General information
Current Name: Government of Ghana
Current Name full English: Government of Ghana
Current Name full native language: n/a
Original Name: Government of Ghana
Original Name full English: Government of Ghana
Original Name full native language: n/a
Actor Chronology
This section contains information about (if applicable) group splinters, name changes, and alliances according to the UCDP definitions of these concepts.
UCDP has not recorded any Chronology Activities involving this group.
Conflict issues
Government of Somalia - Al-Shabaab
Conflict Goal Issues: Al-Shabaab is an Islamist rebel group who emerged in Somalia in 2007 aiming to expel Ethiopian troops residing in the country and establish an Islamic state. As The conflict began in the years where Ethiopia was in de-facto control of the Somali government, which is why early statements often are directed towards the Ethiopian government. In the year of its emergence, the group released one statement pertaining to the conflict goal issues of Al-Shabaab: “When we force Ethiopia to withdraw its troops from our country, its traitors will follow and the people will be able to embrace an Islamic government. Democracy is not right. They call it democracy when a man marries another man and a woman marries another woman. How can such things be allowed to happen?” From this statement, the project coded the group as calling for the creation of an anti-democratic Islamic state whereby gender rights would be heavily restrained.
As the conflict progressed, Al-Shabaab remained insistent in its desire to establish an Islamic state and to restrict gender rights and rights pertaining to sexuality. The emphasis on opposing democracy was, comparatively, decreased over the course of the conflict, although occasional statements were coded as indicating a continued anti-democracy position. The group also expressed resistance to elections toward the end of the conflict, although this was mostly based on allegations of corruption. Several new issues also emerged throughout the conflict. Al-Shabaab pronounced its intent to establish Sharia law and to protect the rights of Somalia’s Muslims following their anticipated rise to power. In combination with this, the group also called for law and order to be established, attempting to fight Somali street gangs, and called for economic reforms to occur, particularly regarding the distribution of wealth, alleging foreign forces of exploiting and looting Muslim civilians in the country. The project also continuously coded Al-Shabaab as expressing intent to restrict freedom of expression and religious rights of non-Muslim people.
The main conflict goal issues of Al-Shabaab were the creation of an Islamic state and the establishment of Sharia law, which was aimed to protect the rights of Muslims and restrict the rights of gender, religion, and freedom of expression. These issues were continuously coded and frequently mentioned by the group, receiving heavy emphasis throughout the entire conflict. Whilst issues of economic reform and law and order were also frequently coded, these received far less emphasis and continuity than changing the political and judicial system to be in-line with their Islamist ideals, which is why they are not coded as main conflict goal issues.
Conflict Dynamics Issues: During the year of its emergence, Al-Shabaab released two statements pertaining to the dynamics of the conflict. They called for the removal of Ethiopian forces in the land and threatened plans to attack military positions, as well as released allegations of atrocities being committed by Ethiopian forces: “They beheaded our children, women and elderly people in Mogadishu and we must behead theirs in Addis Ababa”.
As the conflict progressed, Al-Shabaab continued to emphasize the removal of foreign forces from Somalia heavily, and frequently mentioned abuses committed by Ethiopian and U.S. forces against Somali civilians. The group also began stating that civilians were intentionally targeted based on their ethnicity and religion, particularly towards the later stages of the coded conflict. Removal of foreign military forces was continuous, but the group also called for the withdrawal of financial support, international monitoring, military support, and political support toward the Ethiopian, U.S., and Somali government throughout the conflict. The question of foreign influence was also frequently raised, where Al-Shabaab continuously called for their population and leaders to resist the anti-Muslim pro-Western “pervasive ideological invasion as well as the military onslaught of the Western World […]”. Al-Shabaab continuously called for the support of its international diaspora and calling for the “Muslim youth around the world” to support the cause with both financial support and for them to join in the fighting in Somalia. Towards the later stages of the coded conflict, the group also called for actions of revenge, particularly emphasizing violence against ‘the Kuffar’ (non-believers) to be undertaken by supporters.
Throughout the conflict, the most heavily emphasized and continuously mentioned conflict dynamics issue was the Al-Shabaab’s calls for the removal of foreign forces from Somalia with threats of continued violence should they remain. This became a central characteristic of the group and was emphasized throughout the entire coded conflict. The removal of foreign influence also became a main issue when the transitional and, later, federal governments of Somalia were established. The calls upon the international Muslim diaspora also became a main issue for the group, as Al-Shabaab continuously called for financial and military support from the international community, particularly emphasizing sending foreign fighters to support the cause. Whilst frequently mentioned, accusations of atrocities being committed against civilians by foreign troops were rarely heavily emphasized and was mostly used as an argument for their main issues to be recognized, which is why the project did not code it as a main issue.
Conflict Resolution Issues: Occasional statements relating to conflict resolution were made throughout the conflict, calling for negotiations, issues regarding reintegration of militants, and calls for the enemy to admit wrongdoing all occurred in singular years. The project did, however, code Al-Shabaab as resisting negotiations continuously throughout the conflict. The issue of opposition to negotiations was also the main issue of Al-Shabaab in Somalia.
Type of conflict issues: Conflict Goal Issues: Blasphemy, Change economic system, Change judicial system, Childrens rights, Civil rights, Constitutional issues, Corruption, CPS: Islamic state, CPS: Opposition to democracy, Cultural rights, Destruction of cultural heritage, Economic reforms, Education system: increase religion, Electoral fraud, Executive power-sharing, Foreign policy reform, Freedom of association, Gender rights, Law and order, Opposition to elections, Opposition to federalism, Oust full executive, Religious rights, Restriction of children’s rights, Restriction of gender rights, Restrictions on freedom of expression, Restrictions on religious rights, Revenues from natural resources, Unification of states
Conflict Dynamics Issues: Atrocities and abuses, Call for collective targeting: religious, Collective targeting: ethnic, Collective targeting: religious, DFI: Removal of foreign influence, DFI: Removal of foreigners, DFI: Withdrawal of financial support, DFI: Withdrawal of humanitarian aid, DFI: Withdrawal of international monitoring, DFI: Withdrawal of military intervention/foreign forces, DFI: Withdrawal of military support, DFI: Withdrawal of political support, IFI: Financial support, IFI: Humanitarian aid, IFI: Political support, IFI: Support from diasporas/foreign fighters, Military conduct, Release of prisoners, Revenge/vengeance
Conflict Resolution Issues:
Call for negotiations, DDR issues, Opposition to negotiations, Recognition of wrongdoing, Structure of negotiations
Government of Sierra Leone - RUF
Conflict Goal Issues: The RUF (Revolutionary United Front) was an armed rebel group formed in 1991 with the pronounced conflict goals of ousting the ruling All Peoples Congress (APC) and reinstating a democratic multi-party-political system in Sierra Leone. The group did not officially advocate an explicit ideology or religion. Still, it was predominantly composed of members from the Temne ethnic group that opposed the hegemonic position of the primarily Mende incumbent regime in Sierra Leone.
The RUF claimed to fight for a diverse array of conflict goal issues. However, there exist distinctive patterns among the group's various concerns and demands. First, demands regarding democratic change and reintroducing a multi-party-political system in Sierra Leone were both the first issues communicated by the group and the most frequently stressed issues throughout the active years of conflict. Interlinked with the broader theme of democratic change were statements and demands regarding, for instance, civil rights, equal representation in state institutions, and freedom of expression. Second, the group emphasized various issues related to the unjust division of resources, such as the lack of public services, corruption, and inequality. Third, especially during the later years of activity, the RUF demanded reforms and alteration to the structure of state institutions. For instance, the group demanded the police, military forces, electoral process, and judicial system be reformed to represent the diversity of the Sierra Leonean society. While the RUF initially demanded the incumbent regime to step down and stated that the purpose of the movement was to destroy the APC, the group subsequently took a less definitive stance and primarily championed democratization, inclusive and enhanced public services, and reform of the state institutions. The RUF's 1995 manifesto Footpaths of Democracy reads, "The RUF/SL revolution is a democratic revolution whose aim is to create the enabling space for the democratic empowerment of the people."…." We are fighting for democracy and by democracy we mean equal opportunity and access to power to create wealth through free trade, commerce, agriculture, industry, science and technology."
Conflict Dynamics Issues: The project has been able to locate four conflict dynamics issues communicated by the RUF, which primarily concern various aspects of foreign involvement in the conflict. In 1992, the group's leader Foday Sankoh raised the conflict dynamics issues of unwanted foreign involvement and stated that the movement refused to consider a cease-fire or peace talks unless the Guinean and Nigerian troops withdrew from Sierra Leone. While the group's 1995 manifesto called on the UN, United States, and Britain to implement and monitor an arms embargo on Sierra leone, the manifesto also accused regional and international institutions and organizations of prolonging and exacerbating the civil war. A section of the 1995 manifesto reads, "In a successful guerrilla campaign, in the light of a full blown civil war, where the only source of strength and capability to engage the guerilla movement lies in external support and interests, the national capacity to resolve the conflict is removed by these very same external forces and interests. For it is their presence and contribution which prolong the civil conflict by ever confusing the balance of power on the ground.".
Besides the conflict dynamics issues related to foreign involvement, the group also stressed the release of Foday Sankoh after his imprisonment in 1997. The RUF gave an ultimatum in 1997 stating that they refused to disarm unless Sankoh is released and released a less definitive statement in 1999, saying that, "We do believe that an important first step to the process of the peace we are inaugurating would be the immediate and unconditional release of the RUF/SL leader, Cpl. Foday Saybana Sankoh."
The type and structure of foreign involvement in the country and the release of Foday Sankoh were the conflict dynamics issues that were the most emphasized and frequently referred to throughout the years of active conflict and can thereby be considered the RUF's primary conflict dynamics issues.
Conflict Resolution Issues: Analogous to the conflict dynamics issues, the project has located four interrelated conflict resolution issues raised by the RUF, which primarily concern various aspects of the structure, timing, and contents of negotiations. The first conflict resolution issue raised by the group was a call for negotiation in 1992. Foday Sankoh, the group's leader, called upon his adversaries to negotiate and provide relevant offers to achieve successful peace talks.
The group continued to raise concerns regarding negotiations and peace processes by demanding different mediators in 1996 and calling for cease-fires, negotiations, and the amnesty of its members in 1999. A 1999 communique by the group reads, "…it is now crystal clear that our conflict is essentially socio-political and cannot be resolved by military means but through genuine negotiation. It is in this regard that peace talks must be seen as an important first step in creating the necessary environment in which confidence-building and respect-restoring measures can be pursued and installed." Based on the general negotiations theme of the raised conflict resolution issues and emphasize by which they have been communicated, the call for and structure of negotiations can be considered the primary conflict resolution issues of the group.
Type of conflict issues: *Conflict Goal Issues: * Basic needs, Bureaucratic setup, Civil rights, Constitutional issues, Corruption, CPS: Democracy, CPS: Other/undefined system, Economic reforms, Electoral fraud, Electoral reform, Executive power-sharing: interim, Freedom of expression, Hold elections, Human rights, Labor rights, Oust full executive, Public services, Recognition as a political party, Reform judicial system, Restructure military forces, Restructure police forces, Revenues from natural resources
*Conflict Dynamics Issues: * DFI: Withdrawal of military intervention/foreign forces, DFI: Withdrawal of military support DFI: Withdrawal of political support, IFI: International monitoring, IFI: Sanctions, Release of prisoners, Return of refugees/IDPs
*Conflict Resolution Issues: * Amnesties, Call for ceasefire, Call for negotiations, Structure of negotiations
Government of Sierra Leone - AFRC
Conflict Goal Issues: The AFCR (Armed Forces Revolutionary Council) was an armed Sierra Leonean rebel group that was formed in May of 1997 by renegade military personnel from the Sierra Leonean army. Together with RUF (Revolutionary United Front), the AFRC managed to oust the government and rule the country from May of 1997 until Marsh of 1998, when forces loyal to the ousted president Kabbah regained control and the AFRC resumed its previous position as an oppositional rebel group. While the group was generally categorized as left-wing, the project has not located statements explicitly defining its ideology.
During the first year of activity, the group expressed various conflict goal issues, which can be categorized into two major themes – concerns about inequality and inept governance and the ousting of the incumbent regime. First, the AFRC accused the Sierra Leonean government of being corrupt, not providing sufficient public services, and not meeting the army's or the civilian population's basic needs. For instance, the AFRC chairman Paul Johnny Koroma stated that "the administration did not appear to be showing sensitivity to the lamentations of the stricken masses; politicians paraded in affluence as if to spite the populace that could not afford the basic necessities of life." Second, the AFRC demanded the ousting of the incumbent president Kabbah and claimed to be fighting for the reinstatement of electoral democracy in Sierra Leone. For instance, a 1997 communiqué by the group reads, "The Military Intervention of May 25, 1997 was the only cure to halt Kabbah, get the Peace Agreement back on course, make Sierra Leone a country devoid of Kamajors, of tribalism, set in motion machinery for an all-participatory democratic elections and then, return the country to a democratically elected civilian Government." While most of the conflict goals issues were stated during the group's inception and government take-over in 1991, the group also demanded to be included in the new government and integrated into the Sierra Leonean military forces following their loss of power and the reinstatement of President Kabbah in 1999.
Conclusively, the primary conflict goal issues raised by the AFRC during the active years between 1990 and 1993 were the corruption and inept governance of the incumbent regime, the ousting of President Kabbah and forming of inclusive democratic institutions and the inclusion of the group in the Sierra Leonean military following the reinstatement of Kabbah.
Conflict Dynamics Issues: The project did not locate any statements concerning conflict dynamics issues until the last year of activity in 1993, when three conflict dynamics issues were coded. In 1993, Mayor Johnny Paul Koroma of the AFRC demanded the government to release the jailed rebel leader Foday Sankoh and stated that the AFRC opposed the presence of Nigerian and ECOMOG (Economic Community of West African States Monitoring Group) forces in Sierra Leone. Conversely, Koroma also stated that the AFRC was in support of peacekeeping forces if they were under the umbrella of the UN. Conclusively, the AFRC primarily raised concerns pertaining to the type of foreign involvement in the country and the release of the rebel leader Foday Sankoh from prison.
Conflict Resolution Issues: The first conflict resolution issue raised by the AFRC was the demand for the implementation of the Abidjan Peace Agreement that was signed in 1997 between President Kabbah of Sierra Leone and the leader of RUF Foday Sankoh to end the protracted civil war. The AFRC stated that the only way to achieve this conflict resolution goal was through the use of force and the ousting of Kabbah and the incumbent regime.
In 1999 AFRC raised several conflict resolutions concerns. For instance, the group demanded benefits and compensation to its soldiers and their families, advocated bilateral disarmament, and demanded the structure of the ongoing negotiation to include the movement's leader Koroma as a key stakeholder. Based on the coded statements, the most emphasized and primary conflict resolution issues raised by the AFRC are the structure and timing of negotiations and disarmament processes and the provision of benefits and compensation to the group's soldiers, members, and supporters.
Type of conflict issues: *Conflict Goal Issues: * Basic needs, Corruption, CPS: Democracy, Electoral fraud, Executive power-sharing, Oust head of the executive, Public services, Security sector power-sharing
*Conflict Dynamics Issues: * DFI: Withdrawal of military intervention/foreign forces, IFI: Military intervention/foreign forces, Release of prisoners
*Conflict Resolution Issues: * Compensation/restoration, DDR issues, Peace agreement implementation
Government of Mali - CMA
Conflict Goal Issues: Coordination des Mouvements de l’Azawad, Coordination of Azawad Movements, (CMA), originally established as Mouvement national de libération de l'Azawad, National Movement for the Liberation of Azawad, (MNLA), was a Touareg secessionist rebel group fighting against the government of Mali to establish an independent state for the Touareg people in Northern Mali called Azawad. The group was established in 2011 as a coalition of returning Touareg people from Libya who had been trained under Gaddafi and remnants of earlier Malian groups such as the ATNMC and MLA. During the years of its establishment CMA, then MNLA, stated several conflict goal issues. The group stated its commitment to principles of democracy, sovereignty, and freedom of expression. CMA also called for independence from the Malian government for Azawad and the Sahara region but also stated that increased autonomy and self-rule would be “the least that we will now accept with the Malian Government.” The issue of independence was reemphasized as the conflict emerged in early 2012, and issues of civil and human rights, security, and corruption were also raised. In late 2012, the group implied its intentions to organize the Malian state structure as a confederation: “We are seeking cultural, political and economic independence but not secession”.
As the conflict progressed, the issue of autonomy began being emphasized again, emphasizing the right to self-governance and self-determination. This also came with allegations of government corruption and calls for executive power-sharing and the federalization of the Malian state to give more autonomy and power to regional governance structures. CMA also reemphasized its intentions to protect the civil and human rights of the people of Azawad and their access to public services and their own natural resources. In 2013, the group stated its intentions to liberate Azawad from poverty and to free it from the administration, which was interpreted as a call for ousting the government.
The main conflict goal issue of CMA was the issue of self-determination, independence, and autonomy. The group frequently varied in communications as to whether it fought for independence or only increased autonomy and self-rule throughout the conflict, which is why the main issue should only be considered increased regional autonomy for the people of Azawad.
Conflict Dynamics Issues: In 2011, CMA released statements calling upon the international community, especially the government of France, to use its influence to take its “full responsibility” and “to better guarantee peace and security as stipulated in international law.”, alluding to the responsibility to protect. In 2012, the group accused the Malian army of “abuse, torture, confiscation of property, perpetrated on the population” and called for the removal of foreign forces, influence, and civilians, stating that their presence “is a real threat and a source of insecurity for the people of Azawad”. The group also called for international investigations to be initiated into the Malian government and army for crimes against humanity.
As the conflict progressed, CMA continuously emphasized ethnically motivated atrocities and abuses against the people of Azawad by military and militia forces. Based on these abuses, the group also frequently called for international investigations, prosecutions, and monitoring missions to be initiated. CMA also began calling for foreign pressure to be applied onto the Malian government again, calling for it to “exercise its moral authority over Mali and uphold the basic principles of human rights in Azawad.” Towards the end of the conflict, CMA released statements calling for the release of political prisoners and prisoners of war detained by the Malian government, for humanitarian aid for the people of Azawad, and for the assistance from the international community, particularly ECOWAS, to assist in mediations with the government.
The main conflict dynamics issues of CMA were the continuously and frequently stated issue of abuses and atrocities against the civilian population in Azawad and the allegations that these were motivated by ethnicity. These issues were heavily emphasized throughout the entire duration of the coded conflict.
Conflict Resolution Issues: In 2011 and 2012, CMA called for negotiations with the government under supervision of the international community, called for the implementation of the Algiers agreement, a peace agreement which included the demilitarization of Azawad, and for recognition of wrongdoing as well as accountability for previous and current war crimes perpetrated by government forces.
As the conflict progressed, issues of accountability and prosecution, peace agreement implementation, calls for negotiations, and demands that negotiations be held under international supervision were continuously stated by CMA. In 2014, the group also called for truth and reconciliation processes to be implemented and for the Malian government to abide by an agreed upon ceasefire.
The main conflict resolution issues of CMA were calls for negotiations, statements pertaining to the structure of negotiations, and calls for the implementation of peace agreements. These issues were continuously and frequently mentioned with heavy emphasis throughout the entire conflict.
Type of conflict issues: The coded conflict issues for this group are: Conflict Goal Issues: Autonomy, Basic needs, Civil rights, Confederation/union, Corruption, Cultural rights, Electoral fraud, Executive power-sharing, Federalism, Freedom of expression, Freedom of movement, Human rights, Independence, Law and order, Oust full executive, Protection of natural resources/the environment, Public services, Rule of law
Conflict Dynamics Issues: Atrocities and abuses, Collective targeting: ethnic, DFI: Removal of foreign influence, DFI: Removal of foreigners, DFI: Withdrawal of military intervention/foreign forces, IFI: Foreign mediator, IFI: Humanitarian aid, IFI: International court/tribunal/investigation, IFI: International monitoring, IFI: Use of foreign influence, Military conduct, Release of prisoners, Return of refugees/IDPs
Conflict Resolution Issues:
Accountability/prosecution/investigation, Call for implementation/abiding to ceasefire, Call for negotiations, Call for truth and reconciliation processes, Peace agreement implementation, Recognition of wrongdoing, Structure of negotiations
Government of Mali - Ansar Dine
Conflict Goal Issues: Ansar Dine, also called Ansar al-Dine or the Defenders of the Faith, was a rebel group with its origins in the northern parts of Mali. Ansar Dine consisted mainly of Tuaregs and had a clear Islamist ideology based in Salafism and Wahhabism. The group emerged in 2011 and the first coded statement by the group was registered to late December of that year when the group’s leader Iyad Ag Ghali said that the group demanded the “implementation of Sharia”. As Ansar Dine involved itself in fighting the [Government of Mali]/#/actor/72) from 2012 and onwards, their conflict goal issues came to evolve, among other things, around the creation of an Islamic republic, the increased influence of religion on Mali’s education system and the attachment of Sharia law to the country’s constitution. However, throughout Ansar Dine’s years of actively fighting the Malian government its main conflict goal issue continuously was a change of the judicial system and the implementation of Sharia. Another conflict goal issue that received a lot of attention was Ansar Dine’s claim that the UNESCO world heritage mausoleums in Timbuktu were haram and therefore should be destroyed. Ansar Dine consequently demolished a number of the ancient Sufi shrines after it gained control of the area in 2012.
Conflict Dynamics Issues: The first issues raised by Ansar Dine in relation to conflict dynamics concerned the involvement of international organizations in the distribution of humanitarian aid in Mali. The group explained: “we only want [things] from Mali” in April 2012. The group referred to assaults and atrocities that had been carried out against the Muslim population as reasons for fighting [Mali’s government]/#/actor/72). The main statements coded as conflict dynamics issues regarded the wish to have a decreased level of foreign involvement in Mali. The call for the withdrawal of French, and other foreign military forces from the region, was especially emphasized throughout the duration of the conflict.
Conflict Resolution Issues: The conflict resolution issues raised by Ansar Dine were few and somewhat ambiguous in nature. During its first registered year of fighting the Malian government in 2012, the group expressed its readiness to “engage in a process of political dialogue”, and urged all other armed movements in the country to join them. However, a few years later in 2015, when a peace agreement had been signed in Mali, Ansar Dine criticized the deal and the groups that had signed it. No main conflict resolution issues could be identified due to the low number of registered issues.
Type of conflict issues: Conflict Goal Issues: Blasphemy, Change judicial system, Civil rights, Constitutional issues, CPS: Islamic state, Destruction of cultural heritage, Economic reforms, Education system: increase religion, Human rights, Law and order, Protection of cultural heritage, Restrictions on religious rights
Conflict Dynamics Issues: Atrocities and abuses, Collective targeting: religious, DFI: Removal of foreign influence, DFI: Withdrawal of humanitarian aid, DFI: Withdrawal of military intervention/foreign forces, IFI: Use of foreign influence, Return of refugees/IDPs
Conflict Resolution Issues: Call for negotiations, Opposition to peace agreement, Structure of negotiations
Government of Central African Republic - anti-Balaka
Conflict Goal Issues: Anti-Balaka, anti-sword/anti-machete, was a mostly Christian rebel group in the Central African Republic (CAR). The group consisted of many different sub-groups and emerged as an alliance of several militias and emerged in 2013 following the ousting of former President Francois Bozize in 2013. During the year of its emergence, anti-Balaka called for two conflict goal issues calling for President Michel Djotodia to be removed from office and stated that a government position constituted a precondition for the group’s surrender.
In its second, and final coded, year of existence, the anti-Balaka reiterated its intentions to oust President Djotodia from office. Although the group did not restate intentions to establish executive power-sharing with themselves in government position, issues of parliamentary and security sector power-sharing were raised, calling for the incorporation of anti-Balaka members into the legislative and military national structures. The group also began calling for the establishment of security and constitutional order as well as for the civil rights and access to public services of the Central African people to be respected. Finally, anti-Balaka also accused the government of economic corruption: “a leader supposed to lead the Central African state is suspected of embezzling a large sum of money at a critical time when the Central African people are shaving the wall”.
The main conflict goal issue for anti-Balaka was the ousting of President Djotodia and his cabinet from power. This issue was continuously stated with heavy emphasis and was frequently indicated by the group during its brief coded existence.
Conflict Dynamics Issues: During the year of its emergence, anti-Balaka raised issues of atrocities and abuses committed by another Central African rebel group, Seleka, against the civilian population. The group also called for the removal of foreigners, calling for the removal of “jihadists from Chad and Sudan”.
In the second coded year of conflict, the group did not explicitly reiterate either of these issues. Instead, anti-Balaka stated that its goal was “to save the country from Chadian and Sudanese forces that have taken the country hostage, and to defend the Christian population”, indicating issues of collective targeting from military forces and calls for the removal of foreign military forces. The group also called for the removal of foreign military support to the Central African government from Chad. Finally, anti-Balaka also initiated a campaign of ethnic cleansing against Muslim civilians in the areas it controlled, stating that: “We don’t want any more Muslims in our country.” No particular main conflict dynamics issue was interpreted as no issues were stated in both coded years.
Conflict Resolution Issues: The only interpreted conflict resolution issue expressed by anti-Balaka in 2013 was a statement calling for general amnesty as a precondition for its forces to surrender to the government. This issue was not reiterated in 2014, although several further issues were raised. The group called for negotiations to be established and a ceasefire to be initiated: “We don't want war anymore. We wish the Central African authorities a dialogue for a return to peace in the Central African Republic.” After this, anti-Balaka also called for compensation of losses suffered during the fighting, the establishment of a national reconciliation process, and for a process of disarmament, demobilization, and reintegration (DDR) to be initiated for combatants who wanted to reintegrate into Central African society. No main conflict resolution issue was interpreted for anti-Balaka.
Type of conflict issues: Conflict Goal Issues: Civil rights, Constitutional issues, Corruption, Executive power-sharing, Law and order, Oust head of the executive, Parliamentary power-sharing, Public services, Security sector power-sharing
Conflict Dynamics Issues: Atrocities and abuses, Call for collective targeting: religious, Collective targeting: religious, DFI: Removal of foreigners, DFI: Withdrawal of military intervention/foreign forces, DFI: Withdrawal of military support
Conflict Resolution Issues:
Amnesties, Call for ceasefire, Call for negotiations, Call for truth and reconciliation processes, Compensation/restoration, DDR issues
Government of Mali - MUJAO
Conflict Goal Issues: Mouvement pour le Tawhîd et du Jihad en Afrique de l'Ouest, Movement for Unity and Jihad in West Africa, (MUJAO) was an Islamist rebel group fighting against the governments of Mali and Algeria. MUJAO emerged as a splinter group from AQIM in 2011, accusing AQIM of having lost its devotion to Jihad and, possibly, of having focused too much on Algeria. As MUJAO were active in both Algeria and Mali, the group’s statements were frequently coded as pertaining to both conflicts. During 2011, MUJAO stated two conflict goal issues, calling for the establishment of Sharia law “across the whole of west Africa”, and protecting the religious rights of west-African Muslims.
As the conflict progressed, protecting the religious rights of west-African Muslims was not explicitly reiterated as a conflict goal issue for MUJAO although it continuously emphasized its intentions to establish Sharia law in Mali. The group also began calling for the establishment of an Islamic state and for gender rights and freedom of expression to be restricted. In 2012, MUJAO also stated its intentions to oust the Malian government and accusing the government of Mali of corruption. Finally, in 2013, MUJAO expressed its opposition toward Malian national elections and stating that voting places would be targeted by Mujahideen attacks.
The main conflict goal issue of MUJAO was the establishment of Sharia law in west Africa and, particularly, in Mali. This issue was continuously stated throughout the conflict and heavily emphasized for all its active years.
Conflict Dynamics Issues: Whilst no conflict dynamics issues were pronounced by MUJAO in 2011, the group stated three issues in 2012. The group called for two prisoners connected to the movement to be released, implicitly accused the government of committing atrocities stating it needed to cease its unwarranted barbaric acts, and called for “jihadists all over the world to head to the Sahel region ‘to fight the international troops which are preparing to intervene in the region militarily’.” No issues were stated in following years, which is why no main conflict dynamics issue was attributed to MUJAO.
Conflict Resolution Issues: MUJAO stated no conflict resolution issues in the first year of conflict, but in 2012 the group stated its readiness to engage in negotiations with the government, although it stated it would rather negotiate with “Mali’s Higher Islamic Council (HIC) on behalf of the government.” Later in the year, however, MUJAO changed its position stating that “there is no negotiation to be had” as the group did not recognize the Malian government.
Type of conflict issues: Conflict Goal Issues: Change judicial system, Corruption, CPS: Islamic state, Opposition to elections, Oust full executive, Religious rights, Restriction of gender rights, Restrictions on freedom of expression
Conflict Dynamics Issues: Atrocities and abuses, DFI: Removal of foreign influence, IFI: Support from diasporas/foreign fighters, Release of prisoners
Conflict Resolution Issues:
Call for negotiations, Opposition to negotiations, Structure of negotiations
Government of Mali - AQIM
Conflict Goal Issues: Qaida al-Jihad fi Bilad al-Maghrib al-Islami, al-Qaida Organisation in the Islamic Maghreb (AQIM) was an Islamist rebel group that splintered from the GIA in 1998. The group emerged in Algeria in 1998 under the name Groupe salafiste pour la prédication et le combat (GSPC) although the group also became active in conflict with the governments of Mauritania and Mali in 2008 and 2009, respectively. The group also fought against the government of Tunisia, although no specific separate conflict issues were interpreted during that conflict, and its explicitly stated aim was to establish an Islamic state in the Maghreb region of Northern Africa. AQIM’s first stated conflict goal issue was interpreted in 2007, when the group stated its intent to oust the government’s of the Maghreb region. In 2008, AQIM reiterated this intention with accusations of government corruption, and also called for the establishment of Sharia law in Mali.
In 2016, the group reiterated its intentions to oust the Malian government and establish Sharia law, and also introduced calls for establishing an Islamic state to protect the religious rights of Malian Muslims.
The main conflict goal issue for AQIM in Mali was the ousting of the Malian government. This issue was continuously stated throughout the conflict with heavy emphasis.
Conflict Dynamics Issues: In 2007, AQIM stated its intentions to collectively target non-Muslim civilians and took accountability for an attack against French and Spanish civilians in the region. In 2008, the group also called for the removal of French and Spanish influence over the governments of the Maghreb region.
As the conflict emerged in Mali, removal of foreign influence was only reiterated in 2016 and calls for collective targeting were not explicitly restated. Instead, the group began calling for the expulsion of foreign military forces both in Mali and Maghreb, but also in Afghanistan in 2010. On singular instances, AQIM also accused the Malian government and foreign forces of committing human rights abuses against Islamists, called for the release of prisoners of war, and called for revenge against government forces.
The main conflict dynamics issues for AQIM in Mali was the withdrawal of foreign forces, as this issue was continuously stated and often heavily emphasized.
Conflict Resolution Issues: The project coded no statements from AQIM in Mali pertaining to conflict resolution issues.
Type of conflict issues: The coded conflict issues for this group are: Conflict Goal Issues: Change judicial system, Corruption, CPS: Islamic state, Oust full executive, Religious rights
Conflict Dynamics Issues: Atrocities and abuses, Call for collective targeting: ethnic, DFI: Removal of foreign influence, DFI: Withdrawal of military intervention/foreign forces, DFI: Withdrawal of military support, Release of prisoners, Revenge/vengeance
Conflict Resolution Issues:
Government of Mali - Signed-in-Blood Battalion
Conflict Goal Issues: The Signed-in-Blood Battalion was an Islamist rebel group fighting against the government of Mali to establish Sharia law in Northern Mali and establish Malian independence from foreign forces. The group emerged as a splinter group of the al-Qaida Organisation in the Islamic Maghreb (AQIM) in 2012, and they merged with Mouvement pour le Tawhîd et du Jihad en Afrique de l'Ouest (MUJAO) to establish al-Murabitun in 2013. During its brief existence, the Signed-in-Blood Battalion expressed one conflict goals issue, when it in 2012 stated its intent to “consolidate shari’ah in northern Mali.” As the only expressed conflict goal issue, change of the judicial system is also considered the main goal issue of the Signed-in-Blood Battalion.
Conflict Dynamics Issues: The Signed-in-Blood Battalion stated several conflict dynamics issues during its brief existence. In 2012, the group called for foreign influence to be removed, stating that any foreign intervention would be considered oppression and aggression. During this time, they also called upon Malian and Muslim diaspora and imams to aid the group in its cause. In 2013, they released one statement which called for the withdrawal of French forces from Malian territory, and for the release of people connected to the group. As no issues were stated with continuity, no main conflict dynamics issues were attributed to the group.
Conflict Resolution Issues: The project coded no statements from the Signed-in-Blood Battalion pertaining to conflict resolution issues.
Type of conflict issues: The coded conflict issues for this group are: Conflict Goal Issues: Change judicial system
Conflict Dynamics Issues: DFI: Removal of foreign influence, DFI: Withdrawal of military intervention/foreign forces, IFI: Support from diasporas/foreign fighters, Release of prisoners
Conflict Resolution Issues:
Government of Mali - al-Murabitun
Conflict Goal Issues: Al-Murabitun was an Islamist rebel group who emerged in Mali as a merger of the Movement for Tawhid and Jihad in West Africa (MUJAO) and the Signed-in-Blood Battalion. The group was created in 2013 with the intent of establishing an Islamic state and engaging in resistance towards the “Zionist movement”. During its first year, al-Murabitun pronounced two conflict goal issues, the establishment of an Islamic State in Mali and the intent to protect Muslims from blasphemous acts.
The group was only coded as pronouncing one more conflict goal issue when, in 2015, the group’s leader Mokhtar Belmokhtar noted an attack as being a reprisal against “the heathen West which has offended our prophet”.
As the salience criterion of continuity and frequency cannot be measured from al-Murabitun, no main conflict goal issue was interpreted for the group.
Conflict Dynamics Issues: During the year of al-Murabitun’s emergence, the project coded the group as calling for the withdrawal of French forces in the region, stating that “The jihadist movement in the region was now ‘stronger than ever’”. The group also mentioned several attacks against civilians internationally and within Mali, alleging that they were motivated by the victim’s Muslim faith.
As the conflict progressed, al-Murabitun reemphasized its intent to expel the French forces from Mali but did not mention the issue of collective targeting again. The group did, however, call attention to an incident in Northern Mali in 2014 where they accused the French military of killing “peaceful children, women and old men”. Al-Murabitun also called for the support of the international diaspora and Mujahideen to support the group, for the release of political prisoners, and stated that an attack on French forces in Mali was a reprisal for a previous attack.
The only continuously coded conflict dynamics issue for al-Murabitun was the call for French forces to be withdrawn, which was also heavily emphasized by the group and should be considered its main conflict dynamics issues.
Conflict Resolution Issues: The project coded no statements from al-Murabitun pertaining to conflict resolution issues.
Type of conflict issues: Conflict Goal Issues: Blasphemy, CPS: Islamic state
Conflict Dynamics Issues: Atrocities and abuses, Collective targeting: ethnic, DFI: Withdrawal of military intervention/foreign forces, IFI: Support from diasporas/foreign fighters, Release of prisoners, Revenge/vengeance
Conflict Resolution Issues:
Government of Mali - JNIM
Conflict Goal Issues: Jamaat Nusrat al-Islam wal-Muslimin, Group for the Support of Islam and Muslims (JNIM) emerged as an Islamist rebel group following a merger of several jihadist groups. The rebel group was created in 2017, during which it stated one conflict goal issue. The group declared its intent to alter the judicial system as it considered the Mauritian government to not “rule according [to] Islamic Sharia law and it supported ‘Christian’ France against the mujahidin in Mali.” Essentially, the group’s first announced conflict goal was to establish Sharia law in Mali and declared opposition to those who resisted it.
During 2018, JNIM reaffirmed its intent to establish Sharia law in Mali but also expressed its opposition to the Malian elections, stating that the only solution to French occupation was jihad.
The main conflict goal issue of JNIM was the establishment of Sharia law in Mali.
Conflict Dynamics Issues: During its first year, JNIM accused the combined forces of France and Mali of conducting operations which resulted in the killing, arrest, and displacement of innocent Muslims. Based on this, JNIM called upon the French military to withdraw their military, and threatened revenge upon the French military and its allies for “killing its [JNIM’s] militants”.
In the following year, JNIM accused the French military to have conducted massacres against Muslims in Mali. This, once again, caused the group to call for withdrawal of French troops, stating that “war between us will not end until the last soldier from the soldiers of Crusader France evacuate the Muslim land of Mali”. During the second year the JNIM also called upon its diaspora community to assist their cause.
The main conflict dynamics issue of JNIM was the issue of atrocities against civilians and the withdrawal of foreign forces from Mali.
Conflict Resolution Issues: The project coded no statements from JNIM pertaining to conflict resolution issues.
Type of conflict issues: Conflict Goal Issues: Change judicial system, Opposition to elections
Conflict Dynamics Issues: Atrocities and abuses, DFI: Withdrawal of military intervention/foreign forces, IFI: Support from diasporas/foreign fighters, Revenge/vengeance
Conflict Resolution Issues:
Government of Mali - IS
Conflict Goal Issues: Islamic State, al-Dawla al-Islamiya, (IS) was a Salafist-Sunni Islamist global rebel group that emerged in Iraq and Syria in 2004. The group originally emerged with the goals of toppling the Iraqi regime and replacing the government with an Islamic state with Sharia law as well as ousting the occupying forces currently residing in the country, but its goals drastically shifted as it grew in size to wish to establish a global Islamic caliphate governed by Sharia law. Whilst the group was international for the majority of its existence, IS is considered a rebel group involved in several dyads as the group fought against, and attempted to overthrow, several individual governments as part of its international aims, and has been coded as such. However, many IS statements were not pertaining to specific countries, and the project has, hence, chosen to code them as pertaining to all countries with significant IS presence. Finally, whilst various groups have claimed allyship and adherence to IS, only statements from official IS groups have been coded by the project as legitimate sources for interpreting conflict issues. IS officially emerged in Mali in 2016, following the recognition of the Islamic State Greater Sahara (ISGS) as a legitimate faction of the group. During this year, the group made one statement pertaining to conflict goals when it stated its allegiance to the IS and their intentions to establish an Islamic state in Mali, aiming to incorporate it into the greater Islamic Caliphate.
Conflict Dynamics Issues: In the year prior to its recognition, when the group was created in 2015 the ISGS released a statement calling upon “all the jihadi groups to pledge allegiance to the Caliph, to unify the word of the Muslims and align the ranks in front of the enemies of religion”. This was the only statement interpreted by IS in Mali regarding conflict dynamics issues.
Conflict Resolution Issues: The project coded no statements from IS in Mali pertaining to conflict resolution issues.
Type of conflict issues: The coded conflict issues for this group are: Conflict Goal Issues: CPS: Islamic state
Conflict Dynamics Issues: IFI: Support from diasporas/foreign fighters
Conflict Resolution Issues:
Annual information
This section contains annual information systematically collected by the UCDP.
1981
Actor Active in Dyad(s):
Government of Ghana - Military faction (forces of Jerry John Rawlings)
1983
Actor Active in Dyad(s):
Government of Ghana - Military faction (forces of Ekow Dennis and Edward Adjei-Ampofo)
Group Archive
This section contains annual information no longer systematically collected by the UCDP.
1981 Group Archive
Government of Ghana - Military faction (forces of Jerry John Rawlings)
Troop Size: 9 000
1983 Group Archive
Government of Ghana - Military faction (forces of Ekow Dennis and Edward Adjei-Ampofo)
Troop Size: 8 000
