing a referendum on Cabindan independence in the early 1990s, and later to observe negotiations. Calling for use of foreign influence was coded when the group appealed to the international community to involve itself in the conflict in forms such as pressuring Angolan leaders: “Specifically, we would like Prime Minister Alkatiri to impress upon Mr Jose Eduardo dos Santos the need to talk to the representatives of the people of Cabinda.”
Conflict Resolution Issues: The first conflict resolution issues were also pronounced by the group in 1990, when it called for negotiations and demanded certain structures to those negotiations. These initial demands were for negotiations with Portugal on the topic of Cabindan independence, to be held in Lisbon. Similar to FLEC-FAC’s conflict goal and conflict dynamics issues, the group’s conflict resolution issues also generally remained the same over time. Calls for negotiations and demands for specific structures of those talks were pronounced from 1990 until 2010. The conflict resolution issue of calling for a ceasefire was coded for just one year, 2002. After a failed merge of FLEC-FAC and FLEC-R, the latter’s leader Antonio Bento Bembe became leader of the Cabinda Forum for Dialogue, a coalition including armed, civil society and religious groups. In 2006 Bembe signed a peace agreement with the government, which FLEC-FAC opposed as they did not consider Bembe to have the authority to sign a peace deal on behalf of Cabinda. FLEC-FAC’s main conflict resolution issues were call for negotiations and structure of negotiations. These issues were consistently called for from 1990 to 2010. The structure often concerns who is to be present at the talks and where they should be held. Nzita’s statement “We want real negotiations in the presence of the international community. Angola has to accept to negotiate with Cabindans, and FLEC is ready to negotiate with Angolans” demonstrates both of these issues, where he called for negotiations and for the international community to be present.
Type of conflict issues: Conflict Goal Issues: Autonomy, Independence, Law and order, Opposition to elections, Referendum, Revenues from natural resources
Conflict Dynamics Issues: Atrocities and abuses, Call for collective targeting: other group, DFI: Removal of foreign influence, DFI: Removal of foreigners, DFI: Withdrawal of military intervention/foreign forces, IFI: Foreign mediator, IFI: Humanitarian aid, IFI: International monitoring, IFI: Military intervention/foreign forces, IFI: Support from diasporas/foreign fighters, IFI: Use of foreign influence
Conflict Resolution Issues: Call for ceasefire, Call for negotiations, Structure of negotiations
Annual information
This section contains annual information systematically collected by the UCDP.
1975
| Estimated Fatalities | |
|---|---|
| High | 0 |
| Best | 0 |
| Low | 0 |
Secondary Warring Support:
Side A (Government of Angola): n/a
Side B (FLEC-FAC): n/a
1989
| Estimated Fatalities | |
|---|---|
| High | 83 |
| Best | 0 |
| Low | 0 |
Secondary Warring Support:
Side A (Government of Angola): n/a
Side B (FLEC-FAC): n/a
1992
| Estimated Fatalities | |
|---|---|
| High | 128 |
| Best | 25 |
| Low | 2 |
Secondary Warring Support:
Side A (Government of Angola): n/a
Side B (FLEC-FAC): n/a
1993
| Estimated Fatalities | |
|---|---|
| High | 0 |
| Best | 0 |
| Low | 0 |
Secondary Warring Support:
Side A (Government of Angola): n/a
Side B (FLEC-FAC): n/a
1994
| Estimated Fatalities | |
|---|---|
| High | 80 |
| Best | 25 |
| Low | 4 |
Secondary Warring Support:
Side A (Government of Angola): n/a
Side B (FLEC-FAC): n/a
1995
| Estimated Fatalities | |
|---|---|
| High | 87 |
| Best | 25 |
| Low | 3 |
Secondary Warring Support:
Side A (Government of Angola): n/a
Side B (FLEC-FAC): n/a
1996
| Estimated Fatalities | |
|---|---|
| High | 256 |
| Best | 29 |
| Low | 6 |
Secondary Warring Support:
Side A (Government of Angola): n/a
Side B (FLEC-FAC): n/a
1997
| Estimated Fatalities | |
|---|---|
| High | 28 |
| Best | 26 |
| Low | 2 |
Secondary Warring Support:
Side A (Government of Angola): n/a
Side B (FLEC-FAC): n/a
1998
| Estimated Fatalities | |
|---|---|
| High | 325 |
| Best | 25 |
| Low | 13 |
Secondary Warring Support:
Side A (Government of Angola): n/a
Side B (FLEC-FAC): n/a
1999
| Estimated Fatalities | |
|---|---|
| High | 4 |
| Best | 0 |
| Low | 0 |
Secondary Warring Support:
Side A (Government of Angola): n/a
Side B (FLEC-FAC): n/a
2000
| Estimated Fatalities | |
|---|---|
| High | 6 |
| Best | 5 |
| Low | 5 |
Secondary Warring Support:
Side A (Government of Angola): n/a
Side B (FLEC-FAC): n/a
2001
| Estimated Fatalities | |
|---|---|
| High | 29 |
| Best | 2 |
| Low | 2 |
Secondary Warring Support:
Side A (Government of Angola): n/a
Side B (FLEC-FAC): n/a
2002
| Estimated Fatalities | |
|---|---|
| High | 398 |
| Best | 31 |
| Low | 31 |
Secondary Warring Support:
Side A (Government of Angola): n/a
Side B (FLEC-FAC): n/a
2003
| Estimated Fatalities | |
|---|---|
| High | 146 |
| Best | 25 |
| Low | 22 |
Secondary Warring Support:
Side A (Government of Angola): n/a
Side B (FLEC-FAC): n/a
2004
| Estimated Fatalities | |
|---|---|
| High | 54 |
| Best | 25 |
| Low | 8 |
Secondary Warring Support:
Side A (Government of Angola): n/a
Side B (FLEC-FAC): n/a
2005
| Estimated Fatalities | |
|---|---|
| High | 36 |
| Best | 8 |
| Low | 8 |
Secondary Warring Support:
Side A (Government of Angola): n/a
Side B (FLEC-FAC): n/a
2006
| Estimated Fatalities | |
|---|---|
| High | 68 |
| Best | 3 |
| Low | 3 |
Secondary Warring Support:
Side A (Government of Angola): n/a
Side B (FLEC-FAC): n/a
2007
| Estimated Fatalities | |
|---|---|
| High | 110 |
| Best | 25 |
| Low | 0 |
Secondary Warring Support:
Side A (Government of Angola): n/a
Side B (FLEC-FAC): n/a
2008
| Estimated Fatalities | |
|---|---|
| High | 33 |
| Best | 8 |
| Low | 8 |
Secondary Warring Support:
Side A (Government of Angola): n/a
Side B (FLEC-FAC): n/a
2009
| Estimated Fatalities | |
|---|---|
| High | 66 |
| Best | 25 |
| Low | 1 |
Secondary Warring Support:
Side A (Government of Angola): n/a
Side B (FLEC-FAC): n/a
2010
| Estimated Fatalities | |
|---|---|
| High | 15 |
| Best | 5 |
| Low | 5 |
Secondary Warring Support:
Side A (Government of Angola): n/a
Side B (FLEC-FAC): n/a
2011
| Estimated Fatalities | |
|---|---|
| High | 4 |
| Best | 2 |
| Low | 2 |
Secondary Warring Support:
Side A (Government of Angola): n/a
Side B (FLEC-FAC): n/a
2012
| Estimated Fatalities | |
|---|---|
| High | 2 |
| Best | 2 |
| Low | 2 |
Secondary Warring Support:
Side A (Government of Angola): n/a
Side B (FLEC-FAC): n/a
2013
| Estimated Fatalities | |
|---|---|
| High | 0 |
| Best | 0 |
| Low | 0 |
Secondary Warring Support:
Side A (Government of Angola): n/a
Side B (FLEC-FAC): n/a
2014
| Estimated Fatalities | |
|---|---|
| High | 15 |
| Best | 0 |
| Low | 0 |
Secondary Warring Support:
Side A (Government of Angola): n/a
Side B (FLEC-FAC): n/a
2015
| Estimated Fatalities | |
|---|---|
| High | 6 |
| Best | 1 |
| Low | 1 |
Secondary Warring Support:
Side A (Government of Angola): n/a
Side B (FLEC-FAC): n/a
2016
| Estimated Fatalities | |
|---|---|
| High | 0 |
| Best | 0 |
| Low | 0 |
Secondary Warring Support:
Side A (Government of Angola): n/a
Side B (FLEC-FAC): n/a
2017
| Estimated Fatalities | |
|---|---|
| High | 0 |
| Best | 0 |
| Low | 0 |
Secondary Warring Support:
Side A (Government of Angola): n/a
Side B (FLEC-FAC): n/a
2018
| Estimated Fatalities | |
|---|---|
| High | 0 |
| Best | 0 |
| Low | 0 |
Secondary Warring Support:
Side A (Government of Angola): n/a
Side B (FLEC-FAC): n/a
2019
| Estimated Fatalities | |
|---|---|
| High | 3 |
| Best | 0 |
| Low | 0 |
Secondary Warring Support:
Side A (Government of Angola): n/a
Side B (FLEC-FAC): n/a
2020
| Estimated Fatalities | |
|---|---|
| High | 6 |
| Best | 0 |
| Low | 0 |
Secondary Warring Support:
Side A (Government of Angola): n/a
Side B (FLEC-FAC): n/a
2021
| Estimated Fatalities | |
|---|---|
| High | 0 |
| Best | 0 |
| Low | 0 |
Secondary Warring Support:
Side A (Government of Angola): n/a
Side B (FLEC-FAC): n/a
2022
| Estimated Fatalities | |
|---|---|
| High | 6 |
| Best | 0 |
| Low | 0 |
Secondary Warring Support:
Side A (Government of Angola): n/a
Side B (FLEC-FAC): n/a
2024
| Estimated Fatalities | |
|---|---|
| High | 0 |
| Best | 0 |
| Low | 0 |
Secondary Warring Support:
Side A (Government of Angola): n/a
Side B (FLEC-FAC): n/a
2025
| Estimated Fatalities | |
|---|---|
| High | 0 |
| Best | 0 |
| Low | 0 |
Secondary Warring Support:
Side A (Government of Angola): n/a
Side B (FLEC-FAC): n/a
Dyad Archive
This section contains annual information no longer systematically collected by the UCDP.
1975 Dyad Archive
Terminated: NO
1989 Dyad Archive
Terminated: NO
1992 Dyad Archive
Negotiations: NO
Victory: NO
Terminated: NO
1993 Dyad Archive
Terminated: NO
1994 Dyad Archive
Negotiations: YES
Comment on Negotiations: In February 1994, President dos Santos and FLEC-FAC leader Henriques Tiago NZita met face to face for the first time. They discussed a ceasefire to pave the way for negotiations on the future status of the province. No progress was made.
Victory: NO
Terminated: YES
Type of termination: No or Low Activity
Date of termination: 1994-12-31
1995 Dyad Archive
Negotiations: NO
Victory: NO
Terminated: NO
1996 Dyad Archive
Negotiations: YES
Comment on Negotiations: In May 1996, talks between the government and FLEC-FAC were held in Pointe-Noire, Congo-Brazzaville, and the parties initiated a ceasefire. Military delegations met in Libreville, Gabon, on 22 July the same year. The talks were to focus on a ceasefire and final conclusions, but FLEC-FAC refused to discuss either and instead suggested scaling down the hostilities. In response the government delegation unilaterally suspended the meeting.
Victory: NO
Terminated: NO
1997 Dyad Archive
Negotiations: NO
Comment on Negotiations: .
Victory: NO
Comment on Victory: .
Terminated: NO
1998 Dyad Archive
Negotiations: NO
Victory: NO
Terminated: YES
Type of termination: No or Low Activity
Date of termination: 1998-12-31
1999 Dyad Archive
Terminated: NO
2000 Dyad Archive
Negotiations: NO
Victory: NO
Terminated: NO
2001 Dyad Archive
Negotiations: NO
Victory: NO
Terminated: NO
2002 Dyad Archive
Negotiations: NO
Victory: NO
Terminated: YES
Type of termination: No or Low Activity
Date of termination: 2002-12-31
2003 Dyad Archive
Comment on Active: The dyad was most likely active in 2003, but there is missing information on number of battle-related deaths.
Negotiations: YES
Comment on Negotiations: On 9 January 2003, “exploratory talks” were held between the government and FLEC-FAC, in Paris, France. A FLEC-FAC representative argued that the talks had focused on putting an end to the war in the enclave and on the future status of Cabinda. According to the rebel source, these talks were held with the support of president Santos. The government proposal for a peaceful settlement had focused on options in which Cabinda remained part of Angolan territory, and did not include the option of independence for the enclave. The proposal had further suggested the inclusion of FLEC-FAC soldiers in the national army and an increased budget for the Cabinda province. The rebels had, however, supposedly dismissed the proposal, and later accused the government for “double dealing”, as it was argued that the government representatives had gone directly from the meeting with FLEC FAC to Gabon to offer the same deal to FLEC-R. A representative of the Angolan authorities later confirmed that there had been exploratory talks with the foreign mission of FLEC-FAC, and that these contacts had begun already in November 2002. On 19 February, the provincial governor of Cabinda announced to the FLEC-FAC that the government were soon to introduce a peace plan for the enclave. In response, a FLEC-FAC representative abroad announced that they welcomed such plan, adding that the organisation was no longer was seeking independence and would be willing to accept a statute of autonomy. A representative from FLEC-R however said he did not believe in the existence of such a plan. The plan failed to materialise during 2003. By the end of March a FLEC-FAC representative confirmed that additional contact had been made between various FLEC factions and the government, while admitting that the various factions were not acting as a united front On 4 April, the government announced that it was willing to consider a constitutional solution to Cabinda and that there had been talks on limited autonomy for Cabinda, although full independence had been ruled out. In July, the original leader of FLEC met with Angolan authorities in Luanda to conduct further “exploratory talks”.
Victory: NO
Terminated: NO
2004 Dyad Archive
Comment on Yearly Battle Related Deaths: Medias coverage of the Cabindan conflict is very limited. Most reports of battles come from either the government side or from the FLEC factions, and there are rarely any neutral sources confirming or denying these reports. Thus, summing up the number of battle-related deaths in any given year is a difficult task.
Years coded as active are the ones where the activity of the parties is high, where there are numerous reports of deaths and where the surrounding circumstances, e.g. statements made by Angolan government officials, commenting on the efficiency of the rebels or large flows of refugees, all point to a death toll above 25."
Comment on Active: In spite of statements from Angolan officials in late 2002 claiming that the rebels had been effectively defeated, separatist activities resurfaced in 2004. However, the rebels were substantially weakened by the onslaught from the Angolan government forces and did not have any permanent logistical bases, but were reduced to small roving groups of rebels with light weapons.
Negotiations: NO
Victory: NO
Terminated: YES
Type of termination: No or Low Activity
Date of termination: 2004-12-31
2005 Dyad Archive
Terminated: NO
2006 Dyad Archive
Terminated: NO
2007 Dyad Archive
Comment on Yearly Battle Related Deaths: Medias coverage of the Cabindan conflict is very limited. Most reports of battles come from the FLEC factions, and there are rarely any neutral sources confirming or denying these reports. Thus, summing up the number of battle-related deaths in any given year is a difficult task.
Due to this, the best estimate should not be interpreted as an exact number. Years coded as active are the ones where the activity of the parties is high, where there are numerous reports of deaths and where the surrounding circumstances, e.g. statements made by Angolan government officials, commenting on the efficiency of the rebels or large flows of refugees, all point to a death toll above 25"
Comment on Active: The indications of an escalation of the armed conflict that had emerged in 2006 further substantiated in 2007. FLEC-FAC representatives described in detail incidents resulting all in all in over 100 battle-related incidents during 2007. The killing of a Brazilian expatriate in a clash at the end of the year brought the fighting also to the attention of international media. Though credible, independent reports were lacking on most incidents, international analysts concluded that low-level fighting had occurred.
FLEC-FAC changed also the meaning of FLEC to Frente de Libertação do Estado de Cabinda, Front of the Liberation of the State of Cabinda. The group reorganised itself and officially substituted Bento Bembe as representative for FLEC for a possible dialogue with the Angolan authorities thereby illustrating the split between the two FLEC factions.
According to local human rights activists, the forces of FLEC-R that had been integrated into the Angolan army helped to persecute members of FLEC-FAC.
Negotiations: NO
Victory: NO
Terminated: YES
Type of termination: No or Low Activity
Date of termination: 2007-12-31
2008 Dyad Archive
Comment on Yearly Battle Related Deaths: There were no credible, neutral reports indicating that fighting in 2008 reached the threshold of 25 battle-related deaths. Meanwhile, there were numerous indications that fighting continued on a lower scale. The rebels reported several clashes with the Angolan Armed Forces (FAA) where they claimed to have killed government soldiers, although these reports could not be verified. Meanwhile, the government admitted that FLEC-FAC rebels continued to infiltrate Cabinda from the Democratic Republic of Congo, and maintained a strong military presence in the province. However, based on the available information, there is no sufficiently strong indication that fighting reached the threshold for inclusion, and the conflict is thus coded as inactive in 2008.
Comment on Active: There were no credible, neutral reports indicating that fighting between FLEC-FAC and the government in 2008 reached the threshold of 25 battle-related deaths. Meanwhile, there were numerous indications that fighting continued on a lower scale. The rebels reported several clashes with the Angolan Armed Forces (FAA) where they claimed to have killed government soldiers, although these reports could not be verified. Meanwhile, the government admitted that FLEC-FAC rebels continued to infiltrate Cabinda from the Democratic Republic of Congo, and continued to keep a strong military presence in the province.
In one confirmed event, three government soldiers and a Portuguese engineer were killed in March, and FLEC-FAC claimed responsibility for the attack. The rebels subsequently threatened to target foreign workers, who frequently rely on the FAA for protection. Former FLEC-R leader Antonio Bento Bembe, now a member of the government, claimed there was no longer an armed conflict in Cabinda and that any deaths there were the result of “banditry”. However, Raul Danda, a Member of Parliament and former Cabindan civil society activist, claimed there were still intermittent clashes between the rebels and the army, resulting in deaths on both sides. Similarly, international monitoring groups concluded that sporadic clashes continued, although there were no independent reports on the number of deaths.
Negotiations: NO
Comment on Negotiations: After FLEC-R signed a peace agreement with the government in 2006, FLEC-FAC was the only remaining active rebel group. While integration of former FLEC-R combatants into military and political positions continued in 2008, there were no reported attempts to negotiate with FLEC-FAC.
Victory: NO
Terminated: NO
2009 Dyad Archive
Comment on Yearly Battle Related Deaths: Media coverage of the Cabindan conflict is very limited, and most reports of battles come from FLEC–FAC without any confirmation from neutral sources. Thus, summing up the number of battle-related deaths in any given year is a difficult task. Years coded as active are the ones where the activity of the parties is high, where there are numerous reports of deaths and where the surrounding circumstances, e.g. statements made by Angolan government officials, commenting on the efficiency of the rebels or large flows of refugees, all point to a death toll above 25. In 2009, several neutral sources reported that sporadic clashes were ongoing and that the army maintained a strong presence in Cabinda. Furthermore, it was reported that the FAA stepped up its counterinsurgency operations in Cabinda in an attempt to flush out FLEC–FAC before the 2010 Africa Cup."
Comment on Active: In 2009, the FAA (Angolan Armed Forces) reportedly stepped up its counterinsurgency operations in Cabinda in an attempt to flush out FLEC–FAC before the 2010 Africa Cup. Angola was to host the soccer tournament, and some of the games would be played in Cabinda. Meanwhile, FLEC–FAC issued numerous statements claiming to have attacked and killed government soldiers. Attacks were also carried out against foreign workers in the province.
Negotiations: NO
Comment on Negotiations: No negotiations between FLEC–FAC and the government took place during 2009. Rumours of contacts between FLEC–FAC officials and government representatives were on several occasions denied by rebel leader N’Zita Tiago.
Victory: NO
Terminated: YES
Type of termination: No or Low Activity
Date of termination: 2009-12-31
2010 Dyad Archive
Comment on Active: Only two events were reported in the media taking place in Cabinda in 2010. Those two events together did not accumulate in 25 battle-related deaths, which is why the conflict is not considered active in 2010. While the conflict might have reached the 25 battle-related deaths threshold, due to limited reporting in media UCDP considers the conflict not active in 2010. For one of the two events (in which members of the Togolese national football team were killed) it remains unsure whether FLEC-FAC was behind the attack, or if it was FLEC-PM, a different faction of FLEC. Both have claimed responsibility for the event.
Negotiations: NO
Victory: NO
Terminated: NO
2011 Dyad Archive
Negotiations: NO
Victory: NO
Terminated: NO
2012 Dyad Archive
Comment on Active: 2012 was a calm year in the Cabinda enclave, FLEC FAC opened up to peace negotiations. The group did not claim any Angolan military deaths during the year but claimed that two FLEC FAC commanders were killed in assassinations by Angolan security forces.
Negotiations: NO
Comment on Negotiations: In 2012 FLEC-FAC asked for talks with the government following the August elections. The group nominated Khendhrah Silverbridge to begin peace talks and offered a unilateral ceasefire agreement. The Government did not respond to FLEC FAC's offer.
Victory: NO
Terminated: NO
2013 Dyad Archive
Terminated: NO
2014 Dyad Archive
Comment on Active: FLEC FAC continued to carry out sporadic guerrilla actions against the Angolan army in 2014.
Negotiations: NO
Victory: NO
Terminated: NO
2015 Dyad Archive
Comment on Active: Only a few ambushes was reported by FLEC FAC in 2015.
Negotiations: NO
Victory: NO
Terminated: NO
2016 Dyad Archive
Comment on Active: FLEC FAC claimed more attacks in 2016, including a high profile attack on an oil platform in May 2016. The former leader of the group, Henriques Tiago Nzita, died in June 2016 and his son took over the Nzita faction of FLEC FAC.
Negotiations: NO
Victory: NO
Terminated: NO
2017 Dyad Archive
Negotiations: NO
Victory: NO
Terminated: NO
2018 Dyad Archive
Terminated: NO
2019 Dyad Archive
Terminated: NO
2020 Dyad Archive
Terminated: NO
Type of termination: Not terminated
2021 Dyad Archive
Terminated: NO
2022 Dyad Archive
Terminated: NO
2024 Dyad Archive
Terminated: NO
2025 Dyad Archive
Terminated: NO