General information
Part of Conflict: South Africa: Namibia
Date of first stated goals of incompatibility: 1966-07-18
Comment on date of first stated goal of incompatibility: Following the announcement in July 1966 by the International Court of Justice that it would not take up the case of South Africa’s mandate over Namibia, SWAPO declared the beginning of the armed struggle: “We have no alternative but to rise in arms and bring about our own liberation. The supreme test must be faced and we must at once begin to cross the many rivers of blood on our march towards freedom.”
Date of first use of armed force: 1966-07-01
Comment on date of first use of armed force: According to South African sources, SWAPO rebels attacked a number of targets in July 1966, including shooting at a border post at Oshikango
First Battle Related Death: 1966-08-26
Comment on First Battle Related Death: On 6 August 1966, South African police carried out an attack on the first Namibian base established by SWAPO’s armed wing, the People’s Liberation Army of Namibia (PLAN). The attack, which took place at Omgulumbashe in Ovamboland, left two SWAPO guerrillas dead.
Date when dyad reached 25 battle releated deaths: 1966-12-31
Comment on date when dyad reached 25 battle related deaths: Sporadic clashes continued during the latter part of 1966, most likely causing the total battle-related deaths to reach the 25 threshold.
Conflict issues
Annual information
This section contains annual information systematically collected by the UCDP.
1975
| Estimated Fatalities | |
|---|---|
| High | 25 |
| Best | 25 |
| Low | 0 |
Secondary Warring Support:
Side A (Government of South Africa): n/a
Side B (SWAPO): n/a
1976
| Estimated Fatalities | |
|---|---|
| High | 25 |
| Best | 25 |
| Low | 0 |
Secondary Warring Support:
Side A (Government of South Africa): n/a
Side B (SWAPO): n/a
1977
| Estimated Fatalities | |
|---|---|
| High | 25 |
| Best | 25 |
| Low | 0 |
Secondary Warring Support:
Side A (Government of South Africa): n/a
Side B (SWAPO): n/a
1978
| Estimated Fatalities | |
|---|---|
| High | 1000 |
| Best | 1000 |
| Low | 0 |
Secondary Warring Support:
Side A (Government of South Africa): n/a
Side B (SWAPO): n/a
Peace agreements
Name of peace agreement: Western Contact Group (WCG) Settlement Proposal
Date when warring parties signed the agreement: 1978-07-12
Comment of peace agreement: Peace process agreement
The date cited is the date when SWAPO announced it agreed to the settlement proposal put forward by the Western Contact Group (WCG). South Africa had accepted the proposal in April. The agreement was then encompassed in a UN Security Council Resolution, UNSCR 435, on 29 September.
With regards to regulation of armed activity, the proposal stipulated confinement to bases of South African and SWAPO troops, a gradual reduction of South African troops in the territory to 1500, and a transitional process controlled jointly by South Africa and the UN. The agreement also stipulated demobilisation of local armies. Immediately after the adoption by the UN of the plan, on “D-Day”, a ceasefire would begin, the warring parties would be confined to bases, and the UN force would take charge over security. Over 12 weeks from “D-Day”, the South African forces would be cut back from some 20-40 000 to 1500.
Concerning the incompatibility, the agreement outlined a process for free and fair elections leading to independence for Namibia. The South African Administrator-General would remain in Namibia and administer the elections, but the process would be supervised by a Special Representative of the UN Secretary General and a 5000-strong UN Transition Assistance Group (UNTAG) would secure order during the transition period. A week after the South African forces were reduced to 1500, the election campaign would begin, and one week after the Special Representative had certified the elections South Africa would withdraw completely and the new government would be installed. The date for independence was envisaged for 31 December 1978.
The agreement also stipulated return of refugees, release of political prisoners, and abolition of apartheid policies. The UN endorsed the agreement through a succession of resolutions in July-September 1978. In UNSCR 431 on 27 July, the Security Council requested the Secretary General to appoint a Special Representative and take other steps necessary to begin implementation of the independence plan. Another resolution, UNSCR 432, on the same day outlined the UN’s position that Walvis Bay was an integral part of Namibia (the issue of Walvis Bay had been left outside of the Settlement Proposal, a fact both parties had accepted). Martti Ahtisaari was afterwards appointed as the Special Representative. On 29 September, the Security Council in UNSCR 435 definitely established the independence plan.
Comment of signatories: The agreement was not established in the form of a traditional peace agreement, but rather the parties declared their agreement with the Settlement Proposal which was then definitely established through the passing of UNSCR 435.
Third parties: Western Contact Group (WCG), United Nations (UN)
Comment of third parties role in peace agreement: The Settlement Proposal was mediated by the Western Contact Group (WCG), comprising the Western members of the UN Security Council; USA, UK, Canada, France and West Germany. It was then established by the UN Security Council, which in turn requested the appointment of a Special Representative of the Secretary General and the creation of a UN Transition Assistance Group (UNTAG).
Ended: True
Date agreement ended: 1978-09-20
Comment of Duration: On 20 September 1978, South Africa’s Prime Minister Vorster announced the intention of his government to reject the Settlement Proposal. Instead, South Africa intended to pursue an internal settlement based on the ethnic homelands system it had established in Namibia. The declaration came in conjunction to Vorster’s retirement as Prime Minister.
The Settlement Plan, as encompassed in UNSCR 435, nevertheless would remain the basis for continued negotiations until the end of the conflict over Namibia.
Full-text peace agreement
1979
| Estimated Fatalities | |
|---|---|
| High | 25 |
| Best | 25 |
| Low | 0 |
Secondary Warring Support:
Side A (Government of South Africa): n/a
Side B (SWAPO): n/a
1980
| Estimated Fatalities | |
|---|---|
| High | 1000 |
| Best | 1000 |
| Low | 0 |
Secondary Warring Support:
Side A (Government of South Africa): n/a
Side B (SWAPO): n/a
1981
| Estimated Fatalities | |
|---|---|
| High | 1000 |
| Best | 1000 |
| Low | 0 |
Secondary Warring Support:
Side A (Government of South Africa): n/a
Side B (SWAPO): n/a
1982
| Estimated Fatalities | |
|---|---|
| High | 1000 |
| Best | 1000 |
| Low | 0 |
Secondary Warring Support:
Side A (Government of South Africa): n/a
Side B (SWAPO): n/a
1983
| Estimated Fatalities | |
|---|---|
| High | 1000 |
| Best | 1000 |
| Low | 0 |
Secondary Warring Support:
Side A (Government of South Africa): n/a
Side B (SWAPO): n/a
1984
| Estimated Fatalities | |
|---|---|
| High | 25 |
| Best | 25 |
| Low | 0 |
Secondary Warring Support:
Side A (Government of South Africa): n/a
Side B (SWAPO): n/a
1985
| Estimated Fatalities | |
|---|---|
| High | 25 |
| Best | 25 |
| Low | 0 |
Secondary Warring Support:
Side A (Government of South Africa): n/a
Side B (SWAPO): n/a
1986
| Estimated Fatalities | |
|---|---|
| High | 1000 |
| Best | 1000 |
| Low | 0 |
Secondary Warring Support:
Side A (Government of South Africa): n/a
Side B (SWAPO): n/a
1987
| Estimated Fatalities | |
|---|---|
| High | 1000 |
| Best | 1000 |
| Low | 0 |
Secondary Warring Support:
Side A (Government of South Africa): n/a
Side B (SWAPO): n/a
1988
| Estimated Fatalities | |
|---|---|
| High | 1001 |
| Best | 1001 |
| Low | 1 |
Secondary Warring Support:
Side A (Government of South Africa): n/a
Side B (SWAPO): n/a
1989
| Estimated Fatalities | |
|---|---|
| High | 363 |
| Best | 361 |
| Low | 360 |
Secondary Warring Support:
Side A (Government of South Africa): n/a
Side B (SWAPO): n/a
1990
| Estimated Fatalities | |
|---|---|
| High | 0 |
| Best | 0 |
| Low | 0 |
Secondary Warring Support:
Side A (Government of South Africa): n/a
Side B (SWAPO): n/a
1991
| Estimated Fatalities | |
|---|---|
| High | 0 |
| Best | 0 |
| Low | 0 |
Secondary Warring Support:
Side A (Government of South Africa): n/a
Side B (SWAPO): n/a
1992
| Estimated Fatalities | |
|---|---|
| High | 0 |
| Best | 0 |
| Low | 0 |
Secondary Warring Support:
Side A (Government of South Africa): n/a
Side B (SWAPO): n/a
1993
| Estimated Fatalities | |
|---|---|
| High | 0 |
| Best | 0 |
| Low | 0 |
Secondary Warring Support:
Side A (Government of South Africa): n/a
Side B (SWAPO): n/a
1994
| Estimated Fatalities | |
|---|---|
| High | 0 |
| Best | 0 |
| Low | 0 |
Secondary Warring Support:
Side A (Government of South Africa): n/a
Side B (SWAPO): n/a
Dyad Archive
This section contains annual information no longer systematically collected by the UCDP.
1975 Dyad Archive
Comment on Active: 1975 saw an increase of guerrilla activity and clashes in northern Namibia, particularly Ovambo. This development came following the opening of the border with Angola after Portugal had withdrawn from the country. Meanwhile, in 1974 the South African Defence Force (SADF) had taken over the command of the counterinsurgency operations from the South African Police (SAP). In addition to operations in Namibia, the South African forces also launched raids into Angolan territory. South African forces were present in Angola from September 1975 to March 1976, during which time they not only conducted operations against SWAPO but also provided active support to UNITA as it launched its campaign against the government of Angola.
Negotiations: NO
Comment on Negotiations: In September 1974, the South African Government had announced its readiness to discuss the future of Namibia with representatives of its inhabitants, and proposed that constitutional talks should be held with representatives of the ethnic homelands created under the apartheid system. The constitutional “Turnhalle conference” was held in late 1975. However, SWAPO rejected the Turnhalle process, maintaining that any steps towards independence must be based on free and fair elections under UN administration. SWAPO outlined its demands in January 1975, offering South Africa a choice between continued guerrilla warfare or negotiations based on a number of conditions, including release of political prisoners, recognition of SWAPO as the legitimate representative of the Namibian people, and withdrawal of all South African troops from the territory before talks could be held.
Victory: NO
Terminated: NO
1976 Dyad Archive
Comment on Yearly Battle Related Deaths: Estimates are based mainly on official South African reports.
Comment on Active: Guerrilla activity took place mainly in Ovambo, Kavango and Caprivi provinces in northern Namibia, launched from SWAPO bases in southern Angola. In mid-1976, SWAPO activity in the border area was reported to be on the increase. South African forces were present in Angola from September 1975 to March 1976, during which time they not only conducted operations against SWAPO but also provided active support to UNITA as it launched its campaign against the government of Angola. South Africa also conducted “hot pursuit” raids into Zambian territory in 1976.
Negotiations: NO
Comment on Negotiations: Discussions on the future of Namibia took place between the US Secretary of State, Henry Kissinger, and South African Prime Minister Vorster in June and September 1976. Kissinger afterwards stated that efforts were being made to convene a constitutional conference under UN auspices, where SWAPO participation would be possible. Meanwhile, Vorster stated after the talks that neither he nor his government would negotiate with SWAPO directly, and proceeded with the “Turnhalle conference” adopted as an alternative process towards independence.
In December 1976, the UN General Assembly adopted a resolution condemning the internal process of constitutional talks adopted by South Africa, and stating that any talks on Namibian independence must be held between SWAPO and South Africa and under UN auspices. SWAPO during the year reiterated its demands that South Africa must withdraw its forces, release political prisoners and recognise SWAPO as the legitimate representative of the Namibian people before any progress towards independence could take place.
Also in December, it was disclosed that Henry Kissinger had circulated a seven-point plan to Sam Nujoma, SWAPO’s president, and the frontline states’ (Angola, Botswana, Mozambique, Tanzania and Zambia) presidents. The plan stipulated a conference with UN and South African participation in Geneva to settle outstanding questions, an early date for independence, end to segregation in Namibia, negotiations between SWAPO and South Africa, and withdrawal of South African forces when a new Namibian government requested it. The suggestions, which were expected to be accepted by South Africa, were rejected by SWAPO although the Tanzanian and Zambian presidents had shown some interest in the plan.
Victory: NO
Terminated: NO
1977 Dyad Archive
Comment on Yearly Battle Related Deaths: The estimates are based mainly on South African official reports.
Comment on Active: Activity continued to take place mainly in northern Namibia, and on Angolan territory in the form of South African raids against SWAPO bases. Guerrilla activity mainly took the form of laying landmines and attacks on local authority persons. In late 1977, observers reported an increased intensity of guerrilla activity in the border area with Angola.
Negotiations: YES
Comment on Negotiations: In 1977 a Western Contact Group (WCG) was formed by the Western members of the UN Security Council (USA, UK, Canada, France and West Germany). The WCG held negotiations with the South African government, which in May agreed to abandon the constitutional plans drawn up by the “Turnhalle conference” in favour of seeking a process that would be internationally acceptable. South African PM Vorster also stated he was prepared to discuss the Namibian question “with other interested parties”. SWAPO, meanwhile, stated they would not take part in future elections unless they were non-ethnic and controlled by the UN, and South African forces were withdrawn. Representatives of the WCG also met with SWAPO representatives in May. However, despite some progress, fundamental disagreement remained with regards to the structure of an interim authority for Namibia. Further separate talks were held by the WCG with South Africa and with SWAPO during the rest of the year. Talks were also held with representatives of the front-line states (Angola, Botswana, Mozambique, Tanzania and Zambia). In October, SWAPO reiterated that withdrawal of South African troops must be a precondition, and also stated that Walvis Bay, seized under direct control by South Africa on 1 September, must remain a part of Namibia.
Victory: NO
Terminated: NO
1978 Dyad Archive
Comment on Yearly Battle Related Deaths: The bulk of the deaths took place in connection with “Operation Reindeerâ€, a South African raid on SWAPO bases in Cassinga and the surrounding area in Angola."
Comment on Active: Guerrilla activity along the border with Angola reportedly increased during early 1978. In early May, South Africa launched a major operation into Angola, codenamed “Operation Reindeer”. The operation included air forces and targeted SWAPO bases in Cassinga (codenamed “Moscow”) and surrounding areas. The operation resulted in the deaths of some 600 SWAPO members and guerrillas. In the second half of the year, guerrilla activity was mainly confined to small-scale clashes and the laying of landmines. In August, an attack on South African soldiers in the Caprivi Strip led to a retaliatory attack into Zambian territory.
Negotiations: YES
Comment on Negotiations: The indirect negotiations led by the Western Contact Group (WCG) continued in 1978. In January, the South African foreign minister R F Botha declared that there were two main obstacles hampering progress in the negotiations: setting’ a date for holding elections on the basis of one man–one vote, and the issue of South African presence in Namibia until the formation of a new government, to which SWAPO was opposed. On 11-12 February, separate but simultaneous talks with South Africa and SWAPO were held in New York; no agreement was reached, however, with Walvis Bay, the presence of South African troops and release of prisoners being the major sticking points. South Africa afterwards suggested it would continue to seek an “internal” settlement, i.e. without involving SWAPO.
New proposals were presented to the parties by the WCG in March and were accepted by the South African government in April. SWAPO initially neither accepted nor rejected it, instead reiterating before the UN its position on Walvis Bay and the issue of South African troop presence. Under pressure from the front-line states (Angola, Botswana, Mozambique, Tanzania and Zambia), however, SWAPO in July agreed to the proposals. These were in September incorporated in UN Security Council Resolution 435, outlining a timetable for implementation, the role to be played by the Special Representative of the Secretary-General and a UN Transitional Assistance Group (UNTAG), continued South African presence during the transition process, and exception of Walvis Bay from the independence process. The latter two points constituted major compromises on behalf of SWAPO, while South Africa conceded to a strong role for the UN.
On 20 September 1978, however, South Africa’s Prime Minister Vorster announced the intention of his government to reject the Settlement Proposal. Instead, South Africa intended to pursue an internal settlement based on the “Turnhalle” process, which was rejected by SWAPO. The Settlement Plan, as encompassed in UNSCR 435, nevertheless would remain the basis for continued negotiations until the end of the conflict over Namibia. It was stated by South Africa that the election results would be in place only until UN-supervised elections could take place. In December, the South African government in principle agreed to the holding of UN-supervised elections in 1979.
Victory: NO
Terminated: NO
1979 Dyad Archive
Comment on Yearly Battle Related Deaths: The estimates are to a large extent based on official South African accounts; detailed figures from independent sources have been difficult to find."
Comment on Active: 1979 saw an increase of SWAPO cross-border attacks, with ensuing South African retaliatory strikes on SWAPO bases in Angola. Guerrilla attacks were also reported further to the south than earlier.
Negotiations: YES
Comment on Negotiations: Implementation of the independence plan embodied in UN Security Council Resolution 435 was hampered in 1979 by disputes over interpretation, and by SWAPO reluctance to accept the compromises the plan envisaged. In January, SWAPO issued a statement accusing the Western Contact Group (WCG) of supporting South Africa’s continued “illegal occupation”, and arguing that the only feasible way to achieve complete liberation was continued armed struggle. Martti Ahtissaari, the Special Representative of the UN Secretary-General, in early 1979 held numerous meetings and talks with representatives of South Africa, SWAPO and the front-line states, but no significant progress was made towards implementation. Proximity talks led by the WCG between the South African government and SWAPO, held in New York in March, also failed to move the process forward. The internal process towards self-governance, sponsored by South Africa and rejected by SWAPO, meanwhile continued, with a National Assembly for Namibia established in May. SWAPO reacted to this development by stating that the move had virtually ruled out the possibility of solving the conflict through negotiation.
Revised proposals were put forward by the WCG during the fall, attempting to resolve South African objections regarding SWAPO bases inside Namibia and supervision of the group’s bases in Angola and Zambia. In July, Angolan President Agostinho Neto put forward a proposal aiming to end the deadlock, envisaging a demilitarised zone (DMZ) on both sides of the border, restriction to bases in Angola of SWAPO guerrillas unwilling to take part in the elections, and UN transitional presence in Angola. The proposal was discussed at talks in Geneva in November, attended by representatives of South Africa and SWAPO as well as representatives of the UN, the WCG, the front-line states and internal Namibian parties. The DMZ proposal was accepted by SWAPO at the end of the year, while South Africa in December outlined a number of conditions for accepting it, in turn rejected by SWAPO. The South African conditions contained, inter alia, a fixed number of SWAPO bases in the DMZ, disarmament of all SWAPO troops outside Namibia within seven days after the certification of elections, that practicalities should be sorted out by the UN forces and South African authorities, and commitment that SWAPO would not make demands for bases on Namibian territory.
Victory: NO
Terminated: NO
1980 Dyad Archive
Comment on Yearly Battle Related Deaths: The estimates are to a large extent based on official South African accounts; detailed figures from independent sources have been difficult to find.
Comment on Active: Activity in 1980 continued to follow the pattern of SWAPO raids into Namibia and laying of landmines, with South African retaliatory raids into Angola. In June, South Africa carried out a major operation, codenamed “Sceptic”, against SWAPO targets in Cunene and Cuando Cubango provinces of Angola. In total, some 400 guerrillas and South African soldiers were killed in the operation, which also resulted in clashes between the South African Defence Forces (SADF) and Angolan troops. As a result of “Operation Sceptic”, SWAPO was driven out of many of its bases in southern Angola.
Negotiations: YES
Comment on Negotiations: In February 1980, discussions led by a UN mission were held regarding technical aspects of the Angolan proposals for a demilitarised zone (DMZ) and South African counter-proposals. The UN mission was led by Lieutenant-General Prem Chand, the envisaged commander of the future UN peacekeeping operation, and the talks involved Angola, South Africa, Namibia, Zambia and Botswana. However, negotiations again became deadlocked, reportedly due to South African fears of a SWAPO electoral victory similar to that of ZANU-PF in Zimbabwe. A high-level UN delegation including the Special Representative of the Secretary-General, Martti Ahtisaari, held further meetings with South Africa and then with SWAPO and the front-line states in March. Further concerns regarding the DMZ and the UN’s impartiality were conferred by South Africa to UN Secretary-General Kurt Waldheim during the summer.
In September, SWAPO’s leader Sam Nujoma stated his willingness to hold direct talks with a South African delegation under UN auspices, without excluding participation by the Namibian internal parties who were considered illegitimate by SWAPO. During the fall, further suggestions for all-party talks were made, and in November UN Secretary-General Waldheim announced that a “pre-implementation meeting” would be held in January 1981.
Victory: NO
Terminated: NO
1981 Dyad Archive
Comment on Yearly Battle Related Deaths: The estimates are to a large extent based on official South African accounts; detailed figures from independent sources have been difficult to find.
Comment on Active: During 1981, South Africa continued to launch hot-pursuit raids into Angola in response to SWAPO activities in Namibia. Guerrilla operations were mainly confined to central Ovamboland in northern Namibia. The Angolan government reported that Angolan soldiers and civilians were often among those killed in the South African raids, but maintained that its forces were under instruction to avoid contact with the South African Defence Forces (SADF). In late August to early September, SADF and the Namibian force set up in 1979, the South West African Territorial Force (SWATF), conducted a major military campaign codenamed "Operation Protea", occupying large parts of southern Angola. Official figures and press reports set the death toll in the operation between 800 and 1200. Following “Operation Protea", the SADF continued to occupy parts of Cunene province until 1989. At the end of the year, South Africa stated it had destroyed several SWAPO bases in Angola in a second operation, “Operation Daisy”, in November.
Negotiations: YES
Comment on Negotiations: In January, direct negotiations took place in Geneva under the chairmanship of Brian Urquhart, UN Under-Secretary-General for Special Political Affairs. Participating in the talks were delegations from South Africa, SWAPO and eight Namibian internal parties. Observing the negotiations were representatives of the UN, the Western Contact Group (WCG), the front-line states (Angola, Botswana, Mozambique, Tanzania and Zambia), Nigeria and the Organisation of African Unity (OAU). Discussions were held regarding a proposed timetable, composition of the envisaged UN peacekeeping operation, and release of prisoners. However, the talks became deadlocked over the issue of SWAPO’s status in the future elections and the status granted to the group by the UN as the “authentic representative of the Namibian people”. The talks ended without the parties signing a declaration of intent on a ceasefire, an outcome which had been sought by Urquhart.
Under the newly elected President Ronald Reagan, the US held new talks with South Africa. The new administration favoured a Namibian solution that was tied to the regional context, and in particular suggested linking the issue of Namibian independence to the withdrawal of Cuban troops from Angola. These developments triggered international opposition, however, prompting the US Government to reassure that UN Security Council Resolution 435 would remain the basis for the Namibian independence process. In September, it was reported that some progress had been made in unilateral discussions between the US and South Africa, including acceptance of previously disputed aspects of Resolution 435 and the UN peacekeeping force. The WCG meanwhile examined the possibility to include minority guarantees in the Namibian elections. In late September, the WCG devised a proposal under which a constituent assembly where all groups were represented would draw up and adopt a constitution, which in turn would provide for fundamental rights and a government with three branches (executive, legislative and judicial). The proposal was presented to the parties during the fall, with SWAPO and the front-line states reportedly accepting it by the end of the year.
Victory: NO
Terminated: NO
1982 Dyad Archive
Comment on Yearly Battle Related Deaths: The estimates are to a large extent based on official South African accounts; detailed figures from independent sources have been difficult to find.
Comment on Active: South African forces continued to conduct raids against SWAPO targets in Angola in 1982. In April, SWAPO carried out its largest military operation so far in the conflict, reaching as far south as the White farming area near Tsumeb, and later south of that town. However, SWAPO claims that the guerrillas had reached Windhoek were dismissed by South Africa. At the end of the year, SWAPO claimed to be operating in most of the northern half of Namibia; however, the South African Defence Force (SADF) at the same time stated that it was in control of the situation.
Negotiations: YES
Comment on Negotiations: Negotiations based on the Western Contact Group’s (WCG) constitutional proposal continued in early 1982. Following South Africa’s response, some modifications were made, the most important being that half the constituent assembly seats would be elected proportionally and the other half by single-member constituencies. This process was, however, rejected by SWAPO in January. New proposals during the spring were also rejected, and in May the WCG conceded that the issue of electoral system had to be addressed as a part of the overall settlement. In July, the US State Department reported that the parties had agreed in principle to the proposal concerning the constitutional process, and that the only remaining issue to settle was the South African demand of “linkage” of withdrawal of its troops with Cuban withdrawal from Angola. However, this issue became increasingly dominant in following negotiations, with Angola and South Africa taking hard opposing positions. The front-line states and the UN demanded that the issue of Cuban troops be separated from that of Namibian independence, but to no avail, and negotiations again stalled.
Due to the hardened South African stance on the “linkage” issue, and also to other aspects of the relations between these countries, negotiations began to take place between South Africa and Angola. However, while directly affecting the Namibian question, these negotiations are not considered to be part of the South Africa (Namibia) conflict in UCDP data, as they do not include both the primary parties, nor can Angola be argued to be representing SWAPO in these negotiations.
Victory: NO
Terminated: NO
1983 Dyad Archive
Comment on Yearly Battle Related Deaths: The estimate is to a large extent based on official South African accounts; detailed figures from independent sources have been difficult to find.
Comment on Active: In early 1983, SWAPO launched a new offensive into Namibia from bases in Angola’s Huila province. In late 1983, South Africa launched “Operation Askari” in prevention of a repeated SWAPO offensive in early 1984. “Operation Askari” involved large-scale mechanised units, including tanks. The operation also saw heavy clashes between South Africa and Angolan and Cuban troops; however, according to South Africa, this happened because SWAPO hid among these troops, and not because the Angolans and Cubans were fighting alongside SWAPO.
Negotiations: YES
Comment on Negotiations: In August 1983, UN Secretary-General Perez de Cuellar visited southern Africa and held talks with SWAPO, South Africa and other involved parties. While most technical obstacles to the implementation of UNSCR 435 by this time seemed to be resolved, he concluded at the end of his visit that the firm position of South Africa on the “linkage” issue made it impossible to implement the UN plan for Namibian independence. In October, the Security Council adopted a resolution condemning South Africa’s actions as hampering the process towards Namibian independence.
In December 1983, France suspended its participation in the Western Contact Group (WCG) due to the lack of progress in the negotiations on Namibia.
Victory: NO
Terminated: NO
1984 Dyad Archive
Comment on Yearly Battle Related Deaths: The estimates are to a large extent based on official South African accounts; detailed figures from independent sources have been difficult to find.
Comment on Active: By 1984, South African activity in southern Angola and counter-insurgency operations in northern Namibia had made it difficult for SWAPO to launch raids into Namibia. This led to a drop in the scale of SWAPO activity in the territory.
Negotiations: YES
Comment on Negotiations: In negotiations outside of the SWAPO-South Africa conflict, South Africa and Angola in February 1984 signed the Lusaka Accord whereby they agreed to cooperate to prevent SWAPO from operating in the “neutralized zone” of southern Angola. However, SWAPO in a statement underlined that the South Africa-Angola agreement did not constitute a ceasefire with SWAPO and that the group would continue its armed struggle. Meanwhile, SWAPO also indicated in early 1984 its willingness to negotiate a ceasefire directly with South Africa under UN auspices, and a secret meeting was held at which SWAPO was reported to have rejected a South African proposal for a unity government.
In an effort to break the deadlock regarding implementation of UNSCR 435, a regional conference on Namibia, chaired by Zambia’s President Kaunda and the South African Administrator-General of Namibia, van Niekerk, was held in Lusaka in May. The conference was attended by delegations from SWAPO, South Africa and the internal Namibian parties, but failed to move the issue forward. In July, South Africa made repeated offers of a ceasefire to SWAPO, which rejected them as they were no linked to implementation of the UN-sponsored independence process.
Victory: NO
Terminated: NO
1985 Dyad Archive
Comment on Yearly Battle Related Deaths: The estimates are to a large extent based on official South African accounts; detailed figures from independent sources have been difficult to find."
Comment on Active: By 1984, South African activity in southern Angola and counter-insurgency operations in northern Namibia had made it difficult for SWAPO to launch raids into Namibia. This led to a drop in the scale of SWAPO activity in the territory. As of 1985, the focus of the armed conflict was instead southern Angola, where clashes between SWAPO and South African forces took place alongside South African involvement in the conflict between UNITA and the Angolan government.
Negotiations: NO
Comment on Negotiations: While stating continued commitment to UNSCR 435, South African President PW Botha in April 1985 stated that an interim government would be installed in Namibia. The highest sovereign power would, however, remain with South Africa until full independence. The move was criticised by SWAPO and the international community as further obstructing the implementation of UNSCR 435.
Meanwhile, in developments related to the Namibia conflict, South Africa and Angola continued to negotiate over South African withdrawal from Angola and removal of Cuban troops from the latter country, an issue South Africa had declared a condition for implementation of Namibian independence.
Victory: NO
Terminated: NO
1986 Dyad Archive
Comment on Active: Cross-border raids into Angola by South African and SWATF troops continued in 1986. The intensity of violence in northern Namibia appeared to increase, with numerous SWAPO sabotages, ambushes and landmine incidents.
Negotiations: NO
Comment on Negotiations: In March 1986, South African President PW Botha announced that South Africa was ready to implement the UN Security Council Resolution 435 independence plan for Namibia, suggesting 1 August as the start date. As in previous years, however, he stated that implementation was conditional on Cuban withdrawal from Angola (the “linkage” argument), and the proposal was rejected.
Victory: NO
Terminated: NO
1987 Dyad Archive
Comment on Active: In early 1987, an upsurge in guerrilla operations was reported by South African sources. In late 1987, SWAPO established the Namibian Press Agency (NAMPA), which went on to report high death tolls of South African soldiers in clashes with SWAPO and to claim the guerrillas were making significant progress in its battle against South Africa. However, Western press reported that South African forces were efficient in tracking and killing SWAPO fighters in northern Namibia.
Negotiations: NO
Comment on Negotiations: No negotiations were held between the warring parties in 1987. However, in related developments, talks were held between South Africa and Angola on the issue of Namibia. The Namibian independence process remained deadlocked due to the South African demand of withdrawal of Cuban troops from Angola before implementation could begin.
Victory: NO
Terminated: NO
1988 Dyad Archive
Comment on Active: In early 1988, SWAPO announced it would extend its activities to include targets considered to represent the South African forces and administration. A major South African raid into Angola in February targeted SWAPO bases near Lubango, some 300 km inside Angola. Following the signing by South Africa, Angola and Cuba of the Geneva Protocol in August, SWAPO announced it would respect the ceasefire provisions therein although it was not party to the negotiations or the agreement. Thus, a de facto ceasefire between South Africa and SWAPO began in August 1988 and was mostly respected during the rest of the year.
Negotiations: NO
Comment on Negotiations: No negotiations were held between the warring parties in 1988. However, a breakthrough in the talks between South Africa and Angola led to the final obstacles to Namibian independence being removed. During the year, talks were held between South Africa, Angola, and Cuba, with involvement by the USA and the Soviet Union, leading to the signing of a ceasefire agreement in August (the Geneva Protocol of 8 August) and then to a tripartite agreement between South Africa, Angola and Cuba on 22 December providing for implementation of the Namibian independence process outlined in UNSCR 435. The December tripartite agreement was accompanied by an Angolan-Cuban agreement on withdrawal of Cuban troops, a key issue for South African acceptance of Namibian independence under the UN plan.
Following the signing of the Geneva Protocol in August, SWAPO announced it would respect the ceasefire provisions therein although it was not party to the negotiations or the agreement. Thus, de facto ceasefire between South Africa and SWAPO began in August 1988.
Victory: NO
Terminated: YES
Type of termination: Ceasefire
Date of termination: 1988-08-10
Comment on Termination: In 1988, talks concerning the conflicts in southwestern Africa were held between South Africa, Angola, and Cuba, with involvement by the USA and the Soviet Union. The talks led to the signing of a peace process agreement, the Geneva Protocol, on 8 August. Following the signing of the Geneva Protocol, SWAPO announced to the UN Secretary General that it would respect the ceasefire provisions therein although it was not party to the negotiations or the agreement. Thus, a de facto ceasefire between South Africa and SWAPO began on 10 August 1988.
Further talks during the year between South Africa, Angola, and Cuba led to the final obstacles to Namibian independence being removed. On 22 December, at the UN headquarters in New York, a tripartite agreement between the three countries was signed, providing for implementation of the Namibian independence process outlined in UNSCR 435. The tripartite agreement was accompanied by an Angolan-Cuban agreement on withdrawal of Cuban troops, a key issue for South African acceptance of Namibian independence under the UN plan.
Since SWAPO was not a party to the negotiations or to the agreements in August and December, these documents are not considered peace agreements in the South Africa (Namibia) conflict. However, as both the warring parties accepted and remained committed to the ceasefire of 10 August 1988, that date is viewed as the date of termination.
Comment on Termination Date: The ceasefire specified in the Geneva Protocol, and by official statement accepted by SWAPO, began on 10 August 1988. The parties remained committed to the ceasefire during the year, and most violent activities ceased after that date.
1989 Dyad Archive
Comment on Active: 1989 saw the beginning of the implementation of the Namibian independence process as embodied in UNSCR 435. Implementation, as well as a formal ceasefire, was agreed to begin on 1 April. However, on the evening of 31 March news emerged of a large-scale infiltration of SWAPO forces from Angola, where they were supposed to be confined to bases, and clashes with South West Africa Police (SWAPOL). In response to this development, and with UNTAG far from fully deployed, the Special Representative of the Secretary General Martti Ahtisaari authorised the South African forces to leave their bases and stop the breaches of the ceasefire. In the following weeks, before the process got back on track and the parties were again confined to bases, some 3-400 people, mainly SWAPO fighters, were killed in clashes between guerrillas and security forces. However, as both parties stated their continued commitment to the peace process and the deaths occurred in operations ostensibly constituting peacekeeping (enforcement of the ceasefire terms), the violence is not considered a renewed outbreak of the armed conflict, which thus remained terminated in 1989.
It remained somewhat unclear why the SWAPO fighters had crossed the border. UNTAG had not yet deployed to the area of northern Namibia where the fighting took place, so accounts of what happened were dominated by South African security forces. SWAPO officially denied having broken the ceasefire and claimed members that were already in Namibia were attacked. UNTAG, in an early report to the Security Council, suggested SWAPO fighters had misunderstood the ceasefire agreement and intended to set up bases on Namibian territory under UN supervision. Some SWAPO fighters who were captured by the South Africans stated they had crossed the border for this purpose.
Negotiations: YES
Comment on Negotiations: In response to the tumultuous events immediately following the start of the implementation period, the UN Secretary General mediated between SWAPO and South Africa and put forward new ceasefire proposals. The Joint Commission set up as part of the agreements between South Africa, Angola and Cuba, and in which the USA and Soviet Union had observer status, also intervened in trying to stop the violence and get the implementation process back on track. Eventually, the parties agreed to a procedure of withdrawal and recommitment. By mid-May, the South African and SWAPO forces were again confined to bases and the implementation process could begin.
Victory: NO
Terminated: YES
Type of termination: No or Low Activity
Date of termination: 1989-12-31
1990 Dyad Archive
Terminated: NO
1991 Dyad Archive
Terminated: NO
1992 Dyad Archive
Terminated: NO
1993 Dyad Archive
Terminated: NO
1994 Dyad Archive
Terminated: NO
