General information
Part of Conflict: Philippines: Mindanao
Date of first stated goals of incompatibility: 1968-07-01
Comment on date of first stated goal of incompatibility: Nur Misauri wrote in an editorial for the Philippine Muslim News, "separatism is a costly and painful process and few ordinary mortals are prepared to pay the price." A few months later, Misauri started the MNLF with an intent of armed struggle for an independent Mindanao.
Date of first use of armed force: 1972-10-01
Comment on date of first use of armed force: MNLF did not launch its first offensive against government troops until after President Marcos had declared martial law in September 1972. In October, an offensive was launched in the Sulu archipelago, and fierce fighting took place.
First Battle Related Death: 1972-10-01
Comment on First Battle Related Death: MNLF did not launch its first offensive against government troops until after President Marcos had declared martial law in September 1972. In October, a large-scale offensive was launched in the Sulu archipelago, and fierce fighting took place.
Date when dyad reached 25 battle releated deaths: 1972-12-31
Comment on date when dyad reached 25 battle related deaths: After the initial rebel offensive in October 1972, the government forces launched a major naval, air, and ground assault to recapture the rebel stronghold in the Sulu archipelago in December. After four days of intense fighting the government forces had to withdraw. Details are scarce but in the first assault the army reportedly lost 35 men.
Conflict issues
Conflict Goal Issues: The Moro National Liberation Front (MNLF) was a rebel group claiming to represent the historically marginalized Muslim populations – known as the Bangsamoro – on the southernmost Philippine island group of Mindanao. The MNLF characterized itself in the language of decolonization and nationalism; its founding manifesto emphasized the wish “to free ourselves from the terror, oppression, and tyranny of Filipino colonialism.” The group’s first stated conflict goals in 1973-1974 stressed self-determination in the form of autonomy and independence, a desire to “democratize” the wealth of its natural resources, and a yearning for an Islamic rule that was capable of protecting the unique ethno-religious culture of the Bangsamoro.
The conflict goals of self-determination and control of Mindanao’s rich natural resources persisted throughout MNLF’s activity. The MNLF vacillated between demands of autonomy and full independence. Demands for independence were instrumental in bolstering their claim to a higher quality “full autonomy” that would not fall “short of their demands.” The MNLF notably dropped its independence bid in 1994, which set the stage for the 1996 peace agreement that created an autonomous regional government. The focus on religious rights and protection of religious heritage waned throughout the group’s existence, though calls for Islamic law and ethno-culturally defined education systems remained important. In the late 80s and early 90s, the MNLF began publically opposing what it viewed as “sham” elections for local leadership and forms of autonomy that were, in their view, far too limited.
The central goal of the MNLF was self-determination for the historically oppressed and culturally distinct Muslim minority populations of Mindanao. The goal of self-determination was ideally one of independence, but “full” autonomy was a long considered solution. Self-determination was connected to the other most consistent conflict goal: control of Mindanao’s natural wealth. The MNLF’s 1974 manifesto stressed the importance of a “free and independent state for the Bangsa Moro people” followed by a call to see “the democratization of the wealth in their homeland.”
Conflict Dynamics Issues: The MNLF’s Declaration of Aims and Manifesto in the early 1970s focused their conflict dynamic issues on the group’s outrage for alleged atrocities and genocide against the Bangsamoro people by the Philippine Government. They speak of the torching of Muslim houses and places of worship, the rape of Muslim women, and the murder of “our innocent brothers, sisters and folks in genocidal campaign of terrifying magnitude.” In the late 80s and early 90s, however, the central conflict dynamic issues coded focused upon achieving political support and recognition from the 46 nation Organization of Islamic Congress in an attempt to maximize negotiation power with the Philippine government.
The main conflict dynamic issues of the MNLF have two distinct periods. Upon their founding, the MNLF focused their attention on public statements describing Philippine abuse, exploitation, and genocide. However, in the early 1990s, the MNLF focused on leveraging political power through international support and recognition.
Conflict Resolution Issues: The first conflict resolution issues coded were MNLF calls for negotiations with the Philippine government in 1988. In the early 1990s, the MNLF consistently made calls for negotiations, which led to the Final Peace Agreement between the MNLF and the Philippine Government in 1996. In 1993 and 1994, this project coded “peace agreement implementation.” To maximize leverage during negotiations, the MNLF demanded “full Moslem autonomy in the southern Philippines as called for in a peace agreement signed by both sides in Libya in 1976.” The MNLF also demanded that the negotiations take place outside of the Philippines and with the OIC as mediator.
The principal conflict resolution issues coded in this project were calls for negotiation with the Philippine Government and calls to implement the previous 1976 peace agreement signed by the two sides.
Type of conflict issues: *Conflict Goal Issues: * Autonomy, Change judicial system, Civil rights, Constitutional issues, CPS: Democracy, Cultural rights, Economic reforms, Education system: increase religion, Electoral fraud, Independence, Land reforms, Opposition to elections, Protection of cultural heritage, Religious rights, Restructure military forces, Revenues from natural resources, Security sector power-sharing
*Conflict Dynamics Issues: * Atrocities and abuses, Collective targeting: ethnic, DFI: Removal of foreigners, IFI: Foreign mediator, IFI: Political support, IFI: Recognition, Military conduct
*Conflict Resolution Issues: * Call for negotiations, Peace agreement implementation, Structure of negotiations
Annual information
This section contains annual information systematically collected by the UCDP.
1975
| Estimated Fatalities | |
|---|---|
| High | 25 |
| Best | 25 |
| Low | 0 |
Secondary Warring Support:
Side A (Government of Philippines): n/a
Side B (MNLF): n/a
1976
| Estimated Fatalities | |
|---|---|
| High | 25 |
| Best | 25 |
| Low | 0 |
Secondary Warring Support:
Side A (Government of Philippines): n/a
Side B (MNLF): n/a
Peace agreements
Name of peace agreement: Tripoli Agreement
Date when warring parties signed the agreement: 1976-12-23
Comment of peace agreement: Partial peace agreement
Negotiations under the auspices of the OIC (Organization of the Islamic Conference) were initiated in 1975, when a first round of talks was held in Jeddah, Saudi Arabia. The talks broke down, but after a visit by Philippine President Marcos’ wife to Libya, new talks started in Tripoli, Libya on 15 December 1976. On 23 December, the Tripoli Agreement was signed by the government of the Philippines and MNLF.
The Tripoli Agreement included a ceasefire to be declared immediately after the signing of the agreement. A Joint Committee should be formed, consisting of the two parties with the help of the Quadripartite Ministerial Commission (Libya, Somalia, Saudi Arabia and Senegal), to supervise the ceasefire agreed upon. A reformation process of the army, in which MNLF troops would join the Philippine Armed Forces, was discussed but the agreement stated that the question should be dealt with at a later stage in the peace process.
Regarding the incompatibility the agreement provided for autonomy in 13 provinces in the southern parts of the Philippines. The authorities of the autonomous region would have the right to set up their own courts and implement Islamic Sharia law in the south. Furthermore, they were given the right to set up their own financial system, a legislative assembly and an executive council. The agreement also regulated Muslim participation and representation in the Supreme Court, the Central government and all other organs of the state.
A complete amnesty was issued for events which took place in the south of the Philippines.
Signatories: Undersecretary of National Defense for Civilian Relations Carmelo Z. Barbero for the Government of the Republic of the Philippines
Chairman Nur Misuari for the Moro National Liberation Front
Minister of State for Foreign Affairs Ali Abdusaalam Treki, for the Libyan Arab Republic
Secretary General Amadou Karim Gaye for the OIC (Organization of the Islamic Conference)
Comment of signatories: Comprehensive agreement signed in Tripoli, Libya on 23 December 1976
Third parties: Libya, Senegal, Saudi Arabia, Somalia, OIC
Comment of third parties role in peace agreement: Libya hosted negotiations in December 1976, and served, together with Somalia, Senegal and Saudi Arabia (these four countries together formed the Quadripartite Ministerial Commission), as mediators. The Libyan Minister of State for Foreign Affairs Ali Abdusaalam Treki signed the agreement together with Amadou Karim Gaye, Secretary General of the OIC (Organization of the Islamic Conference). The agreement stated that a Joint Committee should be formed, consisting of the two parties with the help of the Quadripartite Ministerial Commission, to supervise the ceasefire agreed upon.
Ended: True
Date agreement ended: 1977-05-22
Comment of Duration: Talks were held between February and April 1977 in order to agree on the details of the Tripoli Agreement signed on 23 December 1976. On 1 May, talks broke down and both parties blamed each other of trying to discard the agreement. During an Islamic Conference meeting between 16-22 May, MNLF leader Nur Misuari said in an interview with Le Monde that MNLF had decided to revert to its original demand for total independence in Mindanao. He stated that MNLF was ready to continue fighting.
The agreement held for 4 months and 29 days.
Full-text peace agreement
1977
| Estimated Fatalities | |
|---|---|
| High | 25 |
| Best | 25 |
| Low | 0 |
Secondary Warring Support:
Side A (Government of Philippines): n/a
Side B (MNLF): n/a
1978
| Estimated Fatalities | |
|---|---|
| High | 1000 |
| Best | 1000 |
| Low | 0 |
Secondary Warring Support:
Side A (Government of Philippines): n/a
Side B (MNLF): n/a
1979
| Estimated Fatalities | |
|---|---|
| High | 25 |
| Best | 25 |
| Low | 0 |
Secondary Warring Support:
Side A (Government of Philippines): n/a
Side B (MNLF): n/a
1980
| Estimated Fatalities | |
|---|---|
| High | 25 |
| Best | 25 |
| Low | 0 |
Secondary Warring Support:
Side A (Government of Philippines): n/a
Side B (MNLF): n/a
1981
| Estimated Fatalities | |
|---|---|
| High | 1000 |
| Best | 1000 |
| Low | 0 |
Secondary Warring Support:
Side A (Government of Philippines): n/a
Side B (MNLF): n/a
1982
| Estimated Fatalities | |
|---|---|
| High | 25 |
| Best | 25 |
| Low | 0 |
Secondary Warring Support:
Side A (Government of Philippines): n/a
Side B (MNLF): n/a
1983
| Estimated Fatalities | |
|---|---|
| High | 25 |
| Best | 25 |
| Low | 0 |
Secondary Warring Support:
Side A (Government of Philippines): n/a
Side B (MNLF): n/a
1984
| Estimated Fatalities | |
|---|---|
| High | 25 |
| Best | 25 |
| Low | 0 |
Secondary Warring Support:
Side A (Government of Philippines): n/a
Side B (MNLF): n/a
1985
| Estimated Fatalities | |
|---|---|
| High | 25 |
| Best | 25 |
| Low | 0 |
Secondary Warring Support:
Side A (Government of Philippines): n/a
Side B (MNLF): n/a
1986
| Estimated Fatalities | |
|---|---|
| High | 25 |
| Best | 25 |
| Low | 0 |
Secondary Warring Support:
Side A (Government of Philippines): n/a
Side B (MNLF): n/a
1987
| Estimated Fatalities | |
|---|---|
| High | 25 |
| Best | 25 |
| Low | 0 |
Secondary Warring Support:
Side A (Government of Philippines): n/a
Side B (MNLF): n/a
Peace agreements
Name of peace agreement: Jeddah Accord
Date when warring parties signed the agreement: 1987-01-04
Comment of peace agreement: Peace process agreement
Negotiations under the auspices of the OIC (Organization of the Islamic Conference) were first initiated in 1975, when talks were held in Jeddah, Saudi Arabia. The talks broke down, but after a visit by Philippine President Marcos’ wife to Libya, new talks started in Tripoli, Libya on 15 December 1976. On 23 December, the Tripoli Agreement was signed by the government of the Philippines and MNLF. Negotiations continued in early 1977, but eventually broke down and did not restart until in 1986, when the parties agreed on a ceasefire and for OIC-sponsored talks to take place in 1987. On 1 January 1987, negotiations opened in Jeddah, Saudi Arabia, and on 3-4 January, the Jeddah Accord was signed.
In the Accord, the parties agreed to continue discussion of full autonomy to the region of Mindanao. The Accord provided for a Joint Commission to be set up to “discuss and draft the mechanism and details of the proposal for the grant of full autonomy to Mindanao, Basilan, Sulu, Tawi-Tawi and Palawan subject to democratic processes.” The Commission was supposed to consist of three members from each party and an initial meeting was planned to take place in Manila on 9 February. The Accord also included a ceasefire agreement and plans for a committee to be set up in order to monitor and implement this ceasefire.
Signatories: For MNLF: Nur Misuari, leader of MNLF and chairman of the MNLF panel; Joseph B. Banghulot.
For the government of the Philippines: Aquilino Pimentel Jr., Presidential adviser and chairman of the government panel; Agapito A. Aquino Senator of the Philippines.
For OIC: Syed Shariffuddin Pirzada, Secretary General of OIC
Comment of signatories: Comprehensive agreement
The Jeddah Accord was signed in Jeddah, Saudi Arabia on 3-4 January 1987, under the auspices of OIC.
Third parties: OIC (Organization of the Islamic Conference)
Comment of third parties role in peace agreement: OIC hosted the negotiations in Saudi Arabia and served as mediators in the talks.
Ended: True
Date agreement ended: 1987-07-28
Comment of Duration: The Jeddah Accord was followed by talks in Manila in February and March and again in Jeddah in July. Although the talks seemed promising at first, with MNLF leader Nur Misuari announcing that he was willing to accept full autonomy rather than to fight for independence, negotiations eventually broke down and on 28 July Misuari ordered his fighters to resume the armed struggle.
The agreement held for six months and 24 days.
Full-text peace agreement
1988
| Estimated Fatalities | |
|---|---|
| High | 25 |
| Best | 25 |
| Low | 0 |
Secondary Warring Support:
Side A (Government of Philippines): n/a
Side B (MNLF): n/a
1989
| Estimated Fatalities | |
|---|---|
| High | 115 |
| Best | 115 |
| Low | 115 |
Secondary Warring Support:
Side A (Government of Philippines): n/a
Side B (MNLF): n/a
1990
| Estimated Fatalities | |
|---|---|
| High | 64 |
| Best | 64 |
| Low | 64 |
Secondary Warring Support:
Side A (Government of Philippines): n/a
Side B (MNLF): n/a
1991
| Estimated Fatalities | |
|---|---|
| High | 0 |
| Best | 0 |
| Low | 0 |
Secondary Warring Support:
Side A (Government of Philippines): n/a
Side B (MNLF): n/a
1992
| Estimated Fatalities | |
|---|---|
| High | 0 |
| Best | 0 |
| Low | 0 |
Secondary Warring Support:
Side A (Government of Philippines): n/a
Side B (MNLF): n/a
1993
| Estimated Fatalities | |
|---|---|
| High | 147 |
| Best | 124 |
| Low | 124 |
Secondary Warring Support:
Side A (Government of Philippines): n/a
Side B (MNLF): n/a
Peace agreements
Name of peace agreement: Statement of Understanding (Cipanas Understanding)
Date when warring parties signed the agreement: 1993-04-16
Comment of peace agreement: Peace process agreement
This agreement came after the Second Round of Exploratory Talks held in Indonesia between the Government of Philippines and MNLF. The talks were proposed to determine modalities for implementation of the 1976 Tripoli Agreement. This agreement set the time, date, and agenda for formal talks between the parties.
With regard to the incompatibility, the agreement continued the process set forth through the Tripoli Agreement to defined the autonomous region in Mindinao, addressing the grievances of the indigenous Muslim population, the Moro.
Signatories: GRP Panel: Eduardo R. Ermita, S. Wiryono, Diretor for Political Affairs, Department of Foreign Affairs, Republic of Indonesia representing the OIC Ministerial Committee of Six
MNLF Panel: Nur Misuar, Ibrahim Saleh Bakr, Deputy Secretary General for Political, Legal and Minority Affairs, OIC, representing the Secretary General of the OIC
Comment of signatories: Dyadic peace agreement signed in Istana Presiden, Chipanas, West Java, Indonesia on 16 April 1993.
Agreement signed without MILF.
Third parties: OIC (Organization of the Islamic Conference), Indonesia
Comment of third parties role in peace agreement: The Indonesian Government hosted the talks and represented the OIC Ministerial Committee of Six, which helped facilitated the process.
Comment of Duration: On 25 October formal peace negotiations started in Jakarta between the MNLF and the government.
Full-text peace agreement
1994
| Estimated Fatalities | |
|---|---|
| High | 11 |
| Best | 11 |
| Low | 11 |
Secondary Warring Support:
Side A (Government of Philippines): n/a
Side B (MNLF): n/a
1995
| Estimated Fatalities | |
|---|---|
| High | 0 |
| Best | 0 |
| Low | 0 |
Secondary Warring Support:
Side A (Government of Philippines): n/a
Side B (MNLF): n/a
1996
| Estimated Fatalities | |
|---|---|
| High | 5 |
| Best | 5 |
| Low | 5 |
Secondary Warring Support:
Side A (Government of Philippines): n/a
Side B (MNLF): n/a
Peace agreements
Name of peace agreement: Final agreement on the implementation of the 1976 Tripoli Agreement between the Government of the Republic of the Philippines (GRP) and the Moro National Liberation Front (MNLF)
Date when warring parties signed the agreement: 1996-09-02
Comment of peace agreement: Full peace agreement
Also called the GRP-MNLF Final Peace Agreement or the Jakarta Accord. The agreement links back to the Tripoli Agreement of 1976 and the autonomous process outlined in that agreement that never materialized. It also refers to previous statements of understanding signed during the peace process in Tripoli 1992, and West Java 1993.
The agreement contained no formal ceasefire, but contained extensive reforms and restructuring of the armed forces of the Philippine’s military and police forces. A specific number of vacancies were made available in both these branches of the armed forces to allow for MNLF integration. The rank and file as well as the commanding officers were to be integrated. An arrangement for the social reintegration and economic development of those demobilized was also established.
The peace plan itself contained two phases; in the first a special zone of Peace and Development would be created to channel funds to the conflict affected areas. In the second phase a new Regional Autonomous Government would be formed if it were approved by a plebiscite in the concerned areas. The autonomous region would receive far-reaching self-governing powers with its own assembly, fiscal independence and influence in the cultural and educational spheres, among other things.
Signatories: Manuel T. Yan (Government of the Philippines Peace Panel Chairman, Ambassador in Indonesia),
Nur Misauri (MNLF),
Ali Alatas (Minister for Foreign Affairs in Indonesia, Chairman of the OIC Ministerial Committee of the Six),
Hamid Al-Gabid (Secreatry-General of the OIC)
Comment of signatories: Dyadic peace agreement
The agreement mentions the importance of the mediators during the negotiations. Firstly and foremost, of course, the delegates of the OIC, and the OIC Ministerial Committee of the Six and its composition of delegates from Indonesia, Libya, Saudi Arabia, Bangladesh, Senegal, and Somalia.
Full-text peace agreement
1997
| Estimated Fatalities | |
|---|---|
| High | 0 |
| Best | 0 |
| Low | 0 |
Secondary Warring Support:
Side A (Government of Philippines): n/a
Side B (MNLF): n/a
1998
| Estimated Fatalities | |
|---|---|
| High | 0 |
| Best | 0 |
| Low | 0 |
Secondary Warring Support:
Side A (Government of Philippines): n/a
Side B (MNLF): n/a
1999
| Estimated Fatalities | |
|---|---|
| High | 0 |
| Best | 0 |
| Low | 0 |
Secondary Warring Support:
Side A (Government of Philippines): n/a
Side B (MNLF): n/a
2000
| Estimated Fatalities | |
|---|---|
| High | 4 |
| Best | 4 |
| Low | 4 |
Secondary Warring Support:
Side A (Government of Philippines): n/a
Side B (MNLF): n/a
2001
| Estimated Fatalities | |
|---|---|
| High | 17 |
| Best | 7 |
| Low | 7 |
Secondary Warring Support:
Side A (Government of Philippines): n/a
Side B (MNLF): n/a
2009
| Estimated Fatalities | |
|---|---|
| High | 10 |
| Best | 10 |
| Low | 10 |
Secondary Warring Support:
Side A (Government of Philippines): n/a
Side B (MNLF): n/a
2010
| Estimated Fatalities | |
|---|---|
| High | 0 |
| Best | 0 |
| Low | 0 |
Secondary Warring Support:
Side A (Government of Philippines): n/a
Side B (MNLF): n/a
2011
| Estimated Fatalities | |
|---|---|
| High | 0 |
| Best | 0 |
| Low | 0 |
Secondary Warring Support:
Side A (Government of Philippines): n/a
Side B (MNLF): n/a
2012
| Estimated Fatalities | |
|---|---|
| High | 0 |
| Best | 0 |
| Low | 0 |
Secondary Warring Support:
Side A (Government of Philippines): n/a
Side B (MNLF): n/a
2013
| Estimated Fatalities | |
|---|---|
| High | 0 |
| Best | 0 |
| Low | 0 |
Secondary Warring Support:
Side A (Government of Philippines): n/a
Side B (MNLF): n/a
2014
| Estimated Fatalities | |
|---|---|
| High | 0 |
| Best | 0 |
| Low | 0 |
Secondary Warring Support:
Side A (Government of Philippines): n/a
Side B (MNLF): n/a
2015
| Estimated Fatalities | |
|---|---|
| High | 0 |
| Best | 0 |
| Low | 0 |
Secondary Warring Support:
Side A (Government of Philippines): n/a
Side B (MNLF): n/a
2024
| Estimated Fatalities | |
|---|---|
| High | 0 |
| Best | 0 |
| Low | 0 |
Secondary Warring Support:
Side A (Government of Philippines): n/a
Side B (MNLF): n/a
Dyad Archive
This section contains annual information no longer systematically collected by the UCDP.
1975 Dyad Archive
Comment on Active: In January, the parties met in peace talks in Jeddah, Saudi Arabia under the auspices of the Islamic Conference. No progress was reported, and violence continued. Following reports in March that thousands of rebels were massing on Basilan and Tawi-Tawi islands the government launched counter-insurgency operations in the area.
In May, a new round of peace talks was held, and in August the government claimed that the parties had agreed on a ceasefire. However, this was contested by spokesmen from MNLF and fighting continued.
Negotiations: YES
Comment on Negotiations: Negotiations were initiated in January 1975 in the Saudi Arabian city of Jeddah. The talks broke down, and in April, the government instigated talks in the Philippine city of Zamboanga city with representatives of 27 Muslim groups. MNLF boycotted the meeting and stated that the talks in Zamboanga were a violation of the agreement stipulating that negotiations should be hosted by the Islamic Conference in Jeddah.
In April, the government announced that they agreed to integrate MNLF members into the armed forces, and in May a new round of talks was held in the southern city of Marawi.
Victory: NO
Terminated: NO
1976 Dyad Archive
Comment on Active: A severe earthquake in August 1976, resulted in a “state of calamity” being declared in the southern Philippines. Fighting decreased and in November, the President’s wife visited Libya to discuss the Muslim insurgency in Mindanao. Libya agreed to host peace talks, which opened in Tripoli on 15 December. On 23 December, the Tripoli agreement was signed, providing for autonomy in 13 provinces in the southern parts of the Philippines. The agreement also included a declaration of ceasefire and an amnesty in the areas of autonomy.
Negotiations: YES
Comment on Negotiations: In November, the President’s wife visited Libya to discuss the Muslim insurgency in Mindanao. Libya agreed to host peace talks, which opened in Tripoli on 15 December. On 23 December, the Tripoli agreement was signed, providing for autonomy in 13 provinces in the southern parts of the Philippines. The agreement also included a declaration of ceasefire and an amnesty in the areas of autonomy.
Victory: NO
Terminated: NO
1977 Dyad Archive
Comment on Yearly Battle Related Deaths: In February 1978, the Defence Ministry reported that more than 800 people had been killed in clashes during 1977.
Comment on Active: The ceasefire agreed upon in December 1976, gradually broke down in 1977. In February, new talks opened in Tripoli, but by early March, they had not resulted in any progress and were suspended. After talks with Libyan President Quaddafi, President Marcos on 26 March declared 13 southern states autonomous in line with the Tripoli agreement signed on 23 December 1977. On 17 April a referendum was held, but MNLF boycotted it on the grounds that no such consultation had been included in the Tripoli agreement. 93,9 percent of the votes that were cast rejected autonomy. The regional government remained in place in spite of the result from the referendum, although MNLF refused to participate in it. In late April talks resumed, but broke down again in early May as both sides accused each other of trying to discard the Tripoli agreement. In late May, President Marcos announced that he was willing to go to Mindanao to negotiate directly with MNLF.
After a landmine attack performed by MNLF on the island of Basilan in September, the armed forces launched a ground, air and naval offensive against the rebels on the islands of Basilan and Jolo.
Negotiations: YES
Comment on Negotiations: In February, new talks opened in Tripoli, but by early March, they had not resulted in any progress and were suspended. After talks with Libyan President Quaddafi, President Marcos on 26 March declared 13 southern states autonomous in line with the Tripoli agreement signed on 23 December 1977. On 17 April a referendum was held, but MNLF boycotted it on the grounds that no such consultation had been included in the Tripoli agreement. 93,9 percent of the votes that were cast rejected autonomy. The regional government remained in place in spite of the result from the referendum, although MNLF refused to participate in it. In late April talks resumed, but broke down again in early May as both sides accused each other of trying to discard the Tripoli agreement. In late May, President Marcos announced that he was willing to go to Mindanao to negotiate directly with MNLF.
Victory: NO
Terminated: NO
1978 Dyad Archive
Comment on Active: The problematic implementation of the Tripoli agreement signed in 1976 caused a split between the head of the MNLF political committee, Hashim Salamat and the president of the MNLF central committee, Nur Misuari. Negotiations were hampered during 1978 due to the leadership problems as the government chose to meet with Salamat rather than Misuari.
In April 1978, the first elections to the National Assembly since martial law was imposed in 1972, were held. The martial law ban on political parties was lifted in January, and candidates from 26 parties contested the elections. President Marcos’ party won 152 of the 165 seats.
Negotiations: NO
Comment on Negotiations: The government met Hasim Salamat in negotiations. However, it is not clear if he can be seen as a representative of MNLF as he reportedly split from Nur Misuari, the President of the MNLF central committee in early 1978.
Victory: NO
Terminated: NO
1979 Dyad Archive
Comment on Active: In May 1979, the government arranged elections to the two regional assemblies covering southern and western Mindanao. MNLF boycotted the elections. The problems with MNLF leadership persisted in 1979, as there were three factions of the group. The main faction, under the leadership of Nur Misuari, was supported by Libya while the faction under Hashim Salamat was supported by Egypt. The third faction received support from Saudi Arabia. The government continued the negotiations with the Salamat faction in Cairo.
Negotiations: NO
Comment on Negotiations: The government continued the negotiations with the Salamat faction in Cairo. However, as it was in conflict with the main faction under Nur Misuari, Salamat cannot be seen as a representative of MNLF.
Victory: NO
Terminated: NO
1980 Dyad Archive
Comment on Active: In 1980, fighting decreased somewhat as the government focused on giving development aid to Mindanao and granted amnesties for those rebels who surrendered. MNLF was also weakened by the persisting internal strives.
Negotiations: NO
Comment on Negotiations: Negotiations were scheduled to take place in late 1980 in Jakarta, Indonesia. However, no talks were initiated.
Victory: NO
Terminated: NO
1981 Dyad Archive
Comment on Active: In early 1981, fighting intensified once again. Negotiations were planned to take place in Jakarta, Indonesia in late 1980, but in 1981 talks still had not started. The leadership issues in MNLF persisted, but although both Misuari and Salamat claimed to represent a majority of the guerrillas, Salamat eventually acknowledged that Misuari had to be included in peace talks. During the year, MNLF carried out several joint attacks with the Communist guerrilla group CPP in the southern island of Mindanao.
In January 1981, President Marcos announced that martial law, imposed in 1972, would be lifted. His legislative powers were transferred to the National Assembly elected in 1978. He also announced presidential elections to be held in June, the first ones since 1969. Marcos won the elections, and began a new six-year term of office.
Negotiations: NO
Comment on Negotiations: Negotiations were planned to take place in Jakarta, Indonesia in late 1980, but in 1981 talks still had not started.
Victory: NO
Terminated: NO
1982 Dyad Archive
Comment on Active: In March 1982, Philippine President Marcos opened a Philippine Sharia Institute to educate lawyers for the administration of Muslim law in the autonomous areas in Mindanao. In June, elections were held to the regional assemblies, but MNLF boycotted the elections and the turnout was low.
Negotiations: NO
Victory: NO
Terminated: NO
1983 Dyad Archive
Negotiations: NO
Victory: NO
Terminated: NO
1984 Dyad Archive
Comment on Active: Following the assassination of opposition leader Aquino in 1983, the government was weakened and the Philippine guerrilla groups took advantage of the situation. In early 1984, MNLF performed several attacks and in March, the government forces launched an offensive against guerrillas in the province of Davao del Norte on the island of Mindanao. The MNLF faction under the leadership of Hashim Salamat, which had called itself the “New MNLF” since the split in 1977, announced that its name was MILF (Moro Islamic Liberation Front)
Negotiations: NO
Victory: NO
Terminated: NO
1985 Dyad Archive
Negotiations: NO
Victory: NO
Terminated: NO
1986 Dyad Archive
Negotiations: YES
Comment on Negotiations: In March, talks were held between two factions of MNLF and the government in Manila. The main faction under the leadership of Nur Misuari did not participate, but it was reported that he might join the negotiations at a later stage. The talks broke down without any progress being reported.
In September, President Aquino flew to Jolo Island for talks with Misuari. The parties reportedly agreed on a ceasefire and to meet in OIC-sponsored negotiations before the end of the year. The next round of negotiations took place in early January 1987.
Victory: NO
Terminated: NO
1987 Dyad Archive
Negotiations: YES
Comment on Negotiations: In January, negotiations were held in Jeddah, Saudi Arabia. They were followed by talks in Manila in February and March and again in Jeddah in July. Although the talks seemed promising at first, with MNLF leader Nur Misuari announcing that he was willing to accept full autonomy rather than to fight for independence, negotiations eventually broke down and Misuari ordered his fighters to resume the armed struggle.
Victory: NO
Terminated: NO
1988 Dyad Archive
Negotiations: NO
Victory: NO
Terminated: NO
1989 Dyad Archive
Comment on Yearly Battle Related Deaths: After the largest incident in February, official sources claimed that both MNLF and MILF troops had been involved.
Comment on Active: On several occasions were there breaches of the ceasefire that had been in place since 1987.
Negotiations: NO
Comment on Negotiations: MNLF as well as MILF boycotted the plebiscite about proposed autonomy on 19 November. Afterwards, when it became official that only 4 of the 13 provinces and 9 cities had voted for autonomy, MNLF claimed that the voting had been rigged.
Victory: NO
Terminated: NO
1990 Dyad Archive
Negotiations: NO
Victory: NO
Terminated: YES
Type of termination: No or Low Activity
Date of termination: 1990-12-31
1991 Dyad Archive
Negotiations: NO
Comment on Negotiations: On 11 November, the MNLF declared a unilateral ceasefire due to the arrival of mediators from the OIC (Organization of the Islamic Conference).
Victory: NO
Terminated: NO
1992 Dyad Archive
Negotiations: NO
Comment on Negotiations: MNLF and the government met in Tripoli in October for exploratory talks, hosted by the Libyan leader Quaddafi.
Victory: NO
Terminated: NO
1993 Dyad Archive
Comment on Active: Several clashes took place between MNLF and government troops, as well as between MILF and Christian paramilitaries.
Negotiations: YES
Comment on Negotiations: Preliminary peace talks, brokered by Libya on 14-16 April, were claimed successful, and in 25 October formal peace negotiations started in Jakarta between the MNLF and the government. Mediators were the OIC and the government of Indonesia. On 7 November, both parties agreed to an interim ceasefire. The talks ended in good spirits on 20 December.
Victory: NO
Terminated: YES
Type of termination: Ceasefire
Date of termination: 1993-11-07
Comment on Termination: Sporadic breaches of the ceasefire that was signed on 7 November 1993 led to a new agreement on 26 January 1994. After that, almost all MNLF activity seized.
1994 Dyad Archive
Negotiations: YES
Comment on Negotiations: MNLF declared a new ceasefire on 26 January, after clashes in the end of 1993. On 25 March, the government declared a general amnesty for all rebels in both the conflict over government and over Mindanao. The second round of talks between MNLF and the government was held in September-December, after several postponements. Before each meeting in the peace process, minor military skirmishes occurred.
Victory: NO
Terminated: NO
1995 Dyad Archive
Comment on Active: A group in the Zamboanga peninsula calling themselves the Islamic Command Council split from the MNLF. They participated in one joint action with the ASG, and eventually merged into them.
Negotiations: YES
Comment on Negotiations: On 26 January a new ceasefire agreement was signed between the government and the MNLF that the MILF informally also committed to. Five days later, the government agreed to the establishment of a provisional autonomous government in Mindanao led by the MNLF. Several violent incidents involving ASG and a breakaway group of MNLF led to postponements of talks until 20 June. After a week of talks they stalled again. Low-level consultations followed until the official third round of formal talks started in Jakarta. On 1 December, an interim agreement was signed concerning education, economy and a formal framework for the autonomous government.
Victory: NO
Terminated: NO
1996 Dyad Archive
Negotiations: YES
Comment on Negotiations: Negotiations continued with MNLF in Jakarta, and led to the signing of a Peace Agreement in Manila on 2 September 1996. In the regional elections that followed, the MNLF leader Nur Misauri became governor of the temporary Special Zone created in Mindanao. MNLF also signed a peace treaty with the Christian paramilitary group Illaga on 29 February.
Victory: NO
Terminated: NO
1997 Dyad Archive
Terminated: NO
1998 Dyad Archive
Terminated: NO
1999 Dyad Archive
Comment on Active: After talks brokered by Libya led to the agreement between MNLF and MILF to form an UCC (United Coordinating Council) in their struggle for Mindanao, the leaders Nur Misauri (MNLF) and Hashim Salamat (MILF) meet again - for the first time in over 20 years - on 16 March.The plebiscite that was scheduled for the autonomous area, according to the 1996 MNLF-government agreement, was postponed due to lack of development funding. The governor over the Special Zone created in 1996, and leader of MNLF, was criticized politically for his lifestyle and for not spending enough time on Mindanao.
Negotiations: NO
Victory: NO
Terminated: NO
2000 Dyad Archive
Negotiations: NO
Victory: NO
Terminated: NO
2001 Dyad Archive
Negotiations: NO
Victory: NO
Terminated: NO
2009 Dyad Archive
Negotiations: NO
Victory: NO
Terminated: NO
2010 Dyad Archive
Comment on Active: During a meeting in Tripoli, Libya in April 2010, the Philippine government and MNLF, by signing a Memorandum of Understanding, reaffirmed their commitment to continue working with the implementation of the peace agreement signed in 1996.
Negotiations: YES
Comment on Negotiations: During a meeting in Tripoli, Libya in April 2010, the Philippine government and MNLF, by signing a Memorandum of Understanding, reaffirmed their commitment to continue working with the implementation of the peace agreement signed in 1996. The parties agreed to support a mechanism to fund development projects in Mindanao called Bangsamoro Development Assistance Fund (BDAF) and to let the Organization of the Islamic Conference (OIC) oversee the implementation of the parts of the peace agreement which concern security, governance and economic issues.
Victory: NO
Terminated: NO
2011 Dyad Archive
Terminated: NO
2012 Dyad Archive
Terminated: NO
2013 Dyad Archive
Negotiations: NO
Victory: NO
Terminated: NO
2014 Dyad Archive
Terminated: NO
2015 Dyad Archive
Terminated: NO
2024 Dyad Archive
Terminated: NO
