General information
Part of Conflict: Turkey: Kurdistan
Date of first stated goals of incompatibility: 1974-12-31
Comment on date of first stated goal of incompatibility: The PKK was founded in 1974 as a Marxist-Leninist group with the goal of establishing an independent and democratic Kurdish state.
Date of first use of armed force: 1983-05-01
Comment on date of first use of armed force: Three Turkish soldiers were reportedly killed in an ambush by PKK in May 1983.
First Battle Related Death: 1983-05-01
Comment on First Battle Related Death: Three Turkish soldiers were reportedly killed in an ambush by PKK in May 1983.
Date when dyad reached 25 battle releated deaths: 1984-08-15
Comment on date when dyad reached 25 battle related deaths: On 15 August 1984 PKK raided police outposts in Eruh and Semdinli. From 30 August to 25 October 16 government soldiers were killed in violence perpetrated by Kurdish separatists according to a report that recorded random examples of incidents. It is hence possible that many more were killed on both sides up until 25 October. Because of the lack of information the last day of 1984 is chosen as the date the conflict reached 25 deaths.
Conflict issues
Conflict Goal Issues: Partiya Karkeran Kurdistan, the Kurdistan Workers Party (PKK), originally emerged as a Maoist/Marxist-Leninist separatist movement aiming to establish an independent state of Kurdistan for Kurdish people. The rebel group was created in 1974 where it established a doctrine of Kurdish nationalism combined with communism. In 1978 PKK released its official Party Programme, from which the project coded several conflict goal issues. Many of the expressed issues concerned large structural reforms of the economic, political, and judicial system. PKK expressed intent to establish democratic socialism with an emphasis on class struggle: “Democracy will be ensured for the workers and peasants first and foremost, and for all other patriotic classes and strata; dictatorship will be applied against collaborating landowners and the comprador bourgeoise.” They also expressed intent to struggle against the Turkish colonization, as they called it, of Kurdish areas, and were explicitly aiming to establish an independent Kurdish state. The programme also noted PKK’s dedication to improving the rights of Kurdish people, including cultural, gender, labor, language, and religious rights. PKK also expressed the intent to “Confiscate the lands of the landowners collaborating with the colonialists in the course of the struggle and to distribute them among the landless peasantry.”, and similar socialist land- and economic reforms.
Since the group’s emergence and the publication of their party programme, significant amounts of conflict goal issues have been interpreted. From this, one can see several trends in how PKK has changed and how their goal issues have evolved. Firstly, the question of independence was not coded after 1998, whilst the question of autonomy were frequently and continuously stated since 1995 and onwards. This signifies a change of policy where ideas of an independent Kurdistan were left for the more realistic goal of establishing an autonomous region within Turkey. Furthermore, calls for both federalism and decentralization of the state was raised by PKK as the conflict progressed, implying a shifted focus from independence to federalism and autonomy. Similarly, the conflict goal issue of establishing a socialist state was only coded once after PKK’s first year of existence. Whilst this may signify a decreased intent of establishing a socialist state, it is noteworthy that socialist rhetoric and theory was, and still is, largely a part of the movement. For example, PKK continuously stated its desires to establish economic reforms which were socialist in nature: “To develop a finance and tax system for the benefit of the working people as an alternative to the finance and tax systems that serve for exploitative structures.” The emphasis on Kurdish rights remained throughout the entirety of the conflict and was continuously coded. Protecting human rights, freedom of expression, freedom of association, cultural heritage, and natural resources, specifically, later became frequently raised conflict goal issues. In addition to economic reforms, reforms to judicial, political, and military structures were expressed as further goal issues.
In terms of which issues were more frequently and continuously stated, as well as more heavily emphasized, the long duration of the conflict introduces several different main goal for PKK depending on which time period is analyzed, particularly regarding the goal issues concerning political systems. For the beginning of the conflict, the conflict was largely shaped by a struggle for independence and the establishment of an independent Kurdish state shaped by democratic and socialist ideals. Between 1995 and 2001 much emphasis was placed on the idea of a decentralized and federalized Turkish state which would grant the Kurdish people more regional power. And, finally, from 2001 and onwards the issue was coded as autonomy: “Even in the sense of autonomy, the Kurds do not seek a state.” Hence, the current main issue would be considered the struggle for an autonomous, but not independent, Kurdistan. Consistent through these phases was the focus on Kurdish civil, cultural, gender, human, labor, religious, and children’s rights, which was also a frequently and continuously mentioned issue for PKK. The establishment of a democratic political system also remained a heavily emphasized and frequently mentioned issue for the group, particularly later in the conflict. Finally, whilst not as continuously coded issue, economic reform should also be considered a main goal issue for PKK, as it permeates much of the group’s political and ideological convictions.
Conflict Dynamics Issues: In the first year of PKK’s existence the group stated one conflict dynamics issue raised. In the Party Programme, the group criticized the gendarmerie (Turkish military police) for creating and maintaining a state of terror among civilians in rural areas. “In rural areas, the gendarmerie uses terror to maintain an atmosphere of fear which the peasants feel to the very marrow of their bones.”
In the beginning of the conflict, much emphasis was put on this intentional civilian targeting by the gendarmerie, particularly based on the ethnicity of the civilians, and in one instance their political allegiance with PKK. PKK also called upon the international community several times throughout the conflict. The group called upon the international community to remove foreign influence on several occasions throughout the conflict. PKK also asked for humanitarian aid from the Red Cross and Red Crescent, requested the creation of a war crimes commission, and called upon the international community to support the rebels rather than Turkey. Throughout the conflict, PKK called for the release of prisoners and refugees held by the Turkish state.
PKK heavily emphasized atrocities the Turkish government comitted, specifically the gendarmerie, committed against the Kurdish civilian population throughout the conflict. PKK especially emphasized the allegations that these atrocities were fueled by intentional targeting of people of Kurdish ethnicity: “Turkey is waging a dirty war in Kurdistan, slaughtering our people, bombing villages, setting fire to forests and denying our basic human rights.” Another main conflict dynamics issue of PKK was the question of foreign influence and pressure. PKK frequently released statements either calling for the international community to cease their support for their Turkish government, and calling for them to support PKK. Such calls were frequently and continuously stated by PKK.
Conflict Resolution Issues: Whilst no conflict resolution issues were interpreted in the first year of conflict, PKK stated several issues as the conflict progressed. From 1993 onwards PKK released several statements pertaining to conflict resolution issues. In the first few years, all interpreted issues were related to calls for negotiations, continuously stating that PKK were ready to solve the conflict diplomatically. In 2000, the group called for investigation and prosecution of “illegal armed forces”, and for compensation to be administered to the affected villages who had been forced to live under the circumstances. Similar calls for accountability and compensation were stated throughout the conflict. PKK also called for several issues relating to ceasefires, both calling for ceasefires and calling for adherence to said ceasefires. Finally, the group also expressed demands on the structure of negotiations, stating that they needed to be held in order to resolve the Kurdish issues, and that PKK be accepted as a legitimate political party, among other demands.
Throughout the conflict, PKK continuously heavily emphasized their intent to participate in negotiations, and it was the main resolution issue of the group. The success of these negotiations was often conditional on the implementation of, and adherence to, proposed ceasefire agreements, which could be considered another main issue for the group. “We want peace and we are ready for negotiations. But if Turkey decides to attack our bases inside Turkey or inside Iraqi Kurdistan, then this unilateral cease-fire will be meaningless. If we are attacked, we will fight back and we have the ability to confront any Turkish aggression.”
Type of conflict issues: Conflict Goal Issues: Autonomy, Basic needs, Revenues from natural resources, Rule of law, Unification of states, Water resources, Change a specific law, Change economic system, Change judicial system, Childrens rights, Citizenship reforms, Civil rights, Confederation/union, Constitutional issues, Corruption, CPS: Democracy, CPS: Other/undefined system, CPS: Secular state, CPS: Socialist state, Cultural rights, Decentralization, Disband para-military forces, Economic reforms, Education system: culture, Education system: increase religion, Electoral reform, Federalism, Foreign policy reform, Freedom of association, Freedom of expression, Gender rights, Human rights, Independence, Labor rights, Land reforms, Language rights, Oust local executive, Protection of cultural heritage, Protection of natural resources/the environment, Public services, Reform executive structure, Reform judicial system, Reform parliament, Religious rights, Restrictions on freedom of expression, Restructure military forces
Conflict Dynamics Issues: Call for collective targeting: political, Atrocities and abuses, Collective targeting: ethnic, Collective targeting: political, DFI: Removal of foreign influence, DFI: Withdrawal of military intervention/foreign forces, IFI: Humanitarian aid, IFI: International court/tribunal/investigation, IFI: International monitoring, IFI: Use of foreign influence, Military conduct, Release of prisoners, Return of refugees/IDPs
Conflict Resolution Issues: Accountability/prosecution/investigation, Amnesties, Call for ceasefire, Structure of negotiations, Call for implementation/abiding to ceasefire, Call for negotiations, Call for truth and reconciliation processes, Compensation/restoration
Annual information
This section contains annual information systematically collected by the UCDP.
1983
| Estimated Fatalities | |
|---|---|
| High | 1 |
| Best | 1 |
| Low | 0 |
Secondary Warring Support:
Side A (Government of Turkey): n/a
Side B (PKK): n/a
1984
| Estimated Fatalities | |
|---|---|
| High | 25 |
| Best | 25 |
| Low | 0 |
Secondary Warring Support:
Side A (Government of Turkey): n/a
Side B (PKK): n/a
1985
| Estimated Fatalities | |
|---|---|
| High | 25 |
| Best | 25 |
| Low | 0 |
Secondary Warring Support:
Side A (Government of Turkey): n/a
Side B (PKK): n/a
1986
| Estimated Fatalities | |
|---|---|
| High | 25 |
| Best | 25 |
| Low | 0 |
Secondary Warring Support:
Side A (Government of Turkey): n/a
Side B (PKK): n/a
1987
| Estimated Fatalities | |
|---|---|
| High | 925 |
| Best | 925 |
| Low | 925 |
Secondary Warring Support:
Side A (Government of Turkey): n/a
Side B (PKK): n/a
1988
| Estimated Fatalities | |
|---|---|
| High | 25 |
| Best | 25 |
| Low | 0 |
Secondary Warring Support:
Side A (Government of Turkey): n/a
Side B (PKK): n/a
1989
| Estimated Fatalities | |
|---|---|
| High | 442 |
| Best | 442 |
| Low | 442 |
Secondary Warring Support:
Side A (Government of Turkey): n/a
Side B (PKK): n/a
1990
| Estimated Fatalities | |
|---|---|
| High | 526 |
| Best | 526 |
| Low | 514 |
Secondary Warring Support:
Side A (Government of Turkey): n/a
Side B (PKK): n/a
1991
| Estimated Fatalities | |
|---|---|
| High | 375 |
| Best | 370 |
| Low | 370 |
Secondary Warring Support:
Side A (Government of Turkey): n/a
Side B (PKK): n/a
1992
| Estimated Fatalities | |
|---|---|
| High | 1680 |
| Best | 1663 |
| Low | 1663 |
Secondary Warring Support:
Side A (Government of Turkey): n/a
Side B (PKK): n/a
1993
| Estimated Fatalities | |
|---|---|
| High | 3517 |
| Best | 2309 |
| Low | 2309 |
Secondary Warring Support:
Side A (Government of Turkey): n/a
Side B (PKK): n/a
1994
| Estimated Fatalities | |
|---|---|
| High | 4268 |
| Best | 4165 |
| Low | 4165 |
Secondary Warring Support:
Side A (Government of Turkey): n/a
Side B (PKK): n/a
1995
| Estimated Fatalities | |
|---|---|
| High | 4435 |
| Best | 3738 |
| Low | 3731 |
Secondary Warring Support:
Side A (Government of Turkey): n/a
Side B (PKK): n/a
1996
| Estimated Fatalities | |
|---|---|
| High | 4067 |
| Best | 3974 |
| Low | 3974 |
Secondary Warring Support:
Side A (Government of Turkey): n/a
Side B (PKK): n/a
1997
| Estimated Fatalities | |
|---|---|
| High | 5124 |
| Best | 3902 |
| Low | 3899 |
Secondary Warring Support:
Side A (Government of Turkey): n/a
Side B (PKK): n/a
1998
| Estimated Fatalities | |
|---|---|
| High | 2162 |
| Best | 2074 |
| Low | 2074 |
Secondary Warring Support:
Side A (Government of Turkey): n/a
Side B (PKK): n/a
1999
| Estimated Fatalities | |
|---|---|
| High | 1440 |
| Best | 1363 |
| Low | 1363 |
Secondary Warring Support:
Side A (Government of Turkey): n/a
Side B (PKK): n/a
2000
| Estimated Fatalities | |
|---|---|
| High | 181 |
| Best | 177 |
| Low | 177 |
Secondary Warring Support:
Side A (Government of Turkey): n/a
Side B (PKK): n/a
2001
| Estimated Fatalities | |
|---|---|
| High | 201 |
| Best | 186 |
| Low | 186 |
Secondary Warring Support:
Side A (Government of Turkey): n/a
Side B (PKK): n/a
2002
| Estimated Fatalities | |
|---|---|
| High | 124 |
| Best | 105 |
| Low | 105 |
Secondary Warring Support:
Side A (Government of Turkey): n/a
Side B (PKK): n/a
2003
| Estimated Fatalities | |
|---|---|
| High | 156 |
| Best | 153 |
| Low | 153 |
Secondary Warring Support:
Side A (Government of Turkey): n/a
Side B (PKK): n/a
2004
| Estimated Fatalities | |
|---|---|
| High | 414 |
| Best | 276 |
| Low | 276 |
Secondary Warring Support:
Side A (Government of Turkey): n/a
Side B (PKK): n/a
2005
| Estimated Fatalities | |
|---|---|
| High | 408 |
| Best | 377 |
| Low | 375 |
Secondary Warring Support:
Side A (Government of Turkey): n/a
Side B (PKK): n/a
2006
| Estimated Fatalities | |
|---|---|
| High | 400 |
| Best | 349 |
| Low | 349 |
Secondary Warring Support:
Side A (Government of Turkey): n/a
Side B (PKK): n/a
2007
| Estimated Fatalities | |
|---|---|
| High | 687 |
| Best | 664 |
| Low | 658 |
Secondary Warring Support:
Side A (Government of Turkey): n/a
Side B (PKK): n/a
2008
| Estimated Fatalities | |
|---|---|
| High | 1067 |
| Best | 681 |
| Low | 634 |
Secondary Warring Support:
Side A (Government of Turkey): n/a
Side B (PKK): n/a
2009
| Estimated Fatalities | |
|---|---|
| High | 232 |
| Best | 219 |
| Low | 214 |
Secondary Warring Support:
Side A (Government of Turkey): n/a
Side B (PKK): n/a
2010
| Estimated Fatalities | |
|---|---|
| High | 414 |
| Best | 356 |
| Low | 347 |
Secondary Warring Support:
Side A (Government of Turkey): n/a
Side B (PKK): n/a
2011
| Estimated Fatalities | |
|---|---|
| High | 760 |
| Best | 558 |
| Low | 557 |
Secondary Warring Support:
Side A (Government of Turkey): n/a
Side B (PKK): n/a
2012
| Estimated Fatalities | |
|---|---|
| High | 866 |
| Best | 853 |
| Low | 853 |
Secondary Warring Support:
Side A (Government of Turkey): n/a
Side B (PKK): n/a
2013
| Estimated Fatalities | |
|---|---|
| High | 36 |
| Best | 32 |
| Low | 32 |
Secondary Warring Support:
Side A (Government of Turkey): n/a
Side B (PKK): n/a
2014
| Estimated Fatalities | |
|---|---|
| High | 11 |
| Best | 10 |
| Low | 9 |
Secondary Warring Support:
Side A (Government of Turkey): n/a
Side B (PKK): n/a
2015
| Estimated Fatalities | |
|---|---|
| High | 1398 |
| Best | 906 |
| Low | 901 |
Secondary Warring Support:
Side A (Government of Turkey): n/a
Side B (PKK): n/a
2016
| Estimated Fatalities | |
|---|---|
| High | 1090 |
| Best | 1074 |
| Low | 1074 |
Secondary Warring Support:
Side A (Government of Turkey): n/a
Side B (PKK): n/a
2017
| Estimated Fatalities | |
|---|---|
| High | 774 |
| Best | 756 |
| Low | 756 |
Secondary Warring Support:
Side A (Government of Turkey): n/a
Side B (PKK): n/a
2018
| Estimated Fatalities | |
|---|---|
| High | 957 |
| Best | 940 |
| Low | 932 |
Secondary Warring Support:
Side A (Government of Turkey): n/a
Side B (PKK): n/a
2019
| Estimated Fatalities | |
|---|---|
| High | 684 |
| Best | 630 |
| Low | 630 |
Secondary Warring Support:
Side A (Government of Turkey): n/a
Side B (PKK): n/a
2020
| Estimated Fatalities | |
|---|---|
| High | 446 |
| Best | 431 |
| Low | 428 |
Secondary Warring Support:
Side A (Government of Turkey): n/a
Side B (PKK): n/a
2021
| Estimated Fatalities | |
|---|---|
| High | 599 |
| Best | 493 |
| Low | 482 |
Secondary Warring Support:
Side A (Government of Turkey): n/a
Side B (PKK): n/a
2022
| Estimated Fatalities | |
|---|---|
| High | 792 |
| Best | 760 |
| Low | 754 |
Secondary Warring Support:
Side A (Government of Turkey): n/a
Side B (PKK): n/a
2023
| Estimated Fatalities | |
|---|---|
| High | 506 |
| Best | 386 |
| Low | 386 |
Secondary Warring Support:
Side A (Government of Turkey): n/a
Side B (PKK): n/a
2024
| Estimated Fatalities | |
|---|---|
| High | 395 |
| Best | 239 |
| Low | 235 |
Secondary Warring Support:
Side A (Government of Turkey): n/a
Side B (PKK): n/a
2025
| Estimated Fatalities | |
|---|---|
| High | 90 |
| Best | 55 |
| Low | 52 |
Secondary Warring Support:
Side A (Government of Turkey): n/a
Side B (PKK): n/a
Dyad Archive
This section contains annual information no longer systematically collected by the UCDP.
1983 Dyad Archive
Negotiations: NO
Victory: NO
Terminated: NO
1984 Dyad Archive
Comment on Active: The PKK launched its first major attacks in August 1984 on government forces in the city of Eruh and Semdinli in the provinces of Hakkari and Siirt. The Turkish government responded with an intensive campaign to round up the Kurdish rebel group, becoming involved in cross-border agreements to this end with neighbouring Iraq and Iran.
Negotiations: NO
Victory: NO
Terminated: NO
1985 Dyad Archive
Comment on Active: There were regular reports of clashes between the security forces and Kurdish insurgents in the provinces in south-eastern Turkey during 1985.
The PKK launched hit-and-run attacks on Turkish villages and military garrisons. In May, there was a major clash in Siverek resulting in over 60 deaths. On May 25, Yildirim Akbulut, the Turkish Minister of the Interior, admitted that the Turkish security forces were fighting a limited guerrilla war against Kurdish separatists. In mid-June 1985 it was claimed that Iran had invited Turkish security forces into the Iranian territory to pursue Kurdish rebels active in the border area.
Responding to the increase in PKK attacks, the Turkish government decided to arm villagers to make them able to protect themselves. It recruited "temporary village guards" from clans that were opposed to the PKK. These village guards were targeted by the PKK even more than regular troops.
The Turkish government had also erected a wire mesh fence along its border with Syria, blocking some of PKK access and supply routes.
In turn, PKK formed the ERNK (Eniya Rizgariya Netewa Kurdistan, Kurdistan Popular Liberation Front). The task of this organisation was in particular to gain support among the Kurdish population in order to provide networks for bases, supply routes and to recruit fighters.
Negotiations: NO
Victory: NO
Terminated: NO
1986 Dyad Archive
Comment on Active: In 1986, PKK decided to dissolve the HRK (Hêzên Rizgariya Kurdistan; Kurdistan Freedom Brigades) and replace it with a purely military wing the ARGK (Arteshen Rizgariya Gelli Kurdistan, Peoples Liberation Army of Kurdistan). It also changed the policy of ERNK (Eniya Rizgariya Netewa Kurdistan, Kurdistan Popular Liberation Front), which was to focus on propaganda and recruitment of new members in Turkey and Europe.
Concerning military operations, the commander of the ERNK Masun (Mazlun) Korkmaz was killed by Turkish troops in March 1986. The Turkish government conducted its first raid into Iraq since 1983 in August 1986. The attack retaliated the killing of a dozen government troops in ambush. According to the Turkish Interior Minister, Yildirim Akbulut, around 200 people were killed in the raid.
An increase in Turkish military actions in the near the Iraqi border was reported by Kurdish sources in early September.
Negotiations: NO
Victory: NO
Terminated: NO
1987 Dyad Archive
Comment on Active: Cross-border operations by the Turkish government forces into Iraqi territory continued and there were numerous reports of PKK attacks on civilian and military targets and of clashes with the security forces.
The PKK used large-scale one-sided violence, mostly attacking the families of “village guards”. In March 1987, the Turkish Air Force attacked nine alleged Kurdish guerrilla hideouts in retaliation for the killing of 14 civilians near Uludere in February. Also in March, the Turkish government carried out a major operation along the border with Syria.
The last four provinces under martial law– Hakkari, Mardin, Diyarbakir, and Siirt –were transferred to a state of emergency (martial law under civil authority) in July 1987.
Negotiations: NO
Victory: NO
Terminated: NO
1988 Dyad Archive
Comment on Active: The PKK started its attacks at the end of March. Starting in May 1988, the Turkish government ordered seek-and-destroy missions based on intelligence information rather than simply reacting to attacks from the PKK.
A state of emergency, declared in 1987, continued in six southeastern provinces facing substantial PKK terrorist violence.
Negotiations: NO
Victory: NO
Terminated: NO
1989 Dyad Archive
Negotiations: NO
Victory: NO
Terminated: NO
1990 Dyad Archive
Comment on Yearly Battle Related Deaths: The number does not include those killed in November - December 1990. Most battle-related deaths were incurred during heavy clashes in March - October.
Negotiations: NO
Victory: NO
Terminated: NO
1991 Dyad Archive
Comment on Active: In the end of 1991, and the beginning of 1992, the Turkish air force conducted several raids on suspected PKK bases in northern Iraq. The Iraqi government complained formally with the UN. The operations were also questioned by international observers and relief workers since many civilians were reportedly killed.
Negotiations: NO
Victory: NO
Terminated: NO
1992 Dyad Archive
Comment on Active: In late 1991 and early 1992 the Turkish air force conducted several raids on suspected PKK bases in northern Iraq. In the end of 1992 renewed air operations were supported by more than 20 000 troops that entered northern Iraq. These operations were timed to strike the PKK when it was weak. The group had been weakened when it was attacked by Iraqi Kurdish forces earlier in October in an attempt to force the group from Iraq.
Negotiations: NO
Victory: NO
Terminated: NO
1993 Dyad Archive
Negotiations: NO
Victory: NO
Terminated: NO
1994 Dyad Archive
Negotiations: NO
Victory: NO
Terminated: NO
1995 Dyad Archive
Comment on Active: During March 1995, 35 000 Turkish troops crossed the Iraqi border and attacked PKK bases. The PKK did however manage to withdraw out of the reach of the Turkish forces. Following international pressure Turkey left Iraq. By July another 3000 troops conducted operations across the border, operations that added to the already heavy casualties of the conflict that year.
Negotiations: NO
Victory: NO
Terminated: NO
1996 Dyad Archive
Negotiations: NO
Victory: NO
Terminated: NO
1997 Dyad Archive
Comment on Active: In May 1997, 50 000 Turkish troops crossed the border and attacked the PKK in Iraq.
Negotiations: NO
Victory: NO
Terminated: NO
1998 Dyad Archive
Negotiations: NO
Victory: NO
Terminated: NO
1999 Dyad Archive
Comment on Active: After PKKs leader Abdullah Öcalan had been captured on 15 February the PKK violently protested the subsequent trial. By April 15 000 Turkish troops entered Iraq temporarily in the hunt for PKK fighters.
Negotiations: NO
Comment on Negotiations: During the trial that followed his capture, PKK leader Abdullah Öcalan called for a PKK ceasefire and claimed he was willing to negotiate an agreement between the parties if his life was spared. Turkey did not wish to negotiate and the PKK did not abide by his call for a ceasefire.
Victory: NO
Terminated: NO
2000 Dyad Archive
Negotiations: NO
Comment on Negotiations: The leadership of PKK declared a unilateral ceasefire in February 2000 and changed its name by removing the controversial word Kurdistan. Turkey did however not respond by engaging in negotiations and instead launched a new offensive.
Victory: NO
Terminated: NO
2001 Dyad Archive
Negotiations: NO
Victory: NO
Terminated: NO
2002 Dyad Archive
Negotiations: NO
Victory: NO
Terminated: NO
2003 Dyad Archive
Negotiations: NO
Comment on Negotiations: No negotiations. The government refused to negotiate, claiming the PKK withdrawal to be a move to save Öcalan.
Victory: NO
Terminated: NO
2004 Dyad Archive
Comment on Active: The conflict is still on going. Fighting between Kongra-GEL and the Turkish army has dropped off in recent years since the capture of Abdullah Öcalan in 1999, Recently there have been more clashes reported.
According to a Turkish security report, seen by Janes Intelligence Review, KONGRA-GEL is experiencing a power struggle between reformists, cadres seeking to legitimise the movement and traditionalists, who intent on resuming political violence.
Analysts have said in August, that the rebels (KONGRA-GEL) appear to have recently split into several factions. Reuters reported that the brother of jailed rebel leader Abdullah Öcalan has formed a breakaway group after leaving the separatist Kurdistan Workers Party (PKK). This new grouping will seek to win the freedom of Osman Öcalans brother and does not aim to damage the PKK but to advance its cause democratically, the statement said (on Kurdish website).
Negotiations: NO
Victory: NO
Terminated: NO
2005 Dyad Archive
Comment on Yearly Battle Related Deaths: In general the reports by Ozgur Politika Web Site and Kurish Roj TV, base their information on the pro-Kurish HPG Press and Liaison Centre. They report very often a higher number of casaulties than the other media reports. The numbers are rarely confirmed by other news sources. However, in cases where the pro-Kurish media sources describe a conflict in detail which is also covered by other news agencies, the casaulties reported are taken into consideration to come to a Best Estimate. If the reports lacks credibility, the fatalities it reports are coded as high. One report has not been taken into consideration, namely the report issued on 31 December 2005 by the Kurish Roj TV in which Kurdish militants say more than 1,000 Turkish soldiers/policemen are killed in 2005 and 138 guerrillas. This figure seems incorrect and would affect the estimates in a disproportional manner."
Negotiations: NO
Comment on Negotiations: The PKK called on 18 August on its armed wing to refrain from violence for a month from 20 August, after Turkish Prime Minister Tayyip Erdogan made a trip to the troubled southeast during which he said his government wanted more reforms for the Kurds.
The appeal of the Democratic Society Movement (DTH), a formation which groups Turkeys most prominent Kurdish political figures and is soon expected to formally become a party, came in the eve of a news conference by the rebels in Brussels.
"It is an urgent, vital and general expectation from the PKK... to take as soon as possible a decision for a ceasefire, without conditions and time limits, in order to ensure a democratic ground for discussing the (Kurdish) problem, free from a climate of violence," the statement said.
The Kurdistan Workers Party (PKK) rebels extended it till 3 October, the day Ankara won EU approval to start accession negotiations. Turkeys government and armed forces ignored the call. The PKKs ceasefire appeared to be an effort to get their case onto the political agenda during sensitive negotiations leading up to Turkeys 3 October date for the start of entry talks witrh the EU.
Victory: NO
Terminated: NO
2006 Dyad Archive
Comment on Active: Clashes between the Turkish government and the PKK continued in 2006, albeit at a relatively low level. The bulk of fighting took place in the PKK stronghold areas of south-eastern Turkey. The PKK called a unilateral ceasefire in late September, but it was quickly rebuffed by the Turkish army, which stated that it would not change its stance against the PKK, and clashes continued throughout fall and winter. PKK forces to an extent used northern Iraq as a staging point for their incursions into Turkey, prompting Turkish authorities to grumble about Iraq and US ignoring this threat against the country. In September the US, Iraq and Turkey set up a working group to deal with the issue of PKK fighters operating out of northern Iraq, with the US stating that it would be unwise to intervene militarily in the relatively stable northern Iraqi provinces.
Negotiations: NO
Comment on Negotiations: There were no negotiations between the primary parties in 2006.
Victory: NO
Terminated: NO
2007 Dyad Archive
Comment on Active: The bulk of fighting between the Turkish government and the PKK took place in the PKK stronghold areas of south-eastern Turkey. In October, the Turkish Parliament authorized an attack on PKK headquarters located in northern Iraq and several cross-border air-strikes were launched that continued into 2008. Most casualties were reported in late 2007.
Negotiations: NO
Comment on Negotiations: There were no negotiations between the two sides of the conflict, inspite of several calls for dialogue and negotiations by the PKK. For example, in November 2007 PKK-leader Öcalan stated that he wanted to negotiate with the Turkish government to end the conflict. The same month, Abdurrahman Cadirci, a senior leader in the PKK called upon the Turkish government to present a peace plan in an interview with a news agency.
The Turkish authorities ruled out talks with the rebels, labelling them terrorists and accused the PKK of proposing peace to gain political leverage.
Victory: NO
Terminated: NO
2008 Dyad Archive
Comment on Yearly Battle Related Deaths: In addition to fighting on Turkish territory, the Turkish army during 2008 conducted several cross-border air-strikes and ground incursions against PKK bases in northern Iraq. The number of casualties in these operations are disputed, particularly with regards to one major offensive that was launched in late February, and another in early May. While the Turkish government and US intelligence sources have alleged the operations were successful with a high number of casualties on the PKK side, the rebels - and local officials in the Iraqi Kurdish region - have made contrary claims. As there are no independent figures available, only the own losses admitted by the parties in relation to these operations have been included in the best estimate."
Comment on Active: In late 2007, after an escalation in PKK attacks, the Turkish government stepped up its military action against the PKK, with parliament authorising operations against PKK headquarters in northern Iraq. In 2008, cross-border air-strikes continued, supplemented by ground incursions. The mandate for cross-border operations was renewed by parliament in October 2008. On two occasions, in September and December 2008, the PKK announced unilateral ceasefires in connection to Muslim festivities, claiming this reflected their desire to find a peaceful solution to the conflict and calling for negotiations. However, armed clashes as well as the planting of bombs and landmines by the PKK continued throughout the year, and in total the fighting resulted in over 500 deaths. The bulk of the fighting took place in the PKK stronghold areas of southeastern Turkey and northern Iraq.
Negotiations: NO
Comment on Negotiations: There were no negotiations between the parties in 2008, despite some calls for dialogue by the PKK. In September and December 2008, the PKK called brief unilateral ceasefires in connection to Muslim festivities, claiming this reflected their desire to find a peaceful solution to the conflict and calling for negotiations. However, the Turkish government has generally refused to negotiate with the PKK, whom they regard as terrorists.
Victory: NO
Terminated: NO
2009 Dyad Archive
Comment on Active: As of 2009 the armed conflict is still ongoing after 25 years of fighting and many thousand fatalities. However, signs of rapprochement during the year raised hope for a political solution.
In spring 2009, the Turkish President Gul acknowledged the importance of the Kurdish question for Turkey, which had been treated as a mere security issue by most Turkish politicians before. In June, Prime Minister Erdogan met with a delegation of the pro-Kurdish Democratic Society Party (DTP) for the first time and announced that the government would grant Turkish Kurds more cultural and political rights. In the reform package, which was presented to the Turkish Parliament in November, Kurdish language rights were gradually expanded to broadcast Kurdish radio and television programs and to teach the Kurdish language at university for the first time. The reform package also included the creation of an independent body to investigate cases of torture. At the same time, the Turkish government continued to refuse negotations with PKK and did not allow the imprisoned PKK-leader Öcalan publish his own roadmap for peace. PKK announced unilateral ceasefires in April and September, which were, however, not formally recognised by Ankara. Thus, skirmishes between PKK and the Turkish military continued, albeit on a lower scale. PKK attacks gave rise to domestic opposition to the government peace initiative and in October, the Turkish parliament extended the mandate of the government forces to launch cross-border operations against Kurdish rebels in Iraq.
The peace initiative suffered another set back, when the Constitutional Court banned the Kurdish party DTP for cooperating with PKK in December. This led to unrest in the Kurdish-populated south-east.
Negotiations: NO
Comment on Negotiations: In June 2009, the Turkish Prime Minister Erdogan met with a delegation of the pro-Kurdish Democratic Society Party (DTP) for the first time and announced that the government would grant Turkish Kurds more cultural and political rights. However, the Turkish government continued to refuse to negotiate with the imprisoned PKK leader Öcalan and did not permit him to publish his own peace plan.
Victory: NO
Terminated: NO
2010 Dyad Archive
Comment on Yearly Battle Related Deaths: The difference between the High and Best numbers in 2010 originates in the varying estimates put forward by different sources. Most of this difference can be accounted through the existence of some inconsistencies between UCDPs event-coded data and summaries of casualties put forward by various Turkish military forces.
Comment on Active: After over 25 years of fighting and tens of thousands of fatalities, the armed conflict continues unabated. The pattern of violence was similar to that observed in previous years, with relative period of calm in the early months of the year followed by a significant increase in violence during the spring and summer, followed yet again by a period of calm in the latter part of the year. This is mostly due to physical constraints - as most fighting occurs in the mountainous areas at the border of Turkey and Iraq, movement is severely impeded as snow covers most mountain passes PKK use, impeding fighting.
Compared to 2009, the intensity of fighting increased significantly, especially between May 2010 and August 2010. As such, on 29 May 2009, Öcalan, PKKs jailed leader declared any talks with Turkey will be ended, also scrapping (on 3 June 2010) the rarely observed unilateral cease-fire that PKK declared in April 2009. Similarly, the Turkish Security Forces intensified their actions against PKK - with operations taking place not only within Turkey itself, but also inside Iraq. As such, in one such event, on 20 May 2010, Turkish fighter planes attacked the Harkuk camp, one of the main outposts of PKK, killing 121. Further increase in tensions occured after a PKK bombing of a Turkish naval base in Iskenderun on 31 May 2010, causing public outrage, determining the Turkish president to declare, on 19 June 2010, that PKK has to be fought until it is eradicated. Moreover, the government initiated a series of reforms within the Turkish security forces, such as the construction of 150 military outposts in the border areas where PKK operates and creation of a professional army designed to fight PKK and be deployed in areas threatened by violence. Further, much of the so-called Kurdish opening was frozen throughout the summer of 2010. Further, Turkey relied on significant assistance from Iran, Syria and the United States in providing various forms of support in their fight against PKK.
On 13 August 2010, PKK declared a unilateral cease-fire, both following a PKK tradition to do so during the month of Ramadan, but also as a means to pressure the government in the wake of a constitutional referendum scheduled to take place on 12 September 2010. While the cease-fire did not mark an end to hostilities, it did lead to a significant decrease in violence, and was prolonged a number of times, extending to the General Elections of 2011. A further sign of PKK’s intentions to negotiate was made on 31 October 2010, when PKK leaders condemned a suicide attack that wounded 32 civilians in Istanbul. The attack was claimed by the Kurdish Freedom Falcons (TAK), a PKK splinter group.
Further, while the policy of the Government remained to label PKK as a terrorist negotiation, refusing to engage in any direct negotiations, information surfaced that at least some contact (through indirect means such as lawyers) existed, especially during and after September 2010. Moreover, PKKs cease-fire was officially noted in November 2010 by both Abdullah Gül, the president of Turkey and by prime-minister Recep Tayyip Erdogan. Furthermore, on 3 November 2011, Erdogan declared a scale down of military operation against PKK has commenced. However, this did not lead to a complete cessation of hostilities - incidents of fighting between the Government of Turkey and PKK being noted in December 2010.
Negotiations: NO
Comment on Negotiations: The policy of the Government remained to label PKK as a terrorist negotiation, refusing to engage in any direct negotiations. However, information surfaced that at least some contact (through indirect means such as lawyers) existed, especially during and after September 2010.
Victory: NO
Terminated: NO
2011 Dyad Archive
Comment on Yearly Battle Related Deaths: The difference between the High and the Best estimates in 2011 mainly stem from different figures regarding the August military operation in northern Iraq.
Comment on Active: In 2011, the decades old conflict between the Government of Turkey and the PKK continued and reached the highest number of battle related deaths since 1999. The year was characterized by some special developments, mainly the Turkish general elections in June and the intense military campaign of Turkey in northern Iraq in the fall, interrupted by a break due to the heavy earthquake in south-eastern Turkey on 23 October.
In the begining of 2011, little pointed for the year to be the bloodiest in over a decade. The ceasefire announced unilaterally by PKK in August 2010, and accepted by Turkey in November 2010, was respected by both sides and signs were positive that Kurdish candidates could campaign freely for the Turkish General elections. The situation changed in March, when PKK threatened to end the ceasefire originally announced to last until after the elections. Soon after, fighting resumed, and led to the first fatalities of the year on 15 March. In the following weeks, a series of mutual attacks took place according to the usual pattern observed in previous years. Noteworthy was the 4 May attack by the PKK on a police escort of Prime Minister Erdogan during a campaign stop in northern Turkey, killing one police man.
Prime Minister Erdogan emerged as the big winner of the 12 June elections. Further, 36 Kurdish candidates were elected to the parliament, a record high. Yet, just days after the elections, Kurdish MP Hatip Dicle was stripped of his newly won seat by the Higher Electoral Board due to a previously received jail sentence under Turkeys anti-terror law. This decision led to popular protests among the Kurdish minority, threats by the PKK to further escalate violence and a boycott of all other 35 Kurdish MPs who refused to take up their position until Dicle was allowed to take up his seat too.
Over the summer, violence indeed increased and attacks from both sides became more frequent. On 14 July, an attack of the PKK resulted in the death of 13 soldiers and 7 killed PKK fighters, the single most violent incident in years. Further, on 17 August, PKK ambushed a military unit, killing 9. The following day, the Turkish Air Force started bombing PKK positions in south-eastern Turkey and northern Iraq, an operation that went on for the reminder of August and resulted in a total of 145 deaths. In September and October, violence remained at a high level with both sides carrying out major operations in Turkey and in northern Iraq. In mid-October, Turkey intensified its activities even more and, on several occasions, conducted ground operations also on Iraqi territory - a development not observed in the previous years.
Due to the earthquake in the region on 23 October, violence calmed down, and on some occasions even cooperation between the army and the local Kurdish population for rescue missions were reported. After a short break, violence re-occurred on a lower level during November, only to increase again in the second half of December when army operations resulted in the death of dozens of PKK fighters. In the course of these operations, Turkey also bombed and killed 35 civilians crossing from Iraq into Turkey. While Turkey immediately apologized and stated that they were mistaken for PKK fighters, Kurdish officials accused Turkey of deliberately targeting civilians.
Negotiations: NO
Comment on Negotiations: No formal negotiations took place between the Government of Turkey and PKK in 2011. The policy of the Government remained to label PKK as a terrorist organisation, refusing to engage in any direct negotiations.
Victory: NO
Terminated: NO
2012 Dyad Archive
Comment on Yearly Battle Related Deaths: The conflict between the Government of Turkey and PKK continued to escalate in 2012, with the highest number of recorded battle-related deaths since the end of the 1990s. The violence was on-going throughout the year, but escalated drastically during the second half of the year.
Comment on Active: The conflict between the Government of Turkey and PKK continued to escalate in 2012, with the highest number of recorded battle-related deaths since the end of the 1990s. The violence was on-going throughout the year, but escalated drastically during the second half of the year. Following increased clashes in August, the Turkish military launched a large-scale offensive in early September in the south-eastern province of Hakkari.
The clear majority of the fighting took place in south-eastern Turkey, but Turkish air force also conducted several attacks against PKK targets in northern Iraq.
Negotiations: YES
Comment on Negotiations: In mid-July the Turkish Prime Minister, Recep Tayyip Erdogan, stated that negotiations could not be held with the PKK prior to a disarmament. However, in late September the prime minister indicated a possibility of restarting the talks. In mid-December it was revealed that new round of talks were on-going with the jailed PKK-leader, Abdullah Öcalan. The main focus of the talks was stated to be the question of PKK’s disarmament.
Victory: NO
Terminated: NO
2013 Dyad Archive
Comment on Active: 2013 has not been updated yet
Negotiations: YES
Victory: YES
Terminated: YES
Type of termination: Ceasefire
Date of termination: 2013-03-21
Comment on Termination: On 21 March 2013 a ceasefire was announced by Öcalan and in May 2013 PKK began a withdrawal into northern Iraq of all forces on Turkish soil.
2014 Dyad Archive
Negotiations: NO
Victory: NO
Terminated: NO
2015 Dyad Archive
Comment on Yearly Battle Related Deaths: The conflict between the Government of Turkey and PKK, which had been largely inactive since the spring of 2013, escalated dramatically in 2015. The conflict re-erupted in July 2015 and resulted in the highest number of recorded battle-related deaths since the end of the 1990s, despite only being active during the second half of the year.
Comment on Active: The fragile ceasefire between the Government of Turkey and the PKK which had been in place since March 2013 was abandoned in late July 2015. This effectively ended the peace process which had been initiated in late 2012. Tensions had been building with the PKK blaming the Government for not preventing Islamic State (IS ) attacks on Kurds in Turkey. Immediately after the IS suicide bomb in Suruc on July 20 which killed 33 – mainly Kurdish – civilians, the conflict quickly escalated to a level not seen since the 1990s. The remainder of the year saw daily attacks by PKK on security forces in the Kurdish-dominated southeastern parts of Turkey. The Government conducted large security operations in the southeast which intensified in the last weeks of the year. Air raids targeting the PKK were launched regularly in southeastern Turkey as well as in the Qandil mountains in northern Iraq. There were heavy casualties on both sides and civilian casualities mounted, particularly in key towns placed under curfew, e.g. Cizre.
Negotiations: NO
Victory: NO
Terminated: NO
2016 Dyad Archive
Terminated: NO
2017 Dyad Archive
Terminated: NO
2018 Dyad Archive
Terminated: NO
2019 Dyad Archive
Terminated: NO
2020 Dyad Archive
Terminated: NO
2021 Dyad Archive
Terminated: NO
2022 Dyad Archive
Comment on Active: In 2022 the majority of the fatalities were PKK soldiers targeted with airstrikes in northern Iraq during the military operation initiated by the Turkish Armed Forces on April 18 under the name ‘Operation Claw-Lock’. The number of fatalities in the conflict Turkey:Kurdistan continued the increasing trend from the year before.
Negotiations: NO
Victory: NO
Terminated: NO
Type of termination: Not terminated
2023 Dyad Archive
Comment on Active: In 2023, similarly to 2022, the majority of fatalities were PKK soldiers targeted with airstrikes and drone attacks in northern Iraq where the Turkish Armed Forces initiated a military operation in April last year under the name ‘Operation Claw-Lock’. A number of fatalities were also recorded in Turkey. The best estimate of fatalities in the Turkey:Kurdistan conflict decreased significantly compared to the previous years, coming closer to the fatality count recorded in 2020.
Negotiations: NO
Victory: NO
Terminated: NO
Type of termination: Not terminated
2024 Dyad Archive
Comment on Active: In 2024, the intensity of the conflict remained low, continuing the downward trend seen since the launch of Operation Claw-Lock in 2022. As in previous years, most of the fatalities were PKK fighters targeted by airstrikes and drone attacks in northern Iraq. Some fatalities were also recorded in Turkey. The best estimate of fatalities in the Turkey: Kurdistan conflict decreased significantly in 2024 compared to previous years, reaching its lowest level since the collapse of the peace negotiations in 2015.
Negotiations: NO
Victory: NO
Terminated: NO
Type of termination: Not terminated
2025 Dyad Archive
Terminated: NO