General information
Part of Conflict: Uganda: Government
Date of first stated goals of incompatibility: 1987-03-01
Comment on date of first stated goal of incompatibility: Sometime in early 1987 Joseph Kony decided to take up arms against the government. People from his home village Odek – present at the time – say that he declared that he had been instructed by the Holy Spirit to fight and overthrow the new government. Kony subsequently left his home together with a small number of followers. Soon thereafter, Kony’s group met a number of Acholi soldiers who turned out to be the rebel group UPDA’s Black Battalion under the leadership of Major Benjamin Apia. Succeeding in persuading the Black Battalion to recognize his spiritual guidance, Kony soon became the overall leader of these men and by late 1987 he had assembled a large following which he named UHSA (United Holy Salvation Army), later to be renamed LRA.
Further statements from the group regarding the exact nature of its incompatibility with the government have over the years given a range of different reasons for the armed struggle. Initially, it was claimed that some of the causes of war were human rights violation against the Acholi population by the government army, ideological objections to Museveni’s system, lack of confidence in the government, the governments mismanagement of the economy, conscription into the NRA army and the lack of northerners in the government.
Apart from these political reasons, there was and continues to be another dimension to LRAs struggle; something that can be discerned from Kony’s initial declaration. The rebels are driven by a firm belief that their struggle is a divine cause, directed and guided by God through his prophet Kony. Kony, in one of his first speeches, said that he had been sent by God to liberate humanity from disease and suffering, but that he had come to realise that healing was senseless as long as those who were healed were then killed. Thus, he had resolved to fight to kill all those who wanted to fight and to destroy the evil forces in the world, promoting justice and righteousness throughout Uganda.
The exact date of Kony’s declaration of intent is not clear, but it took place sometime in early 1987. Early 1987 is, in line with UCDP coding rules, interpreted as during the first quarter of the year, which means that it must have taken place at the latest in March.
Date of first use of armed force: 1988-02-25
Comment on date of first use of armed force: The situation in northern Uganda in the late 1980s was extremely confused with a number of rebel groups being referred to as “Lakwenas” or the “Holy Spirit Movement II”, both names indicating a link with the defunct Holy Spirit Movement of Alice Lakwena. Alice fought the government from 1986 to November 1987, when she suffered a major defeat and was forces to flee to Kenya. The groups that subsequently emerged are distinct from Alice’s rebels, something that reports from this time had not picked up on. Therefore, it is difficult to establish when the movement which would later become LRA (see comment on name of primary party) first used armed force. However, many sources suggest that LRA leader Joseph Kony started operating on his own, attacking government troops, sometime in late 1987 / early 1988.
The first substantiated report of what would be LRA, using armed force against the forces of the government is dated to 25 February 1988, when a clash occurred outside of Gulu.
First Battle Related Death: 1988-02-25
Comment on First Battle Related Death: There may well have been battle-related deaths as early as 1987, but confused news reporting concerning the different rebel movements makes this impossible to substantiate. However, in late February, it is possible to conclude that it was Kony’s rebels who fought the NRA (the government army) outside Gulu. At that date, the NRA had caught up with a group of rebels who had recently killed 50 civilians in Koch Goma, near Gulu. The death toll in the 25 February clash was 25.
Date when dyad reached 25 battle releated deaths: 1988-02-25
Comment on date when dyad reached 25 battle related deaths: There may well have been battle-related deaths as early as 1987, but confused news reporting concerning the different rebel movements makes this impossible to substantiate. However, in late February, it is possible to conclude that it was Kony’s rebels who fought the NRA (the government army) outside Gulu. At that date, the NRA had caught up with a group of rebels who had recently killed 50 civilians in Koch Goma, near Gulu. The death toll in the 25 February clash was 25.
Conflict issues
Conflict Goal Issues: The Lord’s Resistance Army (LRA), previously known as HSM II, UHSA, UCDA, and UDCM/A, was a Christian nationalist rebel group fighting against the government of Uganda as part of a divine cause believed to be guided by God to free the world from evil. The group emerged from the Acholi ethnic group, which it claimed to represent throughout its existence, although the group appeared to be more characterized by its Christian faith than its Acholi ethnicity. The group emerged in 1987, during which it stated several conflict goal issues. LRA called for civil-, cultural-, and language rights to be protected through increased national integration through intertribal marriages being promoted. The group also called for education to be provided to all people, and for “rehabilitation of the economy and rehabilitation of the country’s infrastructure”, calling for public services to be provided and economic reform to be implemented. LRA also called for increased power-sharing through incorporating people from Northern Uganda into the government, for elections to be held, for relations with neighboring states to be improved, and for the establishment of an “ethnically balanced army”. Finally, LRA also called for structural changes to the judicial and executive systems through the “creation of a Religious Affairs Ministry to ‘see an end to the use of witchcraft and sorcery by promotion of the Ten Commandments’.” During the same year, the group also called for the establishment of a politically independent judiciary.
As the conflict progressed, calls for changing the judicial system were frequently interpreted and the calls continued to be divided between regarding the establishment of a religious judiciary and an independent judiciary, although emphasis was mostly placed on the religious judiciary based around the ten commandments toward the latter stages of the conflict. Calls for executive power-sharing were made on occasion, although not with much continuity. Foreign policy reform was also raised by LRA, although statements became more focused on preventing Ugandan expansion into neighboring countries than building relations with other countries. Issues pertaining to the rights of citizens and their access to public services were not explicitly stated after 1987. Calls for military reform to become more representative of the people of northern Uganda were frequently interpreted, particularly toward the latter stages of the conflict. LRA also raised several new issues, although only those that were stated with emphasis and continuity will be mentioned here. From 1996 and onwards, the group began frequently and continuously calling for the establishment of multi-party democracy in Uganda. In some cases, particularly toward the end of the conflict, the group called for the federalization of the state to give more power to regional governance structures and ethnic groups. LRA also frequently stated its intentions to oust the sitting governments of Uganda throughout the conflict, although such statements were not interpreted after 2004. This also included several calls for the removal of Ugandan President Yoweri Museveni and his cabinet.
The main conflict goal issues of LRA throughout the conflict was the establishment of a religious judicial system, the ousting of the Ugandan government, and the establishment of a proper multi-party democracy in Uganda. These issues were frequently stated throughout the conflict and were all heavily emphasized in many coded years.
Conflict Dynamics Issues: LRA stated one conflict dynamics issue during 1987, when the group accused the Ugandan army of military misconduct through violating human rights. As the conflict progressed, the issue of military conduct was frequently reemphasized, mainly through using civilians and civilian communities as human shields. The group also accused the military of initiating hostilities and of intentionally targeting Acholi civilians based on their ethnicity. Whilst LRA made numerous statements toward the international community to either support the group through aid, monitoring, and financial and political support, and for the withdrawal of foreign forces, influence, and financial support, the only issue that was continuously stated was the assistance of the international community in providing a third-party mediator to resolve the conflict and issues pertaining to the removal or changing of the mediator. Towards the end of the conflict, LRA made several statements calling for Acholi refugees to be allowed to return to their lands.
The main conflict dynamics issues of LRA were the issues of military misconduct, ethnically motivated atrocities, and the assistance with third-party mediation. The first two issues were central to the group throughout the entire conflict, and the issue of third-party mediation was particularly important towards the end of the conflict. The issue of mediation was also heavily contested, as calls for international assistance with mediation were joined with calls for the removal of appointed and suggested mediators under allegations of bias and corruption.
Conflict Resolution Issues: In 1987, LRA called for national dialogue to be promoted through a national conference being held which would be followed with general elections. This issue was only explicitly reemphasized once, in 2012. Throughout the conflict, the group made several statements calling for negotiations, and stating several demands and conditions for negotiations to be held, with the government. Towards the end of the conflict, these conditions were specifically focused on the presence of third-party mediators and assistance. Sparse statements were also made regarding accountability of military commanders and political figures for atrocities committed during the violence, calls for a general amnesty for its soldiers, and for ceasefires to be implemented.
The main conflict resolution issue of LRA was the issue of negotiations. This issue was continuously stated throughout the conflict with heavy emphasis and was clearly central to the group in attempting to resolve the conflict politically.
Type of conflict issues: Conflict Goal Issues: Basic needs, Change judicial system, Civil rights, Constitutional issues, Corruption, CPS: Democracy, CPS: Other/undefined system, Cultural rights, Destruction of cultural heritage, Economic reforms, Electoral fraud, Electoral reform, Executive power-sharing, Federalism, Foreign policy reform, Freedom of association, Gender rights, Hold elections, Human rights, Land reforms, Language rights, Oust full executive, Oust head of the executive, Public services, Referendum, Reform executive structure, Reform judicial system, Reform parliament, Religious rights, Restriction of children’s rights, Restrictions on religious rights, Restructure military forces, Revenues from natural resources, Security sector power-sharing
Conflict Dynamics Issues: Call for collective targeting: other group, Atrocities and abuses, Call for collective targeting: religious, Collective targeting: ethnic, Collective targeting: political, DFI: Removal of foreign influence, DFI: Removal of foreign mediator, DFI: Withdrawal of humanitarian aid, DFI: Withdrawal of military intervention/foreign forces, DFI: Withdrawal of military support, DFI: Withdrawal of political support, IFI: Financial support, IFI: Foreign mediator, IFI: Humanitarian aid, IFI: International monitoring, IFI: Military support, IFI: Political support, IFI: Recognition, IFI: Use of foreign influence, Military conduct, Return of refugees/IDPs, Revenge/vengeance
Conflict Resolution Issues: Accountability/prosecution/investigation, Amnesties, Call for ceasefire, Call for negotiations, Compensation/restoration, DDR issues, National dialogue, Opposition to negotiations, Peace agreement implementation, Recognition of wrongdoing, Structure of negotiations, Structure of peace agreement
Annual information
This section contains annual information systematically collected by the UCDP.
1987
| Estimated Fatalities | |
|---|---|
| High | 0 |
| Best | 0 |
| Low | 0 |
Secondary Warring Support:
Side A (Government of Uganda): n/a
Side B (LRA): n/a
1988
| Estimated Fatalities | |
|---|---|
| High | 1563 |
| Best | 1413 |
| Low | 1413 |
Secondary Warring Support:
Side A (Government of Uganda): n/a
Side B (LRA): n/a
1989
| Estimated Fatalities | |
|---|---|
| High | 566 |
| Best | 566 |
| Low | 566 |
Secondary Warring Support:
Side A (Government of Uganda): n/a
Side B (LRA): n/a
1990
| Estimated Fatalities | |
|---|---|
| High | 89 |
| Best | 77 |
| Low | 77 |
Secondary Warring Support:
Side A (Government of Uganda): n/a
Side B (LRA): n/a
1991
| Estimated Fatalities | |
|---|---|
| High | 816 |
| Best | 816 |
| Low | 816 |
Secondary Warring Support:
Side A (Government of Uganda): n/a
Side B (LRA): n/a
1992
| Estimated Fatalities | |
|---|---|
| High | 0 |
| Best | 0 |
| Low | 0 |
Secondary Warring Support:
Side A (Government of Uganda): n/a
Side B (LRA): n/a
1994
| Estimated Fatalities | |
|---|---|
| High | 226 |
| Best | 149 |
| Low | 149 |
Secondary Warring Support:
Side A (Government of Uganda): n/a
Side B (LRA): n/a
1995
| Estimated Fatalities | |
|---|---|
| High | 332 |
| Best | 295 |
| Low | 295 |
Secondary Warring Support:
Side A (Government of Uganda): n/a
Side B (LRA): n/a
1996
| Estimated Fatalities | |
|---|---|
| High | 1035 |
| Best | 689 |
| Low | 689 |
Secondary Warring Support:
Side A (Government of Uganda): n/a
Side B (LRA): n/a
1997
| Estimated Fatalities | |
|---|---|
| High | 763 |
| Best | 502 |
| Low | 502 |
Secondary Warring Support:
Side A (Government of Uganda): n/a
Side B (LRA): n/a
1998
| Estimated Fatalities | |
|---|---|
| High | 654 |
| Best | 551 |
| Low | 551 |
Secondary Warring Support:
Side A (Government of Uganda): n/a
Side B (LRA): n/a
1999
| Estimated Fatalities | |
|---|---|
| High | 11 |
| Best | 11 |
| Low | 11 |
Secondary Warring Support:
Side A (Government of Uganda): n/a
Side B (LRA): n/a
2000
| Estimated Fatalities | |
|---|---|
| High | 181 |
| Best | 164 |
| Low | 164 |
Secondary Warring Support:
Side A (Government of Uganda): n/a
Side B (LRA): n/a
2001
| Estimated Fatalities | |
|---|---|
| High | 158 |
| Best | 110 |
| Low | 110 |
Secondary Warring Support:
Side A (Government of Uganda): n/a
Side B (LRA): n/a
2002
| Estimated Fatalities | |
|---|---|
| High | 1805 |
| Best | 1010 |
| Low | 1010 |
Secondary Warring Support:
Side A (Government of Uganda): n/a
Side B (LRA): n/a
2003
| Estimated Fatalities | |
|---|---|
| High | 1100 |
| Best | 642 |
| Low | 641 |
Secondary Warring Support:
Side A (Government of Uganda): n/a
Side B (LRA): n/a
2004
| Estimated Fatalities | |
|---|---|
| High | 2215 |
| Best | 1610 |
| Low | 1609 |
Secondary Warring Support:
Side A (Government of Uganda): n/a
Side B (LRA): n/a
2005
| Estimated Fatalities | |
|---|---|
| High | 814 |
| Best | 695 |
| Low | 695 |
Secondary Warring Support:
Side A (Government of Uganda): Government of Sudan
Side B (LRA): n/a
2006
| Estimated Fatalities | |
|---|---|
| High | 318 |
| Best | 221 |
| Low | 221 |
Secondary Warring Support:
Side A (Government of Uganda): n/a
Side B (LRA): n/a
2007
| Estimated Fatalities | |
|---|---|
| High | 5 |
| Best | 5 |
| Low | 5 |
Secondary Warring Support:
Side A (Government of Uganda): n/a
Side B (LRA): n/a
Peace agreements
Name of peace agreement: Agreement on Comprehensive Solutions between the Government of the Republic of Uganda and Lord’s Resistance Army/Movement
Date when warring parties signed the agreement: 2007-05-02
Comment of peace agreement: Partial peace agreement
The Agreement on Comprehensive Solutions between the Government of the Republic of Uganda and Lord’s Resistance Army/Movement was signed as part of the Juba peace process, which began in mid-2006. Comprehensive solutions to the conflict had been the second point on the negotiation agenda and talks on the subject had been ongoing intermittently since September 2006.
The accord provides general guidelines for addressing the long-term economic, political and social issues that afflict northern Uganda. Under the accord equal opportunities and treatment, diversity in government institutions, redevelopment of the norths economic and educational infrastructure and the resettlement of internally displaced persons (IDPs) are identified as prioritised areas in building a sustainable peace.
Signatories: For the Government of Uganda: Henry Oryem Okello, Minister of State for Foreign Affairs
For the LRA: Mr. Martin Ojul, Leader of the LRA/M Delegation
Witnessed by: Dr. Samson L. Kwaje, Minister for Information and Broadcasting in the Government of Southern Sudan and Acting Mediator of the Peace Talks.
Third parties: H.E. Dr. Samson L. Kwaje, Minister for Information and Broadcasting in the Government of Southern Sudan and Acting Mediator of the Peace Talks.
Comment of third parties role in peace agreement: Dr. Samson L. Kwaje witnessed the peace agreement
Ended: True
Date agreement ended: 2008-09-11
Comment of Duration: This agreement was concluded as part of the Juba Peace Process. The Juba process was supposed to be ended by a final agreement, after which all other agreements would be implemented. The agreement was planned for 29 February 2008. The planned signing ceremony was rescheduled numerous times as Joseph Kony the leader of LRA failed to turn up due to different obstacles. On 11 April 2008 the government of Uganda stated that the signing had been put off and that the government had no plans to extend the Cessation of Hostilities Agreement unless circumstances significantly change. On 11 September chief mediator Riek Machar disbanded the cessation of hostilities monitoring team and declared the peace process over. LRA did not abide by the ceasefire and on 14 December 2008 Uganda launched military operations against LRA with US backing.
Full-text peace agreement
Name of peace agreement: Agreement on Accountability and Reconciliation between the Government of the Republic of Uganda and the Lords Resistance Army/Movement
Date when warring parties signed the agreement: 2007-06-29
Comment of peace agreement: Partial peace agreement
The Agreement on Accountability and Reconciliation between the Government of the Republic of Uganda and the Lords Resistance Army/Movement was the second accord signed within the Juba peace process. The question of accountability had been highly controversial due to the ICC indictments against five top-LRA leaders, including Kony.
In the accord, the parties agreed to establish a viable national alternative to ICC indictments. The agreement provides for the formation of a domestic legal framework that will function as a substitute for the ICC prosecutions. This is to be complemented by alternative processes like traditional justice. Under the accord, the rebel commanders that are accused of serious crimes will face formal criminal and civil justice proceedings in courts, which can impose as of yet undetermined "alternative penalties and sanctions" that will replace existing penalties". Abuses by the national army are to be pursued in the criminal justice system.
Signatories: For the Government of Uganda: Dr S Kagoda, Permanent Secretary, Ministry of Internal Affairs & Acting Head of the Government of Uganda Delegation
For the LRA: Mr. Martin Ojul, Leader of the LRA/M Delegation
Agreement witnessed by: H.E Lt. Gen. Riek Machar Teny-Dhurgon (PhD), Vice President of the Government of Southern Sudan and Mediator of the Government of Uganda - Lord’s Resistance Army/Movement Peace Talks; H.E Japheth R Getugi for the Government of the Republic of Kenya and; H.E Ali I Siwa for the Government of the United Republic of Tanzania
Third parties: H.E Lt. Gen. Riek Machar Teny-Dhurgon (PhD), Vice President of the Government of Southern Sudan and Mediator of the Government of Uganda - Lord’s Resistance Army/Movement Peace Talks; H.E Japheth R Getugi for the Government of the Republic of Kenya and; H.E Ali I Siwa for the Government of the United Republic of Tanzania
Comment of third parties role in peace agreement: Riek Machar, Japheth R Getugi and Ali I Siwa witnessed the agreement
Ended: True
Date agreement ended: 2008-09-11
Comment of Duration: This agreement was concluded as part of the Juba Peace Process. The Juba process was supposed to be ended by a final agreement, after which all other agreements would be implemented. The agreement was planned for 29 February 2008. The planned signing ceremony was rescheduled numerous times as Joseph Kony the leader of LRA failed to turn up due to different obstacles. On 11 April 2008 the government of Uganda stated that the signing had been put off and that the government had no plans to extend the Cessation of Hostilities Agreement unless circumstances significantly change. On 11 September chief mediator Riek Machar disbanded the cessation of hostilities monitoring team and declared the peace process over. LRA did not abide by the ceasefire and on 14 December 2008 Uganda launched military operations against LRA with US backing.
Full-text peace agreement
2008
| Estimated Fatalities | |
|---|---|
| High | 66 |
| Best | 53 |
| Low | 53 |
Secondary Warring Support:
Side A (Government of Uganda): Government of DR Congo (Zaire), Government of Sudan
Side B (LRA): n/a
Peace agreements
Name of peace agreement: Annex to the accountability and reconciliation protocol
Date when warring parties signed the agreement: 2008-02-19
Comment of peace agreement: Partial peace agreement
The annex provides measures to implement the June 29 agreement on Accountability and Reconciliation and in it the parties agree that a special division of the Ugandan High Court shall investigate and prosecute those who planned or carried out war crimes and “widespread, systematic, or serious attacks” on civilians during the conflict. It is furthermore stated that the traditional justice system, known as Mato Oput, shall supplement the national one and that the two shall serve as an alternative to the International Criminal Court (ICC). Furthermore, it provides for a commission to hold hearings and to analyse and preserve the history of the conflict. Another important aspect of the annex is that it stipulates for the government to establish mechanisms to make reparations to victims of the conflict.
Signatories: Hon. Ruhakana Rugtinefa (Dr) Minister of Internal Affairs and Head of GoU Delegation
Dr David Nyekorach Matsanga Leader of the LRA/M Delegation
WITNESSED BY:
H.E. Lt. General Riek Ivlachar Teny-DhurgorTfPhD Teny-DhurgorT(PhD) Vice President, Government of Southern Sudan And Chief Mediator of the Peace Talks
H.E. André M Kapanga (PhD) For the Government of the Democratic Republic of Congo
H.E. Japhbtn R. Getugi For the Government of the Republic of Kenya
H.E. NsavJkeG. Ndatta For the Government of the United Republic of Tanzania
H.E. Francisco Caetana Madeira For the Government of the Republic of Mozambique
Lt. Gen. (Rtd.) Gilbert Lebeko Ramano For the Government of the Republic of South Africa
HE. Jan Ledang For the Government of Norway
Ms Anna Sundstrom Political Advisor to the EU Special Representative for the Great Lakes Region For the European Union
Mr Timothy R. Shortley Senior Advisor to the Assistant Secretary of State for African Affairs. For the Government of the United States of America
Comment of signatories: Dyadic peace agreement
Ended: True
Date agreement ended: 2008-09-11
Comment of Duration: This agreement was concluded as part of the Juba Peace Process. The Juba process was supposed to be ended by a final agreement, after which all other agreements would be implemented. The agreement was planned for 29 February 2008. The planned signing ceremony was rescheduled numerous times as Joseph Kony the leader of LRA failed to turn up due to different obstacles. On 11 April 2008 the government of Uganda stated that the signing had been put off and that the government had no plans to extend the Cessation of Hostilities Agreement unless circumstances significantly change. On 11 September chief mediator Riek Machar disbanded the cessation of hostilities monitoring team and declared the peace process over. LRA did not abide by the ceasefire and on 14 December 2008 Uganda launched military operations against LRA with US backing.
Full-text peace agreement
Name of peace agreement: Implementation protocol to the Agreement on Comprehensive Solutions
Date when warring parties signed the agreement: 2008-02-22
Comment of peace agreement: Partial peace agreement
The protocol sets out the framework by which the 2 May 2007 Agreement on Comprehensive Solutions is to be implemented. Under the accord, recruitment into the armed forces and the security agencies and their composition are to reflect national numbers. It also stipulates that an “Equal Opportunities Commission” is to be set up after the signing of the Final Peace Agreement. This body will be charged with investigating any regional or ethnic imbalances and disparities in participation in government departments and institutions. Furthermore, it provides for the establishment of a “diaspora desk” in the foreign ministry that will be tasked with facilitating the return of Ugandans living abroad.
Signatories: For the government of Uganda: Hon. Ruhakana Rugunda (Dr), Minister of Internal Affairs and Head of GoU Delegation
For the LRA: Dr. David Nyekorach Matsanga, Leader of the LRA/M Delegation
Witnessed by: H.E Lt. Gen. Riek Machar Teny-Dhurgon (PhD), Vice President of the Government of Southern Sudan and Chief Mediator of the Peace Talks;
H.E. Joaquim Chissano, Special Envoy of the UN Secretary General for LRA affected areas;
H.E. André M Kapanga (PhD) for the Government of the Democratic Republic of Congo;
H.E. Japeth R. Getugi for the Government of the Republic of Kenya;
H.E. Nsavike G. Ndatta for the Government of the United Republic of Tanzania;
Lt. Gen. (Rtd.) Gilbert Lebeko Ramano for the Government of the Republic of South Africa;
H.E. Heidi Johansen for the Government of Norway;
Ms Anna Sundtröm, Political Advisor to the EU Special Representative for the Great Lakes Region, for the European Union;
H.E. Bryant E. Burton for the Government of Canada;
Mr Timothy R. Shortley, Senior Advisor to the Assistant Secretary of State for African Affairs, for the Government of the United States of America
Comment of signatories: Dyadic peace agreement
Third parties: H.E Lt. Gen. Riek Machar Teny-Dhurgon (PhD), Vice President of the Government of Southern Sudan and Chief Mediator of the Peace Talks; H.E. Joaquim Chissano, Special Envoy of the UN Secretary General for LRA affected areas; H.E. André M Kapanga (PhD) for the Government of the Democratic Republic of Congo; H.E. Japeth R. Getugi for the Government of the Republic of Kenya; H.E. Nsavike G. Ndatta for the Government of the United Republic of Tanzania; Lt. Gen. (Rtd.) Gilbert Lebeko Ramano for the Government of the Republic of South Africa; H.E. Heidi Johansen for the Government of Norway; Ms Anna Sundtröm, Political Advisor to the EU Special Representative for the Great Lakes Region, for the European Union; H.E. Bryant E. Burton for the Government of Canada; Mr Timothy R. Shortley, Senior Advisor to the Assistant Secretary of State for African Affairs, for the Government of the United States of America
Comment of third parties role in peace agreement: They all witnessed the agreement.
Ended: True
Date agreement ended: 2008-09-11
Comment of Duration: This agreement was concluded as part of the Juba Peace Process. The Juba process was supposed to be ended by a final agreement, after which all other agreements would be implemented. The agreement was planned for 29 February 2008. The planned signing ceremony was rescheduled numerous times as Joseph Kony the leader of LRA failed to turn up due to different obstacles. On 11 April 2008 the government of Uganda stated that the signing had been put off and that the government had no plans to extend the Cessation of Hostilities Agreement unless circumstances significantly change. On 11 September chief mediator Riek Machar disbanded the cessation of hostilities monitoring team and declared the peace process over. LRA did not abide by the ceasefire and on 14 December 2008 Uganda launched military operations against LRA with US backing.
Full-text peace agreement
Name of peace agreement: Agreement on a Permanent ceasefire
Date when warring parties signed the agreement: 2008-02-23
Comment of peace agreement: Partial peace agreement
The Permanent ceasefire provides for a truce to take effect 24 hours after the signing of the Final Peace Agreement. Furthermore, it stipulates that all forces of LRA shall be encamped within Ri-Kwang-Ba assembly area and that a buffer zone around it shall be respected. The former Cessation of Hostilities Monitoring Team (CHMT) is to be transformed into a Ceasefire Monitoring Team (CMT), composed of five representatives of each of the parties to the agreement, five members from each of the AU observer countries to the peace talks and a five-person liaison team from the UN. The CMT is to be lead by two senior officers in the SPLA.
Signatories: For the government of Uganda: Hon. Ruhakana Rugunda (Dr), Minister of Internal Affairs and Head of GoU Delegation
For the LRA: Dr. David Nyekorach Matsanga, Leader of the LRA/M Delegation
Witnessed by: H.E Lt. Gen. Riek Machar Teny-Dhurgon (PhD), Vice President of the Government of Southern Sudan and Chief Mediator of the Peace Talks;
H.E. Joaquim Chissano, Special Envoy of the UN Secretary General for LRA affected areas;
H.E. André M Kapanga (PhD) for the Government of the Democratic Republic of Congo;
H.E. Japeth R. Getugi for the Government of the Republic of Kenya;
H.E. Nsavike G. Ndatta for the Government of the United Republic of Tanzania;
Lt. Gen. (Rtd.) Gilbert Lebeko Ramano for the Government of the Republic of South Africa;
H.E. Heidi Johansen for the Government of Norway;
Ms Anna Sundtröm, Political Advisor to the EU Special Representative for the Great Lakes Region, for the European Union;
H.E. Bryant E. Burton for the Government of Canada;
Mr Timothy R. Shortley, Senior Advisor to the Assistant Secretary of State for African Affairs, for the Government of the United States of America
Comment of signatories: Dyadic peace agreement
Third parties: H.E Lt. Gen. Riek Machar Teny-Dhurgon (PhD), Vice President of the Government of Southern Sudan and Chief Mediator of the Peace Talks; H.E. Joaquim Chissano, Special Envoy of the UN Secretary General for LRA affected areas; H.E. André M Kapanga (PhD) for the Government of the Democratic Republic of Congo; H.E. Japeth R. Getugi for the Government of the Republic of Kenya; H.E. Nsavike G. Ndatta for the Government of the United Republic of Tanzania; Lt. Gen. (Rtd.) Gilbert Lebeko Ramano for the Government of the Republic of South Africa; H.E. Heidi Johansen for the Government of Norway; Ms Anna Sundtröm, Political Advisor to the EU Special Representative for the Great Lakes Region, for the European Union; H.E. Bryant E. Burton for the Government of Canada; Mr Timothy R. Shortley, Senior Advisor to the Assistant Secretary of State for African Affairs, for the Government of the United States of America
Comment of third parties role in peace agreement: They all witnessed the agreement
Ended: True
Date agreement ended: 2008-09-11
Comment of Duration: This agreement was concluded as part of the Juba Peace Process. The Juba process was supposed to be ended by a final agreement, after which all other agreements would be implemented. The agreement was planned for 29 February 2008. The planned signing ceremony was rescheduled numerous times as Joseph Kony the leader of LRA failed to turn up due to different obstacles. On 11 April 2008 the government of Uganda stated that the signing had been put off and that the government had no plans to extend the Cessation of Hostilities Agreement unless circumstances significantly change. On 11 September chief mediator Riek Machar disbanded the cessation of hostilities monitoring team and declared the peace process over. LRA did not abide by the ceasefire and on 14 December 2008 Uganda launched military operations against LRA with US backing.
Full-text peace agreement
Name of peace agreement: Agreement on Disarmament, Demobilisation and Reintegration
Date when warring parties signed the agreement: 2008-02-28
Comment of peace agreement: Partial peace agreement
The Agreement on Disarmament, Demobilisation and Reintegration establishes that the Ceasefire Monitoring Team (CMT), provided for in the Agreement on a Permanent Ceasefire, shall be responsible for the implementation of the disarmament and demobilization process. The accord stipulates that the CMT is to adopt a Disarmament Operations Plan, which will provide e.g. the establishment of disarmament sites etc. On Demobilisation, the agreement stipulates that LRA will demobilize from encampments within the Ri-Kwan-Ba Assembly Area. After Disarmament and Demobilisation the CMT is responsible for arranging the ex-fighters’ repatriation from Ri-Kwan-Ba to Uganda. Furthermore, the government is tasked with identifying and preparing reception points. When in Uganda, the former fighters have the right to chose either to join the army or to receive reintegration support to help them in their transition to civilian life. Under the accord, demobilized LRA combatants will retain their ranks, but they will not be recognized by the UPDF (Uganda People’s Defence Force, the national armed forces).
Signatories: For the government of Uganda: Hon. Ruhakana Rugunda (Dr), Minister of Internal Affairs and Head of GoU Delegation
For the LRA: Dr. David Nyekorach Matsanga, Leader of the LRA/M Delegation
Witnessed by: H.E Lt. Gen. Riek Machar Teny-Dhurgon (PhD), Vice President of the Government of Southern Sudan and Chief Mediator of the Peace Talks; H.E. Joaquim Chissano, Special Envoy of the UN Secretary General for LRA affected areas; H.E. André M Kapanga (PhD) for the Government of the Democratic Republic of Congo; H.E. Japeth R. Getugi for the Government of the Republic of Kenya; H.E. Nsavike G. Ndatta for the Government of the United Republic of Tanzania; Lt. Gen. (Rtd.) Gilbert Lebeko Ramano for the Government of the Republic of South Africa; H.E. Heidi Johansen for the Government of Norway; Mr Roeland van de Geer, EU Special Representative for the Great Lakes Region; H.E. Bryant E. Burton for the Government of Canada; Mr Timothy R. Shortley, Senior Advisor to the Assistant Secretary of State for African Affairs, for the Government of the United States of America
Comment of signatories: Dyadic peace agreement
Third parties: H.E Lt. Gen. Riek Machar Teny-Dhurgon (PhD), Vice President of the Government of Southern Sudan and Chief Mediator of the Peace Talks; H.E. Joaquim Chissano, Special Envoy of the UN Secretary General for LRA affected areas; H.E. André M Kapanga (PhD) for the Government of the Democratic Republic of Congo; H.E. Japeth R. Getugi for the Government of the Republic of Kenya; H.E. Nsavike G. Ndatta for the Government of the United Republic of Tanzania; Lt. Gen. (Rtd.) Gilbert Lebeko Ramano for the Government of the Republic of South Africa; H.E. Heidi Johansen for the Government of Norway; Mr Roeland van de Geer, EU Special Representative for the Great Lakes Region; H.E. Bryant E. Burton for the Government of Canada; Mr Timothy R. Shortley, Senior Advisor to the Assistant Secretary of State for African Affairs, for the Government of the United States of America
Comment of third parties role in peace agreement: They all witnessed the agreement.
Ended: True
Date agreement ended: 2008-09-11
Comment of Duration: This agreement was concluded as part of the Juba Peace Process. The Juba process was supposed to be ended by a final agreement, after which all other agreements would be implemented. The agreement was planned for 29 February 2008. The planned signing ceremony was rescheduled numerous times as Joseph Kony the leader of LRA failed to turn up due to different obstacles. On 11 April 2008 the government of Uganda stated that the signing had been put off and that the government had no plans to extend the Cessation of Hostilities Agreement unless circumstances significantly change. On 11 September chief mediator Riek Machar disbanded the cessation of hostilities monitoring team and declared the peace process over. LRA did not abide by the ceasefire and on 14 December 2008 Uganda launched military operations against LRA with US backing.
Full-text peace agreement
Name of peace agreement: Agreement on Implementation and Monitoring Mechanisms
Date when warring parties signed the agreement: 2008-02-29
Comment of peace agreement: Partial peace agreement
The Agreement on Implementation and Monitoring Mechanisms concerns all the accords signed in the Juba process. It calls for a transitional period of one month – to commence immediately upon the signing of the Final Peace Agreement (FPA) – during which the government and the LRA shall prepare for implementation of the FPA. Under the accord, the parties shall agree on an Implementation Schedule which shall be attached to the Final Peace Agreement, setting out all relevant dates and timeframes. Furthermore, the Agreement on Implementation and Monitoring Mechanisms also provides for the establishment of an ‘Oversight Forum’ to oversee and monitor the implementation of the Final Peace Agreement and to provide advice and support to the parties and any relevant institutions established under the Final Peace Agreement. The Juba-process’ Chief Mediator, Riek Machar shall chair the forum, while the UN Secretary General’s Special Envoy for LRA affected areas, Joaquim Chissano, will be its Spokesperson. The agreement also stipulates for the creation of a Joint Liaison Group (JLG), which will monitor the implementation of the Final Peace Agreement on the ground in accordance with the Implementation Schedule and provide the Oversight Forum with progress reports.
Signatories: For the government of Uganda: Hon. Ruhakana Rugunda (Dr), Minister of Internal Affairs and Head of GoU Delegation
For the LRA: Dr. David Nyekorach Matsanga, Leader of the LRA/M Delegation
Witnessed by: H.E Lt. Gen. Riek Machar Teny-Dhurgon (PhD), Vice President of the Government of Southern Sudan and Chief Mediator of the Peace Talks; H.E. Joaquim Chissano, Special Envoy of the UN Secretary General for LRA affected areas; H.E. André M Kapanga (PhD) for the Government of the Democratic Republic of Congo; H.E. Japeth R. Getugi for the Government of the Republic of Kenya; H.E. Nsavike G. Ndatta for the Government of the United Republic of Tanzania; Lt. Gen. (Rtd.) Gilbert Lebeko Ramano for the Government of the Republic of South Africa; H.E. Heidi Johansen for the Government of Norway; Mr Roeland van de Geer, EU Special Representative for the Great Lakes Region; H.E. Bryant E. Burton for the Government of Canada; Mr Timothy R. Shortley, Senior Advisor to the Assistant Secretary of State for African Affairs, for the Government of the United States of America
Comment of signatories: Dyadic peace agreement
Third parties: H.E Lt. Gen. Riek Machar Teny-Dhurgon (PhD), Vice President of the Government of Southern Sudan and Chief Mediator of the Peace Talks; H.E. Joaquim Chissano, Special Envoy of the UN Secretary General for LRA affected areas; H.E. André M Kapanga (PhD) for the Government of the Democratic Republic of Congo; H.E. Japeth R. Getugi for the Government of the Republic of Kenya; H.E. Nsavike G. Ndatta for the Government of the United Republic of Tanzania; Lt. Gen. (Rtd.) Gilbert Lebeko Ramano for the Government of the Republic of South Africa; H.E. Heidi Johansen for the Government of Norway; Mr Roeland van de Geer, EU Special Representative for the Great Lakes Region; H.E. Bryant E. Burton for the Government of Canada; Mr Timothy R. Shortley, Senior Advisor to the Assistant Secretary of State for African Affairs, for the Government of the United States of America
Comment of third parties role in peace agreement: They all witnessed the agreement.
Ended: True
Date agreement ended: 2008-09-11
Comment of Duration: This agreement was concluded as part of the Juba Peace Process. The Juba process was supposed to be ended by a final agreement, after which all other agreements would be implemented. The agreement was planned for 29 February 2008. The planned signing ceremony was rescheduled numerous times as Joseph Kony the leader of LRA failed to turn up due to different obstacles. On 11 April 2008 the government of Uganda stated that the signing had been put off and that the government had no plans to extend the Cessation of Hostilities Agreement unless circumstances significantly change. On 11 September chief mediator Riek Machar disbanded the cessation of hostilities monitoring team and declared the peace process over. LRA did not abide by the ceasefire and on 14 December 2008 Uganda launched military operations against LRA with US backing.
Full-text peace agreement
2009
| Estimated Fatalities | |
|---|---|
| High | 263 |
| Best | 238 |
| Low | 238 |
Secondary Warring Support:
Side A (Government of Uganda): Government of Central African Republic, Government of DR Congo (Zaire), Government of Sudan
Side B (LRA): n/a
2010
| Estimated Fatalities | |
|---|---|
| High | 69 |
| Best | 51 |
| Low | 51 |
Secondary Warring Support:
Side A (Government of Uganda): Government of Central African Republic, Government of DR Congo (Zaire), Government of Sudan
Side B (LRA): n/a
2011
| Estimated Fatalities | |
|---|---|
| High | 66 |
| Best | 64 |
| Low | 64 |
Secondary Warring Support:
Side A (Government of Uganda): Government of Central African Republic, Government of DR Congo (Zaire), Government of South Sudan, Government of Sudan
Side B (LRA): n/a
2012
| Estimated Fatalities | |
|---|---|
| High | 16 |
| Best | 16 |
| Low | 16 |
Secondary Warring Support:
Side A (Government of Uganda): Government of Central African Republic, Government of DR Congo (Zaire), Government of South Sudan
Side B (LRA): n/a
2013
| Estimated Fatalities | |
|---|---|
| High | 47 |
| Best | 47 |
| Low | 47 |
Secondary Warring Support:
Side A (Government of Uganda): Government of Central African Republic, Government of DR Congo (Zaire), Government of South Sudan, Government of Malawi, Government of South Africa, Government of Tanzania
Side B (LRA): n/a
2014
| Estimated Fatalities | |
|---|---|
| High | 29 |
| Best | 29 |
| Low | 29 |
Secondary Warring Support:
Side A (Government of Uganda): Government of DR Congo (Zaire), Government of South Sudan, Government of Malawi, Government of South Africa, Government of Tanzania
Side B (LRA): n/a
2015
| Estimated Fatalities | |
|---|---|
| High | 24 |
| Best | 24 |
| Low | 23 |
Secondary Warring Support:
Side A (Government of Uganda): n/a
Side B (LRA): n/a
2016
| Estimated Fatalities | |
|---|---|
| High | 9 |
| Best | 9 |
| Low | 9 |
Secondary Warring Support:
Side A (Government of Uganda): n/a
Side B (LRA): n/a
2017
| Estimated Fatalities | |
|---|---|
| High | 56 |
| Best | 17 |
| Low | 17 |
Secondary Warring Support:
Side A (Government of Uganda): n/a
Side B (LRA): n/a
2018
| Estimated Fatalities | |
|---|---|
| High | 2 |
| Best | 2 |
| Low | 2 |
Secondary Warring Support:
Side A (Government of Uganda): n/a
Side B (LRA): n/a
2019
| Estimated Fatalities | |
|---|---|
| High | 10 |
| Best | 10 |
| Low | 10 |
Secondary Warring Support:
Side A (Government of Uganda): Government of South Africa
Side B (LRA): n/a
2020
| Estimated Fatalities | |
|---|---|
| High | 2 |
| Best | 2 |
| Low | 2 |
Secondary Warring Support:
Side A (Government of Uganda): n/a
Side B (LRA): n/a
2021
| Estimated Fatalities | |
|---|---|
| High | 0 |
| Best | 0 |
| Low | 0 |
Secondary Warring Support:
Side A (Government of Uganda): n/a
Side B (LRA): n/a
2022
| Estimated Fatalities | |
|---|---|
| High | 0 |
| Best | 0 |
| Low | 0 |
Secondary Warring Support:
Side A (Government of Uganda): n/a
Side B (LRA): n/a
2024
| Estimated Fatalities | |
|---|---|
| High | 3 |
| Best | 0 |
| Low | 0 |
Secondary Warring Support:
Side A (Government of Uganda): n/a
Side B (LRA): n/a
2025
| Estimated Fatalities | |
|---|---|
| High | 0 |
| Best | 0 |
| Low | 0 |
Secondary Warring Support:
Side A (Government of Uganda): n/a
Side B (LRA): n/a
Dyad Archive
This section contains annual information no longer systematically collected by the UCDP.
1987 Dyad Archive
Terminated: NO
1988 Dyad Archive
Comment on Active: UHSA under Joseph Kony launched its armed struggle in late 1987 and by 1988 the conflict crossed the 25 battle-related deaths threshold for the first time. Claiming to have been instructed by the Holy Spirit to fight and overthrow the new government, Kony spent 1987 building up his own armed group, initially by becoming the spiritual mobiliser of UPDA’s Black Battalion. By the end of the year he was operating independently and had initiated his armed struggle against the government.
There were a number of large-scale battles between UHSA and NRA during the year. At least initially the rebels fought in much the same way as HSM had, more or less following Lakwena’s Holy Spirit Tactics (see section on HSM). Thus, controllers stood at the front sprinkling holy water to confuse the enemy, the rebels were forbidden to take cover and many of the soldiers carried stone grenades, as opposed to real ones. However, when UPDA signed a peace agreement in June and UHSA was joined by elements within the former who opted to continue fighting this mode of conduct changed. It was the very hard core of ex-UPDA, under the leadership of the group’s former overall Military Commander Brigadier Odong Latek, that teamed up with Kony and they convinced him to start using tested guerrilla tactics instead of the Holy Spirit ones. From October 1988 the government forces carried out a series of anti-insurgency operations that resulted in serious human rights abuses against the civilian population of the north.
Negotiations: YES
Comment on Negotiations: There appears to have been a couple of peace initiatives during the year, one of which led to an actual meeting between the parties. In April commanders from NRA and, what is termed HSM (Holy Spirit Movement), met at the Acholi Inn in Gulu to discuss a ceasefire. It seems as if the group that is referred to as HSM was in fact representatives from UHSA, Lord’s Army and another, smaller rebel outfit. These groups were commonly referred to as “Lakwena part II” to indicate a link with the defunct Holy Spirit Movement of Alice Lakwena.
Another effort to initiate peace talks was made in June, when UHSA leader Joseph Kony sent a letter to a NRA commander requesting a meeting. However, due to a breakdown in communications, NRA attacked Kony before the talks could begin. Kony later declared that he would continue to fight until all NRA soldiers were converted and anointed in oil.
Victory: NO
Terminated: NO
1989 Dyad Archive
Comment on Active: The situation in northern Uganda was very confused in the late 1980s, with numerous rebel groups - some with similar names - fighting the Ugandan government. However, in 1989 it is clear that the group that is now called the LRA (Lords Resistance Army), then UHSA (United Holy Salvation Army) was one of the main players active. In May, the government launched a major offensive against UHSA and by the end of the month, nine rebel camps had been overrun in Gulu district. Reports indicate that the offensive subsequently continued and that UHSA suffered major defeats during the year.
Negotiations: NO
Victory: NO
Terminated: NO
1990 Dyad Archive
Comment on Yearly Battle Related Deaths: There was a lull in the fighting between the UHSA and the governmnet in 1990. Apart from a few incidents between April and August, there were no reports of clashes in the north. The fighting that did take place was a mix of rebel ambushes on government troops and government attacks on UHSA, following rebel attacks on civilians.
Comment on Active: There was a lull in the fighting between the government and UHSA in 1990, and it appears as if the government was focusing on the conflict with the Uganda Peoples Army (UPA) in eastern Uganda. Apart from a few clashes between the parties between April and August, the rebels mainly focused on soft, civilian targets during the year, attacking villages, refugee camps, cars and a train.
Negotiations: NO
Victory: NO
Terminated: NO
1991 Dyad Archive
Comment on Active: The year saw an escalation of hostilities, as the governmnet launched a major counter-insurgency operation against the rebels. "Operation North" was initiated on 31 March and for the coming five months the northern districts of Apac, Lira and Kitgum were completely sealed off with a media blackout imposed.
Both the government army (the NRA) and the rebels committed gross human rights abuses. The person in charge of the operation, the Minister of State for Defence, Major General David Tinyefuza, became notorious as the NRA conducted killings, arbitrary arrests and torture. The following year he was replaced. The rebels for their part, seemed to punish the civilian population for not supportig them. During the year local government officials had urged the civilian population to mobilize into local defense units, armed with bows and arrows. These were supposed to protect the villages from UDCA attacks and resist the rebels until the NRA had a chance to arrive. Local Defense Units became a common phenomenon, signalling the civilian populations gradual disenchantment with the rebellion.
Operation North and the loss of civilian support was a near fatal blow to the rebel group and the next couple of years saw a reduction in rebel activities.
Negotiations: NO
Victory: NO
Terminated: YES
Type of termination: No or Low Activity
Date of termination: 1991-12-31
Comment on Termination: Operation North and the loss of civilian support was a near fatal blow to the rebel group and the next couple of years were relatively calm, with a clear reduction in rebel activities.
1992 Dyad Archive
Negotiations: NO
Victory: NO
Terminated: NO
1994 Dyad Archive
Comment on Active: After two years of relative calm and two months of talks between the parties in late 1993 and early 1994, the conflict resumed when the president issued an ultimatum, stating that the rebels had to admit defeat and turn in their weapons in seven days. Not willing to comply with this, the rebels crossed the border into southern Sudan where they set up bases and began making incursions into northern Uganda. The conduct of the rebels towards the civilian population, while always brutal, worsened further after the peace talks broke down.
Negotiations: YES
Comment on Negotiations: The negotiations that had commenced in 1993 continued in 1994. On 10 January the parties met again, and this time LRA leader Joseph Kony attended the talks. At the meeting he held a four hour speach, where he lashed out against the Acholi community in general and the Acholi elders in particular claiming that they had sent the rebels out into the bush and then abandoned them. In subsequent one-to-one talks between Kony and head government negotiator Betty Bigombe, Kony informed her that the rebels wanted to come out of the bush, but that they needed up to six months to gather all fighters and regroup.
On 24 January 1994, a third meeting was held at Lakwatimer Primary School. The issue in focus was ceasefire arrangements, wherefore the participation of NRA’s Col Wassawa and Lt Col Toolit was crucial. Reportedly, the meeting went well and a further follow-up meeting was held to hammer out the details. In early February a ceasefire document was finally drafted and signed by NRA Col Wassawa and LRA Commander George Omona.
Parallel to this, the process to arrange a meeting between Kony and president Museveni had begun. However, in early February relations between the rebels and particularly some NRA representatives began to sour. There were rumours that Kony’s demand for a six month period to regroup his fighters was simply a cover for continuous negotiations with the Sudanese regime aiming to secure weapons and other types of logistic support for the group. On 6 February president Museveni issued an ultimatum, stating that if the LRA did not admit defeat and handover their weapons in seven days, they would be destroyed by the NRA. Subsequently, the rebels withdrew from the peace process and crossed the border to southern Sudan, from where they resumed their armed struggle.
While theories regarding the reasons behind the failure of the talks abound, a reliable and initiated explanation is yet to come. However, what is clear is that there seems to have been influential elements within both parties opposed to the talks.
Victory: NO
Terminated: NO
1995 Dyad Archive
Comment on Active: In 1995 the conflict became even more lethal, as LRA with Sudans assistance introduced the use of landmines and rocket-propelled grenades. Furthermore, even if the practice of abducting children to fill up the rebel ranks had been introduced earlier, the mass-abduction phenomenon became increasingly common during 1995.
In October 1995, fierce battles were fought between the LRA and the Sudanese rebel group SPLM/A. SPLM/A managed to overrun a number of LRA camps in southern Sudan, pushing the Ugandan rebels back from the border and towards the Sudanese town Juba. LRA suffered heavy casualties which subsequently made the last months of 1995 calm, with no LRA attacks or battles in northern Uganda.
Negotiations: NO
Victory: NO
Terminated: NO
1996 Dyad Archive
Negotiations: NO
Comment on Negotiations: Even though there were no direct peace negotiations between the Ugandan government and the Lords Resistance Army (LRA) in 1996, both parties made some peace initiatives. In a speech on 3 June, 1996, President Yoweri Museveni stated that the government would give amnesty to ordinary fighters of the LRA, but not to the LRA leaders. In September 1996 several members of the LRA called for peace talks with the authorities.
Victory: NO
Terminated: NO
1997 Dyad Archive
Comment on Active: As in previous years, the LRA in 1997 had their bases in southern Sudan. However, during the year the neighbouring country became an increasinlgy dangerous safe haven for the rebels, as the Sudanse rebel group SPLM/A, allied to the Ugandan government, fought the rebels on numerous occasions. Apart from the rebel groups fighting each other on Sudanese soil, the conflicts in the two neighbouring states (GoSudan vs SPLM/A and GoUganda vs LRA) became even further inter-mingled during the year. In March there were reports of Ugandan governmnet troops (UPDF) entering Sudan to conduct joint attacks on LRA camps with SPLM/A. Furthermore, in April Sudanese regular troops entered northern Uganda together with LRA rebels, intent on fighting the UPDF.
Despite major defeats in southern Sudan on the part of LRA, the Ugandan rebels were still able to continue making incursions into northern Uganda. In January the Ugandan parliament voted to escalate the military efforts against the LRA. Subsequently, LRA stepped up their attacks, especially targeting the civilian population in Kitgum district attacking mainly civilians but also fighting the Ugandan army (UPDF).
Negotiations: NO
Comment on Negotiations: Even though there were no direct peace negotiations between the Ugandan government and the Lords Resistance Army (LRA) in 1997, the LRA made a peace initiative in April when they stated their willingness to enter into peace negotiations with the Ugandan authorities. However, president Museveni remained intent on ending the war by military means.
In October President Yoweri Museveni accepted the idea of granting the top LRA leadership, including Joeph Kony, amnesty.
Victory: NO
Terminated: NO
1998 Dyad Archive
Comment on Active: During the year, LRA suffered major set-backs in southern Sudan. However, despite the fact that the Sudanese rebel group SPLM/A - allied to the Ugandan government - overran many of the groups main camps in 1998, the rebels managed to keep up the pressure on government forces in northern Uganda. There were continuous incursions from southern Sudan and during the year, the conflict increased in intensity. LRA continued to mainly target the civilian poulation, but there were also frequent clashes with government forces.
Negotiations: YES
Comment on Negotiations: In mid May 1998, it was reported that the Ugandan government had entered into secrete negotiations with the Lords Resistance Army (LRA). These talks seem to have lasted at least until early July, when district military commanders of the Ugandan states of Gulu and Kitgum met with 8 representatives of the LRA in Nairoby, Kenya. Seeing as President Yoweri Museveni on 21 July announced that he was ready to accept a ceasefire with the LRA if they agreed to remain in defined bases and not move around, it appears that the talks at least touched upon the question of a ceasefire.
Victory: NO
Terminated: YES
Type of termination: No or Low Activity
Date of termination: 1998-12-31
1999 Dyad Archive
Comment on Active: While the years first two months saw a few rebel attacks in northern Uganda, this was followed by a ten-month calm in the conflict as a heavy UPDF clamp-down led the rebels to cross into southern Sudan. On 22 December hundreds of rebels re-entererd the country in the wake of the Nairobi peace agreement, signed by Uganda and Sudan in view to restore full diplomatic relations between the two countries. As both Uganda and Sudan vowed to stop supporting each others rebels, one theory is that LRA left southern Sudan for fear of being arrested by Sudanses authorities.
Despite the fighting that did take place in January-February and in late December, the death toll did not cross 25, wherefore the dyad is not coded as active in 1999.
Negotiations: NO
Comment on Negotiations: In May 1999 President Yoweri Museveni, however, offered an amnesty to all Lords Resistance Army (LRA) rebels and pomised LRA leader Joseph Kony a cabinet post should he be democratically elected to the government.
Victory: NO
Terminated: NO
2000 Dyad Archive
Comment on Active: The large group of LRA rebels that had crossed into northern Uganda from southern Sudan in late 1999, continued to cause problems for the Ugandan army (UPDF) in 2000. As in preceding years, LRA continued to mainly attack soft targets, committing gross human rights abuses. In late 2000, the rebels crossed back into Sudan in response to an Ebola outbreak in Gulu district. Thus, the last two months of 2000 were characterised by relative calm.
Negotiations: NO
Victory: NO
Terminated: NO
2001 Dyad Archive
Comment on Active: The relative calm that had prevailed in northern Uganda since October 2000 remained through the March 2001 elections. However, soon thereafter LRA resumed their cross-border attacks, primarily directed at the civilian population.
Negotiations: YES
Comment on Negotiations: In March 2001 it was reported that government officials held direct talks with representatives from the Lords Resistance Army (LRA) and the Sudanese government in order to seek an end to the rebellion in Acholi. Later in June the Gulu LC5 Chairman Walter Ochorra met a local LRA leader of the Gulu district, Lt. Col. Oneu Kandulu. The talks concerned the peaceful resolution of the insurgency, the LRA abductions of civilians and an amnesty for LRA rebels.
Victory: NO
Terminated: NO
2002 Dyad Archive
Comment on Yearly Battle Related Deaths: There is a great variation in the death toll mainly due to poor reporting. The LRA gives no comments to any incidents making official statements the main source of information. Sometimes it has not been possible to confirm the official death tolls. There seem to be a tendency for the government to exaggerate the deaths of the LRA but to play down its own.
In 2002 Sudan sided with the Ugandan army against the LRA, making Sudan a secondary warring party. Because of this, the deaths caused by the Sudanese army on LRA and vice versa were included in the battle related deaths.
Comment on Active: The year was characterised by "Operation Iron Fist", a major UPDF offensive against LRA bases in southern Sudan. In late March, a protocol was signed by the government of Sudan and the government of Uganda, where the Khartoum regime allowed a significant number of Ugandan troops to be deployed in southern Sudan. In April Operation Iron Fist was launched and roughly 5000 UPDF troops were sent into Sudanse territory, in view to attack LRA bases. In response to the mounting pressure in Sudan, LRA re-entered northern Uganda, initiating a wave of killings. By the end of 2002, LRA had stepped up their attacks through northern Uganda and the humanitarian situation was the worse in many years. The Uganda Human Rights Commission concluded that the operation – at least in the short term – increased human rights violations and autrocities against civilians
Negotiations: NO
Victory: NO
Terminated: NO
2003 Dyad Archive
Comment on Yearly Battle Related Deaths: There is a great variation in the death toll, mainly due to poor reporting. The LRA gives no comments to any incidents making official statements the main source of information. Sometimes it has not been possible to confirm the official death tolls. There seem to be a tendency for the government to exaggerate the deaths of the LRA but to play down its own."
Comment on Active: The year 2003 saw what appeared to be a well-planned geographic spread of the conflict to the east, into the Teso and Lango regions and by July and August the LRA had secure bases in eastern Uganda. The reasons for the move appears to have been manifold, one being that there were very little to live from in Acholi, after 17 years of looting, wherefore a move to the fertile east made sense. Another reason often cited is that in the wake of frequent claims by Museveni that Operation Iron Fist was a great success, the rebels wanted to show that they were still a force to be reckoned with. Yet another reason seems to have been that the rebels aimed to attract the support of former fighters from the now defunct rebel group Uganda Peoples Army (UPA), which had been based in Teso.
In response to LRAs brutal attacks on villages in Teso, which the army seemed incapable of curbing, a band of local youth took the matter into their own hands and created the "Arrow Boys", a peoples militia, numbering around 11 000. The group is led by formed members of the UPA, Mosa Echuaru and Sam Otai and is partly armed by the UPDF. Utilising its superior knowledge of the terrain, the highly motivated militia during the year managed to calm much of the region.
In addition to this most striking feature of the year 2003, fighting also continued between LRA and UPDF in the Acholi region.
Negotiations: NO
Comment on Negotiations: On 23 February 2003, LRA declared an immediate ceasefire to pave the way for peace talks and in early March, the government responded in kind. However, between these dates and late April, when the government withdrew the ceasefire offer, not a single meeting was held between the two parties. Most analysts puts this down to mutual distrust.
Victory: NO
Terminated: NO
2004 Dyad Archive
Comment on Active: The improved relations between the government and the Sudanese regime continued to cause problems for LRA, as the UPDF were allowed to cross into Sudan in pursuit of the rebels for the third year running. LRA came under even further military pressure when the Khartoum regime struck a deal with the Ugandan government, waiving previous geographical restrictions and allowing UPDF go even further into Sudan. This meant that UPDF were able to attack LRA’s main base in Bileniang, east of Juba in southern Sudan.
Subsequently, in November LRA leader Joseph Kony made some ouvertures to the government and during the last two months of 2004, a ceasefire was respected as a tentative process towards comprehensive peace talks was initiated.
Negotiations: YES
Comment on Negotiations: The improved relations between the government and the Sudanese regime continued to cause problems for LRA, as the UPDF were allowed to cross into Sudan in pursuit of the rebels for the third year running. LRA came under even further military pressure when the Khartoum regime struck a deal with the Ugandan government, waiving previous geographical restrictions and allowing UPDF go even further into Sudan. This meant that UPDF were able to attack LRA’s main base in Bileniang, east of Juba in southern Sudan.
In this context, the LRA leader Joseph Kony through his spokesman Sam Kolo in November announced that he was willing to talk to the government. The Ugandan government looked favorably on this and on 14 November, president Museveni ordered a seven-day suspension of armed forces operations in a specified northern area so that the rebels could gather for peace talks. Five days later, Kony reciprocated the government’s ceasefire, stating that LRA would not attack UPDF anywhere in northern Uganda or southern Sudan. After this, numerous extensions of the ceasefire followed, while attempts at arranging negotiations were made. The government’s top negotiator Betty Bigombe held face- to-face talks with Sam Kolo and also talked with Joseph Kony over the phone. Kony initially demanded that the government announce a 100 cessation of military operations against LRA as a prerequisite for him participating in peace talks. The Ugandan regime refused, airing concerns that the rebels were simply using the ceasefire to rehabilitate themselves and unearth hidden arms. However, the process gained some momentum as Bigombe led a team of Acholi elders to meet face to face with a number of LRA commanders, led by Kony’s second in command Vincent Otti, on 7 December. The meeting was one of the key demands that the LRA had presented as a pre-condition for direct peace talks with the government. At the meeting, the Acholi elders assured the rebels that they would be welcomed back into society and that they would not be punished for crimes committed, if they negotiated peace with the government. Subsequently, the government extended the geographical zone for the ceasefire so that Kony would be able to meet and consult with Vincent Otti. On 28 December, a first direct – but still informal – meeting was held between government officials and LRA at Ngorno-romo, close to the Sudanese border. The meeting, which was mainly aimed at building trust, also included tribal and religious leaders.
All these efforts eventually paid off, and the first talks between the official government team, led by Ugandan Minister of Internal Affairs, Ruhakana Rugunda, and the LRA delegation were held on 29 December, in Ludwa village, Kitgum district. During the meeting, the question of a total ceasefire was discussed. A decision was made to reach agreement on the issue over the next two days, and a signing ceremony was scheduled for 31 December. The following two days saw Bigombe’s team conducting intense shuttling between the government’s team in Kitgum and the rebel side in the bush, in an attempt to finalize the details. The year did not end on a positive note however, as the signing ceremony was postponed indefinitely. Reports from the negotiators indicated that the government team had finalized a draft agreement, which had then been sent to the rebels. However, due to some queries that LRA had concerning the proposed accord, the signing was postponed.
Victory: NO
Terminated: NO
2005 Dyad Archive
Comment on Active: The conflict between the Government of Uganda and LRA continued in 2005, albeit on a lower scale than the previous year. Peace hopes were dashed in early 2005, as LRA failed to sign a draft ceasefire agreement that would pave the way for more comprehensive negotiations. Even though contacts between Betty Bigombe, the mediator, and the rebels continued, no results were reached during the year. Instead, parallel to the fighting between government troops and rebels, 2005 also saw an increase in LRA atrocities, directed at the civilian population in the north. The Ugandan government were allowed to enter Sudanese territory in pursuit of the rebels for the fourth year running. The cooperation between the two states appears to have improved after the signing of the peace agreement in southern Sudan and LRA no longer has a fixed head quarter on Sudanese territory. The rebels have been forces to sub-divide into smaller units to avoid detection by the army.
Negotiations: NO
Comment on Negotiations: After the rebels failed to sign the draft ceasefire in late December 2004 there were no direct negotiations between the parties even though the mediator Betty Bigombe and her peace team stayed in contact with the rebels, attempting to re-start the talks.
In early February the government announced an 18 day unilateral ceasefire, in an attempt to enable the rebels to meet among themselves and discuss the peace process. The ceasefire zone was 45 square km and stretched from Gulu to Kitgum district in northern Uganda. However, there was no visible progress during these weeks and no meetings took place. Rather, there were reports of increasing atrocities by the LRA against the civilian population outside the ceasefire zone and after the 18 days had expired, the government indicated that it now favoured a military solution to the conflict. A further set back for the peace process was that most of LRAs peace team, including chief negotiator Sam Kolo, surrendered to the government, leaving hardliners like Vincent Otti to negotiate for the rebels.
In October the International Criminal Court (ICC) unsealed their first arrest warrants ever for five LRA leaders, including Joseph Kony. Bigombe initially opposed the move, stating that it would end any chance for a negotiated end to the conflict. However, after discussions with president Museveni, she indicated that the door was still open for negotiations with those not indicted by ICC.
In November Vincent Otti called BBC and stated that the rebels were willing to enter into talks with the government, claiming that he was speaking with the backing of Kony. Interior Minister Ruhakana Rugunda welcomed the initiative, but as of late 2005 no further progress has been made.
For further information on Bigombe’s work, see information on third party.
Victory: NO
Terminated: NO
2006 Dyad Archive
Negotiations: YES
Victory: NO
Terminated: YES
Type of termination: Ceasefire
Date of termination: 2006-08-26
2007 Dyad Archive
Comment on Active: For the first time since 1993, the conflict between LRA and the Ugandan government was not active in 2007. The cessation of hostilities agreement that was initially signed in August 2006 was extended several times throughout the year as the Juba peace process – categorised by sputtering progress punctuated by frequent delays – ensued. While there were some documented violations of the agreement from both sides, the fighting did not escalate to cross the 25 battle-related deaths threshold.
After an agreement had been reached on reconciliation and accountability in late June, the process went on recess so as to allow the two parties time for consultation with civil society. However, as the restart of the process was delayed, a discussion of regional military action against LRA was initiated. In September the Ngurdoto agreement was signed by Uganda and neighbouring DRC, mandating military cooperation to disarm cross-border rebel groups. The accord explicitly mentioned action against LRA within 90 days. Under the agreement, the military action would entail joint operations between the Ugandan army and MONUC, the UN peacekeeping force in DRC. While a meeting to discuss strategy for such an attack was held in mid-October, no military action materialised during 2007. The Ugandan government continued to pledge support of the Juba process, justifying the negotiation of the 90-day clause in the midst of the peace process by stating that the rebels were violating the Cessation of hostilities agreement (CHA) by their continued presence in DRC. Under the CHA the rebels are to assemble in Ri-Kwangba, just across the border in Sudan.
Notable, also, for 2007 was that the rebel side suffered major internal splits and defections. In October LRA leader Joseph Kony had Vincent Otti, his second in command, killed. The two had been at odds over the negotiation process and Kony told confidantes that he believed that Otti was planning to assassinate him and take over the leadership of the LRA. In the context of this power struggle, a string of defections commenced in November, beginning with LRA’s operations director, Patrick Opio Makasi accompanied by his two wives and children and followed by 30 others. Furthermore, there were reports of three hundred more defectors waiting in the wings.
Negotiations: YES
Comment on Negotiations: In 2007, the negotiation process got off to a rocky start, when the LRA team on 12 January, three days before the talks were due to resume, announced that they withdrew from the process. Stating that they would not re-join negotiations until Dr Riek Machar, vice-president of the Government of Southern Sudan was replaced as chief mediator and the venue shifted from Juba, the rebels effectively put the process on hold. The reason for this utspel appears to have been a speech in Khartoum in which Sudanese President Bashir pledged to force the LRA out of Sudan.
The following two months saw a surge of activity as attempts were made to get the rebels back to the table (see comment on third parties). Apart from finally succeeding in getting the LRA team back to the negotiation table, the flurry of diplomatic activity also led to an extension and slight alteration of the cessation of hostilities agreement. One big hurdle to implementing the agreement had been that the LRA did not want to assemble at Owiny Ki-bul, one of the original assembly points. Under the new agreement, all LRA fighters are to assemble at Sudanese Ri-Kwangba, right across the border from their Congolese base.
On 26 April the Juba process resumed and negotiations on the second item on the agenda, comprehensive solutions to the conflict, got underway. On 2 May an agreement was reached, providing general guidelines for addressing the long-term economic, political and social issues that afflict northern Uganda. Under the accord equal opportunities and treatment, diversity in government institutions, redevelopment of the north’s economic and educational infrastructure and resettling internally displaced persons (IDPs) are identified as prioritised areas in building a sustainable peace. However, observers have noted that the terms of the agreement are very vague and as implementation modalities are to be negotiated at a later point, many have pointed to the risks of future deadlocks that this entails.
Talks then proceeded, focusing on the third point on the agenda: reconciliation and accountability. The ICC indictments against five top-LRA leaders, including Kony, had been a big obstacle in the Juba process as the safety of the leadership was a prerequisite for the LRA team to consider signing a final agreement. On 29 June an accord was signed, where the parties agreed to establish a viable national alternative to ICC indictments. The agreement provides for the formation of a domestic legal framework that will function as a substitute for the ICC prosecutions. This is to be complemented by alternative processes like traditional justice. Under the accord, the rebel commanders that are accused of serious crimes will face formal criminal and civil justice proceedings in courts, which can impose as of yet undetermined “alternative penalties and sanctions” that will replace existing penalties”. Abuses by the national army are to be pursued in the criminal justice system.
After the signing of the agreement on reconciliation and accountability, the process went on a hiatus, allowing for the two parties to conduct consultations with civil society. While originally set to resume in August, the negotiation process was yet again delayed, failing to restart through the rest of 2007. The government carried out its nation-wide consultancy tour between August and 26 September, but the rebels’ process was delayed due to differences with international donors regarding its’ funding. However, on 1 November LRA’s consultancy tour finally got underway. In a historic first trip to Kampala, the main LRA delegation arrived in Ugandan capital and released a white dove as a symbolic gesture of peace. They then visited President Museveni and signed an addendum to the cessation of hostilities agreement that extended the pact for another three months. Martin Ojul, the delegation’s leader then led the group up to Gulu and appeared on a local radio station asking for forgiveness from the local population.
Victory: NO
Terminated: NO
2008 Dyad Archive
Comment on Active: In 2008, the Ugandan conflict continued. However, as compared to the previous year, the active rebel group changed, as ADF again became dormant, while LRA re-commenced armed activities. The latter group, led by Joseph Kony, had joined the Juba peace process in mid-2006 and subsequently refrained from fighting in 2007- Also during the first months of 2008 LRA adhered to a ceasefire, but in April the peace process fell part after Kony failed to sign the Final Peace Agreement (FPA). In early June DRC and Southern Sudan vowed to assist Uganda in fighting LRA should Kony continue to refuse to sign the accord. The Ugandan rebels responded by launching an attack on an SPLA detachment in Nabanga in southern Sudan near the border with Congo, killing 15 soldiers and around 10 civilians. The following months saw sporadic clashes between the SPLA and LRA fighters, but also some instances of the Congolese army (FARDC) fighting the rebels.
After Kony missed a November deadline for signing the agreement, and against the backdrop of the resumption of LRA attacks on civilians in southern Sudan and initiation of attacks in eastern Congo, this set back was by most observers and analysts viewed as a confirmation that LRA, while engaging in negotiations, had in fact been buying time and preparing for war. On 14 December the armed forces of Uganda (UPDF), DRC (FARDC) and Southern Sudan (SPLA) launched Operation ‘Lightning Thunder’, beginning with a surprise air strike against Camp Swahili, LRA’s main camp in Garamba national park in north-eastern DRC. Due to poor coordination, bad weather and the dense forests in the region, the ground troops arrived late, wherefore the rebels had ample time to disperse in the jungle. For reasons that remain unknown, Kony had left the camp just before the air strike. He was subsequently left unharmed and could organise and lead the rebels’ ensuing operations.
While Operation Lightning Thunder continued through the rest of December, UPDF had difficulties locating the scattered rebels and very little fighting was reported. Whereas fighting between the Ugandan army and its allies and the LRA was very limited, LRA attacks on civilians were anything but. On 24 December the rebels launched a wave of brutal massacres of the civilian population in north-eastern DRC, killing hundreds (for more information on the so-called Christmas massacres, see the section on One-sided violence).
Negotiations: YES
Comment on Negotiations: The year saw continued negotiations between the government and the LRA within the Juba process, initiated in 2006. On 22 January LRA leader Joseph Kony sacked the head of LRA’s negotiating delegation, Martin Ojul, together with three others, accusing them of “making money from the peace talks”. This, coupled with the death of LRA’s second in command, Vincent Otti in October 2007, who had become the public face of the rebel group, made for a worrying start of the year. However, fears of a breakdown of the Juba process were dispersed when negotiations did resume on 30 January, with the LRA team lead by David Matsanga. After signing an extension of the cessation of hostilities, the parties turned to negotiate a protocol to re-enforce the Agreement on the Comprehensive Solution to the northern Uganda conflict, signed on 2 May 2007. LRA initially demanded that people from northern and eastern Uganda should be assured 35 per cent representation in military, government and ambassadorial posts, something that the government rejected. The question of northerners’ representation in state institutions was subsequently referred to the Equal Opportunities Commission. Agreement was, however, reached on a number of other issues, such as the facilitation for settlement of IDPs and the establishment of a “diaspora desk” in the foreign ministry.
Mechanisms for the implementation of the Agreement on Accountability and Reconciliation from 29 June 2007 were also discussed at the February talks. The parties subsequently agreed that traditional justice mechanisms would supplement the national justice system and that the combination of the two would provide an alternative to the International Criminal Court (ICC).
Negotiations then moved on to the fourth point of the Juba process’ agenda (see comment on negotiations in 2006 for details about the five points of the Juba process): a final ceasefire. This was followed by talks on disarmament, demobilization and reintegration (DDR), the fifth and final point. Subjects that were up for discussion were whether demobilised rebel fighters would retain their ranks, the release of women and children and the location of reception points for LRA combatants. After agreement had been reached, the LRA team travelled to Joseph Konys base in Garamba National Park for a final consultation before signing. With them, the team also had the text of a proposed Final Peace Agreement (FPA), drafted by the peace talks secretariat. This was to include all the substantive agreements reached between the two parties in Juba since 2006 and as well as an Implementation Schedule, to be signed with and attached to the FPA.
It is unclear if Kony was indeed briefed, but despite this plans for the signing ceremony continued and on 10 April Machar, the UN Secretary-General’s special envoy for LRA-affected areas Joaquim Chissano and Acholi religious and political leaders assembled at Ri-Kwangba to witness the signing. However, Kony failed to show up, saying that he did not understand certain elements of the documents and wanted clarification on the issues of the Mato Oput (traditional justice system) and the Special Division of the High Court. Subsequently, Kony said that he no longer trusted the mediators, claiming that they were pro-government and fired Matsanga. The latter was then replaced by James Obita.
The April debacle was followed by a period of confusion, with diverging statements and information coming from Machar, LRA’s negotiators and Kony. One of the problems that had plagued the Juba process from the outset was the question of the legitimacy of LRA’s mediation team and its ability to speak for the military leadership in the bush. With Kony’s failure to show up, the uncertainties surrounding to what extent he had been briefed and consulted during the process as whole became even more pressing. Further complicating the situation, there were unclearness as to who was actually speaking on Kony’s behalf, when, in June, Matsanga re-appeared and claimed to have been reinstated by the LRA leader.
A workshop in May with the LRA delegation and Kony’s wives, intended to update the rebel leader, was followed by a statement from Kony where he reiterated his committed to peace. However, despite this he failed to show up on several signing sessions in Ri-Kwanga. While LRA through the summer continued to make demands and request meetings, Ugandas president Yoweri Museveni stated in July that his government would not hold further negotiations with Kony but instead would wait for him to sign the Final Peace Agreement. On 11 September, Machar disbanded the cessation of hostilities monitoring team and declared the peace process over. In November there were yet again indications that Kony would sign the FPA. A signing ceremony was prepared and group of Ugandan government officials, as well as religious and cultural leaders from northern Ugand travelled to Ri-Kwangba. However, again Kony failed to show up. Against the backdrop of the resumption of LRA attacks in southern Sudan and initiation of attacks in eastern Congo, the November set back was by most observers and analysts viewed as a confirmation that LRA, while engaging in negotiations, had in fact been buying time and preparing for war.
Victory: NO
Terminated: NO
2009 Dyad Archive
Comment on Active: The conflict between the Ugandan government and the rebel group LRA continued unabated in 2009. As in 2008, no fighting took place in Uganda, however, but was rather mainly concentrated to Bas- and Haut-Uele districts in the Congolese Orientale province, Western Equatoria state in Southern Sudan and to south-eastern Central African Republic.
“Operation Lightning Thunder”, the offensive launched by the Ugandan army (UPDF, Uganda People’s Defence Force), together with their Congolese and Southern Sudanese allies in December 2008 continued into 2009. UPDF was initially mandated to remain in eastern Congo for 30 days only, but this was extended twice and the operation continued into March, with both Ugandan and Congolese soldiers fighting the rebels. Southern Sudan’s main role was to try to seal off the border between DRC and Sudan so as to prevent the pursued rebel fighters from spreading out into Southern Sudan. In mid-January the Kampala-Kinshasa-Juba alliance was extended to also include the Central African Republic (CAR) as a government spokesman announced that the Bangui regime had agreed to support Uganda in its conflict against LRA. Apart from allowing UPDF troops on Central African soil, CAR also stated that an additional number of soldiers would be deployed to its southern border to attempt to hinder LRA infiltration.
Despite the intention to confine the rebels to an ever-decreasing area in north-eastern DRC, Ugandan and Congolese military pressure led three LRA contingents to cross into CAR; one led by LRA leader Joseph Kony himself and one by his second in command, Okot Odhiambo. A Special Force of some 130-160 soldiers from UPDF was subsequently deployed in the country, led by President Museveni’s son, Lt. Colonel Muhoozi Kainerugaba Museveni. Well equipped and trained, the Special Forces were successful in pushing the Kony group northwards. Many analysts believe that this group was heading towards the Sudanese Darfur region, where they more easily could be equipped by the Sudanese regime. The other two LRA groups in CAR remained more or less in one place, however; one operating between Yubu and Obo, and the other west of Obo. Apart from these three groups of LRA fighters, a number of smaller groups remained in DRC and South Sudan, probably aiming to divert the forces pursuing Kony towards protecting villages.
Operation lightning Thunder was ended on 15 March 2009, and the Ugandan troops officially left DRC. The armed campaign continued through the rest of the year, however, albeit more covertly. This was mainly because it was politically difficult for Congolese President Joseph Kabila to defend the open presence on Congolese soil of Ugandan soldiers. Subsequently, somewhere between 2000 and 3000 Ugandan soldiers remained in Congo even after the end of Operation Lightning Thunder and continued pursuing the LRA rebels. Furthermore, some 1000 – 2000 UPDF troops were deployed in Southern Sudan and in CAR, operating against the rebels.
After Operation Lightning Thunder had ended, the Ugandan government hailed the offensive as a success, but many observers were skeptical. While the rebels dispersed and split into smaller groups, attacks on civilians increased dramatically. Apart from numerous attacks on villages in all three affected countries, at least one large-scale massacre was carried out by the rebels in December 2009, almost a year to the day after the so-called Christmas massacres of 2008 (for more information, see the section on one-sided violence in the database). Apart from killing more than 300 people, the rebels abducted some 250 civilians, most probably to reinforce their ranks.
Negotiations: NO
Comment on Negotiations: Following the failure of LRA leader Joseph Kony to sign the final peace agreement in 2008, no negotiations took place in 2009.
LRA spokesmen however made some attempts to resume the peace process during the year. Pressured militarily after the December 2008 government offensive in eastern DRC, the first LRA call for a ceasefire and renewed negotiations came already on 1 January. In mid-March, LRA spokesman David Matsanga again appealed for a truce, saying that LRA was willing to observe a ceasefire if the government did the same and that the group wanted fresh talks to be initiated, albeit not in Juba, where the peace process had previously taken place, but on “neutral ground”, in for example Kenya or Tanzania. New attempts were made in June and October, with Matsanga announcing that LRA was willing to talks to the government provided that there was a change in negotiator. Instead of Riek Machar, who had led the Juba peace process between 2006 and 2008, Matsanga claimed that Kony would prefer Nigerian ex-president Olusegun Obasanjo.
The government rejected all these calls, saying that agreement had already been reached on all issues and that the peace talks were concluded; the only thing missing was Kony’s signature on the final accord.
Victory: NO
Terminated: NO
2010 Dyad Archive
Comment on Active: The year 2010 saw a continuation of Ugandan government troops (UPDF) pursuing groups of LRA fighters over a vast territory, stretching over three countries: DRC, CAR and Southern Sudan. On paper, they were joined in this venture by the national armies of these thee states, but in practice UPDF was the only military force capable of dealing with the LRA. This was both due to poor motivation on part of the three allied armies, and to the fact that they – for different reasons – were too weak militarily.
Dominic Ongwen, wanted by the ICC, is in charge of LRA’s operations in DRC, where the rebels in 2010 appeared to be establishing a new base area. Previously concentrated in Haut Uele, groups of LRA fighters in 2010 moved west to Bas Uele and started attacking civilians. Bas Uele, and more specifically Ango territory in the northern-most part of the district, is deemed to be a strategically sound area for the group to establish themselves in, according to analysts. It is a vast area, sparsely populated and with very limited military presence. To the south the river Ule serves as a natural barrier to movements from the south and the border with CAR, and the large Zemongo forest, is to the north. To the west Ango territory is bordered by Equateur Province, a violent region which is a hotbed of Congolese rebel activities. Troops in pursuit of LRA would need to come from the east, along a route that is easy to monitor. During 2010 LRA fighters launched a strategy of attempting to empty Ango territory of civilians. Wanting total control of the area to ensure safe passage to CAR, rebels were reported to explicitly tell the civilian population that their land now belonged to the LRA and that they should leave for CAR. The emptied land was then cultivated by LRA abductees. The move west has made UPDF’s pursuit of the rebels even more difficult, since the former’s supply lines are being increasingly stretched.
Most analysts agree that at least half of the LRA groups were in 2010 located in CAR and that this was most probably where LRA leader Joseph Kony spend at least the first three months of the year. Also here UPDF has found their supply lines stretched, with rebels being spread out across both Haut Mbomou and Mboumo. A common problem is that UPDF soldiers move too slowly. They are dependent on food and water being delivered by helicopter, and since the helicopters in use are too few the soldiers often had to wait for days at a time.
Also Southern Sudan, and more specifically Western Equatoria, was struck by LRA attacks in 2010. However, compared to previous years, the level of violence decreased and it seems as if none of the LRA groupings were based in the country. As in 2009, self-defense groups, called Arrow Boys like their Ugandan counterparts, continued to be the rural communities’ main protection against rebel attacks.
The year saw relatively little fighting between the armed forces of Uganda, CAR, DRC and Southern Sudan on the one hand and LRA on the other. Given that LRA generally avoids direct military confrontations and that UPDF had difficulties to locate the rebels due to stretched supply lines, this is hardly surprising. There were, however, a number of cases when UPDF troops were able to catch up with the rebels and could engage them militarily. There were also a few instances of Sudanese and Congolese troops attacking, or being attacked by LRA. In all, these events resulted in roughly 40 deaths, wherefore the conflict is coded as active in 2010.
It should be noted that while not engaging armies, LRA fighters continued to launch attacks on the civilian population of the three countries where they were based, causing massive displacement and bloodshed (for more information on this, see the section on one-sided violence in the database).
Negotiations: NO
Comment on Negotiations: There were no negotiations between LRA and the government in 2010.
Victory: NO
Terminated: NO
2011 Dyad Archive
Comment on Active: In 2011, the conflict between the Ugandan army and its allies and the LRA continued on roughly the same level of intensity as in 2010. The group remained scattered over three countries (DRC, CAR and South Sudan) and the difficult terrain and large distances hampered the allied armies’ efforts to pursue them. Another problem for the Ugandan army was primarily the Congolese army’s- but also the Central African one’s distrust towards them. This caused relations to be strained and hampered cooperation and intelligence sharing.
The LRA conflict reached the international headlines in late 2011, when US President Barack Obama decided to send 100 Special Forces to the region in support of the anti-LRA effort. The troop were deployed in regional capitals as well as in the field over the last months of the year, but information on how this affected the situation on the ground has yet to emerge.
Negotiations: NO
Comment on Negotiations: There were no negotiations between the Ugandan government and LRA in 2011.
Victory: NO
Terminated: YES
Type of termination: No or Low Activity
Date of termination: 2011-12-31
Comment on Termination: Fighting in both dyads active in 2011 de-escalated in 2012 and neither crossed the 25 battle-related deaths threshold.
2012 Dyad Archive
Comment on Active: Despite the fact that the US in late 2011 had sent Special Forces to help remove the LRA threat in general and the groups leadership in particular, the number of confrontations between the two sides decreased in 2012. The group has split up into smaller units, moving over a large area and avoiding direct contact with enemy forces, making them difficult to track down. Further complicating the situation is the fact that there are too few troops actively pursuing the rebels. The Central African Republic has only roughly 100 soldiers deployed in the vast eastern region, where LRA are active. In many towns there are only two to five soldiers that are ill-equipped, with limited transport and communications means. Some villages and towns have no soldiers deployed at all. Furthermore, while some 750 US trained Congolese soldiers were part of the FARDC presence in the LRA affected areas of DRC during the first part of the year, they were transferred south with the escalation of the M23 rebellion (see the section on DRC in the encyclopedia), leaving only 1000 troops in a vast region. It is the Ugandan army that is by far the most effective force pursuing the rebels, but also their numbers were cut during the year. Moreover, they were not allowed to operate in DRC, and there were also areas in CAR to which UPDF (the Ugandan army) was denied access.
In all, this resulted in the conflict between the government of Uganda and its allies and the LRA not being recorded as active in 2012.
Negotiations: NO
Comment on Negotiations: There were no negotiations between the government and LRA in 2012.
Victory: NO
Terminated: NO
2013 Dyad Archive
Comment on Active: After a year of low activity in fighting between Ugandan and its allies and LRA – mainly due to difficulties in tracking down the scattered and mobile rebel group – the year 2013 saw a slight escalation and the dyad was recorded as active.
The alliance fighting LRA experienced both successes and setbacks during the year. The number of troops contributed to the regional task force tasked with tracking down and dealing with LRA, AU-RTF, increased as DR Congo deployed 500 soldiers to the effort in February. Furthermore, after having been largely inactive, both the Congolese and the South Sudanese troops in AU-RTF appeared to become increasingly operational during the fall, carrying out a number of operations against LRA targets. The rebels seemed to have been weakened by the military pressure and were also depleted by an increase in defection rates. However, the lack of large-scale massacres and the decrease in day-to-day attacks on civilians was probably also due to an expressed strategy of lying low, avoiding to draw attention to the group.
A key problem for the AU-RTF was that its troops were not authorized to access some areas where LRA were based. One such place was the Kafia Kingi enclave in southern Darfur, in Sudan, where LRA leader Joseph Kony was reported to be based until March 2013. Furthermore, the crisis in CAR and Southern Sudan caused major setbacks for the alliance. When CAR’s president Francois Bozizé was ousted by the Seleka rebel alliance in late March operations against LRA ground to a halt. The new leaders perceived Uganda to be allies of the former president and it was not until international pressure mounted that they eventually became more cooperative, allowing AU-RTF to become operational again. However, the situation in the country remained chaotic, allowing LRA to seek new safe havens and acquire vital supplies in under-patrolled areas. When the crisis in South Sudan erupted in mid-December these problems amplified. The 500 South Sudanese troops contributed to AU-RTF were withdrawn and many of the Ugandan soldiers were drawn into the fighting on the government side. Subsequently, LRA gained much needed breathing room yet again.
Negotiations: NO
Comment on Negotiations: No negotiations took place between the Ugandan government and LRA in 2013. In December Ugandan president Yoweri Museveni stated his position on talks with LRA on the radio, saying “No, it is a waste of time. If he [Joseph Kony] wants to get out of the bush, he only has to do it. There is no reason for negotiating. The time for the negotiation was over a long time ago.”
Victory: NO
Terminated: NO
2014 Dyad Archive
Comment on Active: In the conflict against LRA, the Ugandan government continued to cooperate militarily with CAR, DR Congo and Southern Sudan, under AU command in the AU-RTF, the regional task force tasked with tracking down and dealing with LRA. UPDF forces were active on the ground in CAR.
Negotiations: NO
Victory: NO
Terminated: YES
Type of termination: No or Low Activity
Date of termination: 2014-12-31
2015 Dyad Archive
Negotiations: NO
Victory: NO
Terminated: NO
2016 Dyad Archive
Negotiations: NO
Victory: NO
Terminated: NO
2017 Dyad Archive
Comment on Active: LRA clashed with Congolese troops in the Ango and Dungu territories of DR Congo. On 16 January the trial of Dominique Ongwen at the International Criminal Court (ICC) opened. On the day before LRA clashed with Ugandan troops in the Central African Republic.
Negotiations: NO
Victory: NO
Terminated: NO
2018 Dyad Archive
Comment on Active: In 2018 LRA only attacked and killed police in one event in Bas-Uélé DR Congo while looting Banda village.
Negotiations: NO
Victory: NO
Terminated: NO
2019 Dyad Archive
Negotiations: NO
Victory: NO
Terminated: NO
2020 Dyad Archive
Negotiations: NO
Victory: NO
Terminated: NO
2021 Dyad Archive
Terminated: NO
2022 Dyad Archive
Terminated: NO
2024 Dyad Archive
Terminated: NO
2025 Dyad Archive
Terminated: NO
