General information
Type of Incompatibility: Government
Comment on Type of Incompatibility: Tensions between two ethnic groups, the Tutsis and the Hutus, have sporadically erupted into serious violence at least from the 1960s and onward. In both the first and the second phase of the conflict, the incompatibility concerned the governmental power, as both parties wanted to control the governance of the country. The refugee situation can be seen as one important aspect of the incompatibility. Throughout the course of the conflict, large populations from both parties was forced to flee abroad. In the refugee camps, hardliners and militias formed. During 1990-1994, Tutsi refugees living in Uganda fought under the banner of the FPR. In the second phase, the focus of the conflict was even more clearly interlinked to the refugee issue and extremists activities. After the FPR takeover 1994, the refugee/hardliner problem was urgent concerning the Hutu party. The Hutu extremists (the Interahamwé militia and a great part of the former Rwandan government troops) continued to oppose every peace effort made by other parties. They continued to stay in DR. Congo (Zaire) and there they formed different armed movements whose stated goal was to ensure a safe return of all Hutu refugees and to have a national dialogue in the country and to allow for a real opposition. Rwanda continued to see the different Hutu-movements a major security problem for the Rwandan government and as genociders and refused any peace attempts that involved the party.
Date of first stated goal of incompatibility: 1990-10-01
Comment on date of first stated goals of incompatibility: FPR claimed the attqacks that started on 1 October 1990 in a Reuters interview on 3 October of 1990, in the interview the spokesman stated "We are opposing a system which is under a small clique that is undemocratic, corrupt and abuses human rights" and "our aim is simply to promote the welfare of the Rwandan people. This is about hunger, poverty and a rotten army,"
The FPR also presented a programme saying that they wanted to secure the abolition of secterianism and to repatriate Rwandan refugees. The government for its part accused FPR of aiming to reinstate Tutsi dominance.
Date of first use of armed force: 1990-10-01
Comment on first use of armed force: Armed force have been used on numerous occasions between Hutus and Tutsis. Ethnic killings are mentioned already before Rwanda got its independence in 1962. However, between the FPR and the Rwandan government, armed force was first used on 1 October 1990. This is the date when the FPR launched their invasion from Uganda in the north. Massacres were perpetrated on Hutus and several towns were occupied in north-east Rwanda. Already the next day, the Rwandan army forces managed to strike back on the rebels.
Date of first battle related death: 1990-10-01
Comment on first battle related death: When FPR launched its invasion on 1 October, the rebels attacked the Kagitumba borderpost, killing one border guard.
Date of conflict reached 25 battle releated deaths: 1990-10-03
Comment on conflict reached 25 battle releated deaths: FPR invaded Rwanda for the first time in OCtober 1990. On 3 October 1990 the army of Rwanda and FPR clashed in Kagitumba valley. In the clashes, that could be confirmed, FPR claimed to have killed 30 Rwandan soldiers.
Reports also claimed that the FPR army had been sharply reduced during the counterattack of the government forces, 1-3 days after the first invasion. On 6 October, a government official said more than 200 of the rebels have been killed by government troops.
Annual information
This section contains annual information systematically collected by the UCDP.
1990
Primary Parties: Government of Rwanda - FPR
Secondary Warring Parties Side A: Government of DR Congo (Zaire)
Dimension: Internationalized intrastate
Comment on Dimension: In 1990 the conflict is coded as internationalized because Zairian government troops participated on the Rwandan government side as a secondary warring party. There were also allegations of Ugandan and French government involvement (Uganda in support of the RPF, France in support of the Rwandan government), but available sources do not provide sufficiently clear evidence of regular combat troop involvement that would meet the UCDP threshold for coding them as secondary warring parties.
| Estimated Fatalities | |
|---|---|
| High | 2338 |
| Best | 1126 |
| Low | 1098 |
Numbers include fatalities for all dyads both active and inactive for this year
1991
Primary Parties: Government of Rwanda - FPR
Dimension: Internal
Comment on Dimension: In 1991 the conflict is coded as internal, since there is no conclusive evidence that any foreign state deployed regular combat troops at a level that meets the UCDP threshold for a secondary warring party. Uganda was widely alleged to support the RPF and there are indications of some French military involvement on the government side, but available sources do not clearly document sustained regular‑troop participation by either state, so both are treated as external supporters rather than coded as secondary warring parties.
| Estimated Fatalities | |
|---|---|
| High | 1977 |
| Best | 153 |
| Low | 150 |
Numbers include fatalities for all dyads both active and inactive for this year
Peace agreements
Name of peace agreement: N’sele Cease-fire Agreement
Date when warring parties signed the agreement: 1991-03-29
Comment of peace agreement: Peace process agreement
The N’Sele ceasefire agreement was the first of the six protocols included in the final Arusha Accords of 1993.The agreement regulated the conflict behaviour of the parties through establishing a ceasefire and a cessation of hostilities to be monitored by a Neutral Military Observer Group, comprised of personnel from Nigeria, Senegal, Zimbabwe, the OAU and representatives of the warring parties. The agreement also established a Neutral Corridor, separating the opposing armies.
Further, a Joint Political Military Commission, composed of representatives of the belligerents, was established to ensure the follow-up of the ceasefire agreement and the comprehensive peace agreement yet to be signed.
Lastly the agreement outlined a short agenda for further talks, specifying that rule of law and democracy should be created, that the formation of a new national army should commence and the a power-sharing arrangement would be established to regulate the incompatibility.
Signatories: For the Rwandese Government:
Boniface NGULINZIRA
Minister for Foreign Affairs and Cooperation
For the Rwandese Patriotic Front:
Pasteur BIZIMUNGU
Member of the Executive Committee for Information and Documentation
For the Facilitator (the United Republic of Tanzania)
Hon. Ahmed Hassan DIRIA (MP)
Minister for Foreign Affairs and International Cooperation
In the presence of the Representative of the Secretary-General of the OAU
(Signed) M. T. MAPURANGA
Assistant Secretary-General in Charge of Political Affairs
Comment of signatories: Comprehensive peace agreement
Third parties: Nigeria, Zimbabwe, Senegal and OAU. Tanzania was the facilitator.
Comment of third parties role in peace agreement: These countries were invited to take part in the Neutral Military Observer Group, which was to monitor the ceasefire.
Ended: True
Date agreement ended: 1993-08-31
Comment of Duration: See Arusha Accords.
Full-text peace agreement
1992
Primary Parties: Government of Rwanda - FPR
Dimension: Internal
Comment on Dimension: In 1992 the conflict is coded as internal, since there is still no conclusive evidence that any foreign state deployed regular combat troops at a level that meets the UCDP threshold for a secondary warring party. Uganda was again widely alleged to support the RPF and there are indications of some French military involvement on the government side, but available sources do not clearly document sustained regular‑troop participation by either state. Both are therefore treated as external supporters rather than coded as secondary warring parties. By the end of the year, both the Rwandan government and the RPF publicly called for the complete withdrawal of all foreign troops from Rwanda.
| Estimated Fatalities | |
|---|---|
| High | 1390 |
| Best | 87 |
| Low | 87 |
Numbers include fatalities for all dyads both active and inactive for this year
Peace agreements
Name of peace agreement: The Protocol of Agreement between the Government of the Republic of Rwanda and the Rwandese Patriotic Front on the Rule of Law
Date when warring parties signed the agreement: 1992-08-18
Comment of peace agreement: Partial peace agreement
The agreement is the second protocol that was included in the final peace agreement of 1993 (the Arusha Accords).
The agreement outlined the basic principles that should guide the country’s politics once the conflict was ended. The parties agreed that the rule of law would reign supreme through the establishment of pluralistic democracy, human rights and national unity. Political parties should be allowed for under law and the judiciary should be made to be independent. The agreement firmly stated the rejection of ideologies based on ethnicity, religion or intolerance.
To approach the goal of such reconciliation and unity a National Commission on Human Rights was established, and all refugees were to be encouraged to return to take part in the democratic process.
Signatories: For and on behalf of the Government of the Republic of Rwanda:
Boniface Ngulinzira
Minister of Foreign Affairs and Cooperation
For and on behalf of the Rwandese Patriotic Front:
Pasteur Bizimungu
Member of the Executive Committee and Commissioner for Information and Documentation
For and on behalf of the Facilitator (United Republic of Tanzania):
Benjamin Mkapa
Minister for Science, Technology and Higher Education
Comment of signatories: Comprehensive peace agreement
Third parties: Tanzania
Comment of third parties role in peace agreement: Tanzania was the facilitator of the talks.
Ended: True
Date agreement ended: 1993-08-31
Comment of Duration: See Arusha Accords.
Full-text peace agreement
Name of peace agreement: Protocol of Agreement on Power-sharing within the Framework of broad-based Transitional Government between the Government of the Republic of Rwanda and the Rwandese Patriotic Front
Date when warring parties signed the agreement: 1992-10-30
Comment of peace agreement: Partial peace agreement
This is the third protocol included in the Arusha Accords of 1993. It addressed power-sharing within the framework of the transitional government.
This agreement set out to include political participation of the RPF and other political forces, enabling them to participate in the transition. Provisions included modalities for the transitional institutions. It laid out powers and composition for the executive powers of the president, the broad-based Transitional Government; created special commissions for reconciliation, the constitution, and electoral processes; and set forth principles, structure, and powers of the judiciary.
Signatories: For the Rwandese Government: Ngulinzira Boniface Minister of Foreign Affairs and Cooperation
For the Rwandese Patriotic Front: Bizimungu Pasteur Member of the Executive Committee and Commissioner for Information and Documentation
In the Presence of Representative of Facilitator (The United Republic of Tanzania): Ahmed Hassan Dira Minister for Foreign Affairs and International Cooperation
In the Presence of Representative of Chairman of OAU: Papa Louis Fall Ambassador of Senegal to Ethiopia and Tanzania. Representative to OAU
In the Presence of Representative of Secretary General of OAU: Dr. M.T. Mapuranga Secretry General Adjoint charge des Affairs Politiques
Comment of signatories: Comprehensive peace agreement signed in Arusha, Tanzania on 30 October 1992.
Third parties: Tanzania
Comment of third parties role in peace agreement: Tanzania facilitated the peace process.
Ended: True
Date agreement ended: 1993-08-31
Comment of Duration: See Arusha Accords.
Full-text peace agreement
1993
Primary Parties: Government of Rwanda - FPR
Dimension: Internal
Comment on Dimension: In 1993 the conflict is coded as internal, since there is no conclusive evidence that any foreign state deployed regular combat troops at a level that meets the UCDP threshold for a secondary warring party. Uganda was widely alleged to support the RPF and there are indications of some French military involvement on the government side, but available sources do not clearly document sustained regular‑troop participation by either state, so both are treated as external supporters rather than coded as secondary warring parties.
| Estimated Fatalities | |
|---|---|
| High | 403 |
| Best | 353 |
| Low | 353 |
Numbers include fatalities for all dyads both active and inactive for this year
Peace agreements
Name of peace agreement: The Protocols of Agreement between the Government of the Republic of Rwanda and the Rwandese Patriotic Front on Power-Sharing within the Framework of a Broad-Based Transitional Government
Date when warring parties signed the agreement: 1993-01-09
Comment of peace agreement: Partial peace agreement
This agreement is the third protocol that was included in the 1993 Arusha Accords, and regulated the incompatibility through power-sharing arrangements on the political level.
The agreement draws up the structure of government for the transitional period, which was to ensue following the signing of the comprehensive peace agreement. The exact specifications for the structure and functions of the executive, legislative and judicial branches are elaborated upon, and power-sharing arrangements are put into place. Ministerial portfolios are distributed to the warring parties (five for the government and five for the FPR) and to other political forces. Also, seats in the assembly are attributed to the signatory parties, with eleven seats going to the ruling MRND party and an equal number of seats to the FPR. Other political parties were also granted seats in this broad-based coalition assembly.
Also, a Post-War Rehabilitation program was established, charged with preparing the logistic and political preparations for the return of refugees.
Signatories: Comprehensive peace agreement
October aagreement signed by:
For the Rwandese Government:
Boniface Ngulinzira
Minister of Foreign Affairs and Cooperation
For the Rwandese Patriotic Front: Pasteur Bizimungu Member of the Executive Committee and Commissioner for Information and Documentation
In the presence of Representative of Facilitator (United Republic of Tanzania): Ahmed Hassan Diria Minister for Foreign Affairs and International Cooperation
In the presence of the Representative of Chairman of the OAU:
Papa Louis Fall
Ambassador of Senegal to Ethiopia, Tanzania and the OAU
In the presence of Secretary General of the OAU
Dr. M.T. Mapuranga
Secrétaire Général Adjoint, chargé des Affaires politiques
Comment of signatories: Comprehensive peace agreement
January agreement signed by:
For the Government of the Republic of Rwanda:
Boniface Ngulinzira
Minister of Foreign Affairs and Cooperation
For the Rwandese Patriotic Front:
Pasteur Bizimungu
Member of the Executive Committee and Commissioner for Information and Documentation
In the presence of the Facilitator (United Republic of Tanzania):
Hon. Ahmed Hassan Diria
Minister for Foreign Affairs and International Cooperation
In the presence of the Current Chairman of the OAU:
Papa Louis Fall
Ambassador of Senegal to Ethiopia, Tanzania and the OAU
For the Secretary General of the OAU
Dr. M.T. Mapuranga
Assistant General Secretary of the OAU in charge of Political Affairs
Third parties: Tanzania
Comment of third parties role in peace agreement: Tanzania was the facilitator of this process
Ended: True
Date agreement ended: 1993-08-31
Comment of Duration: See Arusha Accords.
Full-text peace agreement
Name of peace agreement: The Protocol of Agreement between the Government of the Republic of Rwanda and the Rwandese Patriotic Front on the Repatriation of Refugees and the Resettlement of Displaced Persons
Date when warring parties signed the agreement: 1993-06-09
Comment of peace agreement: Partial peace agreement
The agreement is the fourth protocol of those included in the final peace agreement; the Arusha Accords. It deals with the issue of repatriation of refugees and displaced persons.
The agreement stipulates that there will be a voluntary return of refugees, which is necessary for national reconciliation and unity. The principle of dual citizenship was also accepted.
A Commission for Repatriation is established and charged with a number of functions and responsibilities. Among these are the identification and resettlement of refugees and the administering of funds from the established Funding Programme. Refugees were to be provided with food, domestic items, agricultural tools, health facilities and education. To raise funds for these activities a donor’s conference was to be held by the UNHCR and OAU.
The return of displaced persons would begin after the establishment of the transitional government.
Signatories: For the Government of the Republic of Rwanda:
Landoald Ndasingwa
Minister of Labour and Social Affairs
For the Rwandese Patriotic Front:
Pasteur Bizimungu
Member of the Executive Committee and Commissioner for Information and Documentation
In the presence of the Representative of the Facilitator (The United Republic of Tanzania):
Ami R. Mpungwe
Ministry of Foreign Affairs and International Cooperation
In the presence of the Current Chairman of the OAU:
Papa Louis FallAmbassador of Senegal to Ethiopia, Tanzania and Representative to the OAU
In the presence of the Representative of the OAU Secretary General
Dr. M.T. Mapuranga
Assistant Secretary General for Political Affairs
Comment of signatories: Comprehensive peace agreement
Third parties: Tanzania
Comment of third parties role in peace agreement: Tanzania was the facilitator of the process
Ended: True
Date agreement ended: 1993-08-31
Comment of Duration: See Arusha Accords.
Full-text peace agreement
Name of peace agreement: The Protocol Agreement between the Government of the Republic of Rwanda and the Rwandese Patriotic Front on the integration of Armed Forces of the two parties
Date when warring parties signed the agreement: 1993-08-03
Comment of peace agreement: Partial peace agreement
This agreement is the fifth protocol that was included in the Arusha Accords of 1993. The agreement focuses on demobilization of forces and the formation of a new national army.
The agreement regulates all sectors of the armed forces; the military, the police and the gendarmerie. All troops involved in the conflict are to relocate to cantonment points to await demobilization or integration into the stipulated new national army. Quotas are specified for this integration, stating that 60% of the military forces will be government troops and 40% will be rebel troops. The command structure is to be based on an equal quota. The same quotas are applied for integration into the National Gendarmerie; the national police force of Rwanda. The agreement also stipulates the doctrine, training program and other specifications for the entire process of the formation of a new army. The implementation of these modalities, and the general supervision of the final peace agreement, are to be supervised by an Neutral International Force, supplied by the UN.
The demobilization programme agreed upon posits a wide number of activities, such as demobilization allowances according to rank, social reintegration and job opportunities for those demobilized.
Signatories: For the Government of the Republic of Rwanda
Dr. Anastase Gasana
Minister of Foreign Affairs and Cooperation
For the Rwandese Patriotic Front
Pasteur Bizimungu
Member of the Executive Committee and Commissioner for Information and Documentation
In the presence of the Representative of the Facilitator (the United Republic of Tanzania)
Joseph Rwegasira
Minister of Foreign Affairs and International Cooperation
In the presence of the Representative of the Secretary General of OAU
Dr. M.T. Mapuranga
Assistant Secretary General in charge of Political Affairs
Comment of signatories: Comprehensive peace agreement
Third parties: Tanzania, UN
Comment of third parties role in peace agreement: Tanzania was the facilitator of the peace process. The UN were supposed to deploy a Neutral International Force to Rwanda to monitor compliance with the ceasefire and formation of the new national army, and to supervise the implementation of the final peace agreement.
Ended: True
Date agreement ended: 1993-08-31
Comment of Duration: See Arusha Accords.
Full-text peace agreement
Name of peace agreement: The Protocol of Agreement between the Government of the Republic of Rwanda and the Rwandese Patriotic Front on Miscellaneous Issues and Final Provisions
Date when warring parties signed the agreement: 1993-08-03
Comment of peace agreement: Partial peace agreement
This agreement was the sixth, and final, protocol that was included in the comprehensive Arusha Accords of 1993. It dealt with minor outstanding issues from the earlier protocols.
The agreement contained specifications for the restructuring of and functioning of the communal police, the security service, the prison service and the intelligence agency. It was stipulated that the FPR were to be effectively represented at all levels of the security services.
Further it was agreed that the duration of the transitional period would be 22 months, with possible extensions of three months if a three-fights majority in the assembly so agreed.
Signatories: For the Government of the Republic of Rwanda
Dr. Anastase Gasana
Minister of Foreign Affairs and Cooperation
For the Rwandese Patriotic Front
Pasteur Bizimungu
Member of the Executive Committee and Commissioner for Information and Documentation
In the presence of the Representative of the Facilitator (the United Republic of Tanzania)
Joseph C. Rwegasira
Minister of Foreign Affairs and International Cooperation
In the presence of the Representative of the Secretary General of the OAU
H.E. Dr. M.T. Mapuranga
Assistant Secretary General in charge of Political Affairs
Comment of signatories: Comprehensive peace agreement
Third parties: Tanzania
Comment of third parties role in peace agreement: Tanzania was the facilitator of the peace process. The United Nations and the OAU were designated tasks of monitoring and verifying the ceasefire agreement and the peace process in general.
Ended: True
Date agreement ended: 1993-08-31
Comment of Duration: See Arusha Accords.
Full-text peace agreement
Name of peace agreement: Arusha Accords
Date when warring parties signed the agreement: 1993-08-04
Comment of peace agreement: Full peace agreement
The Arusha Accords were signed 4 August 1993. It lasted less than a month - the implementation of the peace agreement was prepared, but never fulfilled. The Arusha Accords comprised a general agreement and six attached protocols that were all combined into a whole to form this comprehensive agreement.
The first point of interest in the agreement was the parties reaffirming the N´Sele Ceasefire Agreement, which instated a Neutral Corridor separating the warring parties from each other. The corridor, and the observance of the ceasefire, was to be monitored by the Neutral Military Observer Group. A unified national army was stipulated, and the government was to contribute 60% of the forces and the FPR 40%. The same formula was applied for the police force, and all other types of uniformed forces. The military pact was of an extensive nature, with military power-sharing also applied to military training schools and other facilities. The combatants that would not be integrated were to become subject to a DDR program which included demobilization allowances and social, economic and educational training.
A power-sharing arrangement was agreed upon in the political sphere to resolve the incompatibility. The president and prime minister were to be chosen through a process of consensus, ministerial portfolios were distributed between all the participating parties (with the FPR receiving five such portfolios) and the seats in the assembly were to be shared according to a similar formula (the FPR being granted 11 seats). The new Prime Minister was to be installed by 10 September. Multiparty general elections were to take place after a 22-month period, during which the power-sharing arrangements would be in force.
Finally, the agreement allowed for repatriation of all Rwandan refugees and the return of internally displaced persons to their homes. The CDR, an extremist party which broke out from the MRND, and which claimed to represent the interests of the Hutu majority, refused to participate in any future Assembly.
Signatories: Major-General Justenal Habyarimana President of the Republic of Rwanda
Colonel Alexis Kanyarengwe Chairman of the Rwandese Patriotic Front
In the presence of the Facilitator
Ali Hassan Mwinyi President of the United Republic of Tanzania
In the presence of the Representative of the Secretary General of the United Nations Vladimir Petrovsky Under-Secretary General Director General of the United Nations Office at Geneva
In the presence of the Secretary General of the OAU Salim Ahmed Salim
Comment of signatories: Comprehensive peace agreement
President Juvénal Habyarimana signed for the Rwandan government and Col. Alex Kanyarengwe signed for the FPR.
The peace agreement was signed in Arusha, Tanzania, in the presence of Ugandan President Museveni, Burundian President Ndaydaye and the OAU Secretary-General Salim Ahmed Salim.
Third parties: Tanzanian President Ali Hassan Mwinyi, the OAU/GOM, the UNOMUR (Observer Mission Uganda Rwanda), the UNAMIR (UN Assistance Mission to Rwanda), Uganda, Burundi, UN Special Representative Jacques-Roger Booh-Booh and OAU Special Representative Djou Felly.
Comment of third parties role in peace agreement: Facilitating efforts during the most important negotiations were made by the Tanzanian President Ali Hassan Mwinyi. In June, the UN Security Council approved the creation of UNOMUR (Observer Mission Uganda Rwanda) in order to facilitate the implementation of the peace agreement. On 18 August, the UNOMUR started to deploy. (On 1 November, UNAMIR (UN Assistance Mission to Rwanda) was inaugurated. This mission was to comprise 2500 soldiers and it would incorporate UNOMUR and GOM. The mandate was to monitor observance of the ceasefire, to contribute to the security of the capital and to facilitate the repatriation of the refugees.) The presidents of Uganda and of Burundi were present during the signing of the peace agreement. The OAU and the UN Special Representatives participated in meetings when the Arusha Accord deadlocked in December.
Ended: True
Date agreement ended: 1993-08-31
Comment of Duration: The peace agreement ended after less than a month. By the end of August there were renewed outbreaks of violence in Kigali and in Butare. Moreover, the transitional government and legislature were not established on 10 September as the peace agreement stipulated. The implementation never really got started. The UNAMIR troops (deployed in November to facilitate the implementation) declared in December that the conditions necessary to introduce the transitional institutions would be fulfilled by the end of the month. In late December the implementation was however further postponed following disagreement between the political parties on the nomination of representatives to the transitional institutions. In April 1994, a genocide broke out and the peace agreement was never fully implemented.
Full-text peace agreement
1994
Primary Parties: Government of Rwanda - FPR
Dimension: Internal
Comment on Dimension: In 1994 a number of foreign states intervened in Rwanda in various ways when the genocide was unleashed, but their involvement is not coded as secondary warring‑party participation. These actors did not clearly align themselves as regular combatants with either side in the incompatibility over government, and their deployments (e.g. evacuation missions and the French‑led Opération Turquoise) are therefore not treated as taking sides as warring parties in this conflict dimension.
| Estimated Fatalities | |
|---|---|
| High | 2033 |
| Best | 1889 |
| Low | 1788 |
Numbers include fatalities for all dyads both active and inactive for this year
1996
Primary Parties: Government of Rwanda - ALiR
Dimension: Internal
Comment on Dimension: In 1996 the Rwanda: Government conflict is coded as internal. Rwandan forces were heavily engaged across the border in DR Congo (Zaire) against PALIR elements in refugee camps and in support of the AFDL, while Mobutu’s government was accused of backing PALIR. However, any direct fighting between the Government of Rwanda and the Government of Zaire is coded to the DR Congo: Government conflict, not to the Rwanda: Government conflict.
| Estimated Fatalities | |
|---|---|
| High | 355 |
| Best | 124 |
| Low | 94 |
Numbers include fatalities for all dyads both active and inactive for this year
1997
Primary Parties: Government of Rwanda - ALiR
Dimension: Internal
Comment on Dimension: In 1997 the Rwanda: Government conflict is coded as internal. The Rwandan army was active across the border in Zaire both against Mobutu’s forces and against ALiR elements based in refugee camps, and the regional wars in Zaire and Burundi were closely intertwined with Rwanda’s security concerns. However, this cross‑border fighting is coded to the DR Congo: Government and Burundi: Goverment conflicts
| Estimated Fatalities | |
|---|---|
| High | 1466 |
| Best | 1086 |
| Low | 686 |
Numbers include fatalities for all dyads both active and inactive for this year
1998
Primary Parties: Government of Rwanda - ALiR
Dimension: Internal
Comment on Dimension: The Rwanda: Government conflict is, despite its strongly regional context, coded as internal in 1998. Most of the fighting between the Rwandan government and ALIR that year occurred on Congolese territory. The DR Congo government cooperated militarily with ALIR as part of its own war against the RCD, which was supported by Rwanda, while Rwandan, Burundian and Ugandan forces operated in DR Congo both against Hutu extremists and against Congolese government troops. This produced a highly regionalised and interwoven conflict system in which it is often unclear which incompatibility particular clashes should be attributed to. It is also unclear in what capacity actors such as Uganda and Burundi were fighting alongside Rwanda. Likewise, as allies of the Congolese government and ALIR militias, Zimbabwe, Namibia, Chad and Angola may at times have fought Rwandan forces, but their precise intentions and the incompatibility under which they were acting are difficult to establish. Because no foreign state is clearly documented as having deployed regular troops in aid of the Rwandan rebels and explicitly taken their side in the incompatibility against the Rwandan government, which is required to code an internationalized internal conflict, the Rwanda: Government conflict remains coded as internal in 1998.
| Estimated Fatalities | |
|---|---|
| High | 1901 |
| Best | 1096 |
| Low | 1096 |
Numbers include fatalities for all dyads both active and inactive for this year
1999
Primary Parties: Government of Rwanda - ALiR
Dimension: Internal
Comment on Dimension: The Rwanda: Government conflict is, despite its strongly regional context, coded as internal in 1999. Most of the fighting between the Rwandan government and ALIR that year occurred on Congolese territory. The DR Congo government cooperated militarily with ALIR as part of its own war against the RCD, which was supported by Rwanda, while Rwandan, Burundian and Ugandan forces operated in DR Congo both against Hutu extremists and against Congolese government troops. This produced a highly regionalised and interwoven conflict system in which it is often unclear which incompatibility particular clashes should be attributed to. It is also unclear in what capacity actors such as Uganda and Burundi were fighting alongside Rwanda. Likewise, as allies of the Congolese government and ALIR militias, Zimbabwe, Namibia, Chad and Angola may at times have fought Rwandan forces, but their precise intentions and the incompatibility under which they were acting are difficult to establish. Because no foreign state is clearly documented as having deployed regular troops in aid of the Rwandan rebels and explicitly taken their side in the incompatibility against the Rwandan government, which is required to code an internationalized internal conflict, the Rwanda: Government conflict remains coded as internal in 1999.
| Estimated Fatalities | |
|---|---|
| High | 315 |
| Best | 315 |
| Low | 115 |
Numbers include fatalities for all dyads both active and inactive for this year
2000
Primary Parties: Government of Rwanda - ALiR
Dimension: Internal
Comment on Dimension: The Rwanda: Government conflict is, despite its strongly regional context, coded as internal in 2000. Most of the fighting between the Rwandan government and ALIR that year occurred on Congolese territory. The DR Congo government cooperated militarily with ALIR as part of its own war against the RCD, which was supported by Rwanda, while Rwandan, Burundian and Ugandan forces operated in DR Congo both against Hutu extremists and against Congolese government troops. This produced a highly regionalised and interwoven conflict system in which it is often unclear which incompatibility particular clashes should be attributed to. It is also unclear in what capacity actors such as Uganda and Burundi were fighting alongside Rwanda. Likewise, as allies of the Congolese government and ALIR militias, Zimbabwe, Namibia, Chad and Angola may at times have fought Rwandan forces, but their precise intentions and the incompatibility under which they were acting are difficult to establish. Because no foreign state is clearly documented as having deployed regular troops in aid of the Rwandan rebels and explicitly taken their side in the incompatibility against the Rwandan government, which is required to code an internationalized internal conflict, the Rwanda: Government conflict remains coded as internal in 2000.
| Estimated Fatalities | |
|---|---|
| High | 294 |
| Best | 155 |
| Low | 155 |
Numbers include fatalities for all dyads both active and inactive for this year
2001
Primary Parties: Government of Rwanda - FDLR-FOCA
Dimension: Internal
Comment on Dimension: In 2001 the Rwanda: Government conflict is, despite its highly regionalised character, coded as internal. Most of the fighting between the Rwandan government and its Hutu opponents, now organised in the FDLR, took place on Congolese territory. The DR Congo government cooperated militarily with FDLR as part of its own war against Rwanda, while Rwandan, Ugandan and Burundian forces operated in the DR Congo both against the FDLR and against Congolese government troops. This produced an interwoven conflict system in which it is often unclear which incompatibility: Rwanda: Government, DR Congo: Government, or each intervener’s own internal conflict, particular clashes should be attributed to, or in what capacity Uganda and Burundi were acting alongside Rwanda. Likewise, as allies of the Congolese government and the Rwandan Hutu militias, Zimbabwe, Namibia, Chad and Angola may at times have fought Rwandan forces, but their intentions and the incompatibility under which they were acting cannot be clearly established. Because no foreign state is documented as having deployed regular troops in aid of the Rwandan rebels and explicitly taken their side in the incompatibility against the Rwandan government, which is required to code an internationalized internal conflict, the Rwanda: Government conflict remains coded as internal in 2001.
| Estimated Fatalities | |
|---|---|
| High | 2054 |
| Best | 2054 |
| Low | 359 |
Numbers include fatalities for all dyads both active and inactive for this year
2002
Primary Parties: Government of Rwanda - FDLR-FOCA
Dimension: Internal
Comment on Dimension: In 2002 the Rwanda: Government conflict is coded as internal. Rwandan government forces fought FDLR mainly on Burundian and Congolese territory, but neither Burundi nor DR Congo can be shown to have deployed regular troops in support of either side in the Rwanda: Government incompatibility, so no secondary warring party is coded.
| Estimated Fatalities | |
|---|---|
| High | 83 |
| Best | 83 |
| Low | 63 |
Numbers include fatalities for all dyads both active and inactive for this year
2003
Primary Parties: -
Dimension: Internal
| Estimated Fatalities | |
|---|---|
| High | 0 |
| Best | 0 |
| Low | 0 |
Numbers include fatalities for all dyads both active and inactive for this year
2004
Primary Parties: -
Dimension: Internal
Comment on Dimension: Burundi supported Rwanda in their fight against FDLR in 2004. In the year the Congolese army (FARDC) in North Kivu also fought FDLR but Rwanda continued to accuse the Congolese army of supporting the group. The government of DR Congo was not seen as a secondary warring party in 2004 since their position in the conflict between Rwanda and FDLR remained unclear. Rwanda supported a rebellion in Dr Congo in 2004 both “directly and indirectly” aggravating the relations between the two countries. Furthermore, the new Transitional Government included both elements earlier loyal to Rwanda and FDLR. Probably the FARDC fought FDLR for two main reasons, first not to give Rwanda an excuse of entering the country and second the RCD elements of the FARDC continued to support the Rwandan governments position in the incompatibility.
| Estimated Fatalities | |
|---|---|
| High | 22 |
| Best | 18 |
| Low | 18 |
Numbers include fatalities for all dyads both active and inactive for this year
2005
Primary Parties: -
Dimension: Internal
Comment on Dimension: The Rwanda: Government conflict was not active in 2005 partly because it was coded as internal. The Government of DR Congo was not considered a secondary warring party in this dyad, even though FARDC repeatedly clashed with FDLR on Congolese territory and some integrated brigades contained elements closer to Rwandan interests.
Relations between Kigali and Kinshasa had become strained in late 2004 after Rwanda threatened to re‑enter DR Congo if the FDLR was not disarmed. Some diplomacy and regional mechanisms were used in an effort to defuse tensions: a Tripartite Commission (DR Congo-Rwanda-Uganda) meeting in Lubumbashi in April 2005 committed the three governments to “put an end to the threat” posed by armed groups in eastern DR Congo, explicitly including the FDLR.
Although these steps acknowledged Rwandan security concerns, implementation stalled and Kigali remained sceptical of both DR Congo and FDLR intentions, continuing to accuse Kinshasa of failing to disarm the group. Given this mixed pattern, FARDC at times fighting FDLR, at times co‑existing with or being accused of tolerating them, and no clear, sustained siding of the Government of DR Congo with Rwanda in the Rwanda-FDLR incompatibility, DR Congo was not coded as a secondary warring party in 2005.
| Estimated Fatalities | |
|---|---|
| High | 0 |
| Best | 0 |
| Low | 0 |
Numbers include fatalities for all dyads both active and inactive for this year
2006
Primary Parties: -
Dimension: Internal
| Estimated Fatalities | |
|---|---|
| High | 0 |
| Best | 0 |
| Low | 0 |
Numbers include fatalities for all dyads both active and inactive for this year
2007
Primary Parties: -
Dimension: Internal
| Estimated Fatalities | |
|---|---|
| High | 0 |
| Best | 0 |
| Low | 0 |
Numbers include fatalities for all dyads both active and inactive for this year
2008
Primary Parties: -
Dimension: Internal
| Estimated Fatalities | |
|---|---|
| High | 0 |
| Best | 0 |
| Low | 0 |
Numbers include fatalities for all dyads both active and inactive for this year
2009
Primary Parties: Government of Rwanda - FDLR-FOCA
Secondary Warring Parties Side A: Government of DR Congo (Zaire)
Dimension: Internationalized intrastate
Comment on Dimension: In 2009 the Rwanda: Government conflict was internationalized. Following the 5 December 2008 Rwandan-Congolese communiqué and the Kagame-Kabila deal, Congolese government forces conducted joint military operations with the Rwandan army against the FDLR on Congolese territory under operation Umoja Wetu. Because DR Congo deployed regular troops in joint military operations alongside the Rwandan government against the FDLR, DR Congo was coded as a secondary warring party on the government side of the incompatibility in 2009.
| Estimated Fatalities | |
|---|---|
| High | 2060 |
| Best | 1807 |
| Low | 1703 |
Numbers include fatalities for all dyads both active and inactive for this year
2010
Primary Parties: Government of Rwanda - FDLR-FOCA
Secondary Warring Parties Side A: Government of DR Congo (Zaire)
Dimension: Internationalized intrastate
Comment on Dimension: In 2010 the Rwanda: Government conflict is coded as internationalized. The FDLR, Rwanda’s main Hutu rebel opponent, operated largely from eastern DR Congo, and Congolese government forces, often with MONUSCO support, targeted the group in Operation Amani Leo. The Operation's principal objectives were to protect civilian populations, clear strategic areas of negative forces, hold territory liberated from FDLR control, restore State authority in these zones. Operation Amani Leo included preventive interventions aimed at stopping the FDLR from regrouping and attacking civilian populations and re-occupying major mining areas. Since DR Congo deployed regular troops against the FDLR under Amani Leo it was coded as a secondary warring party on the government side in the Rwanda: Government conflict, even though the fighting took place on Congolese territory and also served DR Congo’s own security interests.
| Estimated Fatalities | |
|---|---|
| High | 267 |
| Best | 212 |
| Low | 208 |
Numbers include fatalities for all dyads both active and inactive for this year
2011
Primary Parties: Government of Rwanda - FDLR-FOCA
Secondary Warring Parties Side A: Government of DR Congo (Zaire)
Dimension: Internationalized intrastate
Comment on Dimension: In 2011 the Rwanda: Government conflict is coded as internationalized. Most of the fighting against the FDLR took place on Congolese territory, where DR Congo continued to support Rwanda by deploying regular forces in joint operations in Rutshuru territory, North Kivu, between March and August; DR Congo is therefore coded as a secondary warring party on the government side.
| Estimated Fatalities | |
|---|---|
| High | 118 |
| Best | 116 |
| Low | 101 |
Numbers include fatalities for all dyads both active and inactive for this year
2012
Primary Parties: Government of Rwanda - FDLR-FOCA
Secondary Warring Parties Side A: Government of DR Congo (Zaire)
Dimension: Internationalized intrastate
Comment on Dimension: In 2012 the Rwanda: Government conflict is coded as internationalized. DR Congo (Zaire) acted as a secondary warring party on the government side by deploying regular forces in joint operations with Rwanda against the FDLR under Operation Amani Leo, until Rwanda announced the withdrawal of its Special Forces from Congolese territory on 30 August 2012, marking the end of that operation and of DR Congo’s secondary‑warring‑party role in this dyad for that year.
| Estimated Fatalities | |
|---|---|
| High | 99 |
| Best | 83 |
| Low | 59 |
Numbers include fatalities for all dyads both active and inactive for this year
2013
Primary Parties: -
Dimension: Internal
| Estimated Fatalities | |
|---|---|
| High | 0 |
| Best | 0 |
| Low | 0 |
Numbers include fatalities for all dyads both active and inactive for this year
2014
Primary Parties: -
Dimension: Internal
Comment on Dimension: After falling out with DR Congo (Zaire) in 2012 Rwanda lost the support of its neighbor in its fight against FDLR. In 2014 Congolese forces clashed with FDLR but not in support of the Rwandan regime.
| Estimated Fatalities | |
|---|---|
| High | 0 |
| Best | 0 |
| Low | 0 |
Numbers include fatalities for all dyads both active and inactive for this year
2015
Primary Parties: -
Dimension: Internal
Comment on Dimension: In 2015 the Rwanda: Government conflict became internationalized, although the conflict did not reach the level of activity. On 24 September 2015, following high‑level bilateral security talks in Kigali, Rwanda and DR Congo issued a joint communiqué in which both defence ministers agreed to “urgently” eradicate the FDLR and to cooperate on the repatriation of FDLR combatants and ex‑M23 fighters. This formalised and reinforced earlier FARDC operations against the FDLR on Congolese territory in line with Rwanda’s security objectives. After this date DR Congo became once again a secondary warring party on the government side in the conflict between Rwanda and the FDLR.
| Estimated Fatalities | |
|---|---|
| High | 8 |
| Best | 8 |
| Low | 8 |
Numbers include fatalities for all dyads both active and inactive for this year
2016
Primary Parties: Government of Rwanda - FDLR-FOCA
Secondary Warring Parties Side A: Government of DR Congo (Zaire)
Dimension: Internationalized intrastate
Comment on Dimension: In 2016 the Rwanda: Government conflict was internationalized. Following the 2015 agreement with Rwanda, DR Congo's army (FARDC) continued to conduct operations against the FDLR on Congolese territory. These operations, that targeted Rwanda’s rebel opponent were carried out in cooperation with, and in support of, Rwandan security objectives. DR Congo was therefore coded as a secondary warring party on the government side.
| Estimated Fatalities | |
|---|---|
| High | 136 |
| Best | 136 |
| Low | 136 |
Numbers include fatalities for all dyads both active and inactive for this year
2017
Primary Parties: -
Dimension: Internationalized intrastate
Comment on Dimension: DR Congo continued to be a secondary warring party in the conflict even though it did not reach the level of inclusion in 2017. All the fighting in 2017 was carried out on Congolese soil between the Congolese army FARDC and FDLR.
| Estimated Fatalities | |
|---|---|
| High | 24 |
| Best | 24 |
| Low | 24 |
Numbers include fatalities for all dyads both active and inactive for this year
2018
Primary Parties: -
Dimension: Internationalized intrastate
Comment on Dimension: In 2018 the Rwanda: Government conflict was internationalized. DR Congo continued to act as a secondary warring party on the government side by using FARDC to conduct operations on Congolese territory against FDLR, Rwanda’s main rebel opponent, in line with the earlier bilateral security cooperation between Kinshasa and Kigali.
| Estimated Fatalities | |
|---|---|
| High | 26 |
| Best | 25 |
| Low | 25 |
Numbers include fatalities for all dyads both active and inactive for this year
2019
Primary Parties: Government of Rwanda - FDLR-FOCA, FDLR-RUD, RMDC
Secondary Warring Parties Side A: Government of DR Congo (Zaire)
Dimension: Internationalized intrastate
Comment on Dimension: In 2019, the Rwanda: Government conflict was internationalized. DR Congo (FARDC) continued to act as a secondary warring party on the government side, conducting operations on Congolese territory against FDLR-FOCA , FDLR-RUD, and CNRD under the existing bilateral security cooperation with Kigali. At the same time, Rwandan Defence Force units themselves operated inside DR Congo against Rwandan rebel groups as part of a broader joint regional plan involving Uganda, Burundi and US AFRICOM support.
| Estimated Fatalities | |
|---|---|
| High | 309 |
| Best | 230 |
| Low | 230 |
Numbers include fatalities for all dyads both active and inactive for this year
2020
Primary Parties: Government of Rwanda - FDLR-FOCA, FDLR-RUD, RMDC
Secondary Warring Parties Side A: Government of DR Congo (Zaire)
Dimension: Internationalized intrastate
Comment on Dimension: In 2020, the Rwanda: Government conflict was internationalized. DR Congo continued to act as a secondary warring party on the government side, conducting operations on Congolese territory against FDLR, FDLR-RUD, and CNRD in line with the existing bilateral security cooperation between Kinshasa and Kigali.
| Estimated Fatalities | |
|---|---|
| High | 137 |
| Best | 134 |
| Low | 133 |
Numbers include fatalities for all dyads both active and inactive for this year
2021
Primary Parties: -
Dimension: Internal
| Estimated Fatalities | |
|---|---|
| High | 24 |
| Best | 24 |
| Low | 24 |
Numbers include fatalities for all dyads both active and inactive for this year
2022
Primary Parties: Government of Rwanda - FDLR-FOCA
Dimension: Internal
Comment on Dimension: In 2022 the Rwanda: Government conflict was internal. Relations between DR Congo and Rwanda deteriorated, and although an April summit in Nairobi agreed to establish an EAC regional force under Congolese leadership to “fight the negative forces” in eastern DR Congo (explicitly including the FDLR and associated Rwandan rebel groups), no foreign state was documented as deploying regular combat troops clearly and specifically in support of either side in the Rwanda-FDLR incompatibility. Consequently, no secondary warring party was coded in this conflict in 2022.
| Estimated Fatalities | |
|---|---|
| High | 46 |
| Best | 46 |
| Low | 46 |
Numbers include fatalities for all dyads both active and inactive for this year
2023
Primary Parties: Government of Rwanda - FDLR-FOCA
Dimension: Internal
Comment on Dimension: In 2023 Rwanda: Government conflict was internal, despite its highly regionalized character. The conflict was closely interconnected with broader regional rivalries, particularly tensions and security interactions involving DR Congo, Burundi and Uganda. However, no foreign state was documented as deploying regular combat troops in clear support of either side in the Rwanda: Government incompatibility, so no secondary warring party was coded.
| Estimated Fatalities | |
|---|---|
| High | 148 |
| Best | 147 |
| Low | 145 |
Numbers include fatalities for all dyads both active and inactive for this year
2024
Primary Parties: Government of Rwanda - FDLR-FOCA
Dimension: Internal
Comment on Dimension: In 2024 the Rwanda: Government conflict was internal, despite its highly regionalized character. It remained closely interconnected with broader regional rivalries and security dynamics involving DR Congo, Burundi and Uganda, no foreign state was documented as deploying regular combat troops in clear support of either side in the Rwanda: Government incompatibility, so no secondary warring party was coded.
| Estimated Fatalities | |
|---|---|
| High | 44 |
| Best | 44 |
| Low | 37 |
Numbers include fatalities for all dyads both active and inactive for this year
2025
Primary Parties: Government of Rwanda - FDLR-FOCA
Dimension: Internal
Comment on Dimension: In 2025 the Rwanda: Government conflict despite its highly regionalised character, coded as internal. Although it remained closely interconnected with broader regional rivalries and security dynamics involving DR Congo, Burundi and Uganda, no foreign state is documented as deploying regular combat troops in clear support of either side in the Rwanda: Government incompatibility, so no secondary warring party is coded.
| Estimated Fatalities | |
|---|---|
| High | 84 |
| Best | 60 |
| Low | 12 |
Numbers include fatalities for all dyads both active and inactive for this year
Conflict Archive
This section contains annual information no longer systematically collected by the UCDP.
1990 Conflict Archive
Negotiations: NO
Comment on Negotiation: In the first month of the war, the government offered peace talks about the refugee situation and political dialogue. The RPF rejected and demanded the resignation of president Habyarimana. Further attempts to address the conflict were made throughout the autumn, with the presidents from Rwanda, Uganda, Burundi and Zaire having talks. The Zairian president Mobutu was appointed as mediator. However, no real attempt to bring the RPF/A in seemed to be made. Talks were, however, held between Ugandan president Museveni and Habyarimana, where the latter promised to put pressure on the RPF to commit to a ceasefire.
Third party involvement: YES
Third party involvement names: Zairean President Mobutu, Burundian President Buyoya, the OAU secretary-General Salim Ahmed Salim, Tanzanian President Mwinyi, Ugandan President Museveni, Belgium.
Comment on Third Party Involvement: President Mobutu acted as mediator; however, his neutrality could be questioned considering the fact that Zaire contributed with troops for the initial period of the war. The OAU made various efforts to hold talks with the states in the region. The Tanzanian president Mwinyi was asked by the organisation to arrange a regional conference in response to the refugee issue. The Burundian president Buyoya participated in the OAU talks, but at the same time indicated that in case of escalation Burundi would support the Rwandan government. The Ugandan president Museveni met with President Habyarimana to discuss the situation under the semblance of third party efforts. However, Musevenis neutrality was even more questioned, as suspicions of Ugandan collaboration with the FPR could not be set aside. In October, Belgium conducted talks with Rwanda on ways to stop the fighting. Also, Belgium made attempts to arrange a regional conference to end the conflict.
Victory: NO
Terminated: NO
1991 Conflict Archive
Negotiations: YES
Comment on Negotiation: On 15-17 September 1991, the first direct talks between the Rwandan government and the FPR were held. The parties expressed their commitment to a ceasefire agreement from March 1992. Zairian president Mobutu acted as a mediator. Earlier during the year, several meeting and talks had been held between a number of countries in the region. The topic discussed were the deployment of a neutral peacekeeping force and the refugee situation. The FPR was however not participating in these talks.
Third party involvement: YES
Third party involvement names: Zairean President Mobutu, Burundian President Buyoya, the OAU Secretary-General Salim Ahmed Salim, Tanzanian President Mwinyi, Ugandan President Museveni, UNHCR, OAU, Nigeria, the OAU representative Hashim Mbita.
Comment on Third Party Involvement: President Mobutu continued mediating efforts. The OAU and the UNHCR arranged a regional conference on the refugee situation. Tanzania, Burundi, Uganda, Zaire were represented. Later in the year, a decision was made about the deployment of a "neutral" peacekeeping force. Nigeria, Tanzania, Uganda, Zaire, Burundi but also Rwanda and the FPR would make up the force. The OAU representative Hashim Mbiti was to be commander. On 7 September, an OAU summit aiming at a solution to the crisis took place in Zaire. As during the previous year, the neutrality for some of these third parties in the conflict could be questioned.
Victory: NO
Terminated: NO
1992 Conflict Archive
Negotiations: YES
Comment on Negotiation: The Foreign Minister of Rwanda met a representative of the FPR on 24 May. This was the first occasion of high-level contact between the warring parties. The MRND, President Habyarimanas party, remained however very negative towards any negotiations. A clear polarisation regarding the peace talks issue appeared in the government, between the MRND on the one hand and the new opposition parties on the other. Regional attempts to resolve the conflict continued. During a meeting between the Rwandan government and the FPR in June, in Paris, Mobutus continued role as a mediator was agreed on and formal discussions were conducted. This led to a series of further negotiations in Arusha, led by the Tanzanian Minister of Foreign Affairs Hassan Ahmed Dira. The first three rounds in July, August and September were productive. Initially, an agreement was reached on the implementation of a new ceasefire. Furthermore, the integration of the FPR in the army was discussed, along with the issues of democracy and national unity. The framework of an OAU monitory force was set up, with Mali, Nigeria, Senegal, Zimbabwe, Egypt, as well as the parties themselves contributing with 50 soldiers altogether. Also Belgium, France, the USA, Uganda, Zaire and Burundi participated, as observers, in the Arusha negotiations. A joint document on ending the civil war was signed by the parties, as well as the OAU representative and the Tanzanian chair mediator Mkipa. The details concerning the key issues for the power-sharing procedure were however not agreed on. In October, during a fourth round of negotiations, a partial accord on power sharing was signed in Arusha. The progress made during the year did however not last all the way out. In November, the parties failed to agree on the creation of a neutral zone for the OAU observers, as well as on the issue of repatriation of refugees, the participation of the FPR in the transitional government and the final incorporation of the FPR in the Rwandan army.
Third party involvement: YES
Third party involvement names: Zairean President Mobutu, OAU/MOG (Organisation of African Unity Neutral Military Observers Group: Mali, Senegal, Zimbabwe, Nigeria, Egypt), Belgium, USA, France, Zaire, Burundi, Uganda, Tanzania, Tanzanian Minister of Foreign Affairs Hassan Ahmed Dira.
Comment on Third Party Involvement: Mobutu kept his position as mediator only during the first rounds of negotiations in Arusha. Henceforth, the mediation was conducted by the Tanzanian Minister of Foreign Affairs Hassan Ahmed Dira. The OAU was active in setting up the framework of a monitoring force, with Mali, Nigeria, Senegal, Zimbabwe, and Egypt contributing with troops. Belgium, France, USA, Uganda, Zaire and Burundi participated, as observers, in the Arusha negotiations.
Victory: NO
Terminated: NO
1993 Conflict Archive
Negotiations: YES
Comment on Negotiation: In January, negotiations took a step forward as a protocol on power sharing was signed in Arusha between the parties. However, Habyarimanas party MRNDD immediately rejected the agreement. In early February, negotiations broke down. A month later, in March, new peace talks were convened in Arusha with the Tanzanian President Ali Hassan Mwinyi as facilitator. Neither these negotiations nor the ones following in April could produce a solution to the crucial issue of the structure of future unitary Rwandan armed forces. Fresh talks were initiated in Kinihira, in May. During these rounds, progress was made. A timetable for the demobilisation of the 19 000 troops of security forces was agreed on. Consensus was also reached on the creation of a neutral zone to be observed by the OAU observer group GOM. Furthermore, an agreement was signed for the establishment of transitional structures and the demilitarisation of Kigali. In June, agreement was concluded on a protocol for the repatriation of all Rwandan refugees resident in Uganda, Tanzania and Zaire. Recommendations were also made that compensation should be made available to those forced into exile more than 12 years ago.
Third party involvement: YES
Third party involvement names: The UN, the OAU/GOM, Tanzanian President Mwinyi.
UN Assitance Mission for Rwanda (UNAMIR)
Comment on Third Party Involvement: The UN Security Council adopted resolutions on the creation of firstly UNOMUR and then also UNAMIR (up to 2500 troops). The objective with these UN missions was to facilitate the implementation of the peace agreement. UNOMUR was deployed in August, with the mandate to patrol the Ugandan side of the border to ensure that no military supplies would be maintained for the FPR. UNAMIR was deployed in November, with the mandate to monitor the observance of the ceasefire, to contribute to the security of the capital and to facilitate the repatriation of refugees. Before the deployment of UNAMIR, the OAU observer group GOM was acting as monitoring peacekeeping force. The Tanzanian President Ali Hassan Mwinyi was engaged as the main facilitator throughout the whole year of negotiations.
Victory: NO
Terminated: NO
1994 Conflict Archive
Comment on Yearly Battle Related Deaths: The massacres performed by Hutu militias and Hutu civilians are often estimated as having resulted in 500 000 - 800 000 deaths. These deaths are not classified as battle-related and are not included in this study.
Negotiations: YES
Comment on Negotiation: The UN and the OAU made attempts to negotiate ceasefires during the genocide. On 30 May, a meeting took place at the UNAMIR headquarters between the government forces and the FPR. In June, the OAU organised a meeting in Tunis. Negotiations were said to include "both sides" as Uganda was seen as representing the FPR. Tanzania, Burundi, Kenya and Zaire were also participating. In July, the new Rwandan President Bizimungu met the Presidents of Zaire and of Tanzania and concluded agreements on the disarmament and gradual repatriation of refugees. These talks continued in October, with plans to establish a buffer zone where the Hutu refugees would readapt to life in Rwanda. At this time the talks were held without a representative of the ex-government. However, the former Prime Minister Jean Kabanda, an effective leader of the "government-in-exile" in Zaire, made a statement where he firmly rejected any plans concerning the creation of a buffer zone.
Third party involvement: YES
Third party involvement names: The UN, France, the USA.
Comment on Third Party Involvement: The UN acted on several fronts during 1994. In January 1350 troops were dispatched in order to arrive at the intended troop size of 2500 UNAMIR peacekeepers. On 22 April the Security Council decided to withdraw all troops but 270 security guards. However, on 17 May, an agreement was made to send 5500 peacekeepers, in the follow-up mission UNAMIR 2. The mandate included policing of Kigali airport and the protection of refugees in designated safe areas. In mid-June there was only 500 troops on the ground, most of them Ghanaian soldiers. By 4 August, the UN force had only amounted to 1000 troops. The increased violence and the failure of the UN contingents to deploy quickly, prompted the French government to announce its willingness to lead an armed police action, endorsed by the UN. The French military presence was to amount to 2000 troops and maintain strict political neutrality. The intention was to operate from the border regions in a purely humanitarian capacity pending the arrival of a multinational UN force. The plans for the French Opération Turquoise were however criticised by the OAU and the FPR among others, seeing to the political biases of France earlier in the conflict. Despite these objections, the French troops arrived in the end of June and established a safe haven for the displaced population in the southwest. France became further criticised for, in this way, having facilitated the entry of Hutu extremists into Zaire. In mid-July, France began to equip a force of 500 troops drawn from Senegal, Congo, Chad, Niger and Guinea-Bissau to assist the French contingent and to facilitate the transfer of responsibility to the UN. During August, the French troops withdrew. By October, 5433 troops were in place in Rwanda, with the largest contingent from Tunisia, Ghana and Ethiopia. Other UN actions included the 20 June decision to extend the mandate of UNOMUR until 21 September. The UN also sent investigation teams to Rwanda, in order to get reports about past and ongoing human rights offences during the year. In July, a commission of inquiry about possibilities for an international war tribunal was set up. In the end of the month, the UN asked the US to send troops to help bury dead people, but with the hope that the 200-strong force at the same time would attract refugees from Zaire to return.
Victory: YES
Victory side: b
Comment on Victory: The use of armed force is temporarily terminated in 1994. The type of termination could be interpreted as victory, with the FPR as victory party. However, since there was no capitulation by the ousted government and since the conflict re-emerged, the event does not qualify as a victory. In April 1994, hardline forces overthrew the Hutu government and launched a genocide on Tutsis and moderate Hutus. In mid-July, these massacres were stopped by the FPR. The rebels declared victory on 19 July and installed the FPR in government. On the same day, France recognised the FPR as victory party. More than 2 million Hutus, among then the former government, fled the country. Consequently, there was no organised adversary left in the country after 1994. However, in 1998 the armed force resurged. By then, the ex-Far and the Interahamwé, staying in the refugee camps in the DRC, had been able to regroup. Tension between them and the FPR/the government had not been overcome.
Terminated: YES
Type of termination: Victory
Date of termination: 1994-07-19
Comment on Termination: In April 1994, hardline forces overthrew the Hutu government and launched a genocide on Tutsis and moderate Hutus. This was stopped by the FPR, who claimed victory and installed itself as the new government on 19 July. More than 2 million Hutus fled the country. However, in 1998 the armed force resurged. The Hutu refugees (Interahamwé and Ex-FAR) had regrouped in the DRC and tension was still high between them and the FPR/the government. The following three years, 1995-1997, it is uncertain if the conflict reached the criteria of armed conflict.
1996 Conflict Archive
Comment on Activity: In 1996, the conflict between Rwandan government forces and Hutu insurgents increasingly linked to PALIR was concentrated in the northwestern and western parts of the country, particularly Gisenyi, Ruhengeri, Kibuye and areas around Lake Kivu. Clashes took place around villages such as Kibilira, Nyamyumba and Kayove, and in sectors of Nyamuyumba, Buhoko and Gashashi, where government forces reportedly killed infiltrators and seized weapons, mines and other military equipment during cordon-and-search operations. Fighting and security operations also occurred near the southern border with Burundi, for example when government soldiers were killed by an anti-tank mine near Nyungwe forest. Throughout the year, aid workers, UN sources and human rights monitors reported repeated engagements between the army and Hutu rebel groups, with dozens of rebels and government soldiers killed and a significant number of civilians caught in crossfire or killed in the context of anti-insurgency operations.
In several areas, including Cyangugu prefecture in the southwest and rural districts near Kigali, Hutu insurgents targeted local authorities, genocide survivors and community leaders in ambushes and raids, while government forces responded with intensified counter-insurgency measures. Reports described the killing of a burgomaster and her relatives, attacks against civilians in remote villages, grenade incidents and efforts by rebels to free prisoners, as well as RPA operations against suspected infiltrators in forests, caves and rural sectors. Government officials attributed the violence to “criminal elements” from the former regime and Interahamwe militia crossing from Zaire, while PALIR claimed responsibility for some incursions. It was unclear from which date PALIR controlled all insurgent groups attacking Rwanda.
Negotiations: NO
Third party involvement: YES
Third party involvement names: UNAMIR
Victory: NO
Terminated: NO
1997 Conflict Archive
Comment on Activity: In 1997, the conflict between Rwandan government forces and Hutu insurgents linked to ex-FAR/Interahamwe and increasingly associated with PALIR intensified, particularly in the northwestern prefectures of Gisenyi and Ruhengeri but also in Kibuye, Byumba, Gitarama, Kigali Rural and Cyangugu. In Ruhengeri and Gisenyi, the RPA conducted large-scale operations against armed groups attempting to establish bases in communes such as Kigombe, Cyabingo, Kinigi, Satinsyi, Karago and Mutura, reporting the killing of dozens of infiltrators and seizing mortars, machine guns and other weapons. Heavy clashes were reported around Gisenyi town and nearby villages, including Bugogwe, and along the border with the Democratic Republic of Congo, where groups of several hundred PALIR crossed or were repelled, with government sources claiming scores of rebels killed. At the same time, human rights and UN sources documented high civilian death tolls during these operations, including killings in several Ruhengeri communes following attacks on aid workers, in and around Mahoko market in Kanama commune, and in communal detention centres in Kanama and Rubavu, where at least dozens of detainees were reported killed.
PALIR carried out numerous attacks on state representatives, local leaders and civilians across several prefectures. In Gitarama and Kibuye, insurgents mounted large assaults on prisons and jails in Bulinga and Gisenyi town, freeing hundreds of detainees and leaving scores of rebels, guards, prisoners and civilians dead. Further incidents were reported in Byumba, Kigali Rural and Cyangugu, including ambushes on vehicles, roadblocks where passengers were separated and killed, clashes involving security forces and local populations against infiltrators, and engagements around forests and border areas. Throughout the year, government and international reporting described hundreds of people killed in fighting, ambushes and security operations.
Negotiations: NO
Third party involvement: NO
Victory: NO
Terminated: NO
1998 Conflict Archive
Comment on Activity: In 1998, the conflict between Rwandan government forces and Hutu insurgents linked to ALIR, remained intense, particularly in the north‑western prefectures of Gisenyi and Ruhengeri. The RPA conducted repeated operations against insurgent forces based in and around communes such as Kinigi, Giciye, Nyarutovu, Kanama and Gishwati Forest, reporting large numbers of insurgents including field commanders killed. Further clashes were reported in Cyangugu and along Lake Kivu, where security forces tracked insurgent leaders attempting to move across the border, and in Byumba, where insurgent attacks on communes such as Cyungo were met by army counter‑operations. A large‑scale sweep launched in October in Gisenyi and Ruhengeri prefectures resulted, according to military sources, in several hundred insurgents killed and dozens captured, as well as the seizure of weapons and other equipment.
In central Rwanda, ALIR‑linked insurgents operated in Gitarama, where February attacks in communes such as Bulinga were followed by further fighting in Nyabikenke, Nyakabanda, Kayenzi, Rutobwe and surrounding hills in the Ndiza region. Government sources described major engagements in these areas, including clashes around local government buildings, military posts and prisons, during which the army claimed to have killed substantial numbers of insurgents and suffered casualties of its own. Additional confrontations occurred in Kigali Rural and Greater Kigali, where security forces, often acting on information from local residents, intercepted infiltrating units and reported killing or capturing their members. By late 1998, sustained RPA operations in the northwest and centre, combined with pressure along the border, reportedly forced ALIR’s main forces to withdraw back into the Democratic Republic of Congo.
Negotiations: NO
Comment on Negotiation: The Rwandan government rejected demands for negotiation with the armed opposition, accusing the leadership of responsibility for war crimes and genocide. During the negotiations in the DRC conflict, the Rwandan government indeed brought up its concern about insecurity elements along its western border. However, the incompatibility of the Rwandan conflict was not the focus of these negotiations. Also, the Hutu opposition militias were not present at the DRC negotiation table.
Third party involvement: NO
Comment on Third Party Involvement: No third parties were directly involved in the Rwandan conflict. However, with the Rwandan and the DRC conflicts having become intertwined, contact between Rwanda and the third parties active in the DRC conflict surely occurred. Indirect discussions about the incompatibility of the Rwandan internal conflict can be assumed to have taken place. Some of the most active third parties in the DRC conflict were Zambian President Frederick Chiluba, the UN, the OAU and former Botswanan President Sir Ketumile Masire
Victory: NO
Terminated: NO
1999 Conflict Archive
Comment on Activity: In 1999, ALIR largely operated from bases in eastern DR Congo, where they underwent training and prepared renewed incursions against Rwanda. Rwandan authorities stated that several hundred insurgents were killed in military operations during the year as the army targeted training camps and assembly areas for forces intended to launch attacks into Rwanda.
Cross‑border cooperation between the Rwandan army and Uganda as well as RCD also shaped conflict dynamics in 1999. After an ALIR unit carried out attacks on foreign tourists in the border region, Ugandan troops pursued the group into the Democratic Republic of the Congo, where Rwandan forces ambushed the retreating rebels along the road between Goma and Kisoro.
Negotiations: NO
Comment on Negotiation: The Rwandan government rejected demands for negotiation with the armed opposition, accusing the leadership of responsibility for war crimes and genocide. During the negotiations in the DRC conflict, the Rwandan government indeed brought up its concern about insecurity elements along its western border. However, the incompatibility of the Rwandan conflict was not the focus of these negotiations. Also, the Hutu opposition militias were not present at the DRC negotiation table.
Third party involvement: NO
Comment on Third Party Involvement: No third parties were involved in the Rwandan conflict. However, with the Rwandan and the DRC conflicts having become intertwined, contact between Rwanda and the third parties active in the DRC conflict surely occurred. Indirect discussions about the incompatibility of the Rwandan internal conflict can be assumed to have taken place.
Victory: NO
Terminated: NO
2000 Conflict Archive
Comment on Activity: In 2000, the conflict between the government of Rwanda and ALIR was fought in DR Congo, as earlier RPA operations had pushed the movement’s main forces into eastern parts of the neighbouring country. Rwandan forces deployed regular troops in eastern DRC, particularly in support of the Congolese Rally for Democracy (RCD) in areas such as North Kivu and South Kivu, and conducted mobile operations against ALIR. Throughout the year, Rwandan and RCD sources reported a series of offensives around insurgent strongholds, including in Walikale and Rutshuru, claiming to have killed significant numbers of combatants and captured others while clearing areas of armed groups.
On 30 September 2000 ALIR was dissolved into the new organisation FDLR, and by the end of the year most of its troops had merged into this group.
Negotiations: NO
Comment on Negotiation: The Rwandan government rejected demands for negotiation with the armed opposition, accusing the leadership of responsibility for war crimes and genocide. During the negotiations in the DRC conflict, the Rwandan government indeed brought up its concern about insecurity elements along its western border. However, the incompatibility of the Rwandan conflict was not the focus of these negotiations. Also, the Hutu opposition militias were not present at the DRC negotiation table.
Third party involvement: NO
Comment on Third Party Involvement: No third parties were involved in the Rwandan conflict. However, with the Rwandan and the DRC conflicts having become intertwined, contact between Rwanda and the third parties active in the DRC conflict surely occurred. Indirect discussions about the incompatibility of the Rwandan internal conflict can be assumed to have taken place.
Victory: NO
Terminated: NO
2001 Conflict Archive
Comment on Activity: In 2001, FDLR including the newly integrated ALiR forces launched a major cross‑border offensive into northwestern Rwanda, often referred to as “Lords Oracle”, when several thousand combatants re‑entered Gisenyi and Ruhengeri from bases in eastern DR Congo. Rwandan army units, reinforced in the northwest, engaged these forces in a series of battles in areas such as Mutura, Cyanzarwe, Giciye, Kinigi, and around the Volcanoes National Park, as well as in districts later known as Bugarura and Bukonya. Using infantry, armoured personnel carriers and helicopter gunships, the RPA reported killing several hundred to more than a thousand FDLR combatants and capturing many others, including officers and brigade‑level commanders, while also sustaining losses among its own troops. Local residents were described as cooperating with government forces by reporting infiltrators and movements of rebel columns, which facilitated ambushes and large‑scale operations against groups advancing from the border.
Following these engagements in May–July, Rwandan authorities stated that they had effectively routed the invading force and that only scattered FDLR elements remained inside Rwanda, hiding in the Virunga and Gishwati forest areas near the DR Congo border. Subsequent months saw continuing mopping‑up operations by the RPA in northwestern districts, during which smaller groups of infiltrators were intercepted, killed or captured in clashes around Kinigi, Ubukonya and other localities. According to Rwandan military and government reporting, these losses left the force often referred to as “ALIR I” largely spent by the end of the year, and the government maintained that it had restored control over the affected areas despite the presence of remaining insurgent pockets along the frontier.
Negotiations: NO
Comment on Negotiation: The Rwandan government rejected demands for negotiation with the armed opposition, accusing the leadership of responsibility for war crimes and genocide. During the negotiations in the DRC conflict, the Rwandan government indeed brought up its concern about insecurity elements along its western border. However, the incompatibility of the Rwandan conflict was not the focus of these negotiations. Also, the Hutu opposition militias were not present at the DRC negotiation table.
Third party involvement: NO
Comment on Third Party Involvement: No third parties were involved in the Rwandan conflict. However, with the Rwandan and the DRC conflicts having become intertwined, contact between Rwanda and the third parties active in the DRC conflict surely occurred. Indirect discussions about the incompatibility of the Rwandan internal conflict can be assumed to have taken place.
Victory: NO
Terminated: NO
2002 Conflict Archive
Comment on Activity: In 2002, Rwandan government forces clashed with FDLR in operations conducted on Burundian territory and in eastern DR Congo, rather than inside Rwanda. In northern Burundi’s Rukoko sector, Rwandan troops operated alongside Burundian government forces along the Rukaramu–Mpanda road against rebel positions on the Bubanza–Nyabunyegeri side, in mopping‑up operations.
During the same period, Rwandan forces withdrawing from eastern DR Congo under a bilateral peace accord were engaged by FDLR near Uvira in South Kivu. In at least one reported ambush close to the town, Rwandan military sources stated that Rwandan troops suffered casualties when their column was attacked along routes used for the pull‑back towards the Rwandan border.
Negotiations: NO
Comment on Negotiation: Different Rwandan exile movements were calling for an Inter-Rwandan-Dialogue but no steps were taken. The only negotiations that took place were between Rwanda and DRC. An agreement was signed on 30 July. In late September and early October Rwanda recalled its soldiers from the Congo under the terms of the agreement; in return the Congo was to help disarm and repatriate groups of rebels opposed to the Rwandan government based in the eastern Congo.
Third party involvement: NO
Victory: NO
Terminated: YES
Type of termination: No or Low Activity
Date of termination: 2002-12-31
Comment on Termination: No incursions into Rwanda from the DR Congo (Zaire) by ALiR, FDLR or other Hutu rebels were made in 2003. The FDLR was believed to have changed their strategy and kept a low military profile to avoid giving Rwanda a reason to return to DR Congo (Zaire).
Comment on Termination Date: The last clash in 2002 was reported on 1 March in Burundi.
2003 Conflict Archive
Comment on Activity: In 2003, there were no reported armed clashes between Rwandan government forces and FDLR units, either on Rwandan territory or in neighbouring states, and the dyadic conflict was not active during the year.
Terminated: NO
2004 Conflict Archive
Comment on Activity: In 2004, FDLR announced Operation Slingshot, described as an effort to strain relations between Rwanda and the DR Congo. During the year, Rwandan authorities reported attempted incursions by FDLR from eastern DR Congo towards Rwanda, including early April movements that were repulsed by Rwandan forces. In the border area of northern Burundi, Rwandan troops briefly crossed into Burundian territory near Cibitoke while pursuing FDLR elements along a corridor used for movements from the DR Congo towards southern Rwanda, reportedly engaging these forces before withdrawing following Burundian protests.
It remained unclear whether FDLR and the Rwandan army clashed directly in the DR Congo during 2004, although Rwandan officials repeatedly accused the DR Congo government and MONUC of failing to disarm FDLR units and claimed that Rwandan forces carried out limited incursions into eastern DR Congo late in the year.
Comment on Yearly Battle Related Deaths: 16 FDLR rebels were killed in retaliation for the April attack inside Rwanda. 4 more FDLR were killed by the army of Burundi in clashes. 2 governmental soldiers of Burundi were ambushed and killed in revenge for arrest of eight FDLR guerrillas.
Negotiations: NO
Comment on Negotiation: The FDLR continued to ask for an inter-Rwandan dialogue, but the government refused to talk to any group connected to the genocide.
Third party involvement: YES
Third party involvement names: MONUC, Joint Verification Commission (JVC),
Comment on Third Party Involvement: MONUC was responsible for the DDRR of FDLR forces inside DRC. The Joint Verification Commission was established in September 2004 to monitor FDLR and Rwandan activity in DRC.
Victory: NO
Terminated: NO
2005 Conflict Archive
Comment on Activity: The Rwanda: Government conflict was not active in 2005. However, FDLR was repeatedly involved in clashes with the Congolese army (FARDC) in eastern DR Congo, for example around Goma and Masisi in North Kivu, in Kanyabayonga and Rutshuru, and in parts of South Kivu. Since DR Congo was not coded as a secondary warring party in this dyad, these clashes are not treated as part of the Rwanda-FDLR conflict. There were no reported FDLR attacks on Rwandan territory during the year.
Negotiations: NO
Comment on Negotiation: In 2005 there were indirect negotiations related to the Rwanda: Government conflict but Rwanda was not a party to them. On 31 March 2005, after talks in Rome mediated by the Sant’Egidio Community between FDLR leaders and a DR Congo government representative, FDLR signed the Rome Declaration, in which it condemned the 1994 genocide, formally renounced armed struggle against Rwanda, and pledged to disarm voluntarily and return home. Rwanda did not participate in these talks.
Third party involvement: NO
Victory: NO
Terminated: NO
2006 Conflict Archive
Terminated: NO
2007 Conflict Archive
Terminated: NO
2008 Conflict Archive
Comment on Activity: In 2008 no clashes occurred between the government of Rwanda and FDLR. As part of the Nairobi communiqué of 2007 the government of DR Congo had promised to disarm FDLR, by force if necessary. The government of DR Congo clashed with FDLR repeatedly in the Rutshuru territory of the Nord Kivu Province between April and July. In late August a common enemy, CNDP allegedly supported by the government of Rwanda, stepped up their attacks in the region leading to a renewed alliance between the government of DR Congo and FDLR. The two now, instead of fighting, conducted joint attacks on the CNDP rebel group.
Negotiations: NO
Comment on Negotiation: From late October 2008 a cycle of bilateral meetings between Congolese and Rwandan officials was launched to seek a joint response to the CNDP/FDLR crisis. On 10 November 2008 presidents Kabila and Kagame reached a secret deal under which Rwanda would agree to move against Laurent Nkunda and accept a new political role for CNDP within the FARDC in exchange for Congolese action against the FDLR. This agreement, which prepared the ground for the joint operation Umoja Wetu, was negotiated strictly at the state‑to‑state level and did not involve direct talks between the Rwandan government and the FDLR.
Third party involvement: NO
Victory: NO
Terminated: NO
2009 Conflict Archive
Comment on Activity: In 2009, the conflict between the Government of Rwanda and the FDLR was fought almost entirely on Congolese soil. In January–February, Rwanda and the Democratic Republic of Congo launched the joint operation “Umoja Wetu” in North Kivu, with Rwandan and Congolese troops advancing into areas such as Masisi, Rutshuru, Walikale and Lubero to strike FDLR bases and supply routes. Rwandan units operated rapidly and often avoided prolonged engagements as FDLR units withdrew into surrounding hills and forests, while both sides issued conflicting claims about losses. By the time Rwandan forces withdrew at the end of February, FDLR positions around several rear bases and strongholds had been disrupted and many combatants had been pushed into more remote areas.
After Rwanda’s withdrawal, Congolese forces, supported logistically by MONUC, continued large-scale operations against FDLR units in North and South Kivu under Kimia II. FARDC units, sometimes with air and artillery support, recaptured a series of local strongholds and base areas, including FDLR positions in Lubero, Walikale, Rutshuru and Mwenga, and reported killing or capturing a number of FDLR commanders and fighters. FDLR combatants responded with ambushes and attacks on FARDC positions, patrols and police posts in territories such as Masisi, Rutshuru, Lubero, Kabare and Mwenga, while also operating in coalition with Congolese armed groups in some areas. Throughout the year, the dyadic confrontation between Rwanda and FDLR thus continued primarily through Rwanda’s early‑year joint operation and subsequent Congolese offensives closely coordinated with Kigali.
Negotiations: NO
Comment on Negotiation: In 2009, there were no direct talks between the Rwandan government and the FDLR. Instead, negotiations took place at the inter‑state level between Rwanda and DR Congo. A secret understanding between Presidents Kagame and Kabila, finalised in November 2008, led to the launch of joint operation “Umoja Wetu”, under which Rwandan Defence Forces (RDF) units entered eastern DR Congo in January–February 2009 to conduct combined operations with FARDC against the FDLR. In parallel, Kinshasa and Kigali coordinated the removal of Laurent Nkunda and the integration of most CNDP forces into FARDC under Bosco Ntaganda, without involving FDLR in any direct negotiations.
Third party involvement: NO
Victory: NO
Terminated: NO
2010 Conflict Archive
Comment on Activity: In 2010, the conflict between the Government of Rwanda and FDLR was fought on Congolese soil through Congolese army operations in eastern DR Congo. Under Operation Amani Leo, FARDC, with MONUC support, conducted repeated offensives against FDLR positions and strongholds in Nord- and Sud-Kivu, including in territories such as Walikale, Rutshuru, Lubero, Kalehe and Punia. These operations targeted FDLR camps, patrols and rear bases, leading to a series of engagements in which FARDC reported having overrun FDLR positions, destroyed camps and captured or killed a number of combatants, while also sustaining losses among its own troops.
FDLR units responded with ambushes and attacks on FARDC positions, police posts and patrols, sometimes in cooperation with allied groups, particularly in and around mining areas and along key roads in Walikale and Rutshuru territories. Fighting was also reported in Virunga National Park and in the high plateaus of Kalehe, where FARDC and FDLR forces clashed during Amani Leo operations. Throughout the year, the dyadic conflict between Rwanda and FDLR thus continued to play out indirectly via Congolese and UN military action against FDLR forces based in eastern DR Congo, while no incursions into Rwandan territory by FDLR were reported in 2010.
Negotiations: NO
Third party involvement: NO
Victory: NO
Terminated: NO
2011 Conflict Archive
Comment on Activity: In 2011, the conflict between the Government of Rwanda and FDLR was fought on Congolese soil. FARDC, sometimes backed by MONUSCO, continued operations against FDLR positions and patrols in North and South Kivu, including in Walungu, Shabunda, Mwenga, Kalehe and Rutshuru territories. In early 2011 Rwanda and DR Congo agreed in Kigali to strengthen cooperation, and between March and August a small joint force of Congolese and Rwandan soldiers was deployed around Kiseguru north of Kiwanja in Rutshuru, conducting limited operations against FDLRelements in the surrounding area. FARDC and MONUSCO also carried out successive “Jua Mupia” phases in parts of Rutshuru and Masisi, reporting the destruction of FDLR camps and the killing or capture of several combatants, including at least one senior commander.
At the same time, FARDC units in South Kivu and Maniema continued to engage FDLR units in more dispersed operations, including sweeps in areas such as Nindja, Bunyakiri and Irhambi‑Katana, and clashes in Kabare, Walungu and Mwenga where FDLR patrols attacked villages or attempted to loot and were pushed back by Congolese forces. Further south and west, the army confronted FDLR groups in Kabambare territory around Saramabila, and reported additional contacts in Maniema and along routes linking Kivu to interior provinces. These operations were primarily handled by FARDC with UN support; the level of direct Rwandan military involvement was limited to small joint deployments on Congolese territory, and no FDLR incursions into Rwanda were reported during the year.
Negotiations: NO
Comment on Negotiation: In 2011 DR Congo negotiated a preliminary ceasefire agreement with FDLR. Initial contacts were taken in early 2011 and talks led to a preliminary agreement on 17 March. The two FDLR leaders General Gaston Rumuli Iyamuremye and Lieutenant General Sylvestre Mudacumuraopposed the agreement, and the proposal was discarded by the organization in a vote on 29 June. No talks were held directly between the government of Rwanda and FDLR.
Third party involvement: NO
Victory: NO
Terminated: NO
2012 Conflict Archive
Comment on Activity: In 2012, the conflict between the Government of Rwanda and the FDLR remained centred in eastern DR Congo, where Rwandan special forces operated alongside FARDC under Operation Amani Leo until Rwanda announced their withdrawal at the end of August. During the first part of the year, FARDC, sometimes with Rwandan support, conducted operations against FDLR positions in areas of South Kivu such as Idunga, Lubemba, Lawnda, Mpese, Mpese–Cinene–Muyinga–Katasomwa and surrounding localities, as well as in Uvira, Shabunda, Mwenga and Rutshuru territories. These actions included raids on FDLR camps, clashes around villages where FDLR units attempted to loot or move through, and engagements in which Congolese forces reported killing FDLR combatants, seizing weapons and receiving surrenders from fighters and their families. During the same period, Rwandan forces also struck FDLR leadership targets across the border, including the killing of FDLR chief of general staff Léodomir Mugaragu in January, and several FDLR officers were reported killed in clashes with FARDC in North and South Kivu.
In the latter part of 2012, FDLR’s presence in eastern DR Congo continued to be challenged by FARDC operations, while the movement also mounted cross‑border raids into Rwanda. In North Kivu, Congolese forces engaged FDLR units around localities such as Nyaruhange–Birwa, Kibirizi and Loufu, and reported contacts with FDLR elements in Maniema (Kabambare territory, including Saramabila) under operations that followed on from Amani Leo. Towards the end of the year, FDLR combatants crossed from the Gasizi area in eastern DR Congo into Rubavu district and northern Rwanda, attacking Rwandan army positions in sectors such as Cyanzarwe and Bugeshi and later striking a game warden camp near Musanze; in response, the Rwandan Defence Force repelled the incursions and reported killing and capturing FDLR fighters and recovering weapons and documents linked to the group.
Negotiations: NO
Third party involvement: NO
Victory: NO
Terminated: YES
Type of termination: No or Low Activity
Date of termination: 2012-12-31
Comment on Termination: Since 2009 Rwanda had been fighting FDLR in joint operations with DR. Congo in the border provinces of Nord and Sud Kivu. When a new conflict broke out on Congolese territory in early 2012 Rwanda was accused of supporting the opposition side and thereby the fragile relationship between Rwanda and DR. Congo broke down and Rwanda was forced to withdraw their Special Forces from its Congolese neighbour on 30 August 2012. However in December 2012 FDLR rebels crossed the border from the Democratic Republic of Congo and attacked a game warden camp.
2013 Conflict Archive
Negotiations: NO
Comment on Negotiation: Rwandan government has continuously refused any dialogue with FDLR. On 30 December the group issued a new statement claiming they were laying down their weapons to transform their struggle into a political one.
Third party involvement: NO
Victory: NO
Terminated: NO
2014 Conflict Archive
Negotiations: NO
Third party involvement: NO
Victory: NO
Terminated: NO
2015 Conflict Archive
Negotiations: NO
Third party involvement: NO
Victory: NO
Terminated: NO
2016 Conflict Archive
Comment on Activity: In 2016, the conflict between the Government of Rwanda and FDLR remained centred in eastern DR Congo and was largely fought through Congolese army operations. Following the 2015 Kigali agreement to “urgently” address the FDLR issue, FARDC continued the Sukola II and related operations against FDLR positions in North Kivu, particularly in areas between Walikale and Lubero, in Bwito and Rutshuru territories, and along the Virunga National Park. Congolese forces reported retaking a number of localities previously regarded as FDLR strongholds, including places such as Buleusa and surrounding villages, and carried out patrols and ambushes that resulted in repeated clashes with FDLR units along roads like the Ishasha axis near Katwiguru and around military positions in Kilambo and Katale.
Over the year, FARDC also targeted FDLR’s command structure. Several senior officers were killed or captured, including members of the general staff and intelligence leadership, and Congolese and UN reporting noted that large numbers of FDLR combatants were killed, captured or demobilised under these operations. By late 2016, FDLR’s remaining organised positions were described as concentrated mainly in Rutshuru territory, with clusters around Kiringa, Kahumiro, Kazaroho and in Virunga National Park near sites such as Camp Paris and the Nyiragongo volcano. Rwanda’s role was primarily political and indirect, with DR Congo again treated as the primary battlefield and Rwandan security concerns addressed through Congolese and MONUSCO action against FDLR on Congolese soil.
Negotiations: NO
Third party involvement: NO
Victory: NO
Terminated: YES
Type of termination: No or Low Activity
Date of termination: 2016-12-31
2017 Conflict Archive
Comment on Activity: In 2017, the conflict between the Government of Rwanda and FDLR remained largely externalised and was fought at low intensity on Congolese soil, with DR Congo continuing to function as the primary battlefield and secondary warring party. FARDC units clashed with FDLR-FOCA and FDLR‑RUD elements, often operating in loose coalition with Nyatura groups, in parts of North Kivu including Rutshuru, Masisi and around Kitshanga. Engagements were reported around army positions and along key roads, such as attacks on FARDC camps near Kitshanga and Katale and on an escorted convoy near Kahunga, during which Congolese soldiers, police and intelligence personnel were killed or wounded and some FDLR fighters were reported killed or captured, with weapons seized.
These confrontations included joint or coordinated FARDC and police responses to FDLR or FDLR–Nyatura raids on localities such as Bwiza and nearby settlements in Rutshuru territory, where FDLR‑linked units sought to loot cattle and supplies and were subsequently pushed back by Congolese forces. Despite these incidents and continued FDLR presence in rural North Kivu, the clashes remained geographically limited and of relatively low intensity compared to earlier periods, and no incursions by FDLR into Rwandan territory were reported during the year.
Negotiations: NO
Third party involvement: NO
Victory: NO
Terminated: NO
2018 Conflict Archive
Comment on Activity: In 2018, the conflict between the Government of Rwanda and FDLR-FOCA remained centred in eastern DR Congo, where the Government of DR Congo (FARDC) continued as a secondary warring party in the conflict between Rwanda and [FDLR-FOCA]. In Rutshuru and Nyiragongo territories, FDLR-FOCA and coalitions with Nyatura attacked or ambushed FARDC positions and convoys in locations such as Mutaho, Machazo, Bishigiro and along roads near Virunga National Park, while Congolese forces launched counter‑attacks on FDLR-FOCA positions and reported regaining control over contested localities. Several of these engagements involved exchanges of fire around FARDC camps or on main roads, with soldiers killed or missing and some civilians hit in crossfire.
FDLR-FOCA also mounted cross‑border raids into Rwanda from North Kivu. In December, suspected FDLR-FOCA elements crossed from DR Congo into Rubavu District and attacked Rwandan army posts in areas such as Cyamabuye, leading to firefights in which Rwandan forces reported casualties on both sides and recovered weapons. Around the same period, Rwandan authorities reported further incursions into the Rubavu border area, while Congolese sources described clashes between FARDC and FDLR-FOCA at the foot of the Mikeno volcano following the arrest of FDLR-FOCA figures in North Kivu. FDLR-FOCA spokesmen publicly acknowledged attacking Rwandan territory, framing these operations as responses to alleged Rwandan activities in eastern DR Congo.
Negotiations: NO
Third party involvement: NO
Victory: NO
Terminated: NO
2019 Conflict Archive
Comment on Activity: In 2019, DR Congo (Zaire) continued to be a secondary warring party in the conflict between the Government of Rwanda and Rwandan armed groups, with FARDC as the main force engaging FDLR-FOCA, FDLR‑RUD and the RMDC network on Congolese soil. In North Kivu, FARDC (sometimes jointly with RDF) conducted repeated operations against FDLR positions in Rutshuru and neighbouring territories, including the attack near Rusinga in which FDLR commander Sylvestre Mudacumura was killed, while FDLR and FDLR‑RUD units carried out ambushes and raids on FARDC convoys, positions and police posts. In South Kivu, FARDC, often supported by Raia Mutomboki factions, mounted large‑scale offensives against RMDC camps around Bitale, Nguliro, Idunga, Kisenya and other localities, resulting in the killing or capture of several RMDC commanders and the dispersal of many fighters. On 26 November 2019 FARDC attacked a cluster of RMDC camps from Kitindiro, Bibatama, Nyamugari and Rutare, causing the group to retreat and split, with some elements escaping towards the highlands or Kahuzi‑Biega National Park and others intercepted by Raia Mutomboki and handed over for transfer to Rwanda. Despite an apparent collapse and temporary lull, RMDC’s armed presence persisted, and late‑2019 operations, including clashes around Kashovu and in Kalehe, continued to inflict losses on its forces while contributing to significant displacement in parts of Kalehe and neighbouring areas. Overall, 2019 saw the highest number of recorded fatalities in this conflict since 2010, driven by intensified FARDC (and occasionally joint FARDC–RDF) offensives against multiple Rwandan rebel factions in both North and South Kivu.
Negotiations: NO
Third party involvement: NO
Victory: NO
Terminated: NO
2020 Conflict Archive
Comment on Activity: In 2020, three actors were involved in the Rwanda: Government conflict, namely FDLR-FOCA, FDLR-RUD and RMDC. DR Congo remained the secondary warring party, with FARDC as the main force confronting these groups on Congolese soil while Rwanda operated more limited special‑forces deployments. In North Kivu, FARDC and RDF units clashed with FDLR‑FOCA and FDLR‑RUD around Rutshuru and Virunga National Park, including operations and ambushes near localities such as Bishigiro, Maroba, Tongo and Nyabanira, and repeated attacks on eco‑guard patrols in the Sarambwe–Rumangabo area. In South Kivu, FARDC mounted a series of offensives against RMDC positions and remnants, notably around Kalehe, Shabunda and Uvira–Ruzizi plain (Bitale, Nguliro, Idunga, Kahungwe, Kanga, Rugezi and Kabere), sometimes in coordination with Raia Mutomboki groups, recapturing camps, killing and capturing RMDC fighters and commanders and pushing surviving units towards Kahuzi‑Biega and neighbouring areas. Late‑year operations, including simultaneous attacks on a cluster of RMDC camps around Kitindiro, Bibatama, Nyamugari and Rutare, further weakened the group’s local base, although RMDC leadership and combatants remained active and continued to present themselves as preparing armed actions against Rwanda from eastern DR Congo and Nyungwe.
Negotiations: NO
Third party involvement: NO
Victory: NO
Terminated: YES
Type of termination: No or Low Activity
Date of termination: 2020-12-31
Comment on Termination: The Chad: Government conflict was terminated as of the end of 2020 due to low activity in 2021.
2021 Conflict Archive
Terminated: NO
2022 Conflict Archive
Comment on Activity: In 2022, the conflict between the Government of Rwanda and Rwandan armed groups remained centred in eastern DR Congo and the Rwanda–Burundi border area. RDF units crossed from Rwanda and clashed with FDLR‑FOCA and allied Nyatura CMC elements around Kibumba, Kakomero, Nyasheke and Machazo. M23, operating alongside RDF, also fought FDLR‑FOCA, FDLR‑RUD and local groups in villages including Bushigiro, Maroba, Rusekera, Butalongola, Kisharo and Kakomero–Rwaza, overrunning several FDLR‑linked positions and camps. Tensions between RDF and FARDC surfaced directly along the Nyiragongo border, where Rwandan soldiers exchanged fire with Congolese troops and in at least one incident shot and killed a FARDC soldier they claimed to have mistaken for an FDLR combatant.
Further south, RMDC units based in the Kibira–Nyungwe forest zone on the Burundi–Rwanda–DR Congo border clashed with the Burundian army in Cibitoke province, in fighting that also involved Kinyarwanda‑speaking elements who had moved from DR Congo into Burundi. From these same rear areas, RMDC claimed cross‑border attacks into Rwanda’s Southern and Western Provinces, including clashes reported by RDF and the Rwandan police near Rusizi and along main roads in southern Rwanda. At the political level, presidents of DR Congo, Burundi, Kenya and Uganda, with Rwanda represented by its foreign minister, met in Nairobi in April and agreed to establish and urgently deploy an East African regional force under Congolese command to “fight the negative forces” in eastern DR Congo, explicitly including FDLR and other Rwanda‑origin rebel groups, while calling on Congolese armed groups to enter a political process or face regional military action.
Terminated: NO
2023 Conflict Archive
Comment on Activity: In 2023, the conflict between the Government of Rwanda and Rwandan armed groups became increasingly intertwined with the DR Congo–M23 war and played out primarily through engagements between RDF‑supported M23 forces and FDLR‑aligned groups in eastern DR Congo. In North Kivu, FDLR‑FOCA and associated Nyatura CMC units repeatedly clashed with and ambushed M23 and RDF columns in Rutshuru and Masisi territories, including around Kazaroho, Kinyandonyi, Kanyali, Muti, Kamena, Kasali, Maroba and the “9ième” area, causing casualties on both sides and, in some incidents, civilian deaths and destruction of property. FDLR‑RUD elements fought RDF and M23 in localities such as Kataka, Nyabanyira, Nkwenda and Nyabanira, losing several fighters and at least one senior commander, while RDF and M23 also confronted coalitions of FDLR‑FOCA, Nyatura and APCLS around Kisingati and Magera I–II. Parallel to this, RMDC/FLN units based in and around the Kibira–Nyungwe forest zone continued to mount cross‑border operations into Rwanda, claiming attacks on RDF positions.
Terminated: NO
2024 Conflict Archive
Comment on Activity: In 2024, the conflict between the Government of Rwanda and FDLR‑FOCA remained closely intertwined with the DR Congo–AFC (former M23) war, and overall intensity decreased compared to 2023, although clashes escalated again in the second half of the year. In North Kivu, FDLR‑FOCA units, sometimes operating alongside VDP/community‑based forces, took part in fighting against RDF and M23 around key positions such as Ndumba hill southwest of Sake and in areas of Tongo, where FDLR‑linked contingents joined Wazalendo attempts to retake localities like Butare from RDF and M23. Over the course of the year, RDF and M23 expanded into zones long associated with FDLR-FOCA and allied groups, including Mashango east of Kitchanga and Marangara east of Tongo.
At the political level, Rwanda and DR Congo negotiated under Angolan mediation a harmonized plan for the neutralization of the FDLR and disengagement of forces, with Rwanda signalling that a withdrawal of several thousand RDF troops from Congolese territory would be contingent on effective action against FDLR structures. This regional diplomatic track, alongside continued front‑line engagements involving FDLR‑FOCA elements on the Wazalendo side and RDF/M23 advances into traditional FDLR rear areas, shaped the lower‑intensity but still active Rwanda–FDLR‑FOCA dyad over the course of 2024.
Negotiations: NO
Third party involvement: NO
Victory: NO
Terminated: NO
2025 Conflict Archive
Comment on Activity: In 2025, the conflict between the Government of Rwanda and FDLR-FOCA (Forces Démocratiques de Libération du Rwanda, Democratic Liberation Forces of Rwanda) increased in intensity as clashes erupted in and around Goma town on Congolese territory. In July, the Rwandan military reportedly backed AFC in a military campaign against FDLR in Rutshuru territory, North Kivu province of DR Congo.
Negotiations: NO
Third party involvement: NO
Victory: NO
Terminated: NO
