General information
Part of Conflict: Ethiopia: Government
Date of first stated goals of incompatibility: 1975-02-18
Comment on date of first stated goal of incompatibility: TPLF was formed in 1975 with the ambition to overthrow the Mengistu regime. The movement demanded social justice and self-determination for all Ethiopians. Note that due to a lack of detailed data, it is not possible to determine an exact date when TPLF’s goal, and thus the incompatibility, was stated. Throughout reports on the movement, it is however frequently emphasised that it was created with the explicit aim of overthrowing the regime. It is therefore assumed that this aim was stated when the movement was officially established, on 18 February 1975.
Date of first use of armed force: 1975-07-31
Comment on date of first use of armed force: In July 1975 TPLF carried out its first operation. One of the groups initial members, Musie, had been captured by the police and seven fighters went to rescue him from Shire garrison in Tigray. The operation was over in minutes, with the TPLF fighters using grenades against the police.
First Battle Related Death: 1975-08-27
Comment on First Battle Related Death: In order to get funding for the new group, TPLF robbed the bank in Axum. Fighting broke out with the police and a police captain was killed.
Date when dyad reached 25 battle releated deaths: 1976-06-02
Comment on date when dyad reached 25 battle related deaths: Suffering from a relative shortage of weapons, the military junta decided to resort to a traditional Ethiopian tactics - the mass deployment of peasant soldiers wo had been mobilised through promises of booty and land. About 50 000 peasants joined the so-called "Peasant March" and headed north.
On the night of 1-2 June TPLF carried out a surprise attack on the marchers at Zalenbessa in Tigray. Over 1200 were killed and much light weaponry fell into the hands of TPLF.
Conflict issues
Annual information
This section contains annual information systematically collected by the UCDP.
1975
| Estimated Fatalities | |
|---|---|
| High | 1 |
| Best | 1 |
| Low | 0 |
Secondary Warring Support:
Side A (Government of Ethiopia): n/a
Side B (TPLF): n/a
1976
| Estimated Fatalities | |
|---|---|
| High | 1000 |
| Best | 1000 |
| Low | 0 |
Secondary Warring Support:
Side A (Government of Ethiopia): n/a
Side B (TPLF): n/a
1977
| Estimated Fatalities | |
|---|---|
| High | 0 |
| Best | 0 |
| Low | 0 |
Secondary Warring Support:
Side A (Government of Ethiopia): n/a
Side B (TPLF): n/a
1978
| Estimated Fatalities | |
|---|---|
| High | 25 |
| Best | 25 |
| Low | 0 |
Secondary Warring Support:
Side A (Government of Ethiopia): n/a
Side B (TPLF): n/a
1979
| Estimated Fatalities | |
|---|---|
| High | 25 |
| Best | 25 |
| Low | 0 |
Secondary Warring Support:
Side A (Government of Ethiopia): n/a
Side B (TPLF): n/a
1980
| Estimated Fatalities | |
|---|---|
| High | 1000 |
| Best | 1000 |
| Low | 0 |
Secondary Warring Support:
Side A (Government of Ethiopia): n/a
Side B (TPLF): n/a
1981
| Estimated Fatalities | |
|---|---|
| High | 1000 |
| Best | 1000 |
| Low | 0 |
Secondary Warring Support:
Side A (Government of Ethiopia): n/a
Side B (TPLF): n/a
1982
| Estimated Fatalities | |
|---|---|
| High | 1000 |
| Best | 1000 |
| Low | 0 |
Secondary Warring Support:
Side A (Government of Ethiopia): n/a
Side B (TPLF): n/a
1983
| Estimated Fatalities | |
|---|---|
| High | 1000 |
| Best | 1000 |
| Low | 0 |
Secondary Warring Support:
Side A (Government of Ethiopia): n/a
Side B (TPLF): n/a
1984
| Estimated Fatalities | |
|---|---|
| High | 1000 |
| Best | 1000 |
| Low | 0 |
Secondary Warring Support:
Side A (Government of Ethiopia): n/a
Side B (TPLF): n/a
1985
| Estimated Fatalities | |
|---|---|
| High | 1000 |
| Best | 1000 |
| Low | 0 |
Secondary Warring Support:
Side A (Government of Ethiopia): n/a
Side B (TPLF): n/a
1986
| Estimated Fatalities | |
|---|---|
| High | 25 |
| Best | 25 |
| Low | 0 |
Secondary Warring Support:
Side A (Government of Ethiopia): n/a
Side B (TPLF): n/a
1987
| Estimated Fatalities | |
|---|---|
| High | 1000 |
| Best | 1000 |
| Low | 0 |
Secondary Warring Support:
Side A (Government of Ethiopia): n/a
Side B (TPLF): n/a
1988
| Estimated Fatalities | |
|---|---|
| High | 1000 |
| Best | 1000 |
| Low | 0 |
Secondary Warring Support:
Side A (Government of Ethiopia): n/a
Side B (TPLF): n/a
2020
| Estimated Fatalities | |
|---|---|
| High | 21219 |
| Best | 20888 |
| Low | 20874 |
Secondary Warring Support:
Side A (Government of Ethiopia): Government of Eritrea
Side B (TPLF): n/a
2021
| Estimated Fatalities | |
|---|---|
| High | 124387 |
| Best | 124266 |
| Low | 123706 |
Secondary Warring Support:
Side A (Government of Ethiopia): Government of Eritrea
Side B (TPLF): n/a
2022
| Estimated Fatalities | |
|---|---|
| High | 164044 |
| Best | 162414 |
| Low | 162309 |
Secondary Warring Support:
Side A (Government of Ethiopia): Government of Eritrea
Side B (TPLF): n/a
Peace agreements
Name of peace agreement: Agreement for lasting peace through a permanent cessation of hostilities between the government of the federal democratic republic of Ethiopia and the Tigray People's Liberation Front (TPLF)
Date when warring parties signed the agreement: 2022-11-02
Signatories: Getachew Reda, Redwan Hussein, Olusegun Obasanjo, Uhuru Kenyatta, Phumzile Mlambo-Ngcuka
Full-text peace agreement
2023
| Estimated Fatalities | |
|---|---|
| High | 0 |
| Best | 0 |
| Low | 0 |
Secondary Warring Support:
Side A (Government of Ethiopia): n/a
Side B (TPLF): n/a
2024
| Estimated Fatalities | |
|---|---|
| High | 0 |
| Best | 0 |
| Low | 0 |
Secondary Warring Support:
Side A (Government of Ethiopia): n/a
Side B (TPLF): n/a
2025
| Estimated Fatalities | |
|---|---|
| High | 19 |
| Best | 19 |
| Low | 19 |
Secondary Warring Support:
Side A (Government of Ethiopia): n/a
Side B (TPLF): n/a
Dyad Archive
This section contains annual information no longer systematically collected by the UCDP.
1975 Dyad Archive
Negotiations: NO
Victory: NO
Terminated: NO
1976 Dyad Archive
Comment on Active: TPLF launched its armed struggle in Tigray in 1975, focusing mainly on building up the group’s military capabilities during the first year. While some attacks on government targets were reported during the year, they were all small-scale and did not reach the 25 battle-related deaths threshold. 1976 is thus the first year that fighting between the front and government forces is included in UCDP data.
In 1976 TPLF was still a very small rebel group, struggling for survival. Most observers agree that it was only because the Derg (the military regime in power since 1974) was so week and disorganised during TPLF’s first years, preoccupied with an invasion by Somali in the southeast and the conflict against Eritrean separatists in the north, that the front was able to establish itself and gain a foothold in the province.
While most of the fighting in 1976 was of a very low intensity, there was one big event that stood out in stark contrast. At the time the Derg viewed TPLF as a minor nuisance, focusing instead on the conflict going on in Eritrea and Ogaden. Due to the inter-connectedness between the rebel groups in Tigray and Eritrea, and the former’s reliance on the latter for training and arms, the regime’s reasoning was that the TPLF and all other small armed groups active in Tigray would end their struggle automatically as soon as the Eritrean rebels were defeated. In order to achieve this, the Derg launched “Operation Raza”, where a peasant army recruited for this sole purpose was intended to wipe out the Eritrean rebellions – and with it its Tigrayan counterpart – by its sheer number. Some 40 000 – 60 000 poorly armed peasant soldiers were subsequently dispatched in northern Tigray, along five entry points to Eritrea. A joint force of TPLF and Eritrean rebels took them by complete surprise and the ensuing scenes have been described as outright slaughter.
Apart from the armed conflict with the government, 1976 was characterised by internecine warfare between TPLF and EDU (Ethiopian Democratic Union), fighting for supremacy in the region. EDU was a rebel group that brought together infamous local shifta leaders and members of the Tigrayan nobility that had lost their positions with the ousting of Emperor Haile Selasie in 1974. The group was highly popular among peasants in Tigray during the mid-1970s and much of TPLF’s attention during the year was given to fight EDU militarily, as well as to try to gain the peasants support by emphasizing the group’s origins in the old regime.
Negotiations: NO
Comment on Negotiations: There were no negotiations between the parties in 1976.
Victory: NO
Terminated: YES
Type of termination: No or Low Activity
Date of termination: 1976-12-31
Comment on Termination: Still in the initial stages of its armed struggle, TPLF’s activity fell in 1977 and fighting between the front and the government did not cross the 25 battle-related deaths threshold.
1977 Dyad Archive
Terminated: NO
1978 Dyad Archive
Comment on Active: 1978 saw the resurgence of fighting between the Derg and TPLF. Having fought off the Somali invasion attempt in Ogaden (see conflict description for the inter-state conflict between Ethiopia and Somalia), the government was free to focus on the troubled north of the country. A substantial number of troops were deployed in Tigray; both to stave off TPLF advances in the region and to prepare for a major offensive in Eritrea, launched from Tigray. Having its greatest strength along the Eritrean border, TPLF was able to conduct a number of hit and run operations against Derg forces, harassing the movement of equipment and troops to Eritrea.
At this time the rebel group was highly mobile. Travelling in small groups, TPLF fighters ranged across the province; carried out small ambushes and then moved on quickly so as to give the impression that they were more numerous than they really were.
During the year TPLF continued fighting EDU, a rebel group based in western Tigray. Furthermore, during the year the front also fought EPRP for opposition ascendancy in eastern Tigray. While initially being pushed back, TPLF were eventually able to drive EPRP from Tigray in March 1978.
Negotiations: NO
Comment on Negotiations: There were no negotiations between the parties in 1978.
Victory: NO
Terminated: NO
1979 Dyad Archive
Comment on Active: In the first half of 1979 the Derg launched a four-month campaign to pacify western and central Tigray. However, by this time TPLF had increased in size and strength and was able to withstand the army’s onslaught. The group ranged more or less freely throughout the countryside - controlling large parts of it – and was able to threaten the Derg’s supply lines. In August the front achieved its biggest break-through up to that point in the conflict, when it managed to push the Ethiopian army out of four garrison towns; Abi Addi, Bizet, Mai Nebri and Adi Gudum.
Negotiations: NO
Comment on Negotiations: There were no negotiations between the parties in 1979.
Victory: NO
Terminated: NO
1980 Dyad Archive
Comment on Active: In August 1980 the Derg launched a massive offensive in Tigray, involving some 40 000 troops, together with aircrafts and helicopter gunships. This was part of the regime’s new counter-insurgency strategy – also termed its “counter-population warfare” due to its brutality – and would last until March the following year. The offensive included heavy bombing and strafing, which seriously interrupted the harvest season and TPLF soon announced its fears of widespread famine. According to the rebels, the offensive had caused some 80 000 peasants to leave their homes.
Negotiations: NO
Comment on Negotiations: There were no negotiations between the parties in 1980.
Victory: NO
Terminated: NO
1981 Dyad Archive
Comment on Active: The Derg offensive that had started in August 1980 continued until March 1981. As during the previous year it was very brutal, involving a great level of indiscriminate violence against the civilian population. When the offensive came to an end in March 1981 the situation between the government and TPLF on the ground was that of a stalemate. In mid-1981 the TPLF stepped up its military activities and increasingly came to be perceived as a problem by the regime.
Negotiations: NO
Comment on Negotiations: There were no negotiations between the parties in 1981.
Victory: NO
Terminated: NO
1982 Dyad Archive
Comment on Active: By 1982 TPLF had become a major problem for the regime. The group had grown in size during the first years of the 1980s due to its increasing popular support. This popular support also granted the front access to invaluable well-informed intelligence and by 1982 the group was able to engage much larger Derg forces than before. As a result of this, the government forces lost control of most of rural Tigray, its control only stretching some 5 – 10 km from the main roads. TPLF was not interested in holding territory, however, but remained committed to guerrilla warfare.
In February 1982 the Derg launched the massive “Red Star Campaign” against the Eritrean rebels, north of Tigray. While primarily directed at EPLF, another main aim of the campaign was to destroy the highly effective links on the ground between TPLF and EPLF and there were subsequently widespread bombing and an increase in army attacks in Tigray.
Also during 1982 TPLF launched its “Southern Operation” and opened a new front in southern Tigray and the northern part of Wollo, the region bordering Tigray in the southeast. This operation was launched together with EPDM, a rebel group formed with TPLF help in Wollo the previous year.
The end of 1982 saw preparations for a new Derg offensive in Tigray (called the “Seventh Offensive”), with MiGs starting to “soften up” the towns and villages to be attacked.
Negotiations: NO
Comment on Negotiations: There were no negotiations between the parties in 1982.
Victory: NO
Terminated: NO
1983 Dyad Archive
Comment on Active: The year 1983 was above all characterised by the onset of the great famine that had its centre in Tigray and Wollo. Not paralleled in the 20th century, the famine had a number of causes, one of them being the desperate poverty in the region and another the region’s unpredictable climate. This was coupled with the regime’s social and agricultural policies which had for years eased the country towards famine. However, in the worst hit regions in the country – Tigray and Wollo – the single most important reason why the drought that started in 1983 became not a “normal” period of hardship for the population, but an unparalleled famine was the counter-insurgency strategy that Derg employed in these areas.
The Derg’s brutal counter-insurgency strategy had been employed since 1980, wherefore the conditions for the famine had developed over time. When the regime stepped up its counter-insurgency campaign in 1983, turning increasingly brutal and destructive, famine soon ensued. Aiming to weaken the peasantry, on which TPLF relied for survival, the Derg disrupted trade flows, destroyed grain stores, killed cattle, burned crops and undermined cross-border relief efforts.
As part of the counter-insurgency strategy, the Derg launched a new offensive against TPLF (called the “Seventh Offensive”) in February 1983. The offensive, which involved some 70 000 troops, lasted through August the same year and was widely viewed as the most brutal so far in the conflict. TPLF initially attempted to defend its base in Shire using trench warfare but was eventually forced to abandon the area.
Apart from fighting in Tigray, TPLF continued to conduct operations in Wollo, in 1983 also expanding its area of operation to also include Gonder, the region southwest of Tigray. In Wollo and Gonder TPLF cooperated mainly with fellow-rebel group EPDM, and at times also with ALF.
Negotiations: NO
Comment on Negotiations: There were no negotiatinos between the parties in 1983.
Victory: NO
Terminated: NO
1984 Dyad Archive
Comment on Active: The great famine that had started the previous year (see comment on activity 1983) continued in 1984 and TPLF focused much of its attention on aiding civilians in crossing the border into Sudan. In parallel to this, the conflict between the front and the government continued with a mix of small skirmishes and some heavy battles throughout Tigray, but also in Wollo and Gondar.
Negotiations: NO
Comment on Negotiations: There were no negotiations between the parties in 1984.
Victory: NO
Terminated: NO
1985 Dyad Archive
Comment on Active: The great famine that had started in 1983 continued through most of 1985, but broke by the end of the year. By then, 800 000 Tigrayans were internally displaced and a further 200 000 had crossed the border to Sudan.
In February the Derg launched a new offensive in Tigray (called the “Eight Offensive”). Its focus was Timbien in central Tigray and the western part of the region, and it was initiated by two weeks of aerial bombardment. On 1 March the ground offensive began and it soon became clear that one of its aims was to move west and cut off relief routs to Sudan, preventing food from reaching people in TPLF controlled areas. Relief efforts were subsequently suspended and plunged into chaos for some months. Following the Eighths Offensive the government had a greater degree of control in Tigray than it had had since 1977.
Negotiations: NO
Comment on Negotiations: There were no negotiatins between the parties in 1985.
Victory: NO
Terminated: NO
1986 Dyad Archive
Comment on Active: Beginning in 1985 TPLF had started to undergo an extensive reorganisation, extending its capacity. The fruits of this process began to show in 1986, when the front was able to attack and destroy much larger Derg forces than before. Furthermore, since the rural economy had started to stabilise and some refugees began to return from Sudan, the rebel group was also able to re-exert its control over the rural areas of the region and resume the siege of the towns during the year.
Negotiations: NO
Comment on Negotiations: There were no negotiations between the parties in 1986.
Victory: NO
Terminated: NO
1987 Dyad Archive
Comment on Active: By early 1987 the military situation in Tigray was stalemated; the government failed to win any significant victories and TPLF remained in control of much of the countryside. Discipline and motivation in the army, which had been on the decrease for many years, appeared to reach a new low in 1987. TPLF, for its part, fared better and was able to mobilise growing human and material resources.
The Derg planned a new offensive to check TPLF’s advances in the summer and autumn of 1987, but the operation was aborted after the rebels launched a three-pronged pre-emptive strike.
Negotiations: NO
Comment on Negotiations: There were no negotiations between the parties in 1987.
Victory: NO
Terminated: NO
1988 Dyad Archive
Comment on Active: In 1988 events in Eritrea and Tigray effectively put the Derg on the defensive, while TPLF and EPLF gained in strength and morale. In February the Derg’s forces suffered its biggest defeat to date at Afabet in Eritrea, when EPLF routed a force of 15 000 men. Once the extent of the defeat became apparent the regime sent moved units from Tigray to Eritrea, even though there were signs that TPLF was planning an offensive. Subsequently, when TPLF a few days later launched its largest attack to up to that date, the rebel force was able to capture all Tigrayan towns north of Mekelle, the district capital. According to credible observers, there were three reasons for this offensive. For one, TPLF wanted to break the military stalemate in the region; second, the front needed to gains some experience in capturing and holding towns as a preparation for the final phase of the conflict; and three, the rebels had started to worry about the growing alienation of the urban population in the region in the face of the rural focused rebellion.
TPLF’s capture of the towns was its biggest military triumph so far in the conflict. The Derg reacted to this, and to the defeat in Eritrea, by proclaiming a state of emergency in the two regions. It introduced a war levy and ordered a new mobilization of conscripts. President Mengistu raised the slogan: “Everything to the warfront” and conscripted thousands into the army. A massive counter-offensive was soon launched, involving some 150 000 troops. In the face of the Derg’s onslaught it became clear that TPLF was not yet ready to relinquish its commitment to guerilla warfare. Instead of risking the loss of many fighters and civilians, the front retreated from the towns, albeit often no more than a few km, after which they resumed the pre-1988 sieges.
The year 1988 was the most savage during the entire conflict. Atrocities were committed on an unprecedented scale by both army and air force. Many of the government activities were designed to reduce the population to a state of famine, such as the deliberate killing of oxen, the burning of grain stores etc. Of the attacks carried out by the air force, the bombing of the north-eastern town of Hausien stands out. An all-day attack by helicopter gun ships and MiGs produced 1800 civilian deaths in a village that was far from the frontlines of the conflict.
Negotiations: NO
Comment on Negotiations: There were no negotiations between the parties in 1988.
Victory: NO
Terminated: YES
Type of termination: Other
Date of termination: 1988-12-31
Comment on Termination: In January 1989 TPLF merged with EPDM, creating EPRDF.
2020 Dyad Archive
Comment on Active: After EPRDF’s military victory in 1991, the group - almost completely dominated by one of its constituent parts, the Tigrayan TPLF, went on to rule the country for more than 25 years. However, amidst large-scale popular protests against the regime, Abiy Ahmed came to power in 2018, initially appearing to usher in an era of political reform. In December 2019, Ahmed oversaw the transformation of EPRDF into Prosperity Party, the latter consisting of all constituent parts of the former, apart from TPLF, which opted out. With that, TPLF was no longer part of the federal government, for the first time since 1991. The party remained in power in its home-region Tigray, however.
Animosity between the center and Tigray was evident already from the outset and 2020 saw tensions rising. As the national general election planned for late August 2020 was delayed due to the COVID-19 pandemic, TPLF decided to go ahead with regional elections in Tigray in September 2020 anyway, securing some 98 % of the votes. This brought the relationship between the two parties to a new low point and all communication between Tigray and Addis Ababa was completely severed, and federal budget transfers frozen. In late October, TPLF claimed that the central government, together with Eritrea, was planning an attack on Tigray and tension rose even further.
On 4 November, the situation exploded, as violent clashes erupted between the TPLF regional forces and the national military force, the Ethiopian National Defense Force (ENDF). Exactly what triggered the outbreak of fighting remains contested, as the two sides traded blame. The conflict quickly spread to large parts of Tigray as Ethiopian government forces, moved in en masse into the northern region during the weeks that followed. Despite the difficulty to obtain reports on the developing conflict, due to a complete internet and telephone shut down in Tigray, it soon became clear that the violence escalated to a level not seen in Ethiopia for nearly 30 years.
While not confirmed at the time, it became evident within weeks of the eruption of the conflict, that the Ethiopian government received assistance from troops crossing the border from Eritrea. Together, these Eritrean troops, ENDF, and Amhara Special Forces (regional paramilitary police force as Amhara region) got the upper hand, and after heavy fighting succeeding in seizing Tigray regional capital Mekele and Abiy Ahmed subsequently declared victory in late November 2020. However, despite this, fighting continued through the rest of the year.
Negotiations: NO
Comment on Negotiations: There were no negotiations between the parties in 2020.
Victory: NO
Terminated: NO
Type of termination: Not terminated
2021 Dyad Archive
Comment on Active: The conflict escalated dramatically in 2021. Having been pushed out of Tigray’s urban centers, TPLF did not surrender, but instead re-grouped, re-organized and launched a guerrilla campaign from the mountains. In the context of extensive one-sided violence carried out by both Ethiopian and Eritrean troops, as well as the Amhara special forces and militia, TPLF gained increasing support from the population, and grew substantially in size. In mid-June, TPLF launched a counter-offensive called Operation Alula, and after fierce fighting, which caused thousands of deaths, the group was able to re-take large swaths of territory, including regional capital Mekele.
The following months saw TPLF advancing south amidst bloody battles, capturing a string of towns in the Amhara region, and also pushing into neighboring Afar. The rebel offensive was not halted until the end of November, when TPLF - which had at this point linked up with fellow rebel group OLA - was a mere 200 km from the capital. At this point, a government counter-offensive caused TPLF to lose its momentum, and December saw the group retreating towards Tigray.
Negotiations: NO
Comment on Negotiations: There were no negotiations between the parties in 2021.
Victory: NO
Terminated: NO
Type of termination: Not terminated
2022 Dyad Archive
Comment on Active: The year 2022 started out relatively calm, with the TPLF more or less ensconced in Tigray, and the government and its allies remaining outside the region. However, in late August the war erupted again. September and October saw large-scale fighting with TDF initially gaining the upper hand, seizing a number of towns in northern Amhara region. However, a joint Ethiopian and Eritrean offensive from Eritrean territory forced TDF to withdraw from Amhara to protect its rear, and from mid-October the rebels lost a string of urban centers, seemingly shifting into guerrilla warfare yet again, some weeks prior to the signing of the cessation of hostilities agreement on 2 November. While the conflict had been brutal even before the re-eruption of fighting in late August, the last phase of the war reached levels of violence not seen before. The number of troops involved was estimated to have numbered around 750 000, and much of the fighting was conducted as a bloody infantry war on several fronts, with both sides accused of using recently recruited fighters as cannon fodder, launching human wave attacks through mined areas towards enemy trenches. Resembling WW1 fighting, and previously used in the interstate war between Eritrea and Ethiopia, the idea behind this tactics was that the sheer number would result in those defending eventually running out of ammunition. By its nature, this type of warfare causes massive death tolls and it is estimated that at least 100 000 fighters were killed on the battlefield between 24 August and 2 November.
Negotiations: YES
Comment on Negotiations: By early October, there was movement on the negotiation front, but the process did not get underway until 25 October, when peace talks opened in Pretoria, South Africa. The negotiations, led by the African Union, and facilitated by Nigeria's former president Olusegun Obasanjo, supported by Kenya's former leader Uhuru Kenyatta and South Africa's ex-vice president Phumzile Mlambo-Ngcuka saw high-level participation from the parties; TPLF was represented by its spokesperson Getachew Reda and the lead negotiator on the government side was the national security advisor Redwan Hussein. Talks were initially scheduled to last until 30 October, but were extended for a few extra days.
On 2 November, the parties released a joint statement, saying that they had "agreed to permanently silence the guns and end the two years of conflict in northern Ethiopia." The peace agreement clearly reflected the current situation on the battlefield, which had shifted in favor of the government. TPLF was under immense pressure, forced to retreat from one urban center after another, and many observers argued that the agreement was much more favorable for the government, some even describing it as a triumph for Abiy Ahmed. Under the accord, TPLF agreed to disarm within 30 days, to allow federal troops to re-enter Mekele and to restore federal authority in the region. Furthermore, the agreement stipulated for TPLF and the government to jointly appoint an inclusive interim council that was to rule the region until elections. This was yet another concession from TPLF , since it implied that the 2020 elections, which were won by TPLF, and which were one of the triggers of the conflict, lacked legitimacy. The government, for its part, agreed to stop its offensive on Mekele, to end the blockade and allow aid deliveries, as well as to restore services to the region. As for one of TPLF’s main demands – the withdrawal of Eritrean troops – the outcome was more unclear. Eritrea – not present in Pretoria – was not mentioned by name in the agreement, which more vaguely states that the parties were to cease “collusion with an external force”.
An early sign of the parties’ commitment to the agreement was that they sent their top military commanders to Nairobi just a few days later, where they held talks on how to put the peace agreement’s security provisions into effect. A follow-up agreement was subsequently signed on 12 November. In the Nairobi Declaration, some amendments were made, whereby the previous 30-day disarmament period was split into two phases. The declaration stated that the disarming of heavy weapons was tied to the withdrawal of foreign and non-ENDF forces in the region, thus more clearly pointing a finger at Eritrea and Amhara regional forces.
During the rest of the year, implementation progress was made on most aspects of the accord, albeit slow in some areas. Work on one of the key areas, disarmament of TPLF, commenced in December, when the Ethiopian–TPLF Joint Committee met and began a new set of talks, specifically geared to this area. One day after the start of the talks, TPLF announced that they had withdrawn their troops from a number of urban areas and progress seemed to continue over the month.
Most analysts agreed that there were two main sticking points remaining: the presence of Eritrea and Amharan regional forces, and the question of the status of Tigray’s Western zone, which Amhara state claimed to historically belong to them, referring to it as Welkait. Abiy Ahmed had been dependent on the assistance of both Eritrea and the Amhara regional forces (as well as the Amhara Fano militia) during the war, and it was unclear how much influence he could wield over them in the post conflict context. As the year drew to a close, Amhara forces remained in control of Western zone/Welkait and while there were reports of Eritrean forces withdrawing from Shire and Axum town on 29 December, aid workers reported that they still retained a substantial presence in the region. Furthermore, not parties to the agreement as such, both EDF and the Amhara regional forces continued to carry out attacks on the civilian population after the signing of the peace agreement.
Victory: NO
Terminated: YES
Type of termination: Peace Agreement
Date of termination: 2022-11-02
Comment on Termination: After the signing of the Pretoria Agreement on 2 November 2022, fighting ceased between the government and TPLF.
However, it was widely argued that there were two sticking points remaining: the presence of Eritrea and Amharan regional forces, and the question of the status of Tigray’s Western zone, which Amhara state claimed to historically belong to them, referring to it as Welkait. Abiy Ahmed had been dependent on the assistance of both Eritrea and the Amhara regional forces (as well as the Amhara Fano militia) during the war, and it was unclear how much influence he could wield over them in the post conflict context. As the year drew to a close, Amhara forces remained in control of Western zone/Welkait and while there were reports of Eritrean forces withdrawing from Shire and Axum town on 29 December, aid workers reported that they still retained a substantial presence in the region. Furthermore, not parties to the agreement as such, both EDF and the Amhara regional forces continued to carry out attacks on the civilian population after the signing of the peace agreement.
Comment on Termination Date: After the signing of the Pretoria Agreement on 2 November 2022, fighting ceased between the government and TPLF.
However, it was widely argued that there were two sticking points remaining: the presence of Eritrea and Amharan regional forces, and the question of the status of Tigray’s Western zone, which Amhara state claimed to historically belong to them, referring to it as Welkait. Abiy Ahmed had been dependent on the assistance of both Eritrea and the Amhara regional forces (as well as the Amhara Fano militia) during the war, and it was unclear how much influence he could wield over them in the post conflict context. As the year drew to a close, Amhara forces remained in control of Western zone/Welkait and while there were reports of Eritrean forces withdrawing from Shire and Axum town on 29 December, aid workers reported that they still retained a substantial presence in the region. Furthermore, not parties to the agreement as such, both EDF and the Amhara regional forces continued to carry out attacks on the civilian population after the signing of the peace agreement.
2023 Dyad Archive
Terminated: NO
2024 Dyad Archive
Terminated: NO
2025 Dyad Archive
Terminated: NO
