General information
Type of Incompatibility: Territory
Comment on Type of Incompatibility: The incompatibility concerns the constitutional status of the territory on the northern bank of the river Brahmaputra within the Indian state of Assam. The Bodo tribe, traditionally inhibiting this area, raised the demand for a separate "Bodo homeland" already in 1967. During the violent insurgency, launched in 1987, the rebel groups have voiced this demand differently.
The ABSU has demanded the establishment of a separate tribal state, from within Assam, to remain inside India. The NDFB has declared their goal to be an independent, sovereign state outside the Indian federation.
Similar to the other conflicts in the North-Eastern region, the Bodo insurgency should be seen as a fight against dispossession of tribal land by Bengali settlers and ethnic Assamese. The Bodos have cited economic and social neglect by the State Government as the cause of their insurgency.
Territory: Bodoland
Date of first stated goal of incompatibility: 1986-10-03
Comment on date of first stated goals of incompatibility: The first demand for a separate state for the "plains tribes" of Assam was issued by the Plains Tribal Council in Assam in 1967 - the same year that the All Bodo Students Union was established. It was, however, not until March 1987 that the ABSU formally launched its violent campaign to front the demand for a separate Indian state of "Bodoland". In its 92 point charter issued in 1987 the ABSU lists a number of economical and cultural demands to accommodate the Bodos grievances, among these demands are the implementation of Bodo as the official language, expansion of education and employment opportunities for Bodos and economic development. The creation of a separate state is put forward as the only certain instrument for achieving these goals.
Of the original 92 demands, two became the focus of the insurgency: i) a separate homeland on the north bank of the river Brahmaputra and ii) a district council for the plains tribes on the southern bank of the river.
Date of first use of armed force: 1988-03-01
Comment on first use of armed force: In March 1988 the ABSU, under the leadership of Upendra Nath Bramha, formally launched a campaign of violence to press for the demand of a separate state within India.
Date of first battle related death: 1989-01-01
Comment on first battle related death: The records relating to the early phase of the insurgency is unclear, and the exact date of first battle-related death is not confirmed. The insurgency campaign were initiated in early February. On 16 February ABSU militants shot dead three government employees and a labourer at Salakati.
Date of conflict reached 25 battle releated deaths: 1989-03-16
Comment on conflict reached 25 battle releated deaths: The records given relating to this early phase of the insurgency is in very general terms, and the specific incidents that make the conflict reach 25 battle-related deaths are not separately accounted for. Violence did culminate in early February, reaching 52 casualties by 18 February. As of 16 March 1989, it was confirmed that among the people killed were approximately 35 security personnel, and that attacks on security personnel is an integrated strategy of the uprising, not only one-sided violence against civilians. 16 March is thus the first date when the conflict can be confirmed to reach the 25- threshold of battle-related deaths.
Annual information
This section contains annual information systematically collected by the UCDP.
1986
Primary Parties: -
Dimension: Internal
| Estimated Fatalities | |
|---|---|
| High | 0 |
| Best | 0 |
| Low | 0 |
Numbers include fatalities for all dyads both active and inactive for this year
1987
Primary Parties: -
Dimension: Internal
| Estimated Fatalities | |
|---|---|
| High | 0 |
| Best | 0 |
| Low | 0 |
Numbers include fatalities for all dyads both active and inactive for this year
1989
Primary Parties: Government of India - ABSU
Dimension: Internal
| Estimated Fatalities | |
|---|---|
| High | 80 |
| Best | 72 |
| Low | 72 |
Numbers include fatalities for all dyads both active and inactive for this year
1990
Primary Parties: Government of India - ABSU
Dimension: Internal
| Estimated Fatalities | |
|---|---|
| High | 25 |
| Best | 25 |
| Low | 25 |
Numbers include fatalities for all dyads both active and inactive for this year
1991
Primary Parties: -
Dimension: Internal
| Estimated Fatalities | |
|---|---|
| High | 0 |
| Best | 0 |
| Low | 0 |
Numbers include fatalities for all dyads both active and inactive for this year
1992
Primary Parties: -
Dimension: Internal
| Estimated Fatalities | |
|---|---|
| High | 14 |
| Best | 14 |
| Low | 8 |
Numbers include fatalities for all dyads both active and inactive for this year
1993
Primary Parties: -
Dimension: Internal
| Estimated Fatalities | |
|---|---|
| High | 6 |
| Best | 6 |
| Low | 6 |
Numbers include fatalities for all dyads both active and inactive for this year
Peace agreements
Name of peace agreement: Memorandum of settlement and Bodoland Autonomous Council Act, 1993
Date when warring parties signed the agreement: 1993-02-20
Comment of peace agreement: Full peace agreement
In Guwahati, on 20 February 1993, the government of Assam and the government of India signed a peace settlement with the militant Bodo group ABSU; one of the groups fighting for greater group rights for the Bodo tribes in the state of Assam.
The settlement stipulated the bringing overground of all ABSU militants, and their subsequent depositing of arms and disbandment. The government of Assam was to initiate immediate steps for suitable rehabilitation, and also provided ex-gratia payments to the next of kin of those killed during the conflict.
The key provisions of the agreement was the establishment of the Bodoland Autonomous Council, comprising 2000 villages and 25 tea plantations in 8 districts of northern and lower Assam. The council should be comprised of 35 elected members, with five more to be nominated by the Governor of Assam from the underrepresented communities. It should act as an assembly for the autonomous area, and secure the "social, economic, educational, ethnic and cultural advancement of the Bodos residing therein". Contrary to what the Bodo delegation demanded the council were not given any autonomy with regard to law and order within this territory.
Two problems were highly visible both in the negotiation and implementation phase of the accord. Firstly, there was no consensus on the Bodos demographic strength and extension within the area they demanded autonomy for. Secondly, as the Bodo villages were not contiguous the demarcation of the jurisdiction of BAC remained a problem. The accord provided for all villages having a 50 per cent tribal population into the BAC. For the sake of contiguity, even villages with only one per cent tribal population was included. When the time for implementation came the accord was met by stiff resistance from the Assamese population in these areas.The accord was heavily criticized by the hard-line militants within the Bodo- movement. The Bodo Security Force said its was a betrayal of the Bodo cause, and had at the time already resumed the violent campaign for a separate state of Bodoland apart from Assam.
Signatories: K.S. Rao, Sansuma Khungur Bwismutiary, Rajesh Pilot and Hiteswar Saikia
Comment of signatories: Dyadic peace agreement
The formal positions of the signatories are: (i) Chief secretary of Assam, (ii) ABSU president, (iii) Union Minister of State for Internal Security and (iv) Chief minister respectively. It can be noted that the memorandum itself was not signed by any representative of the Central Government, but was a bipartite affair between ABSU and representatives of Assam
Full-text peace agreement
1994
Primary Parties: Government of India - NDFB
Dimension: Internal
| Estimated Fatalities | |
|---|---|
| High | 36 |
| Best | 36 |
| Low | 36 |
Numbers include fatalities for all dyads both active and inactive for this year
1995
Primary Parties: -
Dimension: Internal
| Estimated Fatalities | |
|---|---|
| High | 16 |
| Best | 16 |
| Low | 16 |
Numbers include fatalities for all dyads both active and inactive for this year
1996
Primary Parties: Government of India - NDFB
Dimension: Internal
| Estimated Fatalities | |
|---|---|
| High | 27 |
| Best | 25 |
| Low | 25 |
Numbers include fatalities for all dyads both active and inactive for this year
1997
Primary Parties: Government of India - NDFB
Dimension: Internal
| Estimated Fatalities | |
|---|---|
| High | 38 |
| Best | 38 |
| Low | 38 |
Numbers include fatalities for all dyads both active and inactive for this year
1998
Primary Parties: Government of India - NDFB
Dimension: Internal
| Estimated Fatalities | |
|---|---|
| High | 31 |
| Best | 31 |
| Low | 31 |
Numbers include fatalities for all dyads both active and inactive for this year
1999
Primary Parties: Government of India - NDFB
Dimension: Internal
| Estimated Fatalities | |
|---|---|
| High | 33 |
| Best | 33 |
| Low | 33 |
Numbers include fatalities for all dyads both active and inactive for this year
2000
Primary Parties: -
Dimension: Internal
| Estimated Fatalities | |
|---|---|
| High | 25 |
| Best | 20 |
| Low | 19 |
Numbers include fatalities for all dyads both active and inactive for this year
2001
Primary Parties: Government of India - NDFB
Dimension: Internal
| Estimated Fatalities | |
|---|---|
| High | 77 |
| Best | 77 |
| Low | 77 |
Numbers include fatalities for all dyads both active and inactive for this year
2002
Primary Parties: Government of India - NDFB
Dimension: Internal
| Estimated Fatalities | |
|---|---|
| High | 44 |
| Best | 44 |
| Low | 44 |
Numbers include fatalities for all dyads both active and inactive for this year
2003
Primary Parties: Government of India - NDFB
Dimension: Internal
| Estimated Fatalities | |
|---|---|
| High | 122 |
| Best | 109 |
| Low | 109 |
Numbers include fatalities for all dyads both active and inactive for this year
2004
Primary Parties: Government of India - NDFB
Dimension: Internal
| Estimated Fatalities | |
|---|---|
| High | 27 |
| Best | 27 |
| Low | 27 |
Numbers include fatalities for all dyads both active and inactive for this year
2005
Primary Parties: -
Dimension: Internal
| Estimated Fatalities | |
|---|---|
| High | 9 |
| Best | 9 |
| Low | 9 |
Numbers include fatalities for all dyads both active and inactive for this year
2006
Primary Parties: -
Dimension: Internal
| Estimated Fatalities | |
|---|---|
| High | 10 |
| Best | 10 |
| Low | 10 |
Numbers include fatalities for all dyads both active and inactive for this year
2007
Primary Parties: -
Dimension: Internal
| Estimated Fatalities | |
|---|---|
| High | 1 |
| Best | 1 |
| Low | 0 |
Numbers include fatalities for all dyads both active and inactive for this year
2008
Primary Parties: -
Dimension: Internal
| Estimated Fatalities | |
|---|---|
| High | 7 |
| Best | 7 |
| Low | 7 |
Numbers include fatalities for all dyads both active and inactive for this year
2009
Primary Parties: Government of India - NDFB - RD
Dimension: Internal
| Estimated Fatalities | |
|---|---|
| High | 92 |
| Best | 86 |
| Low | 82 |
Numbers include fatalities for all dyads both active and inactive for this year
2010
Primary Parties: Government of India - NDFB - RD
Dimension: Internal
| Estimated Fatalities | |
|---|---|
| High | 86 |
| Best | 57 |
| Low | 57 |
Numbers include fatalities for all dyads both active and inactive for this year
2011
Primary Parties: -
Dimension: Internal
| Estimated Fatalities | |
|---|---|
| High | 26 |
| Best | 26 |
| Low | 26 |
Numbers include fatalities for all dyads both active and inactive for this year
2012
Primary Parties: -
Dimension: Internal
| Estimated Fatalities | |
|---|---|
| High | 6 |
| Best | 6 |
| Low | 6 |
Numbers include fatalities for all dyads both active and inactive for this year
2013
Primary Parties: Government of India - NDFB-S
Dimension: Internal
| Estimated Fatalities | |
|---|---|
| High | 29 |
| Best | 29 |
| Low | 26 |
Numbers include fatalities for all dyads both active and inactive for this year
2014
Primary Parties: Government of India - NDFB-S
Dimension: Internal
| Estimated Fatalities | |
|---|---|
| High | 58 |
| Best | 39 |
| Low | 33 |
Numbers include fatalities for all dyads both active and inactive for this year
2015
Primary Parties: -
Dimension: Internal
| Estimated Fatalities | |
|---|---|
| High | 12 |
| Best | 12 |
| Low | 12 |
Numbers include fatalities for all dyads both active and inactive for this year
2016
Primary Parties: -
Dimension: Internal
| Estimated Fatalities | |
|---|---|
| High | 0 |
| Best | 0 |
| Low | 0 |
Numbers include fatalities for all dyads both active and inactive for this year
2017
Primary Parties: -
Dimension: Internal
| Estimated Fatalities | |
|---|---|
| High | 0 |
| Best | 0 |
| Low | 0 |
Numbers include fatalities for all dyads both active and inactive for this year
2018
Primary Parties: -
Dimension: Internal
| Estimated Fatalities | |
|---|---|
| High | 1 |
| Best | 1 |
| Low | 1 |
Numbers include fatalities for all dyads both active and inactive for this year
2019
Primary Parties: -
Dimension: Internal
| Estimated Fatalities | |
|---|---|
| High | 1 |
| Best | 1 |
| Low | 1 |
Numbers include fatalities for all dyads both active and inactive for this year
2020
Primary Parties: -
Dimension: Internal
| Estimated Fatalities | |
|---|---|
| High | 0 |
| Best | 0 |
| Low | 0 |
Numbers include fatalities for all dyads both active and inactive for this year
Peace agreements
Name of peace agreement: Memorandum of settlement
Date when warring parties signed the agreement: 2020-01-27
Comment of peace agreement: Partial peace agreement
The Memorandum of settlement was signed between the Government of Assam and ABSU as well as various factions of NDFB who had continued to demand separate Statehood for Bodoland.
NDFB agreed that all factions under the agreemet would abjure path of violence, surrender their weapons and disband their armed organisations within one month of signing the settlement. The government of India and the government of Assam would rehabilitate the cadres.
The agreement provided for the appointment of a commission to examine and recommend an alteration of the Bodoland Territorial Area District (BTAD) to include villages having a majority tribal population and exclude villages with a majority non tribal population and to increase the seats of the Bodo Territorial Council to a maximum of 60 after the alteration.
the agreement provided for a Joint Monitoring Committee with representatives from MHA, Government of Assam, BTC and Bodo organisations to monitor implementation of the agreement.
Signatories: Signed in the presence of Hon'ble Union Home Minister of Indoa, Shri Amit Shah
Lawrence Islary ABSU
Pramod Boro ABSU
Ranjan Daimary NDFB
Gobinda Basumatary NDFB
B. Saoraigwra NDFB
Dhirendra Boro NDFB
Mihineswar Basumatary UBPO
Kumar Sanjay Krishna Government of Assam
Satyendra Garg
MHA
Signing of the agreement is witnessed by Hagrama Mohilary CEM, CEM, BTC Himanta Biswa Sarma Cabinet Minister, Assam Sarbananda Sonowal CM, Assam
Comment of third parties role in peace agreement: In the presence of Union Home Minister Amit Shah, the tripartite agreement was signed by top leaders of the four NDFB factions, the ABSU and the United Bodo People's Organization (UBPO); Joint Secretary in the Home Ministry Satyendra Garg; and Assam Chief Secretary Kumar Sanjay Krishna. Assam Chief Minister Sarbananda Sonowal also signed the pact as one of the witnesses
Full-text peace agreement
2021
Primary Parties: -
Dimension: Internal
| Estimated Fatalities | |
|---|---|
| High | 3 |
| Best | 3 |
| Low | 3 |
Numbers include fatalities for all dyads both active and inactive for this year
2022
Primary Parties: -
Dimension: Internal
| Estimated Fatalities | |
|---|---|
| High | 0 |
| Best | 0 |
| Low | 0 |
Numbers include fatalities for all dyads both active and inactive for this year
Conflict Archive
This section contains annual information no longer systematically collected by the UCDP.
1986 Conflict Archive
Terminated: NO
1987 Conflict Archive
Terminated: NO
1989 Conflict Archive
Comment on Activity: The Bodo insurgency gathered momentum from February 1989, with ABSU fronting the demand for a separate state within India. As of March 1989 the violent agitation, in the form of general strikes, bombings, attacks on security personnel and communal violence had killed approximately 300 persons, whereof 35 were security-personnel. The state government called in the army and central reserve police force to curb the violence. A new wave of intercommunal violence and attacks against the state flared up in august, raising the death tolls to over 500 in total, while forcing 60 000 people to flee the affected area. The government responded by expressing willingness to accommodate the tribal’s socio-economic demands, but stated that any violence would be met by violence to maintain the unity of the state.
Some news reports indicated that the reports of violence had been exaggerated and widely circulated by competing political forces in neighbouring state attempting to destabilize the AGP government in Assam.
Negotiations: YES
Comment on Negotiation: On 24 August 1989 representatives of ABSU agreed to suspend their agitation to create a congenial atmosphere for further talks with the government. Tripartiate talks, between centre, state and the ABSU, was conducted on two occasions between August and December 1989. Following the meetings, the restrictions imposed following the insurgency was lifted and ABSU stated that a cessation of violence should immediately follow. In spite of less violence towards the end of the year, the absence of any substantive discussion of the main issues led to allegations that the government merely was trying to by itselves time, while indecisiveness only added further to rebel frustration.
Third party involvement: NO
Victory: NO
Terminated: NO
1990 Conflict Archive
Negotiations: YES
Comment on Negotiation: A third round of tripartite talks, between the centre, state and the ABSU took place in early January, to consider measures to redress Bodo grievances. Upendra Brahma, president of the ABSU, led the Bodo delegation and strongly reiterated the demand for a separate state of Bodoland. Several rounds of talks were allegedly held throughout the year, but there were no public records or official declarations indicating that any serious attempt was made to address the core incompatibility. After the fifth round of talks it seemed, however, that the ABSU´s demand for a separate state was not as strident as earlier and that the rebel outfit had softened its stance to accommodate a political solution to the conflict.
Third party involvement: NO
Victory: NO
Terminated: YES
Type of termination: No or Low Activity
Date of termination: 1990-12-31
Comment on Termination: No formal ceasefire had been signed between the ABSU and the government forces. The ABSU did, however, declare willingness to suspend its agitation to create a congenial atmosphere for further talks. The government subsequently lifted the restrictions that had been imposed on the Bodos due to the rebellion, and the ABSU stated that a cessation of hostilities should follow. During the rounds of tripartite talks conducted between 1990-92, violence by ABSU remained at a relatively low level.
Comment on Termination Date: The talks, initiated in late 1989, remained in a stalemate up until February 1993. Despite the impasse in the negotiations, violence remained at a relatively low level and the conflict did not reach the threshold of 25 battle related deaths either in 1991 or 1992. The date of termination is thus set to the last date of the last active year.
1991 Conflict Archive
Negotiations: NO
Third party involvement: NO
Victory: NO
Terminated: NO
1992 Conflict Archive
Negotiations: NO
Third party involvement: NO
Victory: NO
Terminated: NO
1993 Conflict Archive
Comment on Activity: Substantial compromises from both sides led to the conclusion of a bipartiate agreement between the Assam Government and the Bodo delegation, with the support of the Indian Government, on 20 February 1993. This formally ended the conflict between them. ABSUs political compromises and its abandonment of the separatist claim provoked, however, the more extremist elements in the Bodo movement. This contributed to the rise of the Bodo Security Force which forcefully criticized the accord as a betrayal of the Bodo cause. In 1992 BDSF resumed the violent campaign for a separate state, and the conflict become active again.
Negotiations: YES
Comment on Negotiation: A memorandum of agreement was signed 20 February 1993 between the state-government of Assam and the Bodo organisations (ABSU- BPAC) The accord provided for the establishment of a Bodoland Autonomous Council within Assam.
Third party involvement: NO
Victory: NO
Terminated: NO
1994 Conflict Archive
Comment on Activity: The deadlock over the implementation of the Bodo accord prevailed in 1994, caused by disagreement over the demarcated area of jurisdiction by the Autonomous Council. Building on the argument of physical contiguity, the Bodo leaders demanded a further addition of 500 villages under the jurisdiction of the BAC, to what was originally included. The Bodos were a minority in many of these contested areas, that was originally sought by them for inclusion in a separate state. Accompanying this political turmoil, the violent campaign for a separate Bodoland intensified. Large-scale attacks on security personnel raised the battle-related death toll to over 25 in 1994. The primary targets of the intensified campaign of violence continued, however, to be civilian victims. Deliberate and systematic attacks by Bodo militants on Muslim settlers, in minority in Bodo-areas, claimed over 200 lives and created over 50 000 refugees as of 1 September 1994.
Negotiations: YES
Comment on Negotiation: The deadlock over the implementation of the Bodo accord prevailed in 1994, caused by disagreement over the demarcated area of jurisdiction by the Autonomous Council. Because of a pragmatic desire with the Indian leadership to reach a political settlement, the clausul concerning the jurisdiction of the council had been left ambiguously formulated. This ambiguity became a major impediment towards the implementation of the accord.
By the end of 1994 major disagreements within the ABSU leadership had been revealed. Bwismuthiary, the Bodo leader who stood as signatory of the Bodo accord had broke off with the more moderate political forces in the movement and revived the demand for a separate state. The move was largely provoked by a growing support for the more extremist forces in the Bodo community, following allegations that ABSUs through its political compromises was siding with the "Indian oppressor".
Third party involvement: NO
Victory: NO
Terminated: YES
Type of termination: No or Low Activity
Date of termination: 1994-12-31
1995 Conflict Archive
Comment on Activity: In September the government asked the army to renew its operation in Assam following the intensification of violence with joint operations by the NDFB and ULFA. The impasse continued over the implementation of the accord, and several of its major provisions remained unfulfilled, such as the holding of elections.
Negotiations: NO
Third party involvement: NO
Victory: NO
Terminated: NO
1996 Conflict Archive
Comment on Activity: On 18 July 1996 the Bodo Liberation Tigers Force was formed, allegedly by surrendered cadres of the BVF - the armed wing of ABSU. The ABSU were at this point of time increasingly alienated from the ongoing peace process. The split in the ABSU leadership had led the leading faction, headed by Bwismuthiary, to revive the demand for a separate state. The more moderate Bodo leadership became increasingly marginalized within the Bodo community.
The BLTF violent campaign for a separate state for the Bodos within the Indian federation received broad attention after a fatal train blast on 30 December 1996, leading to at least 36 civilian casualties. As the group primarily attacks civilian targets, specialising in bomb attacks, the BLFT is not recorded as an active warring party.
Comment on Yearly Battle Related Deaths: Low estimate: confirmed battle related deaths in the NDFB/government-dyad The vast majority of casualties this year is civilians killed either in non-state violence between the Bodos and Santhal tribesmen - approximately 200 casualties in 1996 - or in one-sided violence by the Bodo militants against non-tribesmen. + 25 BLTF
Negotiations: NO
Third party involvement: NO
Victory: NO
Terminated: NO
1997 Conflict Archive
Comment on Activity: Following an upsurge in rebel violence, the military, paramilitary and police in Assam was put under unitary command in late January in an effort to strengthen their combat effectiveness. An estimated 25 000 government troops was also moved into the area for a major counter-offensive.
The ABSU-faction who had broke off from the negotiation table formally revived the agitation for a separate state of Bodoland . There are no reports that the ABSU directly fronted this demand by military means, but the linkages from ABSU to BLTF were well established. BLTF was established by the former leader of ABSUs armed forces, i.e. the Bodo Volunteer Force.
Negotiations: YES
Comment on Negotiation: Negotiations were planned between the ABSU and the state government. Fractionalisation on the side of the Bodos led the dominant faction of ABSU to reject negotiations, but instead formally revive the agitation for a separate state.
The PDF, the more moderate political faction of the ABSU continued negotiations with the government, but was marginalised within the Bodo movement. The overall picture remained that of a peace process caught off track, and the tripartiate talks held in September with representatives of the Union government, the Assam government and Bodo representatives, did no include the active rebel outfits.
Third party involvement: NO
Victory: NO
Terminated: NO
1998 Conflict Archive
Comment on Activity: 1998 was marked by an upsurge in communal violence. According to police sources more than 300 persons had been killed by tribal violence as of September 1998 and 70 000 had become internally displaced. As a retaliation to civilian massacres by Bodo militants the other tribes in the area set up their own armed groups. Among these were the Bengali Tiger Force (Bengali settlers), the Birsa Communal Force and Adivasi Cobra Militant Force (both origin within the Santhal tribe).
Negotiations: YES
Comment on Negotiation: Tripartiate talks were conducted at the end of May, but apparently without the inclusion of any of the major rebel outfits. In these talks the demand for a separate state within India and a re-negotiation of the 1993 Bodo Accord was the most important demands.
Third party involvement: NO
Victory: NO
Terminated: NO
1999 Conflict Archive
Negotiations: YES
Comment on Negotiation: Six meetings between BLTF representatives and the government were allegedly held in 1999. This was the initiation of a peace process still in place by 2002. The BLTF declared a unilateral ceasefire on 22 July 1999.
Third party involvement: NO
Victory: NO
Terminated: YES
Type of termination: No or Low Activity
Date of termination: 1999-12-31
2000 Conflict Archive
Comment on Activity: Conflict activity this year was especially marked by a number of internecine clashes between the NDFB and the BLTF. By large NDFBs control over Bodo-inhabited territory prevailed, mainly because militarys counter-operations in Assam focused primarily on combating ULFA. (See the Assamese conflict) In August the NDFB shot dead the moderate tribal leader Brahma, widely known for campaigning for more political autonomy, rather than a separate state. The incident paved the way for more extremist elements on the side of the Bodos, and a consequent upsurge in violence in the latter half of the year.
In April the Bodoland Autonomous Council, established as a part of the Bodo Accord in 1993 was eventually dissolved. The council had remained paralysed since its establishment partly due to disagreement over the demarcated area of its jurisdiction and partly because continuous violence had inhibited free elections.
Negotiations: YES
Comment on Negotiation: The BLFT threatened to retract from its unilateral ceasefire in place since late July 1999 if the government failed to initiate any negotiations. In a conciliatary gesture the Indian Government decided to suspend military operations against the BLTF from 15 March onward, and on 28 March the Indian Government and the BLTF agreed on a ceasefire to create a conducive atmosphere for further peace-talks. After initial talks the government and the BLTF decided to set up a Joint Monitoring Group to oversee the suspension of the military activity. The ceasefire was mutually extended for one year on 15 September 2000, following "satisfactory progress" in peace talks. The largest rebel outfit NDFB was not participating in the peace process.
Third party involvement: NO
Victory: NO
Terminated: NO
2001 Conflict Archive
Negotiations: YES
Comment on Negotiation: Tripartiate talks between the Union Government, State government and the BLTF were held in New Dehli in July, but these were inconclusive with regard to regulating the incompatibility. The ceasefire between the government and the BLTF was still extended for another four months on 15 September 2001.
The ongoing dialogue, including 25 tripartiate talks by August 2001, centred on BLTFs demand for the establishment of a Bodoland Territorial Council, having larger area of juridiction than the dissolved Bodoland Autonomous council. In September it was decided that other parties should be included in the ongoing talks; among them non-Bodo groups, more moderate Bodo organisations and the highly antagonistic NDFB. The NDFB on its side consistently spurned all initiatives to find a political solution.
Third party involvement: NO
Victory: NO
Terminated: NO
2002 Conflict Archive
Comment on Activity: The demobilisation of the BLTF and the first steps towards the establishment of Bodoland Territorial Council led to allegations against the BLFT that they were siding with the suppressing authority. Former BLTF insurgents became thus deliberate targets in NDFBs violent campaign.
Negotiations: YES
Comment on Negotiation: The ceasefire between the BLTF and the government, last extended on 15 September 2001, was not formally extended any further. A de facto ceasefire did continue to operate, and the dialogue between the parties continued about the Bodoland Territorial Council.
Progress was made on the issue as the state government in February approved the formation of the BTC. In spite of progression, the problem or territorial jurisdiction and marginalisation of other ethnic groups re-emerged as major points of contention. Fourteen non-Bodo groups set 10 November 2001 as the deadline for the government to drop the proposal of a territorial council, but this was ignored by the government.
Third party involvement: NO
Victory: NO
Terminated: NO
2003 Conflict Archive
Comment on Activity: There were three events that which occurred that were new for 2003. First, authorities in Assam decided to provide villagers with weapons to help "combat insurgency" through the Village Defense Party (VDP) community policing system, which was set up several years ago but which had become defunct for lack of funds.
Secondly, Bhutan this year formed a government militia force to fight and remove Indian separatist groups which resided illegally in Bhutan (mainly the groups United Liberation Front of Assam, National Democratic Front of Bodoland, and the Kamtampur Liberation Organization). In November, the Bhutanese Prime Minister met with ULFA leaders and asked them to leave the kingdom immediately; when they did not Bhutan launched a major offensive to root them (and other rebels groups) out. While there were suggestions that Bhutan took this action at the behest of India (which would make Bhutan a secondary warring party), Bhutan itself asserted that it undertook the operation because of the negative effects on Bhutan of the rebels presence; officials mentioned, for example, the relocation of schools, economic decline, and attacks by militants on Bhutanese security forces. Thus, Bhutan itself asserts that it undertook this action purely as a security measure and not to assist India in its conflict against the rebels. Indian military sources reported that the offensive resulted in the deaths of up to 140 rebels and 8 Bhutanese troops, but Bhutan declined to comment on the fatality totals (which were not broken down per group).
Finally, the Bodo Liberation Tiger Force (BLFT) signed a peace agreement with the government. The conflict between NDFB and the government, however, continued.
Comment on Yearly Battle Related Deaths: "Best estimate: 100
Low estimate: 100
High estimate: 122"
Negotiations: YES
Comment on Negotiation: The BLFT signed a peace agreement with the Indian government entitled the "Memorandum of Settlement." For more information on this agreement, please refer to the peace agreement variable.
While BLTF agreed to disarm, NDFB vowed to continue fighting for its goal of an independent Bodoland, and at least 100 people were killed in fighting between NDFB and the government. Thus, the peace agreement gave little hope for an ending to the conflict as a whole.
Third party involvement: NO
Victory: NO
Terminated: NO
2004 Conflict Archive
Comment on Activity: A major offensive by the armed forces of Bhutan to expel foreign insurgents inflicted a major defeat on NDFB. Operation All Clear was launched in late 2003 and continued in early 2004. The Indian trained Bhutanese army was assisted by the Indian armed forces in the counterinsurgency operation.
Being forced out of Bhutan NDFB lost some of its important rebel hideouts. The outfit did however maintain its presence in the border areas of Myanmar and Bangladesh, and managed to recoup its forces during the first half of the year.
A marked escalation of rebel violence took place in early October, in what analysts said was an attempt to increase bargaining power ahead of peace moves. On 15 October the group announced a unilateral truce, lasting for six months, and pawned the way for negotiations in December.
Comment on Yearly Battle Related Deaths: "Best estimate: 30
Low estimate: 30
High estimate: 30"
Negotiations: YES
Comment on Negotiation: In September the National Democratic Front of Bodoland (NDFB) responded positively to the governments call for a ceasefire.
In early December it was reported that the Union government had entered into direct negotiations with NDFB, after the outfit itself opted to negotiate with New Delhi and not with the state government
Third party involvement: NO
Victory: NO
Terminated: YES
Type of termination: No or Low Activity
Date of termination: 2004-12-31
2005 Conflict Archive
Comment on Yearly Battle Related Deaths: 08-jul
Negotiations: YES
Comment on Negotiation: The unilateral ceasefire declared by the NDFB in 2004 continued to hold and was subsequently extended through the spring of 2005. After a reported six months of negotiations, on 25 May 2005 the Indian government and NDFB signed a one-year ceasefire pact. The pact required the rebels to disarm and stay in specially-appointed camps run by the police for protection from other militant groups that oppose a ceasefire. The accord also required militants to end guerrilla attacks and soldiers to respect the ceasefire. The pact specifies that it should be monitored by a committee of government officials and rebel leaders.
Third party involvement: NO
Victory: NO
Terminated: NO
2006 Conflict Archive
Comment on Activity: The existing ceasefire which was due to expire on 31 March was extended during the 27 March talks for 6 months. There were some sporadic acts of violence and the two parties occasionally lobbed accusations that the other side was violating the ceasefire; the level of activity, however, remained under UCDPs 25 battle-death threshold for inclusion as an active conflict.
Negotiations: YES
Comment on Negotiation: The NDFB held its first round of talks with Delhi on 27 March, which was intended to focus on extending the ceasefire and which indeed resulted in a 6 month extension. The NDFB secretary general Govinda Basumatary asserted that they would not be "formal peace talks" and larger issues were not discussed. Reuters reported that the government wants the group to present a list of demands, a step the NDFB says it will take only if the status of the talks is upgraded to a political rather than merely "bureaucratic" level.
Third party involvement: NO
Victory: NO
Terminated: NO
2007 Conflict Archive
Comment on Activity: With the exception of a single fatality, the ceasefire between NDFB and the government of India remained in place throughout 2007.
Negotiations: NO
Comment on Negotiation: No talks took place in 2007. The NDFB expressed its frustration and stated that no talks had taken place at the political level between India and the NDFB since the start of the ceasefire. The lack of progress is in part due to Indias charter of demands establishing preconditions to the initiation of negotiations which the NDFB refuses to submit to.
Third party involvement: NO
Victory: NO
Terminated: NO
2008 Conflict Archive
Negotiations: NO
Third party involvement: NO
Victory: NO
Terminated: NO
2009 Conflict Archive
Comment on Activity: In late 2008, Ranjan Daimary (alias D R Nabla), one of the top NDFB leadership, was ousted due to his alleged involvement in a bombing campaign against civilian targets in October that year. The main faction, which had initiated negotiations with the government in 2004, announced that it would be participating in the 2009 elections. Following this, Daimary and a faction loyal to him vowed to continue the armed struggle. In 2009, NDFB - RD (National Democratic Front of Bodoland - Ranjan Daimary faction) clashed sporadically with Indian security forces, particularly during the later half of the year. The group was also involved in extortion to acquire funds for its armed struggle.
Negotiations: YES
Comment on Negotiation: On 23 September 2009, tripartite talks were held between the Indian government, the local Assam government and NDFB. During the negotiations, the parties discussed NDFB’s charter of demands, which included the establishment of a separate Bodo state. However, the group had dropped the demand for a sovereign state, which had previously hampered negotiation attempts, and sought only autonomy within the Indian state. After the talks, NDFB general secretary Govinda Basumatary commented that "The first round of dialogue was satisfactory”.
However, the NDFB - RD (National Democratic Front of Bodoland - Ranjan Daimary faction), which had split from the main NDFB in late 2008, rejected talks and instead pursued continued armed struggle.
Third party involvement: NO
Victory: NO
Terminated: NO
2010 Conflict Archive
Negotiations: NO
Comment on Negotiation: During 2010, the Union Government said it was ready to hold dialogue with two of the major insurgent groups in Assam -United Liberation Front of Assam (ULFA) and National Democratic Front of Bodoland (NDFB) - even if the anti-talk factions of the groups are opposed to it.
Third party involvement: NO
Victory: NO
Terminated: YES
Type of termination: Ceasefire
Date of termination: 2010-12-31
Comment on Termination: There were some conflict activities and battle-related deaths during 2011 but they did not reach the UCDP threshold. During 2011, the Union Government decided to extend the ceasefire with NDFB-PTF. Also the NDFB-ATF, which is the same group as NDFB-RD, had declared a unilateral indefinite ceasefire with effect from August.
Comment on Termination Date: The conflict was terminated by 31 December 2010 due to a ceasefire during 2011.
2011 Conflict Archive
Negotiations: NO
Comment on Negotiation: During 2011, the Union Government decided to extend the ceasefire with NDFB-PTF. Also the NDFB-ATF, which is the same as NDFB-RD, had declared a unilateral indefinite ceasefire with effect from August.
Third party involvement: NO
Victory: NO
Terminated: NO
2012 Conflict Archive
Comment on Activity: The ceasefire between the Government of India and various Bodo rebel groups continued to continued to hold in 2012. However, low-level violence persisted in the area, as the Indian Government continued to pursue members of NDFB-RD (which declared a unilateral ceasefire with the government).
Comment on Yearly Battle Related Deaths: Indian security forces killed a handful of NDFB-RD fighters in 2012, but the conflict did not become active. The hardliner NDFB-RD faction splintered from its parent group in 2008 when the NDFB began peace talks with the government.
Negotiations: YES
Comment on Negotiation: Various reports indicate that the NDFB held regular talks with the Government of India in 2012. Talks, however, did not achieve a permanent peace agreement.
Third party involvement: NO
Victory: NO
Terminated: NO
2013 Conflict Archive
Comment on Activity: The Bodo conflict became active again in 2013. The decision of Ranjan Daimary to negotiate a ceasefire with the Indian government precipitated the decision of his leutenant, I.K. Songbijit, to break away from the NDFB-RD. Songbijits new faction, the NDFB-S, clashed on numerous occassions with Indian security forces in 2013, and this fighting produced over 25 fatalities.
Comment on Yearly Battle Related Deaths: The Bodoland conflict generated over 25 battle-related fatalities in 2013, and therefore became active after two consecutive years of inactivity.
Negotiations: YES
Comment on Negotiation: Talks and formal negotiations occurred between several factions of Bodo rebels and the Indian Government in 2013.
Third party involvement: NO
Victory: NO
Terminated: NO
2014 Conflict Archive
Negotiations: NO
Third party involvement: NO
Victory: NO
Terminated: YES
Type of termination: No or Low Activity
Date of termination: 2014-12-31
2015 Conflict Archive
Comment on Activity: The conflict was not active in 2015. NDFB-S, the largest militant group still fighting the Indian government joined forces with a number of other North-Eastern militant groups to establish the United Liberation Front of Western South East Asia (UNLFW) in April 2015.
Negotiations: NO
Third party involvement: NO
Victory: NO
Terminated: YES
Type of termination: Other
Date of termination: 2015-04-17
Comment on Termination Date: NDFB-S and four other groups established UNLFW (a new group) on that day. The new group has a new incompatibility (Western South East Asia) and its own conflict.
2016 Conflict Archive
Terminated: NO
2017 Conflict Archive
Comment on Activity: The Bodoland conflict was active in 2014 because of the numerous encounters between government forces and NDFB-S in Assam state. In light of the threat posed by the group the Assamese state government decided to step up its counterinsurgency measures directed against the outfit by having the army and police cooperate.
Terminated: NO
2018 Conflict Archive
Terminated: NO
2019 Conflict Archive
Terminated: NO
2020 Conflict Archive
Negotiations: YES
Third party involvement: NO
Terminated: NO
2021 Conflict Archive
Terminated: NO
2022 Conflict Archive
Terminated: NO
