General information
Type of Incompatibility: Government
Date of first stated goal of incompatibility: 1987-10-15
Comment on date of first stated goals of incompatibility: In Burkina Faso, armed conflict over government took place in connection with a 15 October 1987 coup. On this day, a previously unknown group named the Popular Front (Front Populaire, FP), composed of well-known political figures, led by Blaise Compaoré, staged an attack against President Thomas Sankara’s Ouagadougou presidential palace. Sankara, and several of his closest advisors and guards, were killed in the attack. In doing so, the FP revealed their willingness to use force to overturn the sitting government.
Due to the nature of coups – requiring secrecy and the element of surprise to be effective – a statement of incompatibility preceding the violence could not be found. In radio broadcasts from Ouagadougou monitored the same evening as the overthrow of government, the coup-makers charged Sankara with having concentrated too much power in his own hands and explained that the objective of the coup had been “to put an end as of October 15 to the autocratic regime of Thomas Sankara, to stop the process of neo-colonial restoration underway by this traitor of the revolution”, thus providing the conflict with a retroactive statement of incompatibility.
Several days after the coup, in his first comments directly to the press, Compaoré added that the take-over had been a preventive act to save his and his allies’ lives. In 1987, rumours had begun to emerge of disagreements between Sankara and several leading members of the country’s political sphere, including second-in-command and close friend Compaoré. Allegedly, Sankara was intending to have him and other key figures arrested and subsequently killed at a meeting scheduled for the day of the take-over. This was dismissed as untrue by people close to Sankara.
Date of first use of armed force: 1987-10-15
Comment on first use of armed force: On the afternoon of 15 October 1987, the Popular Front attacked the Ouagadougou presidential palace, marking the onset of the conflict
Date of first battle related death: 1987-10-15
Comment on first battle related death: The Popular Front’s attack against the Ouagadougou presidential palace resulted in the death of head of state Thomas Sankara and several of his closest aids and guards. Allegedly, the attackers are said to first have killed several presidential guards – who put up resistance – before Sankara himself faced the coup-makers and was killed by three shots to the stomach.
Date of conflict reached 25 battle releated deaths: 1987-10-15
Comment on conflict reached 25 battle releated deaths: The coup-related violence that lasted one day is thought to have claimed close to 100 lives, including that of President Thomas Sankara and a dozen of his closest advisors and guards. Among those killed were said to be the presidential spokesman, legal advisor, and the head of army health services. Following the initial attack against the presidential palace late in the afternoon on 15 October 1987, sporadic gunfire could be heard in the capital Ouagadougou for more than three hours.
Annual information
This section contains annual information systematically collected by the UCDP.
1987
Primary Parties: Government of Burkina Faso - Popular Front
Dimension: Internal
| Estimated Fatalities | |
|---|---|
| High | 25 |
| Best | 25 |
| Low | 0 |
Numbers include fatalities for all dyads both active and inactive for this year
2014
Primary Parties: -
Dimension: Internal
| Estimated Fatalities | |
|---|---|
| High | 0 |
| Best | 0 |
| Low | 0 |
Numbers include fatalities for all dyads both active and inactive for this year
2015
Primary Parties: -
Dimension: Internal
| Estimated Fatalities | |
|---|---|
| High | 1 |
| Best | 1 |
| Low | 1 |
Numbers include fatalities for all dyads both active and inactive for this year
2016
Primary Parties: -
Dimension: Internal
| Estimated Fatalities | |
|---|---|
| High | 5 |
| Best | 5 |
| Low | 5 |
Numbers include fatalities for all dyads both active and inactive for this year
2017
Primary Parties: -
Dimension: Internal
| Estimated Fatalities | |
|---|---|
| High | 13 |
| Best | 10 |
| Low | 10 |
Numbers include fatalities for all dyads both active and inactive for this year
2018
Primary Parties: Government of Burkina Faso - JNIM
Secondary Warring Parties Side A: Government of Mali
Dimension: Internationalized intrastate
Comment on Dimension: In 2018, the conflict between the Burkinabe government and JNIM was internationalized, with Mali supporting the government side.
The neighboring countries Burkina Faso, Mali, Mauritania, Niger, and Chad face similar challenges, as they are all - more or less - targeted by Islamist organizations. In 2014, these countries agreed to establish the Joint Force of the G5 Sahel—Force Conjointe du G5 Sahel (FC-J5S), aimed at together neutralizing the islamist groups. While the force has been hampered by delays due to lacking financing, it carried out its first operation in late 2017 and in January 2018, Operation Pagnali was launched in the border zone between Mali and Burkina Faso, with the objective of “destroying the supply chains of armed terrorist groups and to contain their movements.” Pagnali was carried out jointly by Burkinabe and Malian troops.
| Estimated Fatalities | |
|---|---|
| High | 103 |
| Best | 79 |
| Low | 70 |
Numbers include fatalities for all dyads both active and inactive for this year
2019
Primary Parties: Government of Burkina Faso - JNIM
Secondary Warring Parties Side A: Government of France
Dimension: Internationalized intrastate
Comment on Dimension: In 2019, the conflict between the Burkinabe government and JNIM was internationalized, with France supporting the government side. The French support came both via the French-led counter-terrorism Operation Barkhane and Operation Sabre. Operation Sabre is a task force of 300-400 special forces based in Kamboinsin, on the outskirts of Ouagadougou, with a mandate to conduct counter-terrorism operations.
A note on the so-called G5 Sahel joint force (FC-G5S) is also warranted. The force was set up by the Sahel's five countries - Burkina Faso, Chad, Niger, Mali and Mauritania - in February 2017, as a means of settling the armed conflicts in the region. More specifically, the joint force's mandate - which is one of peace enforcement rather than peace keeping - includes fighting terrorism and restoring state authority. However, the force struggles with funding deficiencies as well as a lack of troops, and cooperation and coordination between the contributing countries remain problematic. Furthermore, the the G5 countries have largely chosen to continue operating as singular units, instead of working together, operating in their own country, in a strip of 50 kilometres on their side of the border, with a right of pursuit. Since also IS is a target for the G5 force, and since several of the countries participating have their own incompatibilities against these groups, a coding rule was created so as to be able to determine which events should be coded to which dyad. Under this rule, fighting carried out on a country’s own soil was recorded as part of that particular conflict, whereas fighting carried across the border, in a neighboring country, was recorded as an action assisting the government of that country. Following this coding rule, none of the countries contributing troops to the G5-Sahel was recorded as a secondary warring party in 2019.
| Estimated Fatalities | |
|---|---|
| High | 404 |
| Best | 271 |
| Low | 185 |
Numbers include fatalities for all dyads both active and inactive for this year
2020
Primary Parties: Government of Burkina Faso - JNIM
Secondary Warring Parties Side A: Government of France
Dimension: Internationalized intrastate
Comment on Dimension: In 2020, the conflict between the Burkinabe government and JNIM was internationalized, with France supporting the government side. The French support came both via the French-led counter-terrorism Operation Barkhane, and Operation Sabre. On a number of occasions, Barkhane conducted airstrikes against JNIM targets during the year. Operation Sabre is a task force of 300-400 special forces based in Kamboinsin, on the outskirts of Ouagadougou, with a mandate to conduct counter-terrorism operations.
A note on the so-called G5 Sahel joint force (FC-G5S) is also warranted. The force was set up by the Sahel's five countries - Burkina Faso, Chad, Niger, Mali and Mauritania - in February 2017, as a means of settling the armed conflicts in the region. More specifically, the joint force's mandate - which is one of peace enforcement rather than peace keeping - includes fighting terrorism and restoring state authority. However, the force struggles with funding deficiencies as well as a lack of troops, and cooperation and coordination between the contributing countries remain problematic. Furthermore, the the G5 countries have largely chosen to continue operating as singular units, instead of working together, operating in their own country, in a strip of 50 kilometres on their side of the border, with a right of pursuit. Since also IS regional wing ISGS is a target for the G5 force, and since several of the countries participating have their own incompatibilities against these groups, a coding rule was created so as to be able to determine which events should be coded to which dyad. Under this rule, fighting carried out on a country’s own soil was recorded as part of that particular conflict, whereas fighting carried across the border, in a neighboring country, was recorded as an action assisting the government of that country. Following this coding rule, none of the countries contributing troops to the G5-Sahel was recorded as a secondary warring party in 2020.
| Estimated Fatalities | |
|---|---|
| High | 359 |
| Best | 352 |
| Low | 183 |
Numbers include fatalities for all dyads both active and inactive for this year
2021
Primary Parties: Government of Burkina Faso - JNIM
Secondary Warring Parties Side A: Government of Chad, Government of France, Government of Ghana, Government of Ivory Coast, Government of Niger, Government of Togo
Dimension: Internationalized intrastate
Comment on Dimension: In 2021, the conflict between Burkina Faso’s government and JNIM was internationalized, as the former received support from France, Chad, Niger, Ivory Coast, Ghana and Togo.
France’s support came both via the French-led counter-terrorism Operation Barkhane and Operation Sabre. On a number of occasions, Barkhane conducted airstrikes against JNIM targets during the year. Operation Sabre is a task force of 300-400 special forces based in Kamboinsin, on the outskirts of Ouagadougou, with a mandate to conduct counter-terrorism operations.
In February, Chad deployed troops to the multinational G5 Sahel joint force (FC-G5S) for the first time. The force was set up by the Sahel's five countries - Burkina Faso, Chad, Niger, Mali and Mauritania - in February 2017, as a means of settling the armed conflicts in the region. More specifically, the joint force's mandate - which is one of peace enforcement rather than peace keeping - includes fighting terrorism and restoring state authority. However, the force struggles with funding deficiencies as well as a lack of troops, and cooperation and coordination between the contributing countries remain problematic. Furthermore, the G5 countries have largely chosen to continue operating as singular units, instead of working together, operating in their own country, in a strip of 50 kilometers on their side of the border, with a right of pursuit. Since also IS regional wing ISGS is a target for the G5 force, and since several of the countries participating have their own incompatibilities against these groups, a coding rule was created so as to be able to determine which events should be coded to which dyad. Under this rule, fighting carried out on a country’s own soil was recorded as part of that particular conflict, whereas fighting carried across the border, in a neighboring country, was recorded as an action assisting the government of that country. Since Chad deployed troops for operations in the tri-border area called Liptako-Gourma, which straddles Burkina Faso, Niger and Mali, they are recorded as secondary warring parties to all these governments. It should be noted, that the Chadian troops were recalled after only six months in the field.
Niger is also part of the FC-G5S, contributing troops to the force. However, it is unclear if the joint Burkina – Niger operations that were reported in June and December were carried out by the multinational force or by the countries bilaterally. Regardless, Nigerien troops carried out joint operations with Burkinabe ones on a number of occasions in 2021, both coordinating and cooperating militarily.
In November 2021, Burkina Faso carried out a joint, anti-JNIM operation with Ivorian, Ghanaian and Togolese troops, on both sides of the countries’ common borders.
| Estimated Fatalities | |
|---|---|
| High | 924 |
| Best | 821 |
| Low | 706 |
Numbers include fatalities for all dyads both active and inactive for this year
2022
Primary Parties: Government of Burkina Faso - JNIM
Secondary Warring Parties Side A: Government of France, Government of Niger, Government of Togo
Dimension: Internationalized intrastate
Comment on Dimension: In 2022, the conflict between Burkina Faso’s government and JNIM was internationalized, as the former received support from France, Niger and Togo.
France’s support came both via the French-led counter-terrorism Operation Barkhane and Operation Sabre. On a number of occasions during the year, Barkhane conducted airstrikes against JNIM targets. Operation Sabre is a task force of 300-400 special operations forces based in Kamboinsin, on the outskirts of Ouagadougou, with a mandate to conduct counter-terrorism operations. However, relations between the Burkinabe government and France deteriorated during the year, as anti-French sentiments among the population grew, and in early 2023, the ruling junta requested that France withdraw all its troops from its territory.
Neighboring Niger is suffering from armed conflicts against the same Islamist groups actively fighting the Burkinabe government, and the two countries has both coordinated and carried out a number of joint operations in the border area. Furthermore, during the year, the Nigerien air force took part in an air operation targeting JNIM in Centre Nord’s Bam province.
2022 saw JNIM moving even further south, targeting both Benin and Togo. In September, Burkinabe armed forces, Volunteers for the Homeland and Togolese forces carried out a joint operation against the group in Centre Est’s Koulpélogo province.
| Estimated Fatalities | |
|---|---|
| High | 1936 |
| Best | 1705 |
| Low | 1612 |
Numbers include fatalities for all dyads both active and inactive for this year
2023
Primary Parties: Government of Burkina Faso - JNIM
Secondary Warring Parties Side A: Government of Mali, Government of Niger
Dimension: Internationalized intrastate
Comment on Dimension: The conflict between the Burkinabe government and JNIM remained internationalized in 2023, with the former being supported by troops from neighboring Niger and Mali.
It is worth noting that France no longer assisted the government militarily. France's long-time support had previously come via both via the French-led counter-terrorism Operation Barkhane and Operation Sabre. However, with the coups placing military juntas in power in Ouagadougou, the relationship between the two countries deteriorated and the French forces were withdrawn by request from the Burkinabe regime.
In contrast, Burkina Faso's relationship with neighboring Niger and Mali - also governed by military regimes - grew increasingly close and in September, the three countries created a defense alliance, the “Alliance of Sahel States”. Joint operations were carried out both before and after this.
| Estimated Fatalities | |
|---|---|
| High | 4929 |
| Best | 4021 |
| Low | 4001 |
Numbers include fatalities for all dyads both active and inactive for this year
2024
Primary Parties: Government of Burkina Faso - JNIM
Secondary Warring Parties Side A: Government of Niger
Dimension: Internationalized intrastate
Comment on Dimension: The conflict between the Burkinabe government and JNIM remained internationalized in 2024, with the former being supported by troops from neighboring Niger.
Burkina Faso's relationship with neighboring Niger and Mali - also governed by military regimes – continued to strengthen. In September 2023, the three countries had created a mutual defense alliance, the “Alliance of Sahel States” (AES) and in July 2024, this pact was turned into a confederation. One of the main objectives of the new confederation was to increase coordination in the fight against both JNIM and the Sahel branch of IS. A joint military force was also announced, but its deployment in the field was unclear in 2024. Some sources announced that it was already in existence, but in early 2025, Niger’s defense chief stated that the 5000 strong force would “soon” deploy. Regardless, in Burkina Faso, the year saw Joint operations take place with Niger.
A note is also warranted on Burkina Faso’s relationship with Russia. Just like fellow AES states, Burkina Faso cut its ties with France after the 2022 coup, instead turning to Russia for military assistance. At the start of 2024, the new Russian force “Africa Corps”, succeeding the Wagner Group, deployed 100 men to the country. In contrast to Wagner Group, Africa Corps is directly subordinate to Russia's Defence Ministry. However, Russia is not coded as a secondary warring party, since the Russian troops were mandated to train Burkinabe soldiers, and not to take part in fighting. In late August the Russian troops were withdrawn from Burkina Faso and deployed to Ukraine.
| Estimated Fatalities | |
|---|---|
| High | 2581 |
| Best | 2136 |
| Low | 2018 |
Numbers include fatalities for all dyads both active and inactive for this year
2025
Primary Parties: Government of Burkina Faso - JNIM
Secondary Warring Parties Side A: Government of Niger
Dimension: Internationalized intrastate
Comment on Dimension: The conflict between the Burkinabe government and JNIM remained internationalized in 2025, with Niger supporting the former militarily.
AES, the mutual defense alliance turned confederation, created by Mali, Burkina Faso and Niger in 2024, continued to deepen, at least on paper. Much focus was places on joint security cooperation and at the December summit, a joint battalion for counterterrorism operations across borders was announced. While it is unclear how much de facto cooperation occurred under AES flag during the year, there were several instances of joint Niger – Burkina Faso operations in the eastern part of the country.
| Estimated Fatalities | |
|---|---|
| High | 4367 |
| Best | 2939 |
| Low | 2870 |
Numbers include fatalities for all dyads both active and inactive for this year
Conflict Archive
This section contains annual information no longer systematically collected by the UCDP.
1987 Conflict Archive
Comment on Yearly Battle Related Deaths: "According to most accounts, including those given by diplomatic sources at the scene, up to 100 people are thought to have been killed in violence related to the coup. The bulk of the deaths are thought to have occurred when Sankara’s presidential guard put up fierce resistance to the coup-makers, in connection with the latter’s attack on the Ouagadougou presidential palace. Included among the deaths were the sitting President Thomas Sankara and a dozen of his closest aides and guards, whom witnesses reporting seeing the following day, being buried in a make-shift grave outside of the capital Ouagadougou. This group of deaths was later conceded by incumbent president Blaise Compaoré.
Another estimate puts the total death-toll at between 30 and 40, reflected in the low estimate, whereas Compaoré conceded only a total of 20 deaths in the time-period of the coup."
Negotiations: NO
Third party involvement: NO
Victory: YES
Victory side: b
Comment on Victory: The coup-makers under the leadership of Blaise Compaoré killed sitting President Thomas Sankara in their attack against the Ouagadougou presidential palace, and succeeded in overturning the sitting government. Sankara, whose death was announced the day after the 15 October coup, is said by the coup-makers to have been killed when resisting arrest. But according to eyewitness statements, Sankara was ambushed and shot by one of Compaoré’s bodyguards, in a manner that appeared premeditated. In a radio message monitored shortly after the coup had taken place, the government, the cabinet and the ruling National Revolutionary Council (NRC) had been dissolved. The NRC was replaced by the new umbrella organization Popular Front (Front Populaire, FP).
The new government ordered the release of all political prisoners, but detained four members of cabinet for refusing to pledge their allegiance to the new leadership. In the central Burkinabè town Koudougou, a unit of soldiers mutinied, causing tension before the unit’s leader fled the country and the group acceded to the new rule.
On 31 October 1987, the new leadership announced the formation of a new government, with Compaoré as president. The two other leading coup-makers, Major Jean-Baptiste Lingani and Captain Henri Zongo, maintained their governmental posts with responsibility for the defence and economics portfolios. Compaoré and his FP, however, had to struggle to gain national and regional legitimacy – there was widespread objection to the coup and Sankara’s death – and Ouagadougou remained tense for some time.
Comment on Victorious Side: On 31 October 1987 a new government was formed under the leadership of coup-leader Blaise Compaoré, and his newly formed Popular Front movement. It soon emerged that former president Thomas Sankara’s top three aides – in addition to Compaoré also Major Jean-Baptiste Lingani and Captain Henri Zongo – had conspired to overthrow him and made up the back-bone of the new government.
Terminated: YES
Type of termination: Victory
Date of termination: 1987-10-15
Comment on Termination: The coup-makers under the leadership of Blaise Compaoré killed sitting President Thomas Sankara in their attack against the Ouagadougou presidential palace, and succeeded in overturning the sitting government. Sankara, whose death was announced the day after the 15 October coup, is said by the coup-makers to have been killed when resisting arrest. But according to eyewitness statements, Sankara was ambushed and shot by one of Compaoré’s bodyguards, in a manner that appeared premeditated. In a radio message monitored shortly after the coup had taken place, the government, the cabinet and the ruling National Revolutionary Council (NRC) had been dissolved. The NRC was replaced by the new umbrella organization Popular Front (Front Populaire, FP).
The new government ordered the release of all political prisoners, but detained four members of cabinet for refusing to pledge their allegiance to the new leadership. In the central Burkinabè town Koudougou, a unit of soldiers mutinied, causing tension before the unit’s leader fled the country and the group acceded to the new rule.
On 31 October 1987, the new leadership announced the formation of a new government, with Compaoré as president. The two other leading coup-makers, Major Jean-Baptiste Lingani and Captain Henri Zongo, maintained their governmental posts with responsibility for the defence and economics portfolios. Compaoré and his FP, however, had to struggle to gain national and regional legitimacy – there was widespread objection to the coup and Sankara’s death – and Ouagadougou remained tense for some time.
Comment on Termination Date: The coup-makers under the leadership of Blaise Compaoré killed sitting President Thomas Sankara in their attack against the Ouagadougou presidential palace, and succeeded in overturning the sitting government. Sankara, whose death was announced the day after the 15 October coup, is said by the coup-makers to have been killed when resisting arrest. But according to eyewitness statements, Sankara was ambushed and shot by one of Compaoré’s bodyguards, in a manner that appeared premeditated. In a radio message monitored shortly after the coup had taken place, the government, the cabinet and the ruling National Revolutionary Council (NRC) had been dissolved. The NRC was replaced by the new umbrella organization Popular Front (Front Populaire, FP).
The new government ordered the release of all political prisoners, but detained four members of cabinet for refusing to pledge their allegiance to the new leadership. In the central Burkinabè town Koudougou, a unit of soldiers mutinied, causing tension before the unit’s leader fled the country and the group acceded to the new rule.
On 31 October 1987, the new leadership announced the formation of a new government, with Compaoré as president. The two other leading coup-makers, Major Jean-Baptiste Lingani and Captain Henri Zongo, maintained their governmental posts with responsibility for the defence and economics portfolios. Compaoré and his FP, however, had to struggle to gain national and regional legitimacy – there was widespread objection to the coup and Sankara’s death – and Ouagadougou remained tense for some time.
2014 Conflict Archive
Terminated: NO
2015 Conflict Archive
Terminated: NO
2016 Conflict Archive
Terminated: NO
2017 Conflict Archive
Terminated: NO
2018 Conflict Archive
Comment on Activity: While JNIM carried out its first attack on Burkinabe soil already in July 2017, it was not until the following year that violence between the group and the Burkinabe army escalated to the extent that the 25 battle-related deaths threshold was crossed and the conflict was recorded as active in UCDP data. During 2018, the Mali connection was clear in that the group carried out a large proportion of its attacks in regions bordering Malian; Sahel in the far north, Nord, to the west of Sahel, and Boucle du Mouhoun, west of Nord. JNIM began carrying out a range of attacks, the types of which would become familiar over the following years: planting land mines, conducting ambushes on military convoys as well as attacks on military- and gendarme positions. Furthermore, specific public figures, such as individual police officers or local politicians were targeted and killed. In March 2018, the group also brazenly carried out a twin attack in Burkina’s capital, Ouagadougou, targeting the French Embassy and the Army Headquarter.
Also in 2018, JNIM began establishing bases in the country’s Est region, where it was joined by IS regional wing ISGS. The chaotic situation in the region meant that it was impossible to separate between the different groups in a vast majority of attacks. Thus, while only a handful of events could be safely attributed to JNIM, this is most likely only a small fraction of the actual number.
Negotiations: NO
Comment on Negotiation: There were no negotiations in 2018.
Third party involvement: NO
Victory: NO
Terminated: NO
Type of termination: Not terminated
2019 Conflict Archive
Comment on Activity: In 2019, the conflict escalated, as JNIM continued to expand its area of operation, carrying out attacks also in Centre Nord, just south of Sahel and further afield, in the country’s southern regions bordering Ivory Coast, Ghana, Togo and Benin.
Negotiations: NO
Comment on Negotiation: There were no negotiations in 2019.
Third party involvement: NO
Victory: NO
Terminated: NO
Type of termination: Not terminated
2020 Conflict Archive
Comment on Activity: In 2020, the conflict continued to escalate, and JNIM retained its large area of operation.
Negotiations: NO
Comment on Negotiation: The Burkinabe authorities seen to have shifted their position on negotiations with the islamists. Having been completely opposed to engaging with JNIM in a dialogue, they now appeared open to the idea.
However, it is unclear whether any negotiations did come off the ground during 2020. There were rumors to that effect in September (only concerning talks with local group active in Soum province), but no more information surfaced. Given that the level of violence in Soum did in fact decrease in the lead-up to the November presidential elections, some argued that a truce may have been negotiated.
Third party involvement: NO
Terminated: NO
Type of termination: Not terminated
2021 Conflict Archive
Comment on Activity: In 2021, the conflict escalated dramatically, going from a little over 350 fatalities in 2020, to almost 850. This was due both to an increase in the number of attacks in areas where the group was already entrenched, and to its continuously expanding reach, which made it capable of carrying out attacks in new areas. Furthermore, the conflict saw both sides inflicting heavy losses on one another in a number of large-scale attacks. Notably, in November, JNIM carried out an attack on a gendarme post in Inata town in the northern Soum province, killing some 53 gendarmes, the highest toll recorded in the rank of the security forces in a single attack.
Negotiations: NO
Comment on Negotiation: Officially, the government for a long time advocated for a purely military approach to the jihadist groups operating in the country, frequently announcing its refusal on principal to “negotiate with terrorists”. While there were signs of a change in this stance in February 2021, when Prime Minister Christophe Dabire implied that the government could be open to dialogue, this did not amount to the initiation of substantial talks with the groups in question. Rather, it soon became clear that the government continued to oppose talks with the leaders of both JNIM and IS, be it national or regional ones, instead aiming to target individual fighters from Burkina Faso. The idea, then, was to attempt to separate moderate fighters from their mother group, and subsequently reintegrate them into society. These types of initiates appear to have sprung up in several parts of the country, but since they did not aim to involve the leadership of the group, and since they did not revolve around the incompatibility, they are not recorded as negotiations by UCDP.
Third party involvement: NO
Comment on Third Party Involvement: There was no third party involvement in the conflict in 2021.
Victory: NO
Terminated: NO
Type of termination: Not terminated
2022 Conflict Archive
Comment on Activity: The security situation in Burkina Faso continued to deteriorate in 2022, and the country saw two military coups connected to this during the year (neither of which caused fighting that crossed the 25 battle-related deaths threshold). Fatalities doubled in the conflict between the government and JNIM compared to the year prior, with numbers going from a little over 800 in 2021, to more than 1600, and the conflict was recorded as a war in UCDP data for the first time. During the year, JNIM was able to both extend its geographical reach and to carry out a number of large-scale attacks against the armed forces. It was one such attack – an ambush on a convoy heading to the besieged town Djibo on 26 September, causing 27 fatalities among the security forces – that seemed to have served as a trigger for the second coup of the year, four days later (the first coup was carried out in January).
Negotiations: NO
Comment on Negotiation: There were no negotiations, as defined by UCDP, between the parties in 2022, but steps were taken indicating a willingness to engage in dialogue on the side of the government. After the January coup, the new regime’s stance on negotiations softened, and it was reported that Junta leader Paul-Henri Sandaogo Damiba aimed to launch a new strategy blending military operations with dialogue. However, it remained unclear if this would mean a national dialogue, involving the government, or that was a way to show its approval of the ongoing local initiatives. Indicating the latter option, the government in April stated that it would provide logistical support and formal mandates to local communities engaged in talks, and that it would offer livelihood opportunities for fighters who agreed to disarm.
Third party involvement: NO
Comment on Third Party Involvement: There was no third party involvement in 2022.
Victory: NO
Terminated: NO
Type of termination: Not terminated
2023 Conflict Archive
Comment on Activity: In 2023, violence in the conflict soared to new heights; fatality numbers had more than doubled between 2021 and 2022 and in 2023, at almost 3800, they were up by as much as 137 % from the year prior. Not only did the armed confrontations multiply and turn increasingly deadly, they also spread geographically, devastating areas that had previously been relatively spared, such as Centre Est’s Boulgou and Koulpélogo provinces, bordering Ghana and Togo. While the government made frequent use of drone strikes against Islamist fighters (albeit clearly hitting civilian targets on multiple occasions), JNIM carried out numerous ambushes, oftentimes targeting the Volunteers for the Defence of the Homeland (VDPs), an auxiliary unit to the armed forces that had been created in 2020, and also carried out complex and large-scale attacks on military camps.
Negotiations: NO
Comment on Negotiation: There were no negotiations in 2023. With the coup of September 2022, which brought Ibrahim Traoré to power, the space for dialogue shrank substantially. The new junta declared total war against the jihadists, and with that, the local negotiations efforts underway in some areas, which had previously been supported by the state, were banned.
Third party involvement: NO
Victory: NO
Terminated: NO
Type of termination: Not terminated
2024 Conflict Archive
Comment on Activity: In 2024, the level of violence de-escalated compared to the peak in 2023. However, compared to previous years in the period, violence and fighting continued to soar, and with almost 2150 deaths incurred during the year, this was the second highest notation ever in the conflict. The armed encounters were less frequent than in 2023, but the year saw the deadliest instances of fighting yet, with the army suffering unprecedented death tolls in ambushes and attacks. While earlier years had seen one or two spectacular attacks annually, in 2024 they multiplied. From late March through early August, JNIM carried out a string of deadly attacks on the army and VDP, in completely different areas of the country. The two most devastating attacks took place in Yagha and Gourma provinces. In early June, JNIM overran an army camp in Mansila, Yagha, killing more than 100 soldiers, before moving on to attack the civilian population. In early August, JNIM carried out its most deadly attacks to date, when the group hit a military convoy carrying some 1000 civilians between Ougarou and Boungou towns, in the country’s Est region. Having taken a short-cut through a forested area, the convoy was caught in the ambush and the subsequent fighting was very intense, leaving some 150 soldiers dead, as well as more than 40 civilians. While the army called in drones, their effectiveness was very limited given the forest cover.
Negotiations: NO
Comment on Negotiation: The junta under Ibrahim Traoré retained its total war, no-dialogue strategy, under which all initiatives revolving around discussions with the jihadists were banned.
Third party involvement: NO
Victory: NO
Terminated: NO
Type of termination: Not terminated
2025 Conflict Archive
Comment on Activity: In 2025, the levels of violence escalated once again and the year saw just below 3000 fatalities in the conflict, the second highest notation ever. JNIM significantly escalated its military campaign, shifting from dispersed insurgent tactics toward more coordinated, large-scale assaults on military positions, including the overrunning of key bases in the northern and eastern regions. Furthermore, the group increasingly engaged in forms of local governance and consolidated control over rural areas, effectively besieging government-held population centers. The overall intensification of the conflict was the result of numerous peaks in violence, spread out over large parts of the country. The most violent period of the year was March through June, when multiple regions experienced near-simultaneous spikes in violence. In the Sahel and Centre-Nord regions, insurgent operations included coordinated attacks on military outposts and VDP positions, often resulting in high casualty events. This period also coincided with increased military operations by state forces, generating cycles of retaliation. A massacre of at least 130 Fulani civilians by state forces in March, in Solenzo, Boucle du Mouhoun region served as a trigger event for the escalation of the conflict. It generated immediate JNIM reprisal operations, such as the attack on Diapaga in the East region, which killed between 50 and 60 soldiers and militia. Another major event during the year was JNIM’s attack on Djibo, the provincial capital of Soum, which had been under siege for several years. On 11 May, hundreds of JNIM fighters attacked the town, temporarily overrunning parts of the town and the military base and killing around 50 soldiers as well as many civilians.
Negotiations: NO
Comment on Negotiation: There were no negotiations between the parties in 2025.
Third party involvement: NO
Comment on Third Party Involvement: There was no third party involvement in 2025.
Victory: NO
Terminated: NO
Type of termination: Not terminated
