General information
Part of Conflict: Ethiopia: Ogaden
Date of first stated goals of incompatibility: 1977-09-04
Comment on date of first stated goal of incompatibility: Many of the leaders of WSLF had a history in the Ogaden Liberation Front, active in the mid-1960s and some analysts argue that the launch of WSLF was simply a reactivation of the older organisation. However, the leader was not the same and neither was the name or most of the rank and file, wherefore WSLF is viewed as a new, independent actor in UCDP data. The group was set up in 1974 or 1975, reports diverge, and it is now known that the intent from the outset was to “liberate” the part of eastern Ethiopia that was called Western Somalia. However, contemporary sources reported next to nothing about the group until it began launching military attacks in 1976, and even then information was very limited. It was only when the fighting escalated in mid-1977, and the Somali army launched an invasion (see the section on the Ethiopia – Somalia conflict in the database, as well as “” in the conflict description) that the Ogaden conflict came into the limelight and interviews were conducted with the leaders of WSLF.
On 24 August Abdulahi Hassan Mahmud, the WSLFs secretary-general and military commander confirmed that the conflict was fought over the status of the greater Ogaden region, saying that the population would get to decide on whether to become part of Somalia or opt for independence. However, the movement’s attitude towards the question of independence seems to have been problematic and over time it wavered between full independence and autonomy within Somalia.
A few days later, on 4 September, the group’s secretary-general specified the area that it was fighting for, stating that WSLF claimed all territory east of a line running from Moyale (on the Ethiopian-Kenya border) through Awash (on the edge of the Rift Valley, about 100 miles east of Addis Ababa, the Ethiopian capital) to El Adde (on the border with Djibouti), an area which he described as being inhabited by Somali people.
Date of first use of armed force: 1975-12-14
Comment on date of first use of armed force: Most sources agree that WSLF started infiltrating fighters across the border into Ethiopia from late 1975. In January 1976 the Ethiopian Government accused the Government of Somalia of having infiltrated agents and guerrillas in southern and eastern Ethiopia in preparation for a "full-scale war". The statement went on to say that between 14 December 1974 and 4 January 1976, at least nine Ethiopian policemen had been killed and 20 other people seriously wounded in attacks by the rebels.
First Battle Related Death: 1976-01-03
Comment on First Battle Related Death: Most sources agree that WSLF started infiltrating fighters across the border into Ethiopia from late 1975. In January 1976 the Ethiopian Government accused the Government of Somalia of having infiltrated agents and guerrillas in southern and eastern Ethiopia in preparation for a "full-scale war". The statement went on to say that between 14 December 1974 and 4 January 1976, at least nine Ethiopian policemen had been killed and 20 other people seriously wounded in attacks by the rebels. Subsequently, by 4 January – probably earlier – at least one fatality had been incurred in the fighting.
Date when dyad reached 25 battle releated deaths: 1976-10-31
Comment on date when dyad reached 25 battle related deaths: While there were reports of intermittent fighting in the contested region throughout 1976, very little information was given on the number of fatalities incurred. Ethiopia only admitted own losses twice during the year, saying that 9 policemen had been killed between 14 December 1975 and 4 January 1976, and stating that the rebels had killed 16 members of the countrys security forces in May 1976. Most probably the 25 battle-related deaths threshold was reached by then, since there appears to have been many further battles taking place (with no fatality information given) and since it seems unlikely that the rebels did not suffer any casualties. However, in line with UCDP coding criteria, the date for the crossing of the 25 battle-related deaths threshold is set to October, when more intense fighting was reported and clashes erupted in Bale, Sidamo and Arussi, including at a major Ethiopian airbase at Goba.
Conflict issues
Annual information
This section contains annual information systematically collected by the UCDP.
1976
| Estimated Fatalities | |
|---|---|
| High | 25 |
| Best | 25 |
| Low | 0 |
Secondary Warring Support:
Side A (Government of Ethiopia): n/a
Side B (WSLF): n/a
1977
| Estimated Fatalities | |
|---|---|
| High | 1000 |
| Best | 1000 |
| Low | 0 |
Secondary Warring Support:
Side A (Government of Ethiopia): Government of Cuba, Government of South Yemen
Side B (WSLF): Government of Somalia
1978
| Estimated Fatalities | |
|---|---|
| High | 1000 |
| Best | 1000 |
| Low | 0 |
Secondary Warring Support:
Side A (Government of Ethiopia): Government of Cuba, Government of South Yemen
Side B (WSLF): n/a
1979
| Estimated Fatalities | |
|---|---|
| High | 25 |
| Best | 25 |
| Low | 0 |
Secondary Warring Support:
Side A (Government of Ethiopia): Government of Cuba
Side B (WSLF): n/a
1980
| Estimated Fatalities | |
|---|---|
| High | 25 |
| Best | 25 |
| Low | 0 |
Secondary Warring Support:
Side A (Government of Ethiopia): Government of Cuba
Side B (WSLF): n/a
1981
| Estimated Fatalities | |
|---|---|
| High | 25 |
| Best | 25 |
| Low | 0 |
Secondary Warring Support:
Side A (Government of Ethiopia): Government of Cuba
Side B (WSLF): n/a
1982
| Estimated Fatalities | |
|---|---|
| High | 25 |
| Best | 25 |
| Low | 0 |
Secondary Warring Support:
Side A (Government of Ethiopia): Government of Cuba
Side B (WSLF): n/a
1983
| Estimated Fatalities | |
|---|---|
| High | 25 |
| Best | 25 |
| Low | 0 |
Secondary Warring Support:
Side A (Government of Ethiopia): Government of Cuba
Side B (WSLF): n/a
Dyad Archive
This section contains annual information no longer systematically collected by the UCDP.
1976 Dyad Archive
Comment on Active: While WSLF launched its armed struggle in late 1975, it wa1976s not until in 1976 that fighting escalated to such a level that the 25 battle-related deaths threshold was crossed, whereby the conflict was coded as active. Receiving substantial material support from the Somali government, the group also had a number of rear bases in the country, the main one located in Hargeisa. From these bases the rebels infiltrated across the border into Ethiopia, where they carried out guerrilla raids, targeting the state apparatus in the region; government offices were destroyed and the police was attacked.
Negotiations: NO
Comment on Negotiations: There were no negotiations between the government and WSLF in 1976.
Victory: NO
Terminated: NO
1977 Dyad Archive
Comment on Active: WSLF’s capacity had improved during 1976 and this process continued in early 1977, with attacks becoming both more frequent and effective. The rebels attacked army convoys, police stations and even fixed army positions and with the large popular support that they enjoyed, they were able to melt back into populace after each attack. This eventually led to the Ethiopian army largely being confined to garrison towns in the region, with WSLF controlling as much as 60 per cent of the countryside.
The main reason for WSLF’s increasing effectiveness was the large-scale support that it received from Somalia. With all this support, Mogadishu expected results. However, by early 1977 it was becoming clear that the WSLF’s progress was too slow for Somalia’s liking and Siad Barre subsequently sent in around 3000 Somali soldiers to fight alongside the rebels, thus providing what is termed secondary warring support by UCDP. Even this did not improve the situation, however, as the Somali soldiers entered Ethiopia disguised as rebels, having removed their uniforms and heavy equipment, and were thus obliged to resort to guerrilla warfare, in which they were not trained. In July Somalia subsequently decided to cut its losses and opted for a regular invasion, aiming for the Ogaden region to be included into a so-called “Greater Somalia” (see the section on the Ethiopia – Somalia conflict). During the rest of the year, two parallel conflicts raged in the region; the interstate one pitching Ethiopia against Somalia, and the intrastate one, in which WSLF continued to fight the Addis Ababa regime. In practice these two conflicts played out as one, as Somalia and WSLF coordinated their armed struggle and the latter more or less functioned as the former’s ancillaries.
The Somali and WSLF troops were initially successful, managing to push the Ethiopian troops out of Ogaden in only a few days. By mid-September they also succeeded in capturing Jijiga, after a couple of weeks of bloody battles. However, by late September the tide began to turn, with the Somali advance coming to a virtual standstill. This was mainly due to overextended fronts, bad weather and the harsh climate in the region. The rest of the year was characterized by a military stalemate, which neither side was able to break.
Negotiations: NO
Comment on Negotiations: As the intrastate conflict between WSLF and the Addis Ababa regime became entangled with the interstate war between Ethiopia and Somalia, it came into the international limelight for the first time. The Somali invasion led the OAU (Organisation of African Unity) to call into session its eight-nation mediation committee set up in 1973 to arbitrate in the Ethiopian-Somali border dispute. The committee subsequently met in Libreville on 5-9 August, joined by the Ethiopian and Somali Foreign Ministers. However, these talks came to an end when Somalia demanded that WSLF be included in the dialogue. Ethiopia staunchly refused, holding that WSLF was “a farce” and “financed, controlled and staffed by the regular Somali Army”.
In September WSLF secretary-general Abdulahi Hassan Mahmoud stated that he was not prepared to engage in ceasefire negotiations with Ethiopia until every “inch” of the land the group claimed had been “liberated”.
Victory: NO
Terminated: NO
1978 Dyad Archive
Comment on Active: In late January 1978, Ethiopia launched its counter-offensive, planned together with Russian and Cuban officers. The Ethiopian army quickly pushed the Somali and WSLF troops eastwards and on 5 March Jijiga was re-captured. After this the Somali defeat was imminent. Somali President Siad Barre on 8 March announced the unilateral withdrawal of the Somali troops and on 23 March Addis Ababa declared that the last frontier post had been regained and that the war was officially over. However, for the WSLF fighters this was not the case. After retreating from Jijiga, WSLF officials stated that that their war would still continue with them returning to guerrilla warfare, operating to cut the communication of Ethiopia’s forces. Over the next few months, this was exactly what the rebels did, with Mogadisho radio broadcasting announcements of a range of operations. While it is very probable that the Ethiopian casualty figures given in these announcements were grossly exaggerated it is clear that WSLF constituted a real problem for Addis Ababa, with the latter threatening to invade Somalia unless Mogadishu withdrew its support to the rebels.
As the year passed, WSLF activity increased and according to journalists travelling in the area, 90 per cent of the lowlands were in rebel hands and the army was largely confined to the towns, the main roads and the air.
Negotiations: NO
Comment on Negotiations: There were no negotiations between the Ethiopian government and WSLF in 1978. At a news conference in Kuwait on 31 July 1978, the defense chief of WSLF said that the front rejected the principle of negotiations “Because Ethiopia uses the language of force”.
Victory: NO
Terminated: NO
1979 Dyad Archive
Comment on Yearly Battle Related Deaths: Almost all fatality figures reported came from the rebel side in the conflict - a clearly biased source. However, a Reuters journalist travelling in the area reported of a three-day battle near Degehabur September, in which around 400 Ethiopians were killed.
Comment on Active: WSLF continued to pose a serious challenge to the regime in Addis Ababa in 1979. As during the previous year, the group controlled a majority of the lowland territories while the army was confined to the towns. According to international relief officers working in the region, the Ethiopian army’s response to the rebels’ military operations was a systematic campaign of terror and violence against the civilian population. These sweeps and patrols succeeded in temporarily reducing the rebels’ activities, but failed to weaken them in the long run.
In late 1979 the government changed its counterinsurgency strategy, adopting a four-pronged approach whereby much of the population was forced into shelters and so-called protected villages and the military launched offensives that targeted all people and economic assets remaining outside these shelters. Furthermore, Addis Ababa began sponsoring Somali insurgent groups against both WSLF and the Somali government and also worked to promote the repatriation of refugees.
Negotiations: NO
Comment on Negotiations: A violent event in 1979 indicated that the Ethiopian regime for the first time had attempted to open a dialogue with the rebels. Indicating a willingness to negotiate a ceasefire with WSLF, the government accepted an invitation from the rebels for a meeting. The military governor of Harar designated a 10-man delegation to meet them. Instead of initiating talks, the team fell into a trap, however, with a concealed WSLF force attacking the visitors and killing seven members of the delegation and capturing the remaining three. It had apparently been the rebel’s aim all along to take hostages to use in future ventures.
Victory: NO
Terminated: NO
1980 Dyad Archive
Comment on Active: In 1980, the Ethiopian government continued to pursue the counterinsurgency strategy that had been launched in late 1979. The civilian population was forced into so-called protected villages so as to deprive the rebels of their support and massive armed force was used in order to break and destroy the WSLF militarily. The rebel group had rear bases where they previously had been safe from Addis Ababa’s attacks, but also this changed with the new counterinsurgency strategy, since it entailed supporting Somali rebel groups, whereby they acted as proxies for the Ethiopian regime inside Somalia. All this served to drastically weaken WSLF.
In August a large-scale military offensive was launched by the Ethiopian government, aided by the Cuban mechanized brigade. Named “Operation Lash”, the offensive had by year’s end succeeded in pushing the rebels out of Ethiopia and into northern Somalia. The relative ease with which this was achieved is explained by a reputable source to be due to internal tensions within WSLF. The rebel group was made up of nine divisions, representing different clans, and these were fiercely competitive. This meant that when they were attacked by government forces they were often reluctant to aid one another.
Negotiations: NO
Comment on Negotiations: There were no negotiations between the government and WSLF in 1980.
Victory: NO
Terminated: NO
1981 Dyad Archive
Comment on Active: After the heavy blows that WSLF had been dealt in 1980, 1981 continued in a similar fashion. Having been pushed out if the Ogaden region by late 1980, the rebels were during the year only able to make brief incursions across the border to carry out guerilla attacks. Also putting a strain on the rebel group were increasing attacks by SNM (Somali National Movement) – a Somali rebel groups that Ethiopia supported and that functioned as a proxy for the Addis Ababa regime.
The group also suffered from political differences with its main supporter – the regime in Mogadishu – which weakened it substantially. This was tied to the internal differences that racked the group, with its long-time leaders being challenged by young radicals who wanted to distance the movement from Somalia, aiming for what they called “true self-determination”. A conference was convened and the veteran Central Committee led by Abdullahi Hassan Mahmoud and his deputy, Abdi Nasir was overwhelmingly defeated. A new executive was elected with a “progressive”, Mohammed Diriyeh Urdoch, as secretary-general. Furthermore, central committee membership was increased from 25 to 50.
Negotiations: NO
Comment on Negotiations: There were no negotiations between the government and WSLF in 1981.
Victory: NO
Terminated: NO
1982 Dyad Archive
Comment on Active: While WSLF had been substantially weakened during the past two years, the group still managed to conduct intermittent guerrilla operations from across the border in 1982. These largely consisted of hit-and-run attacks and night raids, and they were matched by search-and-pursuit operations by the Ethiopian army, in combination with heavy reprisals against the civilian population in villages in the vicinity of the rebel attacks.
Apart from being pursued by the army, WSLF was also involved in a conflict with the Addis Ababa – supported Somali rebel group SNM (Somali National Movement), serving as a proxy for Ethiopia. Clashes between WSLF and SNM were intense during 1982, which was one of the reason for the former’s low-key presence inside Ogaden.
Negotiations: NO
Comment on Negotiations: During the year, WSLF proposed two points “for solving the Western Somali issue”: First that Ethiopia should “recognize the WSLF as the legitimate and sole representative of the Western Somali people and second, that the Western Somali people should be allowed to run their own affairs without any preconditions, and, at the same time, that all foreign powers be withdrawn from Western Somali territory.” However, no negotiations were initiated.
Victory: NO
Terminated: NO
1983 Dyad Archive
Comment on Active: In 1983 conflict activity continued to be made up largely by intermittent guerrilla operations carried out by rebels temporarily infiltrating across the border from Somalia. There were a few exceptions however. WSLF managed to carry out some dramatic raids such as storming the prison in Jijiga in August. In reprisal for that action, the Ethiopian army destroyed the villages of Birgot, Midha and Burey and killed 300 civilians. By and large, WSLF more and more began to resemble a spent force, however.
Furthermore, the rebel group continued to be racked by internal problems. A sign of this was a decision taken on 4 December 1983 to postpone the annual congress of the WSLF, which was due to be held on 1 January 1984, until 1 January 1985.
Negotiations: NO
Victory: NO
Terminated: YES
Type of termination: No or Low Activity
Date of termination: 1983-12-31
Comment on Termination: By late 1983 a combination of military pressure by Ethiopia and its allies SNM (Somali National Movement) and internal differences had served to weaken WSLF to the point that it was no longer a military threat to the Addis Ababa regime. Subsequently, in 1984 armed activity did not cross the 25 battle-related deaths threshold required for a conflict to be recorded as active in UCDP data.
