General information
Type of Incompatibility: Territory
Comment on Type of Incompatibility: South Ossetia voted for independence from Georgia on 21 December 1991 and held a referendum on 19 January 1992. On both occasions, an overwhelming majority voted for the independence of the region and reintegration into the Russian Federation. The Georgian government condemned the independence declaration as an attempt to violate the territorial integrity of a sovereign state.
In 2005, the South Ossetian authorities modified this position. Instead of unification with North Ossetia within the Russian Federation, it was declared that South Ossetia aspired to independence. After Russia recognized South Ossetia as an independent state in August 2008, South Ossetian President Kokoity reaffirmed this position.
Territory: South Ossetia
Date of first stated goal of incompatibility: 1991-12-21
Comment on date of first stated goals of incompatibility: South Ossetia voted for independence from Georgia on 21 December 1991 and held a referendum on 19 January 1992. On both occasions, an overwhelming majority voted in favor of the region's independence and reintegration into the Russian Federation. The Georgian government condemned the independence declaration as an attempt to violate the territorial integrity of a sovereign state.
Date of first use of armed force: 1991-12-22
Comment on first use of armed force: Fighting broke out in Tskhinvali the capital of South Ossetia after the region declared its independece.
Date of first battle related death: 1992-05-12
Comment on first battle related death: At least one person was killed by Georgian militants in Tskhinvali, the capital in South Ossetia.
Date of conflict reached 25 battle releated deaths: 1992-06-08
Comment on conflict reached 25 battle releated deaths: Shelling in South Ossetia killed 28 people during the night of 8 June 1992.
Annual information
This section contains annual information systematically collected by the UCDP.
1991
Primary Parties: -
Dimension: Internal
| Estimated Fatalities | |
|---|---|
| High | 0 |
| Best | 0 |
| Low | 0 |
Numbers include fatalities for all dyads both active and inactive for this year
1992
Primary Parties: Government of Georgia - Republic of South Ossetia
Dimension: Internal
| Estimated Fatalities | |
|---|---|
| High | 137 |
| Best | 134 |
| Low | 134 |
Numbers include fatalities for all dyads both active and inactive for this year
1993
Primary Parties: -
Dimension: Internal
| Estimated Fatalities | |
|---|---|
| High | 0 |
| Best | 0 |
| Low | 0 |
Numbers include fatalities for all dyads both active and inactive for this year
1994
Primary Parties: -
Dimension: Internal
| Estimated Fatalities | |
|---|---|
| High | 0 |
| Best | 0 |
| Low | 0 |
Numbers include fatalities for all dyads both active and inactive for this year
1995
Primary Parties: -
Dimension: Internal
| Estimated Fatalities | |
|---|---|
| High | 0 |
| Best | 0 |
| Low | 0 |
Numbers include fatalities for all dyads both active and inactive for this year
1996
Primary Parties: -
Dimension: Internal
| Estimated Fatalities | |
|---|---|
| High | 0 |
| Best | 0 |
| Low | 0 |
Numbers include fatalities for all dyads both active and inactive for this year
1997
Primary Parties: -
Dimension: Internal
| Estimated Fatalities | |
|---|---|
| High | 0 |
| Best | 0 |
| Low | 0 |
Numbers include fatalities for all dyads both active and inactive for this year
1998
Primary Parties: -
Dimension: Internal
| Estimated Fatalities | |
|---|---|
| High | 0 |
| Best | 0 |
| Low | 0 |
Numbers include fatalities for all dyads both active and inactive for this year
1999
Primary Parties: -
Dimension: Internal
| Estimated Fatalities | |
|---|---|
| High | 0 |
| Best | 0 |
| Low | 0 |
Numbers include fatalities for all dyads both active and inactive for this year
2000
Primary Parties: -
Dimension: Internal
| Estimated Fatalities | |
|---|---|
| High | 0 |
| Best | 0 |
| Low | 0 |
Numbers include fatalities for all dyads both active and inactive for this year
2001
Primary Parties: -
Dimension: Internal
| Estimated Fatalities | |
|---|---|
| High | 0 |
| Best | 0 |
| Low | 0 |
Numbers include fatalities for all dyads both active and inactive for this year
2002
Primary Parties: -
Dimension: Internal
| Estimated Fatalities | |
|---|---|
| High | 0 |
| Best | 0 |
| Low | 0 |
Numbers include fatalities for all dyads both active and inactive for this year
2003
Primary Parties: -
Dimension: Internal
| Estimated Fatalities | |
|---|---|
| High | 0 |
| Best | 0 |
| Low | 0 |
Numbers include fatalities for all dyads both active and inactive for this year
2004
Primary Parties: Government of Georgia - Republic of South Ossetia
Dimension: Internal
| Estimated Fatalities | |
|---|---|
| High | 73 |
| Best | 27 |
| Low | 27 |
Numbers include fatalities for all dyads both active and inactive for this year
2005
Primary Parties: -
Dimension: Internal
| Estimated Fatalities | |
|---|---|
| High | 0 |
| Best | 0 |
| Low | 0 |
Numbers include fatalities for all dyads both active and inactive for this year
2006
Primary Parties: -
Dimension: Internal
| Estimated Fatalities | |
|---|---|
| High | 0 |
| Best | 0 |
| Low | 0 |
Numbers include fatalities for all dyads both active and inactive for this year
2007
Primary Parties: -
Dimension: Internal
| Estimated Fatalities | |
|---|---|
| High | 0 |
| Best | 0 |
| Low | 0 |
Numbers include fatalities for all dyads both active and inactive for this year
2008
Primary Parties: Government of Georgia - Republic of South Ossetia
Secondary Warring Parties Side B: Government of Russia (Soviet Union)
Dimension: Internationalized intrastate
Comment on Dimension: In 2008, the conflict was coded as an intrastate conflict with foreign involvement by Russia as a secondary warring party on the side of South Ossetia. While the territorial conflict between the self-proclaimed Republic of South Ossetia and Georgia has been active intermittently since 1992, Russia's role as a secondary warring party was new. The decision by UCDP to view Russia’s involvement as the action of a secondary warring party in this intrastate conflict and not as a primary party in a presumed interstate conflict with Georgia is based on official Russian statements. From those, it can be concluded that Russia, instead of having its own incompatibility with Georgia, shared South Ossetia’s position in the breakaway republic’s conflict with the regime in Tbilisi and wanted to support it by intervening militarily.
For example, on 14 August, Russian President Medvedev said that Russia would support “any decision taken by the peoples of South Ossetia and Abkhazia” concerning the issue of status and ”guarantee them in the Caucasus and in the world.” Although Russian officials had stated that they would like to see the Georgian president leave power, Russian Foreign Minister Lavrov denied that Russia aimed to overthrow the Georgian government. When describing the Russian war aims to the United Nations General Assembly on 27 September 2008, Lavrov said that "Russia helped South Ossetia to repel aggression." Russia also argued that it intervened with military means "following a request from the government of South Ossetia."
Before 2008, Russia had formally acted as a third party. It had been involved in mediation as a member of the Joint Control Commission. It had contributed troops to the Joint Peacekeeping Forces, a trilateral peacekeeping force with Georgian, Russian, and Ossetian troops. Even before the August 2008 escalation, Georgia had claimed that the Russian peacekeepers were not neutral and had protested against Russia’s increasing military, economic and political presence in the region.
| Estimated Fatalities | |
|---|---|
| High | 859 |
| Best | 621 |
| Low | 621 |
Numbers include fatalities for all dyads both active and inactive for this year
2009
Primary Parties: -
Dimension: Internal
| Estimated Fatalities | |
|---|---|
| High | 0 |
| Best | 0 |
| Low | 0 |
Numbers include fatalities for all dyads both active and inactive for this year
2010
Primary Parties: -
Dimension: Internal
| Estimated Fatalities | |
|---|---|
| High | 0 |
| Best | 0 |
| Low | 0 |
Numbers include fatalities for all dyads both active and inactive for this year
2011
Primary Parties: -
Dimension: Internal
| Estimated Fatalities | |
|---|---|
| High | 0 |
| Best | 0 |
| Low | 0 |
Numbers include fatalities for all dyads both active and inactive for this year
Conflict Archive
This section contains annual information no longer systematically collected by the UCDP.
1991 Conflict Archive
Terminated: NO
1992 Conflict Archive
Comment on Yearly Battle Related Deaths: The conflict escalated in May. Most battle-related deaths occurred in the shelling of Tskhinvali in June.
Negotiations: YES
Comment on Negotiation: After South Ossetia's independence declaration in December 1991 and the referendum in January 1992, the government in Georgia expressed its readiness to negotiate a solution to the problems in the region.
The two sides engaged in talks on 25 January, but the fighting in South Ossetia continued. On 20 March, an agreement to hold tripartite talks on South Ossetia was reached between Georgian and North Ossetian officials.
A ceasefire and a lifting of the blockade on South Ossetia were agreed on 27 May after talks between representatives from Georgia, Russia, North and South Ossetia. The ceasefire was, however, broken immediately.
At the end of June, negotiations led to an agreement signed between the Georgian and Russian presidents on 24 June. The agreement was implemented in July and included a ceasefire, withdrawal of all armed forces from South Ossetia, and the setup of a 1500-strong tri-ethnic peacekeeping force drawn equally from Georgia, Russia, and Ossetia soldiers. The agreement also established the Joint Control Commission (JCC), a body of Georgians, Russians, North and South Ossetians, established to direct and control the Joint Peacekeeping Forces.
A political settlement to the conflict could, however, not be reached.
Third party involvement: YES
Third party involvement names: Russia, CSCE
Comment on Third Party Involvement: Russia's Supreme Soviet was involved in the ceasefire agreements in the South Ossetia conflict both in May and in June. The agreement in June resulted in the setup of a peacekeeping force including Russian, Georgian, and Ossetian soldiers.
The CSCE Mission to Georgia was deployed on 3 December 1992 to promote negotiations between the conflicting parties.
Victory: NO
Terminated: YES
Type of termination: Ceasefire
Date of termination: 1992-07-14
Comment on Termination: A ceasefire agreement was reached on 24 June 1992 and was signed between Georgian and Russian presidents. The agreement was implemented in July and included a ceasefire, the setup of a peacekeeping force with Georgian, Russian, and Ossetian soldiers. A political settlement could, however, not be reached.
Comment on Termination Date: A ceasefire agreement was signed on 24 June 1992 but was implemented in July. On 4 July, representatives of Georgia, Russia, North, and South Ossetia agreed to withdraw all armed forces from South Ossetia. On 14 July, a peacekeeping force including troops from Georgia, Russia, and Ossetia was deployed in a 15-km buffer zone.
1993 Conflict Archive
Terminated: NO
1994 Conflict Archive
Terminated: NO
1995 Conflict Archive
Terminated: NO
1996 Conflict Archive
Terminated: NO
1997 Conflict Archive
Terminated: NO
1998 Conflict Archive
Terminated: NO
1999 Conflict Archive
Terminated: NO
2000 Conflict Archive
Terminated: NO
2001 Conflict Archive
Terminated: NO
2002 Conflict Archive
Terminated: NO
2003 Conflict Archive
Terminated: NO
2004 Conflict Archive
Comment on Activity: In 2004, the conflict between Georgia and the breakaway Republic of South Ossetia turned violent for the first time since 1992. In November 2003, fraudulent parliamentarian elections had led to large-scale public protests, which forced former President Eduard Shevardnadze to resign. In January 2004, Mikhail Saakashvili came to power, stating that one of his main priorities as the new president of Georgia was to restore the country’s territorial integrity. In early 2004, the new regime managed to resolve its long-running conflict with the Ajara republic peacefully and subsequently calculated that the same pattern could be repeated in South Ossetia. A two-pronged strategy was launched, based on the assumption that the de facto South Ossetian President Eduard Kokoity had very little democratic legitimacy and popular support and – subsequently – that shifting the population’s loyalties ought to be possible. Thus, the Saakashvili government launched a large anti-smuggling campaign, aiming to deny the South Ossetian regime its incomes from the lucrative black market, leaving the local authorities unable to deliver basic services to the population. Simultaneously, the Georgian government launched a humanitarian offensive to win the hearts and minds of the citizens.
However, the dual strategy backfired, as the South Ossetian population turned even more anti-Georgian, re-grouping around Kokoity. The situation in the so-called zone of conflict – a circle of 15 km radius from the center of the de facto South Ossetian capital Tskhinvali – grew increasingly tense, with the number of Georgian troops and roadblocks swelled in connection to the anti-smuggling campaign. The South Ossetians perceived this military build-up as preparation for military action, and by July, the security situation had deteriorated significantly, with sporadic gunfire exchange between ethnic Georgian and ethnic South Ossetian villages. Subsequently, in August, tensions exploded and took the region to the brink of war. For a week, there were intense shelling and gun battles between the two sides. There were both civilian and military casualties, and the Joint Peace Keeping Force ceased to function, with “peacekeepers” from Georgia and South Ossetia fighting each other. However, a ceasefire signed on 18 August took hold on 19 August, and through the rest of the year, a precarious peace remained in place.
Negotiations: YES
Comment on Negotiation: There were numerous JCC meetings during the year. However, in the weeks running up to the violence, the structure broke down, and meetings were repeatedly postponed. However, some meetings were held, and at one of them, in June, the commission determined that the new checkpoints set up by Georgia and the increase in the number of armed personnel to be in contravention of agreements, stating that the checkpoints should be removed and the extra personnel should be withdrawn. Even though the Georgian side agreed to this, no action was taken for two and a half months.
At the next meeting, held in mid-July, the control of the Rokski tunnel and the demilitarisation of the zone of conflict was discussed. The Rokski tunnel links South Ossetia with Russian and is the main route for goods entering the territory. The parties agreed to reduce tension, but most thorny issues were postponed to later meetings.
In August, the JCC was up and working again, and between 12 and 18 August, the commission was in near-permanent emergency sessions. On 13 August, it facilitated a ceasefire agreement, planned to effect at midnight. However, despite pledges by both Georgian and South Ossetian officials to abide by the ceasefire, it was violated almost instantly. On 17-18 August, the JCC managed to secure a second ceasefire agreement. Even though fighting erupted only hours later, the ceasefire took hold on 19 August, and an uneasy truce has been in place since.
On 5 November, a high-level meeting between Georgian Prime Minister Zurab Zhvania and de facto South Ossetian President Eduard Kokoity took place in the Russian Black Sea resort Sochi. The Georgian side proposed a plan consisting of the implementation of the ceasefire, full demilitarisation, increased monitoring of the Rokski tunnel, more OSCE monitoring, and a return to talks on South Ossetia's status as soon as possible. The South Ossetian delegation called for their counterparts to fulfill commitments made at previous JCC meetings, such as the removal of unauthorized checkpoints and the withdrawal of extra troops in the zone of conflict. The meeting resulted in an agreement on demilitarisation of the zone of conflict by 20 November.
Subsequently, Georgian State Minister for Conflict Resolution Issues Goga Khaindrava held talks with the South Ossetian side on 9 November in Tskhinvali over the implementation of the agreement.
During the following week, some progress was made, but already on 17 November, Khaindrava said that the process of demilitarization of the conflict zone could not be completed before the deadline due to the large number of arms and mined territories in the region. Subsequently, at a 20 November JCC meeting in Vladikavkaz, representatives of the Georgian, South Ossetian, Russian, and North Ossetian sides agreed to set a new deadline. Particularly, the JCC agreed that the military fortifications should be dismantled before 28 November.
The last session of the JCC in 2004 was held in Tbilisi on 22-23 December. The co-chairmen of the commission also held separate talks with Georgian Prime Minister Zurab Zhvania and South Ossetian leader Eduard Kokoev on 23 December and 24 December, respectively. The talks yet again focused on the demilitarisation of the zone of conflict, which has failed to take place despite the 5 November agreement.
Third party involvement: YES
Third party involvement names: OSCE, the Russian Federation, North Ossetia, the EU
Comment on Third Party Involvement: Russia, North Ossetia, OSCE, and the EU are the external participants in the Joint Control Commission (JCC), which also includes representatives from Georgia and South Ossetia.
Representatives from the OSCE provide political guidelines to the JCC, and the EU had participated since 2001.
Apart from participating in the JCC, which was not functioning smoothly in the run-up to violence, the OSCE was engaged in reducing the rising tension using other means. On 30 July, the Bulgarian Chairmanship-in-Office (CiO) called for the implementation of the 2 June and 15 July JCC agreements, the withdrawal of all paramilitary and police personnel not required, a JCC meeting, and an expert group meeting in Tskhinvali. Furthermore, on 6 August, the OSCE Permanent Council agreed to increase the number of military observers in South Ossetia from 4 to 6. Solomon Passy, the Chairman-in-Office, also invited high-level decision-makers to serious negotiations in Sofia. In mid-August, the JCC agreed upon the mutual withdrawal of all illegal outposts and armed formations from the conflict zone. Additionally, Georgian prime minister Vasily Kochmar should attend the expanded meetings of the JCC. On 13 August, Georgia and South Ossetia signed a ceasefire agreement in South Ossetia's capital Tskhinvali after two days of severe fighting. Representatives from Georgia, South Ossetia, Russia, and North Ossetia were participating in the meeting, and observers from the OSCE were also present. After a meeting facilitated by Russia on the following day, the conflicting sides clarified their intention to deescalate the situation further. On 17 August, another meeting of the JCC was held, resulting in an agreement that confirmed the ceasefire and included the demilitarization of the region and the opening of the roads. Further meetings of the JCC, also in Moscow, followed in October.
On 5 November, Russia mediated a meeting between Georgia and South Ossetia in Sochi that resulted in an agreement to withdraw troops from their border zones to reduce tensions. The Head of OSCE Mission to Georgia, Roy Reeve, traveled between Tbilisi and Tskhinvali, attempting to promote the implementation of the 5 November agreement between the two sides.
Victory: NO
Terminated: YES
Type of termination: Ceasefire
Date of termination: 2004-08-19
Comment on Termination: A ceasefire signed on 18 August took hold on 19 August, and through the rest of the year, a precarious peace remained in place. The negotiations between the conflicting parties became deadlocked after the 2004 escalation. The relation between the two sides continued to be tense in the following three years, but only sporadic clashes occurred.
2005 Conflict Archive
Comment on Third Party Involvement: Russia, North Ossetia, OSCE and EU are the external participants in the Joint Control Commission (JCC), which also includes representatives from Georgia and South Ossetia.
Victory: NO
Terminated: NO
2006 Conflict Archive
Comment on Third Party Involvement: Russia and North Ossetia are the external participants in the Joint Control Commission (JCC) which also includes representatives from Georgia and South Ossetia. Negotiations between the two sides of the conflict in the JCC format continued in 2006. The Organization of Security and Cooperation in Europe (OSCE) maintains a presence in South Ossetia with a mandate to promote negotiations between the conflicting parties –implemented through the JCC sessions- and to monitor the activities of the Joint Peacekeeping Forces (JPKF), comprising troops of the members of the JCC.The European Union assisted the Georgian and South Ossetian sides with financial support to the JCC related-activities through a grant to the OSCE.
Victory: NO
Terminated: NO
2007 Conflict Archive
Comment on Third Party Involvement: Russia and North Ossetia are the external participants in the Joint Control Commission (JCC) which also includes representatives from Georgia and South Ossetia. Negotiations between the two sides of the conflict in the JCC format continued in 2007. The Organization of Security and Cooperation in Europe (OSCE) maintains a presence in South Ossetia with a mandate to promote negotiations between the conflicting parties –implemented through the JCC sessions -, monitor the activities of the Joint Peacekeeping Forces (JPKF), comprising troops of the members of the JCC.
The European Union assisted the Georgian and South Ossetian sides with financial support to the JCC related-activities through a grant to the OSCE.
Victory: NO
Terminated: NO
2008 Conflict Archive
Comment on Activity: During the first half of the year, the security situation deteriorated gradually as the number and intensity of gunfire exchanges increased. After a few clashes between South Ossetian and Georgian troops in the first days of August, tensions culminated on 7 August. Only hours after having declared a unilateral ceasefire, the Georgian President Saakashvili launched a large-scale military offensive on Tskhinvali, the capital of South Ossetia, to take control of the city. Neighboring Russia openly sided with South Ossetia and immediately sent troops, tanks, and bomber planes to repel the Georgian army. The Russian prime minister Putin justified this step with an alleged “genocide” against the Ossetians, citing highly inflated death tolls. Five days of heavy shelling and ground fighting followed. Finally, the Georgian troops withdrew from the South Ossetian territory, and Russian forces took control of areas far beyond the administrative border of South Ossetia. In the areas occupied by the Russian army, looting of villages took place, perpetrated mainly by South Ossetian militias. Mediation by the French president on behalf of the European Union resulted in a six-point peace plan signed by Russia, Georgia, South Ossetia, and Abkhazia. The agreement established a ceasefire and called for the withdrawal of all parties to the positions held before August. It did not, however, address the political status of South Ossetia. A few days later, Russia recognized the independence of South Ossetia. The Russian government subsequently signed agreements on military support with South Ossetia and announced that it would keep more than 3000 troops inside the South Ossetian borders. By mid-October, the Russian forces had almost completely withdrawn from the so-called buffer zone adjacent to South Ossetia on undisputed Georgian territory. Instead, the EU deployed 200 observers in this area to monitor the ceasefire. The monitors were, however, denied access to South Ossetia by Russia. The relations between the warring parties remained tense, but by the end of 2008, there had only been very few ceasefire violations.
Comment on Yearly Battle Related Deaths: For the five days of intense fighting in August, the battle-related death estimates were based on the most conservative claims of the warring parties about their losses and - if available - the judgment of renowned non-governmental organizations as to whether these claims are adequate. The difference between the high and the best estimate is due to the different statements that have been reported by South Ossetian authorities and Russian authorities about South Ossetian servicemen killed in the fighting.
Negotiations: YES
Comment on Negotiation: The negotiations taking place in 2008 were limited to security-related issues and did not address the incompatibility of the conflict.
As the security situation deteriorated in the first half of the year, Georgia and South Ossetia did not participate in any negotiations. The parties could not agree on the framework of the talks. Georgia rejected Russian and South Ossetian proposals for negotiations in the framework of the Joint Control Commission (JCC) with the participation of Georgian, South Ossetian, Russian, and North Ossetian negotiators. Likewise, the South Ossetian authorities refused to participate in bilateral Georgian-South Ossetian talks proposed by Georgia.
After the conflict had turned violent again in August, the warring parties agreed on an EU-brokered six-point peace plan. The agreement was agreed upon by Russia and Georgia on 12 August and formally signed by South Ossetia and Abkhazia two days later. The agreement established a ceasefire and called for international discussions on the modalities of security and stability in South Ossetia and Abkhazia, the other region striving for independence from Georgia. On 8 September 2008, the Russian and French presidents further elaborated on provisions for the implementation of the peace plan that was agreed upon by Georgia.
Issues related to the security situation and the return of refugees were on the agenda in the three subsequent rounds of negotiations. The talks took place under the joint auspices of the United Nations, the European Union, and the Organization for Security and Co-operation in Europe.
The first round of talks in October 2008 collapsed with Georgia and Russia blaming each other for the failure even to enter the same room. A key sticking point was the inclusion or not of delegations from South Ossetia and Abkhazia. The two regions had been recognized as independent by Russia but were still seen as part of the Georgian territory by Georgia.
To render the inclusion of representatives of the breakaway regions acceptable, the second round of negotiations on 18 and 19 November 2008 was more informal. All participants, including South Ossetian delegates, took part in their individual capacities, i.e., the formal status of the delegations was not determined. Discussions about regional security and stability and refugees and internally displaced people (IDPs) were on the agenda.
In the third round of negotiations on 17 and 18 December 2008, Georgia and Russia came close to an agreement about mechanisms to prevent and resolve security incidents. Further meetings were scheduled for the year 2009.
Third party involvement: YES
Third party involvement names: Organization for Security and Cooperation in Europe (OSCE), European Union, United Nations
Comment on Third Party Involvement: Before the outbreak of hostilities in August 2008, the Mission of the Organization for Security and Cooperation in Europe (OSCE) had monitored the Joint Peacekeeping Forces (JPKF) comprising one battalion each of Georgian, North Ossetian, and Russian peacekeepers, under Russian command, in the zone of the Georgian-Ossetian conflict. After the August escalation, the OSCE monitored the ceasefire. In late 2008, OSCE had 180 people in Georgia, including 28 unarmed observers. The mandate for the OSCE ended on 1 January 2009, and OSCE participating states failed to reach a consensus on the future of the mission. In particular, Russia could not accept any linkage between the OSCE activities in South Ossetia and the rest of Georgia because it had recognized the independence of South Ossetia.
Mediated by the French president Nicholas Sarkozy on behalf of the European Union, the peace plan was signed by Russia, Georgia, South Ossetia, and Abkhazia. The EU continued to discuss the situation with both Russia, the secondary warring party, and Georgia. It then co-chaired with the UN and the OSCE three rounds of negotiations on security-related issues in late 2008. The European Union also deployed more than 300 staff, mainly civilian ceasefire monitors, to Georgia in September/October 2008. The mission's primary tasks included monitoring and analyzing the situation of the stabilization process, normalization building, the return of internally displaced persons and refugees, contributing to the reduction of tensions through liaison, facilitation of contacts between parties, and other confidence-building measures.
The United Nations co-chaired with the EU and the OSCE three rounds of negotiations in Geneva in late 2008.
Victory: NO
Terminated: YES
Type of termination: Ceasefire
Date of termination: 2008-08-12
Comment on Termination: On 12 August, the Russian president ordered an end of military operations in Georgia and approved the six-point peace plan calling for an end of hostilities. The Georgian president approved the document later the same day, which was the last day of fighting. The six-point peace plan was signed by South Ossetia on 14 August, by Georgia on 15 August, and by Russia on 16 August.
Note: The UCDP Conflict Termination Dataset codes 14 August, the day when South Ossetia formally signed the agreement as the day of termination. This is due to some minor differences in the definition between the two datasets.
2009 Conflict Archive
Comment on Third Party Involvement: The EUMM (European Union Monitoring Mission) continued to monitor the ceasefire. In 2009, its staff numbered 320. The EU also brokered a meeting between South Ossetian and Georgian officials held in the village of Ergneti in the conflict zone in April 2009. The EU jointly with the United Nations, and the OSCE (Organisation for Security and Cooperation in Europe) mediated several rounds of talks between Georgia, Russian, Abkhazia and South Ossetia held in Geneva. In June 2009, the OSCE had to close down its monitoring mission in Georgia as Russia vetoed an extension of its mandate. Since 1992 the OSCE mission had operated in the country.
Victory: NO
Terminated: NO
2010 Conflict Archive
Terminated: NO
2011 Conflict Archive
Terminated: NO
