General information
Part of Conflict: Sudan: Government
Date of first stated goals of incompatibility: 2005-11-05
Comment on date of first stated goal of incompatibility: In October 2005 the secretary-general of SLM/A - Minni Minawi organized a SLM/A conference in a village in Eastern Darfur called Haskanita. The conference was boycotted by SLM/A President Abdel Wahid and one reason for this was that he thought the conference was too dominated by the Minawi cattle-herding Zaghawa tribe whilst his own sedentary Fur was underrepresented.
At the end of the conference, Minawi was elected as a new leader of SLM/A something that according to the Minawi supporters had established the movement’s new hierarchy. However, this election result was not accepted by Wahid and on 5 November Izzedin Abdul head of the Khartoum office of the SLM/A said that “"He [Minawi] is not the president. And he will never be a president by this way. The president should be [the winner of] a fair and free election."
Minni Minawi had tried to take control over the whole of SLM/A at Haskanita but failed and after this conference, Minawi and his followers acted on their own. However, the overall political agenda remained the same within both of the movements despite the split. They still wanted to fight for a secular Sudan with a decentralized form of governance.
Date of first use of armed force: 2006-01-23
Comment on date of first use of armed force: The first reported use of armed force of the SLM/A - MM occurred on 23 January 2006 when SLM/A - MM attacked a governmental convoy.
First Battle Related Death: 2006-01-23
Comment on First Battle Related Death: The first reported use of armed force of the SLM/A - MM occurred on 23 January 2006 when SLM/A - MM attacked a governmental convoy and 24 persons were killed.
Date when dyad reached 25 battle releated deaths: 2006-02-14
Comment on date when dyad reached 25 battle related deaths: The fighting between the Government of Sudan and SLM/A - MM reached the threshold of 25 battle-related deaths on 14 February 2006 when government forces and allied militia carried out a joint attack with air support on Rahad El Reel, South Darfur.
The SLA and IDPs reported that a mixed force of Government soldiers (with air support) and 300 militia members attacked the town. There was an SLM/A - MM presence in the area and they shot down one Government attack helicopter, and during the fighting seven civilians were allegedly killed.
Conflict issues
Conflict Goal Issues: The Sudan Liberation Movement/Army – Minni Minawi (SLM/A-MM) emerged as a splinter group from the Sudanese Liberation Movement/Army (SLM/A) when its leader Minni Minawi, former Secretary of the group, was not recognized as President of the SLM/A by the other group leaders following a boycotted internal election that elected Minawi. The SLM/A-MM’s goal remained ostensibly the same as they were during its official inclusion in the SLM/A, aiming to oust the government and replace it with a secular democratic state with heavy decentralization. Whilst the split from the SLM/A occurred in October 2005, the SLM/A-MM did not release any statements regarding conflict goal issues during its first few months of existence. As the conflict intensified, the SLM/A-MM began pronouncing its conflict goal issues. In 2006, they called for the basic needs of the people of Darfur to be protected, for para-military forces, specifically the Janjaweed, to be disbanded, for law and order to be established through a foreign intervention, and for executive power-sharing to be established within the government to properly represent all regions of Sudan.
The emphasis on establishing law and order as well as on disarming and demobilizing the Janjaweed were continuously mentioned throughout the conflict, but the other issues were not reemphasized in the following year. SLM/A-MM instead pronounced its intent to oust the local government of the Darfur region. This came in tandem with calls to restructure the judicial and executive systems to oust corrupt and criminal people in positions of power and to end unfair prosecution of innocent people. The group also emphasized the importance of protecting laws regarding crimes against humanity in Darfur, stating that the government aimed to continue ethnic cleansing into Darfur.
Whilst several issues were raised by the SLM/A-MM throughout the conflict, none were expressed with particular emphasis nor frequency, which is why no specific conflict goal issues are considered especially salient for the group.
Conflict Dynamics Issues: During the year of its creation, the SLM/A-MM only released one statement pertaining to conflict dynamics issues, where they called for the international community to assist them in the peace process. In the following year, 2006, the group increased its statements regarding the dynamics of the conflict. They did not reemphasize calls for foreign assistance in mediation, but rather called upon the international community to utilize its influence to pressure the Sudanese government to adhere to the agreed upon Darfur Peace Agreement and for international political support. They also expressed their support for a military intervention into Darfur with a mandate to use force in order to protect civilians and pursue war criminals. This came in tandem with other calls for international prosecution of criminals of war in the area. The crimes committed were mainly blamed on the Janjaweed, who were provided with arms by the government, who committed massacres in Darfur against civilians based on their ethnicity. Finally, the SLM/A-MM also called upon the government to release illegally detained prisoners and called for refugees from Darfur to be allowed to return to their homes.
In the final year of conflict, 2007, the SLM/A-MM repeated statements regarding war crimes committed against civilians based on ethnic adherence. The group also reemphasized its calls for military intervention and foreign influence to affect the conflict and to protect civilians, although calls for political support and return of refugees were not explicitly made. The group also called upon the international community to supply Darfur with efforts of humanitarian aid, and for UN monitoring of the signing of the Darfur Peace Agreement. The SLM/A-MM also emphasized atrocities committed not only by the Janjaweed, but also by government forces: “The government is still targeting civilians, at least burning their villages, throwing them into bush”
The main conflict dynamics issues for the SLM/A-MM were the ethnically motivated atrocities committed against civilians in Darfur and the calls for a military intervention to prohibit future abuses. Whilst other issues were also called for with similar frequency, the emphasis placed on these issues implies their increased salience for the group.
Conflict Resolution Issues: During 2005, the year the SLM/A-MM emerged, they released a statement indicating its intent to negotiate a peaceful and political solution to the conflict with the government, calling upon the international community to assist them in the peace process. In 2006, neither of these issues were explicitly stated. Instead, issues of accountability and prosecution for war criminals, as well as disarmament and demobilization of the Janjaweed were emphasized, as were calls for the implementation and adherence to a ceasefire with the Sudanese government and pronounced its conditional acceptance of a peace agreement.
During 2007, SLM/A-MM reaffirmed its commitment to all previously stated issues, calling for accountability and prosecution of war criminals, governmental adherence to ceasefire agreements, calls for negotiations to be held with certain conditions, specifically that communications be held with on-the-ground leaders and not “those living in five star hotels in Europe”.
In terms of main issues, the group heavily emphasized the peace process of establishing peace agreements and initiating negotiations with the government, which could be considered main issues, but the limited timeframe of the conflict makes salience difficult to determine.
Type of conflict issues: Conflict Goal Issues: Basic needs, Rule of law, Constitutional issues, Disband para-military forces, Executive power-sharing, Freedom of expression, Law and order, Oust local executive, Public services, Reform executive structure, Reform judicial system
Conflict Dynamics Issues: Atrocities and abuses, Collective targeting: ethnic, IFI: Foreign mediator, IFI: Humanitarian aid, IFI: International court/tribunal/investigation, IFI: International monitoring, IFI: Military intervention/foreign forces, IFI: Political support, IFI: Use of foreign influence, Military conduct, Release of prisoners, Return of refugees/IDPs
Conflict Resolution Issues: Accountability/prosecution/investigation, Structure of negotiations, Structure of peace agreement, Call for implementation/abiding to ceasefire, Call for negotiations, DDR issues, Peace agreement implementation
Annual information
This section contains annual information systematically collected by the UCDP.
2005
| Estimated Fatalities | |
|---|---|
| High | 0 |
| Best | 0 |
| Low | 0 |
Secondary Warring Support:
Side A (Government of Sudan): n/a
Side B (SLM/A - MM): n/a
2006
| Estimated Fatalities | |
|---|---|
| High | 137 |
| Best | 134 |
| Low | 134 |
Secondary Warring Support:
Side A (Government of Sudan): n/a
Side B (SLM/A - MM): n/a
Peace agreements
Name of peace agreement: Darfur Peace Agreement
Date when warring parties signed the agreement: 2006-05-05
Comment of peace agreement: Partial peace agreement
On 5 May 2006 the Government of Sudan and the SLM/MM (Minni Mannawi faction) signed a peace agreement concerning the three states of Darfur, in the Nigerian city of Abuja. The agreement contains a total of 6 annexes, all which are reaffirmed. The peace agreement was meant to be signed by SLM/AW and JEM as well as SLM/MM, but the two former groups refused to sign, leading to the peace agreement mentioning all groups, but applying only to SLM/MM.
This dyadic peace agreement, being wide in scope, covered such issues as national and state power-sharing, demilitarization of the Janjaweed and other militias, an integration of SLM/A and JEM troops into the Sudanese Armed Forces and police, a system of federal wealth-sharing for the promotion of Darfurian economic interests, a referendum on the future status of Darfur and measures to promote the flow of humanitarian aid into the region.
The agreement contained a comprehensive ceasefire agreement (CFA), which reaffirmed in particular the NDajema Agreement of April 2004. The CFA forbade mobilization, recruitment, military actions and propaganda, and stipulated the release of all detainees. It also contained measures to protect humanitarian aid routes and IDPs. The CFA was to be monitored and verified mainly by AMIS, whose force strength was to be enhanced by international partners. An important part of the CFA was the neutralization of the Janjaweed and the Popular Defence Forces, for which the GoS was responsible. The agreement stipulated that the GoS was to take all measures available to neutralize the threat posed by these groups operating in GoS territory. Disengagement, redeployment and demobilization were sequenced according to a step-by-step plan according to a specified time-frame.
The chapter on Final Security Arrangements outlined the final moves for demobilization and reintegration of ex-combatants. Forces of SLM/A and JEM were to be integrated into the security institutions of Sudan, with a total of 4000 soldiers being integrated into the armed forces, 1000 being integrated into the police and another 3000 being given professional and educational training for reintegration into civilian life. Integrated battalions were to be composed of between 33% and 50% SLM/A or JEM troops. Senior positions in SAF command and HQ were also to be granted to the movements, at a total of 20%. The agreement further stipulated reforms of various security institutions, for instance the Border Intelligence Units, the Popular Defence Forces and the Popular Police, in order to increase equitable representation and professionalism.
Regarding the incompatibility the agreement both touched on political representation and the future status of Darfur. In the political sphere the most important provisions were power-sharing at the national and state level, the creation of a Transitional Darfur Regional Authority (TDRA), a referendum and general moves towards the equitable representation of Darfurians in Sudanese affairs. Up until elections, i.e. in the interim period, the SLM/A and JEM would be represented at the national level by a Senior Assistant to the President, to be selected from a list of nominees by these two movements. This Senior Assistant was to be placed at the head of a number of councils and committees in order to ensure influence over national policy. Further, the 3 posts of Cabinet Minister held by Darfurians would remain, and an additional Cabinet Minister and 2 posts of State Minister would be allocated to SLM/A and JEM nominees. 12 seats in the legislative would also be awarded to such nominees. Power-sharing arrangements were also agreed upon within Darfur, with the seat of Governor of 1 of the 3 Darfurian states to be held by a SLM/A and JEM nominee, and with 2 seats of Deputy Governor in all other states. Ministerial positions were also to be given to these movements, along with 21 seats out of the 66 seat legislatures of the three states. Lastly, the GoS was to ensure the fair and equitable representation of Darfurians in the national judiciary and civil services. The TDRA would be responsible in the interim period for certain aspects of the implementation process, with the responsibility also of recommending national and state legislation to enhance cooperation and coordination. Pending elections 6 SLM/A nominees and 6 JEM nominees would run local governments. The permanent status of Darfur would be determined by a referendum, to be held no later than July 2010. In this referendum the two alternatives would be; 1) the creation of a unified Darfur region, or 2) status quo with 3 existing Darfurian states (north, south and west).
On wealth-sharing and fiscal redistribution the peace agreement stipulated a complex structure of federal fiscal relations, with the general aim of fiscal equalization of the Sudanese states. For this purpose Darfur would be given priority in resource redistribution, and also benefit from the Darfur Reconstruction and Development Fund. This part of the agreement also outlined some moves towards land reform, with the affirmation of tribal land ownership and the principal of restitution in cases of lost land. To arbitrate in land disputes the agreement stipulated the creation of a Land Commission, which would make binding decisions on land rights. The distribution of land between different groups, however, was not specifically regulated.
The GoS, the TDRA and international partners were responsible for the reconstruction of Darfur, and of the creation of conditions susceptible to the voluntary return of refugees and IDPs. AMIS would monitor and patrol humanitarian aid routes and demilitarized IDP camps to ensure the return of IDPs and refugees. The agreement also stipulated a donor conference to accumulate the necessary resources for the reconstruction and development of Darfurs economy.
One of the final provisions was the stipulated holding of a Darfur-Darfur dialogue conference, to which all stakeholders in the conflict would be invited to discuss the conflict, reconciliation, community building and issues of land and natural resources. Such a conference would recommend policy and advise the government on legislation to promote peace and reconciliation.
Signatories: For the GoS: Dr. Magzoub al-Khalifa
For the Sudan Liberation Movement/Army: Minni Arkou Minnawi
Witnessed by:
For the AU: Dr. Salim Ahmed Salim, AU Special Envoy and Chief Mediator
For the AU: Denis Sassou-Nguesso, Chairman of the AU
For the AU: Alpha Oumar Konare, Chairperson of the AU Commission
For the Republic of Nigeria: President Olusegun Obasanjo
For the Libyan Arab Jamahiriya: Dr. Ali Treki
For the USA: Robert Zoellick, Deputy Secretary of State
For the UK: Hilary Benn, Secretary of State for International Development
For the UN: Jan Pronk, Special Representative of the Secretary-General of the UN in Sudan
For the EU: Pekka Haavisto
For the Arab League: Zeid Al Sabban, Counsellor
For the Arab Republic of Egypt: Ahmed A. Haggag, Ambassador
For Canada: Allan Rock, Ambassador
For Norway: Dr. Kjell Hodnebo
For France: Henri de Coignac, Ambassador
For the Netherlands: Agnes Van Ardenne, Minister for Development Cooperation
Comment of signatories: Dyadic peace agreement
Minni Minnawi, signatory for the SLM/A (MM) did not at the signing represent the whole of the SLM/A movement, but only his own faction, leaving the movement split on this peace agreement since the SLA lead by Abdel Wahid el-Nour refused to sign. Also, the JEM refused to sign the agreement, stating that it did not adress the root causes of the conflict.
Third parties: AU, AMIS, UN
Comment of third parties role in peace agreement: The AU was the chief mediator in these negotiations, and during the seventh round the DPA was signed in Abuja, Nigeria. The seventh round began on 29 November 2005, alternated between different locations but finished in Abuja.
Ended: True
Date agreement ended: 2010-12-31
Comment of Duration: The duration of the DPA ended at the end of 2010. At that time the government and SLM/A (MM) clashed at three different times. Also, Mini Minawi said that he was thinking of joining forces with SLM/A led by Abdul Wahid. In addition the government declared Mini Minawi and his forces being a legal target.
Full-text peace agreement
2007
| Estimated Fatalities | |
|---|---|
| High | 20 |
| Best | 20 |
| Low | 20 |
Secondary Warring Support:
Side A (Government of Sudan): n/a
Side B (SLM/A - MM): n/a
2008
| Estimated Fatalities | |
|---|---|
| High | 0 |
| Best | 0 |
| Low | 0 |
Secondary Warring Support:
Side A (Government of Sudan): n/a
Side B (SLM/A - MM): n/a
2009
| Estimated Fatalities | |
|---|---|
| High | 0 |
| Best | 0 |
| Low | 0 |
Secondary Warring Support:
Side A (Government of Sudan): n/a
Side B (SLM/A - MM): n/a
2010
| Estimated Fatalities | |
|---|---|
| High | 2 |
| Best | 2 |
| Low | 2 |
Secondary Warring Support:
Side A (Government of Sudan): n/a
Side B (SLM/A - MM): n/a
2011
| Estimated Fatalities | |
|---|---|
| High | 2 |
| Best | 0 |
| Low | 0 |
Secondary Warring Support:
Side A (Government of Sudan): n/a
Side B (SLM/A - MM): n/a
2014
| Estimated Fatalities | |
|---|---|
| High | 0 |
| Best | 0 |
| Low | 0 |
Secondary Warring Support:
Side A (Government of Sudan): n/a
Side B (SLM/A - MM): n/a
2017
| Estimated Fatalities | |
|---|---|
| High | 0 |
| Best | 0 |
| Low | 0 |
Secondary Warring Support:
Side A (Government of Sudan): n/a
Side B (SLM/A - MM): n/a
Dyad Archive
This section contains annual information no longer systematically collected by the UCDP.
2005 Dyad Archive
Terminated: NO
2006 Dyad Archive
Comment on Yearly Battle Related Deaths: Most of the fighting between the Government of Sudan and SLM/A (MM) took place during the first half of the year, prior to the signing of the Darfur Peace agreement on 5 May 2006, but there was also reported fighting on some occacions after the signing.
The figure reported for this dyad is most likely much lower than the actual figure. One reason for this is that the situation in Darfur 2006 was very difficult for different agencies such as health organisations, journalists and different NGO’s, resulting in very limited reports coming from Darfur throughout the year."
Comment on Active: The SLM/A - MM dyad was active throughout the year of 2006. Most of the fighting took place at the beginning of the year before the signing of the Darfur Peace Agreement on 5 May 2006, but there was also reported fighting during the last half of the year. In addition to the fighting against the government, the SLM/A - MM was also involved in several battles against other factions of the SLM/A, mainly the SLM/A faction led by Abdul Wahid. The year 2006 was characterized by fragmentation on the rebel side of the conflict in Darfur. After the conference in Haskanita in October 2005 when Minni Minawi split from SLM/A there were two factions of the SLM/A, but during 2006 there were reports of up to 10 different rebel groups in Darfur, and the majority of these were different splinter groups from the SLM/A. Moreover, the SLM/A - MM attacked civilians that did not support the signing of the DPA and after these attacks, some people began to refer to them by the name of "Janjaweed 2".
In the DPA it is stated that the SLM/A - MM should get a more extensive political role both in Khartoum and in Darfur. Even though Minni Minawi now is the Special Representative of the President one cannot say that the DPA has been implemented. Only very few aspects of the DPA have been implemented, and fighting between the SLM/A - MM and the government occurred on several occasions after the signing.
Negotiations: YES
Comment on Negotiations: The SLM/A - MM was part of the negotiations that lead to the signing of the Darfur Peace Agreement. The AU was the chief mediator in these negotiations, and during the seventh round the DPA was signed in Abuja, Nigeria. The seventh round began on 29 November 2005, alternated between different locations but finished in Abuja. Minni Minnawi was the only rebel leader that signed the agreement.
Victory: NO
Comment on Victory: No victory for the searched year.
Terminated: YES
Type of termination: Peace Agreement
Date of termination: 2006-05-05
Comment on Termination: The Darfur Peace Agreement (DPA) was signed on 5 May 2006.
2007 Dyad Archive
Comment on Active: The SLM/A - MM was not active in 2007 since they signed the Darfur peace Agreement (DPA) in May 2006. Although, slow implementation and some clashes between the SLM/A - MM and the government the parties still stick to the DPA.
Negotiations: NO
Victory: NO
Comment on Victory: .
Terminated: NO
2008 Dyad Archive
Negotiations: NO
Victory: NO
Terminated: NO
2009 Dyad Archive
Terminated: NO
2010 Dyad Archive
Negotiations: NO
Victory: NO
Terminated: NO
2011 Dyad Archive
Negotiations: NO
Victory: NO
Terminated: YES
Type of termination: Other
Date of termination: 2011-11-13
Comment on Termination: SLM/A - MM joined an alliance called the Sudan Revolutionary Front (SRF) in November 2011. SLM/A - MM continued to fight the Sudanese government as part of this alliance.
2014 Dyad Archive
Negotiations: NO
Victory: NO
Terminated: NO
2017 Dyad Archive
Terminated: NO