General information
Part of Conflict: India: Kashmir
Date of first stated goals of incompatibility: 1977-05-29
Comment on date of first stated goal of incompatibility: JKLF (Jammu and Kashmir Liberation Front) was established on 29 May 1977 in the UK, with the basis in an already existing undergroud militant network based in the UK. The primary aim of the group was "to struggle against foreign occupation, gain independence and attain an honourable position amongst free nations of the world."
Date of first use of armed force: 1984-02-03
Comment on date of first use of armed force: Even before the establishment of JKLF in 1977 its leaders, under other banners, had participated in violent activities, such as the highjacking of an Indian airplane in 1971. In the 70s and early 80s, the UK based JKLF was mainly confined to agitation on the political and diplomatic front. The first use of armed force by JKLF members that can be separately confirmed was the kidnapping of "Indian Deputy High Commissioner in Birmingham" Mr. Mahtre, on 3 February 1984. The kidnappers demanded the release of one of the co-founders of JKLF, Mr. Butt. The demand was turned down and on 6 February Mr. Mahtre was killed.
The armed struggle was, according to JKLF's own historical account, launched on 31 July 1988 with two bomb-blasts in the city of Srinagar.
First Battle Related Death: 1984-02-06
Comment on First Battle Related Death: The first battle related death in the conflict that can be separately confirmed was the kidnapping and subsequent killing of "Deputy High Comissioner in Birmingham" Mr Mahtre, on 6 February 1984. The kidnappers originally demanded the release from jail of one of the co-founders of JKLF, Mr Butt. When the demand was turned down, Mr Mahtre was killed.
Date when dyad reached 25 battle releated deaths: 1990-02-12
Comment on date when dyad reached 25 battle related deaths: It is difficult to find reports on the separate incidents of violence in the early phases of the conflict. By 12 February 1990, over 100 people had been killed in clashes in Jammu and Kashmir state.
Conflict issues
Conflict Goal Issues: Kashmir insurgents refers to a wide range of actors with approximately 150 groups included under the label. As a result, actor characteristics and issues are not necessarily universally shared across all groups. Even the overarching goal of secession from India, a goal shared across all groups, could entail the vastly different outcomes of irredentism or independence. The Kashmir insurgents are characterized by an Islamist ideology and in some cases by Kashmir nationalism. The first coded conflict goal issue was expressed by JKLF in 1977 in support of independence. The group stated their mission to be “to struggle against foreign occupation, gain independence and attain an honourable position amongst free nations of the world”. For the most part, this goal remained intact throughout the conflict however there were significant differences between the different groups. While some groups, notably JKLF, repeatedly stated an aspiration for independence, while others, like the Hizbul Mujahideen (HM), wished for Kashmir to instead become a part of Pakistan. Based upon the conflict goal issues located and coded by the project, the main conflict goal issues for the Kashmir insurgents were independence and irredentism. These two issues, while being conflicting and irreconcilable, are given the most emphasis and represent the core goals of the different rebel groups under that are operating under the umbrella of Kashmir insurgents.
Conflict Dynamics Issues: The first conflict dynamics issue coded by the project was in 1984 concerning the release of prisoners. In a letter sent to a London news agency, JKLF declared that they had kidnapped and an Indian diplomat and threatened to kill him unless the Indian government agreed to free several prisoners, including Mohammad Maqbool Butt who had been sentenced to death. Owing in large part to differences between the various rebel groups counted among the Kashmir insurgents, there are inconsistencies which makes it difficult to track the evolution of conflict dynamics issues. This divide more or less coincided with the individual groups’ relationship to Pakistan and their stance on independence or irredentism. For example, while JKLF issued a statement in 1997 that “all armed forces and civil personnel of India and Pakistan (should) be withdrawn from the state and all militants disarmed”, the United Jehad Council stated in 1999 that “Pakistan was morally and legally bound to provide us (the militants) with military support....”. Consequently, while some groups only sought increased foreign involvement in the context of UN action, by holding referendum under the auspices of the UN or requesting the presence of UN peacekeepers, others sought help calling on Pakistan or other Islamic nations. The principal conflict dynamics issue was atrocities and abuses, increased foreign involvement by having foreign actors use their influence and decreased foreign involvement with the withdrawal of Indian, and depending on the group Pakistani, military forces. These issues were all frequently, continuously raised by a range of different groups albeit with some variation regarding the specificities of exactly what kind of foreign involvement should be increased or decreased, usually in relation to Pakistan. Atrocities and abuses were raised early on by JKLF and continued to be raised many times over the course of the conflict by a range of different groups. Accusation of abuses include that of custodial killings, torture, rape, and mass killings of innocents. JKLF commented on the issue in 1993, stating that “the United Nations has been acting in a way that gives full licence to India to go ahead with a genocide of Kashmiris”.
Conflict Resolution Issues: The first conflict resolution issue located by the project was a 1992 call for negotiation issued by the JKLF. The group explained that the fighting was meant to force India to engage in talks and stated that “We know we cannot drive India out”. Many of the prominent factions among the Kashmir insurgents regularly called for negotiations. While they also voiced opposition to negotiations at times, such objections for the most part arose from a perceived lack of seriousness and willingness to engage rather than as a blanket objection against, or unwillingness to partake in, negotiations at all. While there were overall few issues raised, calls for negotiations was by far the issue raised most frequently among the conflict resolution issues throughout the conflict. Another frequently raised issue was the exact structure of negotiations. This issue often concerned the inclusion of Pakistan in negotiations.
Type of conflict issues: Conflict Goal Issues: Autonomy, Blasphemy, Change economic system, Change judicial system, Civil rights, Constitutional issues, CPS: Democracy, CPS: Islamic state, Cultural rights, Decentralization, Education system: increase religion, Executive power-sharing, Executive power-sharing: interim, Federalism, Foreign policy reform, Freedom of association, Freedom of expression, Hold elections, Independence, Irredentism, Law and order, Opposition to elections, Protection of cultural heritage, Public services, Referendum, Reform judicial system, Religious rights, Restriction of gender rights, Restrictions on freedom of expression, Restrictions on religious rights
Conflict Dynamics Issues: Atrocities and abuses, Call for collective targeting: political, DFI: Removal of foreign influence, DFI: Removal of foreigners, DFI: Withdrawal of military intervention/foreign forces, DFI: Withdrawal of political support, DFI: Withdrawal of sanctions, IFI: Foreign mediator, IFI: International court/tribunal/investigation, IFI: International monitoring, IFI: Military intervention/foreign forces, IFI: Military support, IFI: Political support, IFI: Use of foreign influence, Military conduct, Release of prisoners
Conflict Resolution Issues: Accountability/prosecution/investigation, Call for ceasefire, Call for implementation/abiding to ceasefire, Call for negotiations, Opposition to negotiations, Opposition to peace agreement, Structure of negotiations
Annual information
This section contains annual information systematically collected by the UCDP.
1977
| Estimated Fatalities | |
|---|---|
| High | 0 |
| Best | 0 |
| Low | 0 |
Secondary Warring Support:
Side A (Government of India): n/a
Side B (Kashmir insurgents): n/a
1984
| Estimated Fatalities | |
|---|---|
| High | 1 |
| Best | 1 |
| Low | 1 |
Secondary Warring Support:
Side A (Government of India): n/a
Side B (Kashmir insurgents): n/a
1989
| Estimated Fatalities | |
|---|---|
| High | 19 |
| Best | 19 |
| Low | 7 |
Secondary Warring Support:
Side A (Government of India): n/a
Side B (Kashmir insurgents): n/a
1990
| Estimated Fatalities | |
|---|---|
| High | 703 |
| Best | 474 |
| Low | 452 |
Secondary Warring Support:
Side A (Government of India): n/a
Side B (Kashmir insurgents): n/a
1991
| Estimated Fatalities | |
|---|---|
| High | 551 |
| Best | 330 |
| Low | 330 |
Secondary Warring Support:
Side A (Government of India): n/a
Side B (Kashmir insurgents): n/a
1992
| Estimated Fatalities | |
|---|---|
| High | 337 |
| Best | 265 |
| Low | 265 |
Secondary Warring Support:
Side A (Government of India): n/a
Side B (Kashmir insurgents): n/a
1993
| Estimated Fatalities | |
|---|---|
| High | 1159 |
| Best | 846 |
| Low | 845 |
Secondary Warring Support:
Side A (Government of India): n/a
Side B (Kashmir insurgents): n/a
1994
| Estimated Fatalities | |
|---|---|
| High | 1148 |
| Best | 958 |
| Low | 955 |
Secondary Warring Support:
Side A (Government of India): n/a
Side B (Kashmir insurgents): n/a
1995
| Estimated Fatalities | |
|---|---|
| High | 894 |
| Best | 687 |
| Low | 687 |
Secondary Warring Support:
Side A (Government of India): n/a
Side B (Kashmir insurgents): n/a
1996
| Estimated Fatalities | |
|---|---|
| High | 1232 |
| Best | 489 |
| Low | 489 |
Secondary Warring Support:
Side A (Government of India): n/a
Side B (Kashmir insurgents): n/a
1997
| Estimated Fatalities | |
|---|---|
| High | 555 |
| Best | 533 |
| Low | 533 |
Secondary Warring Support:
Side A (Government of India): n/a
Side B (Kashmir insurgents): n/a
1998
| Estimated Fatalities | |
|---|---|
| High | 701 |
| Best | 576 |
| Low | 576 |
Secondary Warring Support:
Side A (Government of India): n/a
Side B (Kashmir insurgents): n/a
1999
| Estimated Fatalities | |
|---|---|
| High | 883 |
| Best | 864 |
| Low | 844 |
Secondary Warring Support:
Side A (Government of India): n/a
Side B (Kashmir insurgents): n/a
2000
| Estimated Fatalities | |
|---|---|
| High | 2422 |
| Best | 2356 |
| Low | 2330 |
Secondary Warring Support:
Side A (Government of India): n/a
Side B (Kashmir insurgents): n/a
2001
| Estimated Fatalities | |
|---|---|
| High | 3644 |
| Best | 893 |
| Low | 817 |
Secondary Warring Support:
Side A (Government of India): n/a
Side B (Kashmir insurgents): n/a
2002
| Estimated Fatalities | |
|---|---|
| High | 1499 |
| Best | 1499 |
| Low | 1499 |
Secondary Warring Support:
Side A (Government of India): n/a
Side B (Kashmir insurgents): n/a
2003
| Estimated Fatalities | |
|---|---|
| High | 1463 |
| Best | 1328 |
| Low | 1307 |
Secondary Warring Support:
Side A (Government of India): n/a
Side B (Kashmir insurgents): n/a
2004
| Estimated Fatalities | |
|---|---|
| High | 1404 |
| Best | 1404 |
| Low | 1227 |
Secondary Warring Support:
Side A (Government of India): n/a
Side B (Kashmir insurgents): n/a
2005
| Estimated Fatalities | |
|---|---|
| High | 1139 |
| Best | 1058 |
| Low | 1055 |
Secondary Warring Support:
Side A (Government of India): n/a
Side B (Kashmir insurgents): n/a
2006
| Estimated Fatalities | |
|---|---|
| High | 728 |
| Best | 705 |
| Low | 698 |
Secondary Warring Support:
Side A (Government of India): n/a
Side B (Kashmir insurgents): n/a
2007
| Estimated Fatalities | |
|---|---|
| High | 562 |
| Best | 550 |
| Low | 540 |
Secondary Warring Support:
Side A (Government of India): n/a
Side B (Kashmir insurgents): n/a
2008
| Estimated Fatalities | |
|---|---|
| High | 525 |
| Best | 500 |
| Low | 482 |
Secondary Warring Support:
Side A (Government of India): n/a
Side B (Kashmir insurgents): n/a
2009
| Estimated Fatalities | |
|---|---|
| High | 393 |
| Best | 361 |
| Low | 358 |
Secondary Warring Support:
Side A (Government of India): n/a
Side B (Kashmir insurgents): n/a
2010
| Estimated Fatalities | |
|---|---|
| High | 437 |
| Best | 370 |
| Low | 365 |
Secondary Warring Support:
Side A (Government of India): n/a
Side B (Kashmir insurgents): n/a
2011
| Estimated Fatalities | |
|---|---|
| High | 147 |
| Best | 140 |
| Low | 140 |
Secondary Warring Support:
Side A (Government of India): n/a
Side B (Kashmir insurgents): n/a
2012
| Estimated Fatalities | |
|---|---|
| High | 147 |
| Best | 144 |
| Low | 143 |
Secondary Warring Support:
Side A (Government of India): n/a
Side B (Kashmir insurgents): n/a
2013
| Estimated Fatalities | |
|---|---|
| High | 147 |
| Best | 146 |
| Low | 140 |
Secondary Warring Support:
Side A (Government of India): n/a
Side B (Kashmir insurgents): n/a
2014
| Estimated Fatalities | |
|---|---|
| High | 228 |
| Best | 179 |
| Low | 178 |
Secondary Warring Support:
Side A (Government of India): n/a
Side B (Kashmir insurgents): n/a
2015
| Estimated Fatalities | |
|---|---|
| High | 170 |
| Best | 165 |
| Low | 164 |
Secondary Warring Support:
Side A (Government of India): n/a
Side B (Kashmir insurgents): n/a
2016
| Estimated Fatalities | |
|---|---|
| High | 297 |
| Best | 282 |
| Low | 282 |
Secondary Warring Support:
Side A (Government of India): n/a
Side B (Kashmir insurgents): n/a
2017
| Estimated Fatalities | |
|---|---|
| High | 322 |
| Best | 322 |
| Low | 322 |
Secondary Warring Support:
Side A (Government of India): n/a
Side B (Kashmir insurgents): n/a
2018
| Estimated Fatalities | |
|---|---|
| High | 390 |
| Best | 386 |
| Low | 386 |
Secondary Warring Support:
Side A (Government of India): n/a
Side B (Kashmir insurgents): n/a
2019
| Estimated Fatalities | |
|---|---|
| High | 276 |
| Best | 267 |
| Low | 266 |
Secondary Warring Support:
Side A (Government of India): n/a
Side B (Kashmir insurgents): n/a
2020
| Estimated Fatalities | |
|---|---|
| High | 312 |
| Best | 311 |
| Low | 311 |
Secondary Warring Support:
Side A (Government of India): n/a
Side B (Kashmir insurgents): n/a
2021
| Estimated Fatalities | |
|---|---|
| High | 254 |
| Best | 250 |
| Low | 247 |
Secondary Warring Support:
Side A (Government of India): n/a
Side B (Kashmir insurgents): n/a
2022
| Estimated Fatalities | |
|---|---|
| High | 237 |
| Best | 235 |
| Low | 235 |
Secondary Warring Support:
Side A (Government of India): n/a
Side B (Kashmir insurgents): n/a
2023
| Estimated Fatalities | |
|---|---|
| High | 173 |
| Best | 119 |
| Low | 111 |
Secondary Warring Support:
Side A (Government of India): n/a
Side B (Kashmir insurgents): n/a
2024
| Estimated Fatalities | |
|---|---|
| High | 114 |
| Best | 112 |
| Low | 111 |
Secondary Warring Support:
Side A (Government of India): n/a
Side B (Kashmir insurgents): n/a
2025
| Estimated Fatalities | |
|---|---|
| High | 158 |
| Best | 93 |
| Low | 87 |
Secondary Warring Support:
Side A (Government of India): n/a
Side B (Kashmir insurgents): n/a
Dyad Archive
This section contains annual information no longer systematically collected by the UCDP.
1977 Dyad Archive
Terminated: NO
1984 Dyad Archive
Negotiations: NO
Victory: NO
Terminated: NO
1989 Dyad Archive
Comment on Yearly Battle Related Deaths: It is difficult to find reports on the separate incidents of violence. The estimate of battle-related deaths must thus be based on the general accounts available, which clearly convey an impression of a mounting insurgency. By 11 December 1989 over 80 persons are said to have been killed in clashes with police, bombing and assassinations during JKLFs campaign. The circumstances are not further specified, but other news reports confirm that several of these are killed by the police during general strikes or demonstrations or in indiscrimminate attacks by the insurgents. A conservative estimate of battle-related deaths in 1989 can thus not be put higher than 25.
Negotiations: NO
Victory: NO
Terminated: NO
1990 Dyad Archive
Comment on Active: In May 1990 spokesmen of the leading rebel outfit, JKLF announced a change of strategy; from more sporadic urban attacks to rural guerrilla warfare. The switch followed four months of a major army crack-down, curfew and daily house-to-house searches in the state capital of Srinagar.
Negotiations: NO
Victory: NO
Terminated: NO
1991 Dyad Archive
Negotiations: NO
Victory: NO
Terminated: NO
1992 Dyad Archive
Negotiations: NO
Victory: NO
Terminated: NO
1993 Dyad Archive
Negotiations: NO
Victory: NO
Terminated: NO
1994 Dyad Archive
Negotiations: NO
Victory: NO
Terminated: NO
1995 Dyad Archive
Negotiations: NO
Victory: NO
Terminated: NO
1996 Dyad Archive
Negotiations: NO
Victory: NO
Terminated: NO
1997 Dyad Archive
Negotiations: NO
Victory: NO
Terminated: NO
1998 Dyad Archive
Negotiations: NO
Victory: NO
Terminated: NO
1999 Dyad Archive
Negotiations: NO
Victory: NO
Terminated: NO
2000 Dyad Archive
Negotiations: YES
Comment on Negotiations: On 24 July the Hizb-ul-Mujahideen declared a unilateral ceasefire. They were widely criticized by other insurgency groups for taking unilateral steps. The Indian government reciprocated the move and suspended all offensive operations against the Kashmir militants in 11 years. Hizb-ul-Mujahideen and Indian representatives met once, but the preliminary talks broke down over the issue of Pakistan participating in possible talks. The Indian government also stated that talks should take place within the framework of the Indian constitution. Any negotiation on Hizb-ul-Mujahideens goal of accession to Pakistan was thus ruled out from the beginning. After two weeks the Hizb-ul Mujahideen decided to end its ceasefire.The Indian government took unilateral steps to facilitate a dialogue, as they suspended all offensive militar operations again in November - during the month of Ramadan. The unilateral ceasefire was extended on several occasions, last time on 22 February 2001. The important APHC welcomed the move and offered to enter into negotiations with the government. Hizb-ul Mujahideen and other of the more militant groups, especially those organizing the foreign rebels, rejected. The period was marked by a number of attacks on security forces and civilians. Another hinder for negotiations to take place was the resistance of the Indian government to involve the Pakistan government in tripartiate talks.
Victory: NO
Terminated: NO
2001 Dyad Archive
Negotiations: NO
Victory: NO
Terminated: NO
2002 Dyad Archive
Negotiations: NO
Victory: NO
Terminated: NO
2003 Dyad Archive
Negotiations: NO
Comment on Negotiations: On 22 October, the Indian cabinet authorized the Deputy Prime Minister to hold talks with Kashmiri group All Parties Hurriyat Conference (APHC), in the first high-level contact between the secessionist leaders and the government, and on 21 November, it was reported that APHC leaders had agreed to enter into negotiations with India, although no date was set for the talks. If talks were to take place, they would constitute the first high-level contact between the government and separatist political leaders in Jammu and Kashmir.
A number of obstacles to talks remained: APHC wanted to discuss the dispute with Pakistan as well, but India was opposed to three-way talks and APHC wanted talks focus not on decentralization as India suggested, but instead on Kashmiris’ demand for autonomy. APHC is a legal political alliance and does not use armed force (though some of its constituents are believed to be allied to with armed militants); it split in 2003 reportedly either over the issue of engaging in talks with India or because divisions between pro-independence and pro-Pakistan factions came to a head.
Victory: NO
Terminated: NO
2004 Dyad Archive
Comment on Active: In the shadow of improved Indian- Pakistan relations, violence in Kashmir declined somewhat compared to previous years. Rebel activity remained, however, at a high level claiming more than 1000 battle related deaths.
The government this year launched an unprecedented dialogue with the All Parties Hurriyat Conference (APHC) . On a meeting 22 January, the parties stated their commitment to find an "honourable and durable solution” to the Kashmir problem through dialogue, calling for an end to all violence. This was the first high level political contact between the Indian government and the seccessionist leaders during the 15 years of insurgency.
A continuation of the talks were slowed down by a change of government in India. The new government later this year re-launched the peace initiativ, offering talks, ceasefire and promises of a partial troop withdrawal. However, the negotiations remained on hold following disagreement over Pakistans involvement in the process.
Negotiations: YES
Comment on Negotiations: The government this year launched an unprecedented dialogue with the All Parties Hurriyat Conference (APHC) – a legal political alliance of groups agitating for Kashmir’s autonomy - but also assumed to represent the main political voice for important segments of the insurgency movement in Kashmir. The alliance groups about two dozen political, religious and community groups but was somehow weakened when a hardline faction, supported by militants opposing talks, split in 2003.
In early January the Union Government formally invited the APHC for talks with the Deputy Prime Minister. On a meeting 22 January, the parties stated their commitment to find an "honourable and durable solution” to the Kashmir problem through dialogue, calling for an end to all violence. This was the first high level political contact between the Indian government and the seccessionist leaders during the 15 years of insurgency. The BJP government then said substantive talks would be held in June with APHC, but the ruling alliance was replaced by a Congress party-led coalition in an election and the dialogue was postponed.
The new government announced that talks were to take during the first months, but the peace processes remained flagged until November, when it regained some momentum following the prime minister’s visit to the area, the announcement of an Indian troop withdrawal and an invitation to unconditional talks and a cease fire with Kashmiri rebel groups. The APHC chairman rejected the Indian offer for talks, saying that there was nothing substantial in the proposal. The APHC criticized the Indian government of not being explicit on whether they were willing to include Pakistan in the dialogue. The APHC argued that they had initiated talks with the previous government on three conditions, firstly, that talks on Kashmir should be unconditional, secondly that they should be Kashmir-centric and thirdly that there should be the mandatory involvement of Pakistan in the talks. The insurgent leaders refused to engage further in the peace process until the Indian government openly acknowledged these as the starting point for talks. Further progress in the dialogue remained on hold throughout 2004, waiting for this issue to be settled.
Victory: NO
Terminated: NO
2005 Dyad Archive
Comment on Active: While the conflict continued, Indian officials reported that cross-border infiltration of insurgents from Pakitsan had dropped to extremely low numbers. This can be attributed to two causes: 1) the ceasefire with Pakistan means that rebels cannot cross the border under cover of cross-border shelling; and 2) India has recently built a fence that covers large parts of the Line of Control, in turn hindering insurgents ability to cross the border. The fence is also a result of the ceasefire, as India was able to build it after the secession of military hostilities.
Negotiations: NO
Comment on Negotiations: Talks were initiated between the government and the All Parties Hurriyat Conference (APHC), an umbrella group for moderate Kashmiri religious and political groups. These talks are not considered negotiations according to UCDP criteria because they only involve one conflict party--the government of India. The APHC does not include any active Kashmiri insurgent group and does not represent the interests of the active rebels.
Victory: NO
Terminated: NO
2006 Dyad Archive
Comment on Active: The level of battle-related violence in Kashmir continued to drop in 2006, leading to an increase in tourism and development aid projects in the state. The Indian army was quick to take credit, attributing the decrease to its "iron fist, velvet glove" counter-guerrilla strategy. Perhaps a more plausible explanation is the ongoing peace process between Pakistan and India, which has led to increased cooperation by Pakistan in stopping cross-border infiltration by insurgents.
Many Kashmiris nonetheless remained frustrated by the slow pace of progress in securing peace and security. Government negotiations with the moderate All Parties Hurriyat Conference produced no substantive results and which did not include the active insurgent groups. There were also disturbing indications throughout 2006 that civilians were increasingly becoming the target for militant violence, and that some groups were redirecting their energies towards large-scale attacks on soft targets outside of Jammu and Kashmir, such as the Mumbai train bombings of July 2006 which were reportedly committed by the Kashmiri insurgent group Lashkar-e-Toiba. There were also some indications that Kashmiri militant groups were becoming increasingly active in trying to incite communal violence.
Negotiations: NO
Comment on Negotiations: Several rounds of talks were held between the Indias Prime Minister Singh and the All Parties Hurriyat Conference (APHC), an umbrella group for moderate Kashmiri religious and political groups. During these talks, the two sides discussed the economic conditions in the region, trade, and the state of human rights, among other issues. The Hurriyat also pressed for a reduction in the army presence in Kashmir and for a release of political prisoners, but its chief demand is to be included in peace talks between India and Pakistan, a move New Delhi has consistently rejected.
These talks are not considered negotiations according to UCDP criteria because they only involve one conflict party--the government of India. The APHC does not include any active Kashmiri insurgent group and does not represent the interests of the active rebels.
Victory: NO
Terminated: NO
2007 Dyad Archive
Comment on Yearly Battle Related Deaths: Hizbul Mujahideen, a leading insurgent group, alleged that the government systematically underreports fatalities to its forces, claiming that only one in ten killings is reported to the media. The group did not provide any evidence to substantiate this claim.
Comment on Active: The Kashmir conflict remained active in 2007, but the trend towards decreasing violence continued, with a sharp decline in fatalities since 2006.
Negotiations: NO
Comment on Negotiations: No negotiations took place between the government of India and any active Kashmiri insurgent group.
Victory: NO
Terminated: NO
2008 Dyad Archive
Comment on Active: The number of fatalities continued to decrease in 2008. This can be explained in part by several factors. First, the ceasefire between Pakistan and India has limited the opportunities for militants to enter Indian-controlled Kashmir from Pakistan because they can no longer cross under the cover of Pakistani shelling. Second, the ceasefire has allowed India to improve security along the border by putting in three-tier border fencing along the Line of Control. The effectiveness of the fencing on the LoC has led to decline in the rate of successful infiltration bids by militants, according to Indian military sources. Finally, US officials claim that a growing number of militants who earlier operated only inside of Pakistan and Kashmir are now joining the insurgency in Afghanistan.
Negotiations: NO
Comment on Negotiations: While bilateral talks continued to take place between India and Pakistan, they did not specifically address the status of Kashmir or include any Kashmiri insurgent groups; thus, they do not constitute negotiations according to UCDPs definition.
Victory: NO
Terminated: NO
2009 Dyad Archive
Comment on Active: The conflict between Kashmir insurgents and the Indian government continued to deescalate during 2009, with the death toll in the conflict being the lowest during the decade. The Indian security forces claimed to be making progress against the insurgent, killing or capturing several militant commanders during the year. At the same time, there were concerns that the rebels were shifting their attention to “soft” targets, underscored by the allegation of Lashkar-e-Taiba’s responsibility for the November 2008 Mumbai attacks.
Negotiations: NO
Comment on Negotiations: In June, Prime Minister Manmohan Singh stated that the government was open to talks with separatist groups as well as with local political parties. In September, it was revealed that government representatives had conducted secret talks with parts of the insurgent movement since the latest negotiation process was abandoned in 2005. In October, Home Minister P. Chidambaram announced there would be "quiet dialogue, quiet diplomacy" with all concerned parties in Jammu and Kashmir. While the statement was welcomed by the All Parties Hurriyat Conference (APHC), separatist leaders responded that the government should pull out its troops, release political prisoners and put an end to human rights violations before talks could be held. Informal talks with the APHC were initiated in late 2009, but did not constitute negotiations by UCDP definitions as the Kashmir insurgents were not represented in the talks. In an apparent attempt to derail the negotiations, the moderate APHC leadrer Fazl Haq Qureshi was shot and badly wounded by unknown gunmen in December.
Victory: NO
Terminated: NO
2010 Dyad Archive
Comment on Yearly Battle Related Deaths: The year also saw violent protests taking place in Kashmir. Starting in early June, demonstrators took to the streets in protest against India. The security forces often responded with violence. These clashes resulted in over 100 deaths between June and October. However, these figures are not part of the state-based death-toll, as the demonstrators were not part of the Kashmiri insurgency per se. As the demonstrators tended to be armed with stones, the incidents do not qualify as one-sided violence either.
Comment on Active: Violence continued throughout 2010, with similar death-tolls as in 2009, a marked decrease when comparing to previous years. Amid several arrests and reports of “neutralised” rebel hideouts, there was abundant reporting of militants attempting to cross the Line of Control, dividing the Pakistani- and Indian-controlled parts of Kashmir. These instances frequently led to violence.
Moreover it should be noted that the period between June and October also saw numerous clashes between stone-throwing demonstrators and security forces. However, as the protesters were not part of the Kashmiri insurgency per se, these events do not fall into the UCDP definition of the dyad.
Negotiations: NO
Comment on Negotiations: The Union Government repeatedly said it was prepared to hold talks with the various groups in Kashmir, provided they would stop their violent activities. In early December, the Jammu and Kashmir Chief Minister also urged the insurgents to engage in dialogue with the Union Government. However, in spite of these attempts no talks were held.
Victory: NO
Terminated: NO
2011 Dyad Archive
Comment on Yearly Battle Related Deaths: Violence continued throughout 2011, although with lower death-tolls as in 2010. This could be seen as a marked decrease when comparing to previous years. Amid several arrests and reports of “neutralized” rebel hideouts, there was abundant reporting of militants attempting to cross the Line of Control, dividing the Pakistani- and Indian-controlled parts of Kashmir. These instances frequently led to violence.
The intensity has been similar during the year, though with a peak in August. The casualties in each attack are a most often only a few and the most casualties are recorded on the side of the insurgents.
Comment on Active: Violence continued throughout 2011, with lower death-tolls as in 2010, a marked decrease when comparing to previous years. Amid several arrests and reports of “neutralized” rebel hideouts, there was abundant reporting of militants attempting to cross the Line of Control, dividing the Pakistani- and Indian-controlled parts of Kashmir. These instances frequently led to violence.
The intensity has been similar during the year, though with a peak in August. The casualties in each attack are a most often one or two and the most casualties are recorded on the insurgents.
Negotiations: NO
Comment on Negotiations: The government of India planned to withdraw paramilitary troops from Kashmir during the year and also to make renewed efforts to hold talks in the region, however no distinct results have been seen.
Victory: NO
Comment on Victory: The conflict is ongoing.
Terminated: NO
2012 Dyad Archive
Comment on Yearly Battle Related Deaths: The conflict between the Government of India and Kashmir Insurgents resulted in 149 battle-related deaths in 2012. This figure constitutes a slight increase from 2011, but remains consistent with an overall decline in the intensity of the conflict since 2002.
Comment on Active: The Government of India - Kashmir Insurgents dyad remained active in 2012. Though the dyad produced slightly more fatalities in 2012 than in the previous year, the conflict has generally continued to become less violent over the past decade.
Negotiations: NO
Victory: NO
Terminated: NO
2013 Dyad Archive
Comment on Yearly Battle Related Deaths: Fighting between Indian security forces and Kashmir insurgents generated over 140 fatalities in 2013. This figure remains almost unchanged from 2012. Though this dyad produced more fatalities than any other in India in 2013, its intensity remains very low compared to the 1990s and 2000s.
Comment on Active: The dyad remained active in 2013. The intensity of the fighting changed very Little between 2012 and 2013.
Negotiations: NO
Comment on Negotiations: No negotiations occurred in 2013.
Victory: NO
Terminated: NO
2014 Dyad Archive
Comment on Yearly Battle Related Deaths: Fighting in Kashmir in 2014 generated over 170 deaths, a level similar with previous years. The intensity remains very low compared to fighting in the 1990s and 2000s.
Comment on Active: The conflict remained active in 2014, at intensity levels similar to those in previous years. Indian security forces continued to engage scores of insurgents attempting to cross the Line of Control between Indian- and Pakistani-controlled territory. Many engagements produced fatalities throughout the year.
Negotiations: NO
Victory: NO
Terminated: NO
2015 Dyad Archive
Comment on Yearly Battle Related Deaths: Fighting in Kashmir in 2015 generated over 160 deaths, a level similar with previous years. The intensity remains very low compared to fighting in the 1990s and 2000s.
Comment on Active: The conflict remained active in 2015, at intensity levels similar to those in previous years. Indian security forces continued to engage scores of insurgents attempting to cross the Line of Control between Indian- and Pakistani-controlled territory. Many engagements produced fatalities throughout the year.
Negotiations: NO
Victory: NO
Terminated: NO
2016 Dyad Archive
Terminated: NO
2017 Dyad Archive
Comment on Active: The conflict over Kashmir continued to be active in 2014, with violence affecting a significant number of the state’s districts. For most of the 2010s, violence has remained at relatively low levels in the region. However, amid intensified efforts from Indian security forces to contain the various insurgent groups in Kashmir, violence escalated for two consecutive years in 2016 and 2017. Activity was registered both in areas along the Line-of-Control, separating Indian-controlled Kashmir from the Pakistani-controlled parts, as well as in other areas of Jammu and Kashmir state.
Negotiations: NO
Terminated: NO
2018 Dyad Archive
Comment on Active: The conflict over Kashmir has increased for the fourth consecutive year and thus continues to be active in 2018. The Pulwama district and Kupwara district were particularly affected; however, violence was recorded all over Jammu and Kashmir state. India continued to blame Pakistan for supporting the Kashmir insurgents groups, while Pakistan denies this. Moreover, India contends that the increase in violence and the claimed decrease in recruitment for the various insurgent groups shows the success of the security forces to combat the Kashmir insurgency.
Terminated: NO
2019 Dyad Archive
Comment on Active: Though the intensity of the conflict over Kashmir has not reached the level of war since 2005, it had kept increasing steadily from 2014 to 2018. This trend was interrupted in 2019 with a drop in the number of battle-related deaths reaching the fatality figure lower than the one in 2016. Despite the fact that the violence was recorded all over Jammu and Kashmir state, Pulwama district was particularly affected in 2019. Meanwhile, India continued to blame Pakistan for supporting the Kashmir insurgent groups, while Pakistan denies this.
Terminated: NO
2020 Dyad Archive
Comment on Active: The conflict intensity increased again in 2020 amidst curfews and communication blackouts introduced in August 2019, following the revocation of Article 370 that granted autonomy to the region in 1947. While the violence was prevalent across Jammu and Kashmir State, Pulwama district was particularly affected in 2020. Meanwhile, India continued to blame Pakistan for supporting the Kashmir insurgent groups, which was yet again denied by Pakistan.
Negotiations: NO
Victory: NO
Terminated: NO
2021 Dyad Archive
Comment on Active: While the conflict intensity decreased slightly in 2021 when compared to 2020, violence was prevalent across Jammu and Kashmir State. The curfews and communication blackouts introduced in August 2019, following the revocation of Article 370 that granted autonomy to the region in 1947, were lifted in February 2021.
Negotiations: NO
Victory: NO
Terminated: NO
2022 Dyad Archive
Comment on Active: While the conflict intensity continued to slowly decreased in 2022, violence was prevalent across Jammu and Kashmir State, and the situation is still tense. The government of India remained focused on a mainly military solution to the Kashmir issue, and there has been continued criticism against the violence from security forces and human rights abuses in the region. Additionally, the Kashmir insurgents have carried out targeted killings of both Muslim and Hindu civilians. The insurgent groups most active in the conflict in 2022 were LeT, JeM and Hizbul Mujahideen.
Negotiations: NO
Victory: NO
Terminated: NO
2023 Dyad Archive
Comment on Active: The conflict in the Jammu and Kashmir state remained active but continued the trend of decreased intensity that has been present for the past years. 2023 was the least fatal year in the conflict since it was first recorded as active in the UCDP. Despite this, the conflict in Jammu and Kashmir remains the most violent one in India.
Negotiations: NO
Victory: NO
Terminated: NO
2024 Dyad Archive
Comment on Active: The conflict, while remaining active, has continued on a path of declining intensity, with 2024 recording the lowest number of fatalities since 1989. While the conflict's intensity continued to decrease, violence remained prevalent throughout Jammu and Kashmir state. The government of India remained focused on a mainly military solution to the Kashmir issue, and there has been continued criticism of the violence by security forces and human rights abuses in the region. As in previous years, the most active groups within the umbrella actor Kashmir insurgents in 2024 were Lashkar-e-Taiba (LeT), Jaish-e-Muhammad (JeM), and Hizbul Mujahideen (HM).
Negotiations: NO
Victory: NO
Terminated: NO
2025 Dyad Archive
Terminated: NO
