General information
Type of Incompatibility: Territory
Comment on Type of Incompatibility: The incompatibility concerns the territorial status of the northern and southern provinces of Sri Lanka, which traditionally have had a Tamil majority. The claim of an independent state of Tamil Eelam, covering the northern and eastern provinces, was first formalized in the Vaddukoddai resolution, signed by a broad alliance within the Tamil political leadership in 1976. It has become the political foundation for the armed separatist struggle that has been fronted by the LTTE from 1975. During the late 80s and 90s the LTTE accepted no political solution short of an independent state in their interactions with the government. With reference to more recent statements by the LTTE leadership there has arguably been a change in the incompatibility. On 26 November 2001 the LTTE leader V. Prabhakaran for the first time left a window open for a political solution of the conflict, short of an independent state of Tamil Eelam. According to Prabhakaran their core demand of self-determination within a Tamil homeland could be realized through autonomy arrangements within a unitary Sri Lanka.
Territory: Eelam
Date of first stated goal of incompatibility: 1976-05-14
Comment on date of first stated goals of incompatibility: The record relating to the early phase of the Tamil militancy is unclear. The above date refers to the passing of the Vaddukoddai resolution, which was the first official call for the establishment of a separate state of Tamil Eelam, covering the northern and eastern parts of Sri Lanka. It reads that "the reconstitution of the Free, Sovereign, Secular, Socialist State of Tamil Eelam [...] has become inevitable in order to safeguard the very existence of the Tamil Nation in this country". It was signed by the Tamil United Liberation Front (TULF), an alliance dominating the political Tamil leadership in the mid 60s. The LTTE and its early predecessor, the Tamil New Tigers (TNT), started out as pure military outfits, and it is difficult to find early political statements specifying their distinct view on the actual realization of Tamil self-determination. The small, but concerted militant struggle of the Tiger movement was however, from its beginning in the mid-70s, known for pursuing the more extreme goal of Tamil independence, also at a time when the more moderate political leaders did not publicly share this view. At the time of the Vaddukoddai resolution the links between TULF and the LTTE was known to be strong, with the leader of the LTTE present at the Vaddukoddai convention and Uma Maheswaran, one of the central persons in the TULF leadership, becoming political leader in LTTE the next year.
Date of first use of armed force: 1975-07-27
Comment on first use of armed force: The records relating to the early phase of Tamil militancy are unclear, especially regarding the first embryonic structures of armed separatism taking hold in the 70s. Several incidents of violence and armed clashes between Tamil youth and the police are reported to take place from the mid 70s. The degree of organisation among the perpetrators and the records of the events are, however, not clear. Among such incidents are the riots in Jaffna, 16 August 1976 and LTTEs alleged involvement in January 1978, in the assassination of a TULF MP, who had switched allegiance to the ruling party. The first use of armed force that the LTTE as a established group officially claimed responsibility for was the killing of a police patrol on its way to a LTTE training camp on 7 April 1978. At the same time that the LTTE made this statement they also acknowledged several past acts of violence, among them the assassination of the Mayor on Jaffna on 27 July 1975. This date is before the formal establishment of LTTE on 5 May 1976, but the same rebel structures under the leadership of Prabhakaran are known to be active under the name Tamil New Tigers from 22 May 1972. This assassination is thus recorded as the first use of armed force.
Date of first battle related death: 1975-07-27
Comment on first battle related death: The records relating to the early phase of Tamil militancy is unclear, especially with regard to the first embryonic structures of armed separatism beginning to take hold in the 70s. Several incidents of violence and armed clashes between Tamil youth and the police are reported from the mid 70s and onwards. The degree of organisation among the perpetrators and the records of the events are not clear. Among such incidents are the riots in Jaffna, 16 August 1976 and LTTEs alleged involvement in January 1978, in the assassination of a TULF MP, who had switched allegiance to the ruling party.
The first use of armed force that the LTTE as an established group officially claimed responsibility for was the killing of a police patrol on its way to a LTTE training camp on 7 April 1978. At the same time that the LTTE made this admittance they also acknowledged several past acts of violence, among these the assassination of the Mayor on Jaffna on 27 July 1975. The LTTE was not formally established before 5 May 1976, but the same rebel structures under the leadership of Prabhakaran from 22 May 1972. The assassination is thus recorded as the first battle-related death.
Date of conflict reached 25 battle releated deaths: 1984-09-01
Comment on conflict reached 25 battle releated deaths: On 1 September 1984 five policemen were killed in an explosion at Thikkam, Jaffna. These deaths added to events in attacks on police and military during the year added upto 25 battle-realted deaths.
Annual information
This section contains annual information systematically collected by the UCDP.
1975
Primary Parties: -
Dimension: Internal
| Estimated Fatalities | |
|---|---|
| High | 1 |
| Best | 1 |
| Low | 0 |
Numbers include fatalities for all dyads both active and inactive for this year
1976
Primary Parties: -
Dimension: Internal
| Estimated Fatalities | |
|---|---|
| High | 0 |
| Best | 0 |
| Low | 0 |
Numbers include fatalities for all dyads both active and inactive for this year
1978
Primary Parties: -
Dimension: Internal
| Estimated Fatalities | |
|---|---|
| High | 1 |
| Best | 1 |
| Low | 0 |
Numbers include fatalities for all dyads both active and inactive for this year
1984
Primary Parties: Government of Sri Lanka - LTTE, TELO
Dimension: Internal
| Estimated Fatalities | |
|---|---|
| High | 86 |
| Best | 80 |
| Low | 80 |
Numbers include fatalities for all dyads both active and inactive for this year
1985
Primary Parties: Government of Sri Lanka - EPRLF, LTTE, TELO
Dimension: Internal
| Estimated Fatalities | |
|---|---|
| High | 1069 |
| Best | 917 |
| Low | 914 |
Numbers include fatalities for all dyads both active and inactive for this year
1986
Primary Parties: Government of Sri Lanka - LTTE
Dimension: Internal
| Estimated Fatalities | |
|---|---|
| High | 25 |
| Best | 25 |
| Low | 0 |
Numbers include fatalities for all dyads both active and inactive for this year
1987
Primary Parties: Government of Sri Lanka - LTTE
Dimension: Internal
Comment on Dimension: Following the Indo-Sri Lanka Agreement of July (between the governments of India and Sri Lanka), India sent a peacekeeping force to implement the terms of the agreement and help disarming the Tamil militant forces. However, the Indian Peacekeeping Force (IPKF), while not coded as a secondary warring party as a result of its peacekeeping mandate, became involved in fighting the LTTE in early October. This intervention was the result of a decision made in light of the LTTE failing to comply with the terms of the agreement (to which it was not a signatory). Here, the IPKF is coded as a third party since technically speaking it was still a peacekeeping-force, considering the stipulations of its mandate. It was reported that IPKF use of force would be directed at those who broke the terms of the accord, irrespective of their affiliation. Hence, the IPKF cannot be coded as a secondary warring party, since in theory it was not. It should be noted however, that in practice the forces were directly involved in battle.
| Estimated Fatalities | |
|---|---|
| High | 1002 |
| Best | 1002 |
| Low | 2 |
Numbers include fatalities for all dyads both active and inactive for this year
1988
Primary Parties: Government of Sri Lanka - LTTE
Dimension: Internal
Comment on Dimension: Following the Indo-Sri Lanka Agreement of July 1987 (between the governments of India and Sri Lanka), India sent a peacekeeping force to implement the terms of the agreement and help disarming the Tamil militant forces. However, the Indian Peacekeeping Force (IPKF), while not coded as a secondary warring party as a result of its peacekeeping mandate, became involved in fighting the LTTE in early October. This intervention was the result of a decision made in light of the LTTE failing to comply with the terms of the agreement (to which it was not a signatory). As a result of talks between India and Sri Lanka in March 1988, it was determined that Sri Lankan forces would cooperate with the IPKF in the eastern parts of the country. Despite this, the IPKF is coded as a third party since technically speaking it was still a peacekeeping-force, considering the stipulations of its mandate. It should be noted however, that in practice the forces were directly involved in battle.
| Estimated Fatalities | |
|---|---|
| High | 25 |
| Best | 25 |
| Low | 0 |
Numbers include fatalities for all dyads both active and inactive for this year
1989
Primary Parties: Government of Sri Lanka - EPRLF, LTTE
Dimension: Internal
Comment on Dimension: From 1987 the Indian Peace Keeping Forces (IPKF) had been deployed in the northern and eastern Sri Lanka with a mandate to supervise the implementation of the Indo-Sri Lanka accord, signed by the two countries in 1987. The accord aimed to end Tamil separatism through a political solution, with the establishment of a system of provincial councils on the island and the linking of the northern and eastern districts into one administrative unit, in return for the disarmament of the militant Tamil cadres. The implementation of the accord proved problematic, and soon after the arrival of the IPKF they found themselves increasingly entangled in factional fighting within the Tamil militancy, particularly with the LTTE. Several observers would argue that the IPKF engaged in offensive warfare on the side of the government. Because IPKFs mandate was peacekeeping it is still not recorded as a secondary warring party, but as a third party.
The presence of Indian troops were increased from 7000 in 1987 to over 75 000 by mid 1988. This number was gradually reduced, but in early 1989 the IPKF had at least 45 000 in the north and the east provinces, and it is estimated that the IPKF lost about 600 soldiers only during only that year.
| Estimated Fatalities | |
|---|---|
| High | 145 |
| Best | 145 |
| Low | 145 |
Numbers include fatalities for all dyads both active and inactive for this year
1990
Primary Parties: Government of Sri Lanka - LTTE
Dimension: Internal
Comment on Dimension: The last remaining IPKF troops were withdrawn on 24 March 1990. Their departure was welcomed by both the government and the LTTE.
| Estimated Fatalities | |
|---|---|
| High | 4608 |
| Best | 3569 |
| Low | 3561 |
Numbers include fatalities for all dyads both active and inactive for this year
1991
Primary Parties: Government of Sri Lanka - LTTE
Dimension: Internal
| Estimated Fatalities | |
|---|---|
| High | 6787 |
| Best | 6432 |
| Low | 6432 |
Numbers include fatalities for all dyads both active and inactive for this year
1992
Primary Parties: Government of Sri Lanka - LTTE
Dimension: Internal
| Estimated Fatalities | |
|---|---|
| High | 4247 |
| Best | 4091 |
| Low | 4091 |
Numbers include fatalities for all dyads both active and inactive for this year
1993
Primary Parties: Government of Sri Lanka - LTTE
Dimension: Internal
| Estimated Fatalities | |
|---|---|
| High | 2347 |
| Best | 2075 |
| Low | 2075 |
Numbers include fatalities for all dyads both active and inactive for this year
1994
Primary Parties: Government of Sri Lanka - LTTE
Dimension: Internal
| Estimated Fatalities | |
|---|---|
| High | 746 |
| Best | 657 |
| Low | 657 |
Numbers include fatalities for all dyads both active and inactive for this year
1995
Primary Parties: Government of Sri Lanka - LTTE
Dimension: Internal
| Estimated Fatalities | |
|---|---|
| High | 5062 |
| Best | 4755 |
| Low | 4748 |
Numbers include fatalities for all dyads both active and inactive for this year
1996
Primary Parties: Government of Sri Lanka - LTTE
Dimension: Internal
| Estimated Fatalities | |
|---|---|
| High | 4254 |
| Best | 3868 |
| Low | 3868 |
Numbers include fatalities for all dyads both active and inactive for this year
1997
Primary Parties: Government of Sri Lanka - LTTE
Dimension: Internal
| Estimated Fatalities | |
|---|---|
| High | 3959 |
| Best | 2880 |
| Low | 2880 |
Numbers include fatalities for all dyads both active and inactive for this year
1998
Primary Parties: Government of Sri Lanka - LTTE
Dimension: Internal
| Estimated Fatalities | |
|---|---|
| High | 4419 |
| Best | 3762 |
| Low | 3762 |
Numbers include fatalities for all dyads both active and inactive for this year
1999
Primary Parties: Government of Sri Lanka - LTTE
Dimension: Internal
| Estimated Fatalities | |
|---|---|
| High | 2616 |
| Best | 1882 |
| Low | 1882 |
Numbers include fatalities for all dyads both active and inactive for this year
2000
Primary Parties: Government of Sri Lanka - LTTE
Dimension: Internal
| Estimated Fatalities | |
|---|---|
| High | 4155 |
| Best | 2525 |
| Low | 2525 |
Numbers include fatalities for all dyads both active and inactive for this year
2001
Primary Parties: Government of Sri Lanka - LTTE
Dimension: Internal
| Estimated Fatalities | |
|---|---|
| High | 1145 |
| Best | 1144 |
| Low | 1144 |
Numbers include fatalities for all dyads both active and inactive for this year
2002
Primary Parties: -
Dimension: Internal
| Estimated Fatalities | |
|---|---|
| High | 6 |
| Best | 6 |
| Low | 6 |
Numbers include fatalities for all dyads both active and inactive for this year
2003
Primary Parties: Government of Sri Lanka - LTTE
Dimension: Internal
| Estimated Fatalities | |
|---|---|
| High | 46 |
| Best | 29 |
| Low | 17 |
Numbers include fatalities for all dyads both active and inactive for this year
2004
Primary Parties: -
Dimension: Internal
| Estimated Fatalities | |
|---|---|
| High | 18 |
| Best | 17 |
| Low | 3 |
Numbers include fatalities for all dyads both active and inactive for this year
2005
Primary Parties: Government of Sri Lanka - LTTE
Dimension: Internal
| Estimated Fatalities | |
|---|---|
| High | 90 |
| Best | 88 |
| Low | 88 |
Numbers include fatalities for all dyads both active and inactive for this year
2006
Primary Parties: Government of Sri Lanka - LTTE
Dimension: Internal
| Estimated Fatalities | |
|---|---|
| High | 2845 |
| Best | 1970 |
| Low | 1970 |
Numbers include fatalities for all dyads both active and inactive for this year
2007
Primary Parties: Government of Sri Lanka - LTTE
Dimension: Internal
| Estimated Fatalities | |
|---|---|
| High | 3070 |
| Best | 2494 |
| Low | 2391 |
Numbers include fatalities for all dyads both active and inactive for this year
2008
Primary Parties: Government of Sri Lanka - LTTE
Dimension: Internal
| Estimated Fatalities | |
|---|---|
| High | 9917 |
| Best | 8262 |
| Low | 8262 |
Numbers include fatalities for all dyads both active and inactive for this year
2009
Primary Parties: Government of Sri Lanka - LTTE
Dimension: Internal
| Estimated Fatalities | |
|---|---|
| High | 13702 |
| Best | 10165 |
| Low | 10136 |
Numbers include fatalities for all dyads both active and inactive for this year
2014
Primary Parties: -
Dimension: Internal
| Estimated Fatalities | |
|---|---|
| High | 0 |
| Best | 0 |
| Low | 0 |
Numbers include fatalities for all dyads both active and inactive for this year
2018
Primary Parties: -
Dimension: Internal
| Estimated Fatalities | |
|---|---|
| High | 0 |
| Best | 0 |
| Low | 0 |
Numbers include fatalities for all dyads both active and inactive for this year
Conflict Archive
This section contains annual information no longer systematically collected by the UCDP.
1975 Conflict Archive
Terminated: NO
1976 Conflict Archive
Terminated: NO
1978 Conflict Archive
Terminated: NO
1984 Conflict Archive
Comment on Activity: 1984 saw numerous incidents of violence between government forces and Tamil separatist-forces. A large proportion of the incidents were located in and around the Jaffna-district in the northern part of the island. Reportedly, this year saw the use of more lethal weaponry than before.
Attempts were made to settle the conflict politically through talks beginning in early January addressing possible ways of devolving power and authority.
Comment on Yearly Battle Related Deaths: All counts are conservative. Deaths are only attributed to groups when group name has been explicitly stated.
Negotiations: NO
Comment on Negotiation: Attempts were made to settle the conflict politically through talks beginning in early January addressing possible ways of devolving power and authority. However these talks did not include the main belligerents, and hence they are not classified as negotiations.
Third party involvement: NO
Victory: NO
Terminated: NO
1985 Conflict Archive
Comment on Activity: The situation was described as “rapidly escalating” early on in the year.
The LTTE carried out a large number of attacks, located primarily in the northern and eastern parts of the island. Tactics used included landmine-attacks and ambushes. During the year, there were also more direct battles taking place between the LTTE and state-forces.
Both TELO and EPRLF carried out attacks during the year; in the case of the former party, the attack on the Yal Devi train in January was notable. In the case of ERPLF, a triple-attack was launched in early May, although it led to several casualties for the attacking party.
Reports of forceful attacks from the government were also reported, for instance following the LTTE-attack on Anuradhapura in May. People who were, or were thought to be separatists were executed on more than one occasion.
The Tamil insurgency was nonetheless hard to withstand, and in September Sri Lankan President Jayewardene admitted that the government had lost control of parts around Trincomalee. The town of Jaffna also fell under rebel control during this year.
Between June and September there was a ceasefire between the government and all militant groups. This ceasefire was not adhered to to any great extent however.
Comment on Yearly Battle Related Deaths: All counts are conservative. Deaths are only attributed to groups when group name has been explicitly stated.
Negotiations: YES
Comment on Negotiation: Starting on 8 July, negotiations took place between the government and umbrella-group ENLF (although the groups included in ENLF sent their own representatives) as well as the PLOTE and the TULF. The negotiations were held in Thimpu, Bhutan, under Indian auspices.
The government negotiating team proposed creating district councils, enjoying jurisdiction over certain issues. The northern districts would be made into a separate province.
The Tamil groups on their part rejected the government proposals and made a joint statement, pointing out 4 principles to be followed in resolving the incompatibility: “1. Recognition of the Tamils of Sri Lanka as a nation.
- Recognition of the existence of an identified homeland for the Tamils in Sri Lanka.
- Recognition of the right of self determination of the Tamil nation.
- Recognition of the right to citizenship and the fundamental rights of all Tamils who look upon the island as their country.” This standpoint was in turn rejected by the government-side. The talks were put to an end in August, after reports of security-forces breaking the ceasefire currently in effect in Sri Lanka. India attempted to get the peace-talks back on track again, and met with both the ENLF and the Sri Lankan government. In October, this led to a renewal of the ceasefire that had been in effect (albeit violated) between June and September. However, in early November the ENLF withdrew from the talks.
Third party involvement: YES
Third party involvement names: Bhutan, India
Comment on Third Party Involvement: Negotiations were held in Thimpu, capital of Bhutan, in July and August.
New Indian Prime Minister Rajiv Ghandi, was an initiator of the Thimpu talks, and India also pressured the ENLF to participate and attempted to prevent the collapse of the talks. Rajiv Ghandi’s approach to Sri Lanka’s warring parties marked a shift away from the approach taken by his late mother, former Prime Minister Indira Ghandi.
India was active as a third party outside the negotiations as well, for instance it assisted in drafting peace initiatives.
Victory: NO
Comment on Victory: Attempts were made to settle such as the Thimpu talks but to no avail.
Terminated: NO
1986 Conflict Archive
Comment on Activity: The LTTE was behind several attacks throughout the year; tactics included laying out landmines as well as carrying out more regular attacks. The group came to enjoy extensive control over parts of the Jaffna-district, and in March was reported to be in de facto charge of law and order, despite governmental presence. In September came reports of the LTTE setting up a parallel administration.
Governmental forces also carried out a number of attacks during the year, notably in May when they carried out an operation aimed at reclaiming the control of Jaffna town in the north. After a few days the government proclaimed almost full control, however two days later the LTTE announced that it had taken back what had been lost.
During the year was also reported a change in battle-field location; the conflict came to be more centred on the eastern parts, after the northern parts had come to be dominated by the LTTE.
Aside from battling the government, the LTTE also fought against other Tamil militant groups. During the year the group managed to severely cripple both the EPRLF and the TELO.
Negotiations: NO
Comment on Negotiation: During 1986 India met with representatives of the Sri Lankan government on several occasions to discuss the conflict. Indian government representatives also met with the LTTE leadership (and with leaders of other Tamil militant groups).
In late December an unofficial government-delegation met with the LTTE in a town located on the Jaffna-peninsula. While there is some unclarity regarding the subject of the talks there is one account stating that the government-delegation was tasked to find out what the possibilities were to start new talks. The LTTE stated that talks would not be initiated if 3000 Tamil prisoners detained without trial were not released first.
Third party involvement: YES
Third party involvement names: India
Comment on Third Party Involvement: During 1986 India met with representatives of the Sri Lankan government on several occasions to discuss the conflict. Indian government representatives also met with the LTTE leadership (and with leaders of other Tamil militant groups)
Victory: NO
Terminated: NO
1987 Conflict Archive
Comment on Activity: Government forces carried out offensives in the north during the first three months of the year.
Between 26 May and 10 June, they notably carried out “Operation Liberation”, aimed at the north-eastern parts of the Jaffna-peninsula where the LTTE held positions. The operation succeeded in capturing Velvettithurai, Point Pedro, and later the area surrounding Atcheveli. This operation caused heavy civilian suffering.
LTTE reportedly largely left Jaffna, leaving the civilian population at the mercy of the security forces resulting in large numbers of civilians killed. According to Anton Balasingham of the LTTE, this year saw the first use of the Black Tiger suicide squad. This attack is said to have been a component of the counteroffensive launched in response to the government’s “Operation Liberation”.
The year also saw a continuation of LTTE-attacks. However following the entry of the Indian Peacekeeping Force (IPKF) the main part of LTTE fighting came to be directed at them. The Indian force quickly seized control over Jaffna.
The year also saw fighting between the LTTE and other Tamil separatist groups, both in the Northern and the Eastern parts of the island.
Negotiations: NO
Comment on Negotiation: While negotiations between the Government of Sri Lanka and the LTTE did not take place, the Indo-Sri Lankan Agreement (Indo-Lanka Accord) was signed by Sri Lankan President Junius Jayewardena and Indian Prime Minister Rajiv Ghandi on 29 July.
The agreement outlined the short-term merger of the Eastern and Northern provinces into one unit, the longer-term future of which would be determined through a referendum. Further the agreement called for a cessation of hostilities and the disarmament of Tamil militant groups, which was to be immediately followed by the governmental forces withdrawing to their camps. The agreement also stipulated that India would assist in implementing its terms by providing military assistance if required, and that it would make sure its territory was “not used for activities prejudicial to the unity, integrity and security of Sri Lanka”.
The LTTE was not party to the agreement and there are differing accounts regarding whether or not the LTTE endorsed the agreement (or if the group did, the extent to which this was a voluntary decision). In light of this it should be mentioned that Anton Balasingham, theoretician and political advisor of the LTTE, claimed a secret “Gentlemen’s agreement” was reached between the LTTE and Rajiv Ghandi prior to the official signing of the Accord. This agreement allegedly guaranteed the LTTE a dominant role in an interim administration in the new north-eastern province and stipulated that complete disarmament under the Indo-Sri Lankan Accord would not be necessary in practise. Moreover the Indian government undertook to supply the LTTE with money and weapons. In return the LTTE would not oppose the Accord between the Sri Lankan and Indian governments. However, Balasingham himself states that this agreement was secret, and due to its sensitive nature impossible to put into writing. Hence this piece of information is unconfirmed.
Third party involvement: YES
Third party involvement names: India
Comment on Third Party Involvement: Throughout the year, India played an active part in attempting to bring the conflict to a close by for instance trying to instigate talks between the government and the Tamils. The Sri Lankan Government discussed the conflict and its possible solutions with the Indians on several occasions. India also had meetings with the LTTE leadership, notably in connection with the Indo-Sri Lankan Accord of July.
Following the Indo-Sri Lanka Agreement of July (between the governments of India and Sri Lanka), India sent a peacekeeping force to implement the terms of the agreement and help disarming the Tamil militant forces. However, the Indian Peacekeeping Force (IPKF), while not coded as a secondary warring party as a result of its peacekeeping mandate, became involved in fighting the LTTE in early October. This intervention was the result of a decision made in light of the LTTE failing to comply with the terms of the agreement (to which it was not a signatory). Here, the IPKF is coded as a third party since technically speaking it was still a peacekeeping-force, considering the stipulations of its mandate. It was reported that IPKF use of force would be directed at those who broke the terms of the accord, irrespective of their affiliation. Hence, the IPKF cannot be coded as a secondary warring party, since in theory it was not. It should be noted however, that in practice the forces were directly involved in battle.
Victory: NO
Terminated: NO
1988 Conflict Archive
Comment on Activity: The vast majority of the fighting occurred between the Indian Peacekeeping Force (IPKF) that had been present in Sri Lanka since October 1987, and the LTTE. The first Sri Lankan attack on the LTTE since the signing of the Indo-Sri Lankan Agreement (late July 1987) took place in mid-April. As a result of talks between India and Sri Lanka in March, it was determined that Sri Lankan forces would cooperate with the IPKF in the east.
The main scene of fighting came to be the eastern parts of the country. Batticaloa had become the main stronghold for the LTTE following the IPKF’s capture of Jaffna the previous year.
In early September, President Jayewardena announced that the northern and eastern provinces would be merged together in accordance with the agreement of 1987 and that elections to a provincial council would be held. The LTTE refused to partake in the political process.
Comment on Yearly Battle Related Deaths: All counts are conservative. Deaths are only attributed to groups when group name has been explicitly stated.
Negotiations: NO
Comment on Negotiation: During the year Indian representatives spoke with both LTTE and the Sri Lankan government. In January, Indian Prime Minister Ghandi and Sri Lankan President Jayewardene discussed the Indo-Sri Lankan Accord of July 1987 and possibilities of a withdrawal of the Indian Peacekeeping troops present in the country. Talks with the LTTE, which were often unofficial in nature, concerned the possibilities of a ceasefire.
Third party involvement: YES
Third party involvement names: India
Comment on Third Party Involvement: During the year Indian representatives spoke with both LTTE and the Sri Lankan government.
Following the Indo-Sri Lanka Agreement of July 1987 (between the governments of India and Sri Lanka), India sent a peacekeeping force to implement the terms of the agreement and help disarming the Tamil militant forces. However, the Indian Peacekeeping Force (IPKF), while not coded as a secondary warring party as a result of its peacekeeping mandate, became involved in fighting the LTTE in early October. This intervention was the result of a decision made in light of the LTTE failing to comply with the terms of the agreement (to which it was not a signatory). As a result of talks between India and Sri Lanka in March 1988, it was determined that Sri Lankan forces would cooperate with the IPKF in the eastern parts of the country. Despite this, the IPKF is coded as a third party since technically speaking it was still a peacekeeping-force, considering the stipulations of its mandate. It should be noted however, that in practice the forces were directly involved in battle.
Victory: NO
Terminated: NO
1989 Conflict Archive
Comment on Activity: In the early months of the year active fighting was primarily between the Indian Peace Keeping Force and the LTTE. By mid-1989 the government and LTTE had apparently made joint cause, as the government announced the demand for IPKFs rapid withdrawal. As negotiations between India and Sri Lanka commenced and the IPKF started to withdraw from the eastern and northern districts, intra-factional fighting between the LTTE and other armed Tamil groups intensified. By the end of the year, the Indian backed Tamil alliance had been virtually destroyed by the LTTE, which at the time actually appeared to have the tacit support of the central government. The LTTE thus moved in to take control over the territory progressively evacuated by the IPKF. By the mid-90s the LTTE had virtual control of the Jaffna peninsula.
Negotiations: YES
Comment on Negotiation: The first formal peace talks between representatives of the central government and the LTTE were conducted on 11 May 1989. The parties were at the time temporarily united in the opposition against further Indian intervention into the conflict. With escalatory violence in early 1989, the Premadesa- government was under hard pressure both from the marxist sinhalese JVP in the south and the separatist LTTE in the north to push for the withdrawal of the Indian forces.
On 28 June the LTTE decided to transform its temporary ceasefire agreement with the Sri Lankan army into a permanent cessation of hostilities. In response the government announced that it would collaborate with the LTTE to secure the withdrawal of IPKF from Sri Lanka. Following months of peace talks with the government, the political wing of the LTTE was recognized as a political party under the name the Peoples Front of the Liberation Tigers. The LTTE subsequently demanded the resolution of the newly established provincial council and the call for new elections, for the LTTE to compete.
Negotiations also commenced between the Indian and Sri Lankan government. Indias concern was primarily with the security of the Tamil groups which had accepted the Indo Lanka accord in 1987. After an all-part peace conference in mid-September, in which all Tamil groups attended, an agreement was reached under which the Indian troops should leave by the end of the year. A much delayed agreement between the two governments was signed on 18 September 1989. The last IPKF soldier left Sri Lanka on 24 March 1990.
Third party involvement: YES
Third party involvement names: India
Comment on Third Party Involvement: In accordance with the India-Sri Lankan accord, signed in mid 1987, India deployed peacekeeping forces on the contested territory to supervise the implementation of the accord, i.e. cessation of hostilities and the surrender of arms. Soon after its arrival the IPKF became however entangled in fighting with the LTTE, while supporting other of the Tamil armed groups. Because of the IPKFs participation in regular warfare and its active role as a separate warring party, several observers would argue that the IPKF on Sri Lanka should not be considered as a regular peacekeeping force, but rather a secondary warring party fighting on the side of the government. The force arrived, however, with a peacekeeping mandate. Following the strict definitions of the conflict-database IPKFs presence is recorded as third party involvement.
Victory: NO
Terminated: NO
1990 Conflict Archive
Comment on Activity: The IPKF had withdrawn by the end of March 1990. Between Oct. 1987 and March 1990, 1155 IPKF soldiers and 683 LTTE soldiers is estimated to have lost 1155 soldier is estimated to have been killed in the fighting.
Shortly after the IPKF had departed warfare re-emerged between the Sinhalese army and the LTTE. On 10 June separatist warfare resumed and broke the 14 months-long peace talks.
The fighting throughout the year was largely taking place in the eastern provinces. In the north the LTTE had moved in and filled the power vacuum left by the withdrawal of the Indian forces. The political wing of LTTE set up a parallel civilian administration on Jaffna peninsula. The LTTE ran a de facto state on the territory from 1990 to 1995, with a political power-structure, police force, law courts, postal service etc.
Comment on Yearly Battle Related Deaths: )
Negotiations: YES
Comment on Negotiation: On 23 February the Premadasa government, which had been in office since 1988, initiated a second attempt at peace talks with the LTTE, following the first round of peace talks in late 1989.
A fragile peace was thus maintained while the government and LTTE discussed the resolution and holding of fresh elections in the north-eastern provincial council, in which the political wing of LTTE could participate. On 10 June 1990 the fighting, however, resumed and the 14 month old ceasefire and the accompanying peace talks came to an end.
Third party involvement: NO
Victory: NO
Terminated: NO
1991 Conflict Archive
Negotiations: NO
Comment on Negotiation: On 11 June 1991 the LTTE, expressing willingness to settle for a separate state within a federal Sri Lanka, offered unconditional talks. The government, however, had several preconditions and fighting actually intensified.
Third party involvement: NO
Victory: NO
Terminated: NO
1992 Conflict Archive
Negotiations: NO
Third party involvement: NO
Victory: NO
Terminated: NO
1993 Conflict Archive
Comment on Activity: Alleged LTTE suicide-bomber attack kills President Premadasa on 1 May, as well as 23 others.
Negotiations: NO
Third party involvement: NO
Victory: NO
Terminated: NO
1994 Conflict Archive
Comment on Activity: The general elections held in August 1994 ended 17 year of supremacy for the United National Party (UNP), which had to hand over governmental power to the Peoples Alliance (PA). The PA came to power on a platform that promised a negotiated settlement on Sri Lankas civil war, and started its term in power with a peace-initiative vis-à-vis the LTTE in mid-October 1994.
Negotiations: YES
Comment on Negotiation: Starting in mid-October 1994, four rounds of talks were conducted between different government teams, led by the Secretary of the President, and a four-member LTTE delegation. The first three rounds of talks took place on 13 October 1994, 2 January and 14 January 1995, respectively. These first negotiations focused on redressing the most immediate effects of the war, such as easening the governments economic embargo of the northern town of Jaffna. The parties also signed an agreement on freezing of all military positions, starting from 8 January. This agreement on cessation of hostilities included many of the provisions of a regular ceasefire, such as monitoring committees and restrictions on movement of combatants. The contentious feature was however, the final clause under which the only condition for either side to terminate the agreement was the delivery of at least 72 hours notice. By the conclusions of the forth rounds of talks it became apparent that the two sides had different agendas regarding what should be the initial steps and the pace of the peace process, and on 18 April 1995 the LTTE withdraw from the negotiations. The next day they attacked two Sri Lanka navy-boats, thus unilaterally ending the cessation of hostilities. This initiated the most violent phase of the conflict since 1983.
Third party involvement: NO
Victory: NO
Terminated: NO
1995 Conflict Archive
Comment on Activity: The ceasefire agreement made in January 1995 (see 1994 yearly data) was broken on 19 April, and intense fighting resumed. October 1995 proved to be a turning point for the Sri Lankan army, which, after a successful offensive, recaptured Jaffna, the stronghold of LTTE, on 2 December 1995. This ended a five-year period of LTTE hegemony in the northern province. By the end of 1996 the government in fact controlled between 60 and 80% of the Jaffna peninsula.
Negotiations: YES
Comment on Negotiation: The second and third rounds of the talks first initiated in October 1994, were held on 2 January and 14 January, respectively. These talks lead to a mutual agreement of cessation of hostilities, starting from 8 January 1995. By the third round of negotiations, the differences between the two sides clearly began to emerge. The government took a multi-track approach to the negotiations: willing to discuss confidence-building measures such as lifting of embargos, but also keen to move forward on the agenda to find a political solution. LTTE on the other hand wanted the government to demonstrate its willingness through the implementation of confidence-building measures, before proceeding on the core incompatibility. On 16 March, before the fourth rounds of negotiations, the LTTE put forward an ultimatum of measures to be taken before the negotiations could proceed. The government rejected to fulfil some of these demands. Following several rounds of deadlocked negotiations, with both sides accusing each other of making unreasonable demands, the LTTE withdraw from the peace process on 19 April, and the next day fighting resumed.
Third party involvement: NO
Victory: NO
Terminated: NO
1996 Conflict Archive
Negotiations: NO
Third party involvement: NO
Victory: NO
Terminated: NO
1997 Conflict Archive
Negotiations: NO
Third party involvement: NO
Victory: NO
Terminated: NO
1998 Conflict Archive
Comment on Activity: In January 1998 the LTTE was officially banned as a political organization by the Government of Sri Lanka.
Negotiations: NO
Comment on Negotiation: On 6 September 1998 LTTE offered to recommence peace talks, insisting, however, on third party mediation. The governments rejected any negotiations with the LTTE, stating that several measures needed to be taken before talks could be initiated. One reason for the governments reluctance to negotiate was the lack of a political consensus within the Sinhala polity on the acceptable terms of negotiation with the LTTE.
Third party involvement: NO
Victory: NO
Terminated: NO
1999 Conflict Archive
Negotiations: NO
Third party involvement: NO
Victory: NO
Terminated: NO
2000 Conflict Archive
Negotiations: NO
Comment on Negotiation: In mid-February 2000 the Norwegian government confirmed the request from the LTTE and the government of Sri Lanka to act as mediators in the conflict, as well as their role as facilitators in the ongoing shuttle-diplomacy to bring the LTTE and the Sri Lankan government to the negotiation-table. Norway had already for about two years been involved in the unofficial peace process to find a political solution to the conflict.
On 24 December 2000 the LTTE declared a unilateral ceasefire, which it extended on several occasions until 24 April 2001. The LTTE leader V. Prabhakaran indicated his readiness to engage in peace talks on the condition that i) the government reciprocated the ceasefire, ii) lifted the ban on LTTE as a legal political organization and iii) lifted the government-imposed economic embargo on rebel held territory. The government found these demands unacceptable, and the ceasefire was not reciprocated.
Third party involvement: YES
Third party involvement names: Norway
Comment on Third Party Involvement: In early January the Norwegian Foreign Department confirmed the involvement of the Norwegian government in the shuttle diplomacy between the Sri Lanka government and the LTTE.
Victory: NO
Terminated: NO
2001 Conflict Archive
Negotiations: NO
Comment on Negotiation: The ceasefire, declared on 24 December 2000, was extended on several occasions up until 24 April 2001. The LTTE indicated a willingness to negotiate if the government i) reciprocated the ceasefire, ii) lifted the ban on LTTE as a legal political organisation and iii) lifted the government-imposed economic embargo on rebel held territory. The government found the demands unacceptable and insisted on unconditional talks. Full-fledged fighting resumed from April.
By the end of the year the Norwegian-led peace process had, however, slowly resumed. In November the LTTE leader V. Prabhakaran stated for the first time that the group could accept a political solution short of independence and would consider autonomy arrangements within a unitary state. According to Prabhakaran, the core in LTTEs claim was Tamils right to self-determination.
At the end of the year a truce was signed between LTTE and the Sri Lankan government, which was in effect from 24 December 2001. At the same time the economic ban on the north-eastern provinces was lifted. Together this satisfied two of LTTEs preconditions for negotiations. On 27 December the Sri Lankan prime minister formally requested Norway to facilitate peace talks with the LTTE.
Third party involvement: YES
Third party involvement names: Norway
Victory: NO
Terminated: YES
Type of termination: No or Low Activity
Date of termination: 2001-12-31
Comment on Termination: The conflict did not reach 25 battle-related deaths in 2002 therefore the conflict is coded as terminated by low activity on 31 December 2001.
However a norwegian brokered declaration of the cessation of hostilities was signed by the two parties on 22 February 2002.
Comment on Termination Date: The date of termination is set on 31 December 2002 since the conflict did not reach 25 battle-related deaths in 2002 since the date of termination always is coded in the last active year. A more accurate date for the termination is on 22 February 2002 when a ceasefire agreement was signed between the parties.
2002 Conflict Archive
Comment on Activity: The unofficial ceasefire, in place since 24 December 2001, was followed by a Norwegian brokered permanent agreement on the cessation of hostilities between the government and the LTTE on 22 February 2002. On 4 November the Sri Lankan government lifted its ban on the LTTE, and between 16 and 18 September the first round of formal peace talks was conducted in Thailand, facilitated by the Norwegian government.
Negotiations: YES
Comment on Negotiation: LTTE leader Prabhakaran and Prime Minister Wickremasinghe signed the Norwegian brokered Memorandum of Understanding (Mou) on the Permanent Cessation of Hostilities on 22 February 2002. The agreement committed the two parties to maintain a separation of forces, refrain from offensive manoeuvres and allow for the unimpeded flow of most items between the areas under their respective control. Three rounds of formal negotiations were held during the year. I) 16-18 September 2002, II) 31 October - 3 November and III) 2-5 December. The negotiations during 2002 primarily address humanitarian and economic issues, with questions relating to the reconstruction and normalisation of civilian life. On the second meeting possible federal arrangements to resolve the incompatibility were also examined. This was a reiteration of LTTEs previously stated willingness to accept a solution short of an independent state, but within the concept of self-determination. No negotiated settlement addressing the core incompatibility was however reached during the year. By the end of 2002 about 100 000 displaced persons had however voluntarily returned to the northeastern province.
Third party involvement: YES
Third party involvement names: Norway
Comment on Third Party Involvement: The Norwegian Government facilitated the formal peace talks between the LTTE and the Sri Lanka government during the latter half of 2002. Norway had then been unofficially involved in the shuttle diplomacy aimed at bringing the parties to the negotiation table since 1998. Norwegian MP Mr. Erik Solheim was the special executive of the Norwegian government in the negotiations.
Victory: NO
Terminated: NO
2003 Conflict Archive
Comment on Activity: Several incidents despite the ceasefire agreement between the parties, happened during 2003.
Comment on Yearly Battle Related Deaths: "Best and low estimate: 828
High estimate: 42
Several incidents happen during the year, which resulted in battle-related deaths, despite the ongoing ceasefire between the primary parties."
Negotiations: YES
Comment on Negotiation: The forth round of negotiations were held in Thailand 6-9 January. The parties discussed high-security zones, resettlement of Tamil civilians and developmental work. Following a suggestions from the Jaffna army commander that the LTTE should lay down their weapons in exchange for re-settlement of the civilians in the high-security zones, the LTTE withdrew from the Sub-committee on De-escalation and Normalization, in protest.
The fifth session of peace negotiations were held in Berlin 7-8 February. The parties discussed incidents in the sea resulting in causalities, humanitarian and rehabilitation activities in the north and east and human rights.
The sixth round of peace talks were held in Japan 18-21 March. Discussions focused on sea conflict,
The LTTE suspended the talks on 21 April, with allegations against the government that they were trying to "marginalize our organization in approaching the international community for economic assistance".
Third party involvement: YES
Third party involvement names: Norway
Comment on Third Party Involvement: Norway acts as facilitator / mediator on the political level. A Scandinavian team, under Norwegian leadership, is also involved in monitoring the ceasefire (Sri Lanka Monitoring Mission).
Victory: NO
Terminated: YES
Type of termination: Ceasefire
Date of termination: 2003-12-31
2004 Conflict Archive
Comment on Activity: 19 battle-related deaths was reported during the year, so this dyad does not reach the threshold for being coded as active. However, during the year fighting has been taking place between the LTTE and a faction, the Karuna faction. The LTTE has accused the government of supporting the Karuna faction.
Negotiations: NO
Comment on Negotiation: There have been several attempts by Norway to restart the political peace process. However, no negotiations have taken place.
Third party involvement: YES
Third party involvement names: Norway, Scandinavian countries.
Comment on Third Party Involvement: Norway has been active during the year in order to restart the political peace process, by having discussions with both parties. The Scandinavian countries have been active as monitors of the ceasefire, by participating in Sri Lanka Monitoring Mission (SLMM).
Victory: NO
Terminated: NO
2005 Conflict Archive
Comment on Activity: In 2005, the conflict between the LTTE and the government became active again, after a year of relative calm. The situation deteriorated throughout the year. Fighting between the LTTE and the break-away Karona-faction affected the relationship between the rebels and the government in a negative way, as the LTTE accused the government of aiding Karona’s group and thus fighting a proxy war in the east. The government vehemently denied this. Tensions increased even further with the assassination of the Sri Lankan Foreign Minister in August. LTTE were blamed, but denied the charges. By the end of the year, the situation deteriorated even further. Sri Lankan troops came under claymore mine attacks on a few occasions and the death toll mounted.
Comment on Yearly Battle Related Deaths: "Best and low estimate
High estimate: 87
It should be noted that there are great difficulties involved in estimating the number of deaths in the conflict between the government and LTTE. This is due, not to poor reporting, but to difficulties in determining who is carrying out the violence. The rebels almost by default deny any involvement in attacks and breaches of the ceasefire. However, as most analysts and country experts deems the LTTE to be the ones responsible, the conflict is coded as active for 2005. The figure given is the sum of all attacks attributed to LTTE not only by news sources but also by analysts and country experts."
Negotiations: NO
Comment on Negotiation: Despite persistent efforts by the Norwegian mediators to restart the peace process, there was no break-through during 2005. Since April 2003 the peace negotiations have been stalled over disagreement on the agenda. While the rebels want the talks to be based on its demands for an Interim Self-Governing Authority (ISGA), the government insists that the focus has to be on long-term peace.
After the tsunami disaster in late 2004, hopes were raised that the tragedy could help pave the way for increased cooperation and lasting peace, giving the two warring parties a common enemy. Most contact between the parties during the first months of the year thus concerned tsunami relief, putting conflict related issues at a back-burner. However, instead of leading to improved relations, the discussions regarding the distribution of the foreign aid heightened tensions between the rebels and the government.
In July the truce came under increasing pressure as rebels traveling through government held territory came under attack by unknown armed men. The situation deteriorated further when Sri Lanka’s foreign minister was assassinated in August. The government blamed the rebels, but the rebels denied the charges. During the autumn violence increased in the east and the truce appeared to be in great danger. Amidst these developments, Norway attempted to get the parties together for talks, but failed as LTTE and the government were unable to agree on a location for negotiations.
Third party involvement: YES
Third party involvement names: Sri Lankan Monitoring Mission (SLMM), Norway, Japanese Special Envoy Yasushi Akashi, UN Special Envoy Lakhdar Brahimi
Comment on Third Party Involvement: The Sri Lankan Monitoring Mission (SLMM) consists of 60 Scandinavian observers, mandated to monitor the ceasefire agreement from 2002.
Norway continues to be the official mediator in the conflict. Apart from Norway’s official peace envoy Erik Solheim, numerous other representatives of the country also acted to break the impasse in the negotiations during the year. However, no break-through was made.
The Japanese Special Envoy Yasushi Akashi met with representatives of the parties in May, in a bid to get the parties back to the negotiating table. Tokyo is financially supporting the peace process and Akashi was reported to have stressed to both sides that the delays were not encouraging donors.
In September, UN Special Envoy Lakhdar Brahimi visited Sri Lanka to help revive the peace process. However, he clearly stated that the UN had no plans to replace Norway as peace broker.
Victory: NO
Terminated: NO
2006 Conflict Archive
Comment on Activity: The deteriorating situation of 2005 continued in early 2006, with continuous Claymore mine attacks on Sri Lankan troops, blamed by the government on the LTTE. The new President, Rajapakse, whilst publicly stating that he wanted to pursue a negotiated settlement, adhered to a two-pronged strategy, urging the LTTE to enter negotiations, while at the same time retaliating against LTTE attacks on security personnel. Clashes in the east between the LTTE and the Karona faction also sparked anger amongst the LTTE, claiming that the government was supporting these anti-LTTE forces. Norway responded to the deteriorating situation by holding talks in Geneva in February, with the aim of reaffirming and strengthening the CFA of 2002. Promises were made to this end, but results were nowhere to be seen. Events took a turn for the worse in April, when LTTE attacks in Colombo on the army HQ prompted retaliation by the Sri Lankan air force. Artillery duels and ground clashes followed in May and June, albeit at a lower level in anticipation of July peace talks that were eventually aborted. In July the LTTE cut off water from the Mavil Aru sluice gate, depriving tens of thousands of civilians of drinking water. In an attempt to brake this siege, which was finally successful, the Sri Lankan army bombed and attacked the LTTE cadres holding the sluice gate, and by this time the CFA existed only on paper. The reopening of the sluice gate did nothing to stop clashes, which occurred in Jaffna, Trincomalee and Batticaloa to name but a few places. The government responded to this state of war by closing off the A9 highway through the Vanni to the rebel stronghold of Killinochi and Jaffna, effectively placing the peninsula under siege and prompting a humanitarian crisis in the north. Violent clashes continued throughout the year, an example being a ferocious, yet failed, government offensive in Jaffna. The LTTE also brought the war to the Sri Lankan heartlands, through attacks as far south as the historical city of Galle. Further ceasefire talks in October, in Geneva, failed to stop the fighting as the LTTE and the government wrangled over the reopening of the A9 highway and security guarantees for aid shipments to Jaffna. In September the CFA suffered further setbacks with the LTTE’s insistence of sending home all observers from EU countries. As of late 2006 the frontline was frozen with few territorial gains having been reached by either side. As a result of the fighting hundreds of civilians died, hundreds of thousands were displaced, and many more faced a humanitarian disaster as aid failed to reach the Jaffna peninsula in large enough quantity.
Comment on Yearly Battle Related Deaths: "Best: 1970, Low: 1970, High: 1843
It should be noted that there are great difficulties involved in estimating the number of deaths in the conflict between the government and LTTE. This is due not to poor reporting but to difficulties in determining who is carrying out the violence. The rebels almost by default deny any involvement in attacks and breaches of the ceasefire (saying it is ""civilian groups"" who are carrying out the attacks). However, as most analysts and country experts (as well as SLMM) deems the LTTE to be the ones responsible, the conflict is coded as active for 2006."
Negotiations: YES
Comment on Negotiation: The government of Sri Lanka and the LTTE held two rounds of talks in 2006, out of a scheduled three rounds. The first round took place 21-23 February in Geneva, where Norway acted as the facilitator. The talks were aimed at reaffirming and strengthening the implementation of the waning CFA of February 2002, which had come under attack following violence in January and February. No new initiatives came out of this meeting, during which the LTTE attacked the government for alleged support of the eastern Karona faction. The promises made by the parties in relation to the CFA yielded little effect in the months that followed. The conflict worsened through April and May, and both parties agreed to procedural talks to be held in June or July in Oslo, talks that never materialized and were subsequently aborted as the LTTE delegation refused to talk with the government. Following heavy military clashes in August both parties in September agreed to unconditional talks under Norway’s mediation. Talks were set, and held, in Geneva in late October. The talks had no set agenda, but the mediators still struggled to reach agreement on any specific issue. The talks soon stumbled over the contentious issue of the A9 highway between Colombo and Jaffna, closed off by the government and inflicting a crippling siege on aid and food to the northern parts of Sri Lanka. The LTTE wanted the highway reopened, whilst the government insisted on shipping in aid by sea and wanting LTTE security guarantees that such shipments would not be attacked. Mutual rapprochement proved to not be forthcoming, and the LTTE stated their reluctance to return for more rounds of talks without a firm guarantee on the reopening of the land route to Jaffna. No further talks were subsequently held in 2006.
Third party involvement: YES
Third party involvement names: Norway, EU, Japan, USA (the Co-Chairs), Sri Lanka Monitoring Mission (SLMM), India
Comment on Third Party Involvement: In 2006 Norway continued to play its’ role as mediator and facilitator of the Sri Lankan peace process. Norway facilitated two rounds of talks in Geneva, and planned a third meeting in Oslo, which was never held. Norway’s mediation efforts were mainly aimed at strengthening Sri Lanka’s faltering CFA, and speed up its’ implementation. No real breakthroughs can be said to have been reached, and Sri Lanka slipped into its worst bout of violence for many years. The Co-Chairs (Norway, EU, Japan and the US) continued to put pressure on both parties in the conflict, meeting representatives from both sides to try to shore up the CFA and enter into outright peace talks. Japan even decided to withhold vast amounts of aid to the country in an attempt to pressure the parties further. India had a more low-key presence in the conflict, but met on a few occasions with the Sri Lankan government.
The SLMM was stationed in Sri Lanka all through 2006, but the number of observers was significantly lowered following the LTTE’s demand that observers from the EU countries were no longer welcome. This decision came in response to the EU’s decision in 2006 to label the LTTE a terrorist organization. The LTTE countered by claiming that EU countries could no longer be unbiased, and set a 1 September deadline for all SLMM staff from Sweden, Finland and Denmark to leave the island. Norway and Iceland –the remaining countries of the SLMM- filled some of the vacancies, but the numbers were decreased overall.
Victory: NO
Terminated: NO
2007 Conflict Archive
Comment on Activity: The armed conflict between the government of Sri Lanka and the LTTE showed no sign of de-escalation in 2007. Violent clashes continued at an unabated pace, claiming the lives of hundreds of civilians and displacing hundred thousands of people from their homes.
The government side saw some significant advances during the year. In January the government announced that they had captured the LTTE’s eastern stronghold of Vakari, after prolonged shelling. After a series of ground offensives by the Sri Lankan Army (SLA), the government in July declared that it had driven the rebels from the last of their eastern strongholds. This brought the east of the country back under government control for the first time since 1994. The LTTE hence lost the control over coastlines and harbors, which allowed the rebels to take in supplies from Southeast Asia and to launch maritime attacks against government forces.
Meanwhile, LTTE actions added a new deadly dimensions to the conflict. In March the LTTE launched its first air strike, using a single-propeller plane to drop bombs on an air force base next to the international airport in Colombo, killing three soldiers. The LTTE are thus the only known rebel group with an army, navy and an air force. In a decisive incident on 2 November, 2007 the leader of LTTEs political wing and spokesperson S. P. Thamilselvan was killed in a air strike by the Sri Lankan government forces. At the end of 2007 the LTTE still dominated large areas of the north of the country, and there was no signs that the LTTE was militarily defeated.
The peace process showed no sign of renewal. In late February 2007, the Tamil Tigers announced that the truce, which came into existence in 2002, was non-existent and that they resumed their armed struggle for statehood. Officially, however, the cease-fire agreement remained in place throughout the year, as none of the parties wanted to be blamed for its demise. On 2 January 2008 the government announced that it had decided to abrocate the cease fire agreement with LTTE as of 16 January 2008.
Comment on Yearly Battle Related Deaths: "Best estimate: 1887, Low estimate: 1777, High estimate: 2509.
It should be noted that there are great difficulties involved in estimating the number of deaths in the conflict between the government and LTTE. This is due not to poor reporting but to difficulties in determining who is carrying out the violence. The rebels almost by default deny any involvement in attacks and breaches of the ceasefire (saying it is ""civilian groups"" who are carrying out the attacks). However, most analysts and country experts (as well as SLMM) deems the LTTE to be the ones responsible."
Negotiations: NO
Third party involvement: NO
Third party involvement names: Norway, Iceland
Comment on Third Party Involvement: In 2007 Norway continued to play its’ role as facilitator of the Sri Lankan peace process. In February Norway asked both sides to make a fresh commitment to the peace process and resume the talks that stalled in October 2006. Also Great Britain offered to act as a mediator in the conflict. There were, however, no formal peace talks between the warring parties during the year.
The Sri Lanka Monitoring Mission was stationed in Sri Lanka all through 2007, but the mission was terminated on 16th January 2008 following the abrogation of the ceasefire agreement by the government.
Victory: NO
Terminated: NO
2008 Conflict Archive
Comment on Activity: On 2 January 2008 the government announced its decision to abrocate the Norwegian arranged cease fire agreement with LTTE. After the cease fire had been abrocated the conflict escalated rapidly and drastically. All through 2008 heavy fighting, at land and at sea, occurred between the Sri Lankan troops and the LTTE. Both sides also allegedly targeted civilians. In September 2008, the army launched a major military offensive aimed at capturing the only remaining rebel held areas in the northern parts of the country. After months of heavy fighting, entailing a high number of casualties, the government had captured previous rebel strongholds such as Kilinochchi, the Jaffna peninsula and Mullaitivu. In April 2009 the army had restricted the area controlled by the LTTE to a small stretch of land north of Mullaitivu and the government claimed it was close to a military victory. The intensive fighting in 2008 and 2009 led to a humanitarian crisis as many civilian Tamils were trapped in the conflict zone.
Comment on Yearly Battle Related Deaths: "Best estimate: 8396, high estimate: 10 260, low estimate: 8396.
It should be noted that there are great difficulties involved in estimating the number of deaths in the conflict between the government and LTTE. Journalists and neutral observers were not allowed in the conflict zone and both sides have traditionally inflated enemy casualties. The number given as best estimate is almost exclusively based on army information whereas LTTE given figures have been included in the high estimate. It should also be noted that the government, during some weeks in October-November 2008 stated it would no longer render public their own nor rebel casualties wherefore there is a gap in the information from this period."
Negotiations: NO
Third party involvement: NO
Victory: NO
Terminated: NO
2009 Conflict Archive
Comment on Activity: On 19 May 2009, President Mahinda Rajapakse formally declared that the more than 25 year long civil war in Sri Lanka was over and that it had ended in victory. On the previous day, Lt-Gen. Sarath Fonseka, chief of SLA (Sri Lankan Army) had proclaimed that the army had dealt the final decisive blow to LTTE and that the group was defeated. He also announced that LTTE leader Prabhakaran’s body had been found. On 17 May, two days before the President’s speech, Selvarasa Pathmanathan, LTTE chief of international relations, announced that LLTE recognised defeat and that they would end their fighting in order to avoid further civilian deaths.
The Sri Lankan government’s victory in mid-May was preceded by intensive fighting that claimed thousands of civilians lives. In the beginning of January, SLA had captured the town of Kilinochchi and a week later also retaken the strategically important Elephant Pass that connects the Jaffna peninsula with the mainland. LTTE had held the Pass since 2000 and was a major blow to the rebels that had just lost their political capital, Kilinochchi. Following these defeats, LTTE was pushed further east in the Mullaitivu district. SLA continued to capture LTTE military bases and LTTE was pushed further and further east into an ever-smaller area. On 5 April, SLA captured the last LTTE-held town, Puthukkudiyiruppu. During the last month of fighting, the rebels were confined to a narrow patch of land on the east coast. The final battles took place on a less then 1 sq. km coastal land in the Mullaitivu district.The army claimed on 19 May that LTTE’s leader Velupillai Prabhakaran, had been found dead in the area of the final battles. There were however conflicting stories regarding the death of the rebel leader. Some reports claimed that he was killed when he tried to escape the small conflict zone while other claimed that he had been captured and then killed. The main senior leaders of LTTE appeared to have been killed in the final days of battles.
Since the war was declared to be over, there has been no reports of renewed activities by LTTE. According to International Crisis Group, almost the entire political and military leadership of LTTE had been killed by the end of the war. Furthermore, in August 2009, LTTE’s international leader and Prabhakaran’s possible successor, S. Pathmanathan was arrested.
Following increased international pressure due to concerns about the large number of civilians trapped in the conflict zone, the Sri Lankan government in January declared no-fire zones, so called “safety zones”. Both the government and the army accused LTTE on several occasions of using preventing the civilians from leaving the combat zone, in order to be able to use them as human shields. LTTE on the other hand repeatedly claimed that SLA did not respect the no-fire zone and that hospitals and other facilities were shelled on a number of occasions. In June, the Foreign Minister also claimed that the army was not responsible for a single civilian death and put the full responsibility on LTTE. See “Comment on battle-related deaths” for further details.
Throughout the period of fighting in 2009, the government banned all journalist from the conflict zone and only allowed ICRC to work in the area. UN agencies and other aid agencies were eventually given restricted access to the government camps for displaced Tamils, which came to hold up to 280 000 civilians. Following the end of the war, UN and other aid agencies as well as several countries have called upon the government to open the camps and allow access to aid agencies. However, the camps remained closed for several months, with the motivation that rebels hiding in the camps needed to be identified. According to International Crisis Group, these camps were overcrowded and the conditions did not meet international standards. Towards the end of 2009, about 147 000 Tamils were reported to have been released from the camps. However, in the beginning of January 2010, UN stated that there were still 110 000 civilians living in the camps. According to the Sri Lankan government, all camps would be closed by the end of January 2010.
Comment on Yearly Battle Related Deaths: "The number of battle-related deaths in Sri Lanka in 2009 is difficult to estimate since almost no figures of casualties could be independently verified. The Sri Lankan government banned all journalist from the conflict zone and only ICRC (International Committee of the Red Cross) was allowed to operate to some extent in the area. UN agencies and a few other aid agencies were eventually allowed limited access to the government camps for displaced persons. These camps came to hold more than 280 000 displaced Tamil civilians. Sri Lankan doctors working at hospitals inside the so called “safety zone†(proclaimed by the government to be a no-fire zone) released causality figures, but were accused by the Sri Lankan government of spreading false information and were later detained.
The Sri Lankan government repeatedly denied that civilians had been killed in the fighting and strongly criticised BBC and other foreign news agencies of spreading false information. The UN and ICRC were also accused by the government of exaggerating the situation for the civilians in the conflict zone. The Sri Lankan army claimed that they had done everything possible to prevent civilian deaths and blamed all civilian deaths on LTTE. They also accused LTTE of preventing civilians from leaving the combat zone in order to use them as human shields. Most notably, on 5 June, the Sri Lankan Foreign Minister Rohitha Bogollagama rejected the UN’s (and other agencies) high estimates of casualties and claimed that the Sri Lankan army was not responsible for a single civilian death.
On May 15, the UN estimated that about 7000 civilians had been killed in the fighting between 20 January and 7 May. The Times claimed on 30 May that according to unreleased UN documents, the figure had risen to 20 000 by 19 May. According to The Times, 13 000 of these had been killed in May only. In total, the UN estimated that between 80 000 and 100 000 people had been killed since the start of the conflict in 1972. Rajiva Wijesinha, permanent secretary at the ministry of disaster management, dismissed all such figures and claimed that between 3000 and 5000 civilians had been killed by LTTE in 2009.
On 22 May, Defence Secretary Gotabaya Rajapakse announced that since the beginning of the last phase of the war (July 2006), over 6200 from the security forces had been killed. The total military death toll since 1981 amounted to about 23 800. Since July 2006, the army had killed 22 000 LTTE troops while 9000 had surrendered, according to the Defence Secretary.
Based on reports from various aid agencies and news agencies, UCDP’s best estimate of the number of battle-related deaths in Sri Lanka for 2009 is 7544. The low estimate is 7486 and the high estimate is 8926. Considering that the UN estimate of 7000 civilians killed between 20 January and 7 May does not cover the entire period of fighting in 2009 and that the Sri Lankan government rarely stated their own casualties during 2009, the actual number of battle-related deaths is likely to be considerably higher. LTTE also rarely stated their own losses, mostly reporting civilian casualties caused by army shelling."
Negotiations: NO
Comment on Negotiation: During the months of fighting in 2009, both warring parties were urged on several occasions by e.g. the USA, the EU, Norway, India and the UN to declare a ceasefire and initiate negotiations. On 4 February, the USA and the UK called for a ceasefire and to give humanitarian agencies access to the conflict zone. Both the Sri Lankan government and LTTE rejected this appeal. On 23 February, LTTE suggested a ceasefire but refused to hand over any weapons before entering into any talks. The government immediately rejected this proposal. According to the government, any ceasefires would only allow LTTE to regroup and civilians would not be let out of the conflict zone by LTTE.
Third party involvement: NO
Victory: YES
Victory side: a
Comment on Victory: The 25 year long civil war in Sri Lanka ended in victory for the Sri Lanka government in May 2009.
On 17 May 2009, Selvarasa Pathmanathan, LTTE chief of international relations, announced that LTTE recognised defeat and that they would end their fighting in order to avoid further civilian deaths. On the following day, Lt-Gen. Sarath Fonseka, chief of the Sri Lankan Army (SLA), proclaimed that LTTE was defeated and that the final battle of Sri Lanka’s long civil war was over. Finally, on 19 May, President Mahinda Rajapakse formally declared the war to be over in his opening speech for a new session of Parliament.
Comment on Victorious Side: Government of Sri Lanka (Ceylon)
Terminated: YES
Type of termination: Victory
Date of termination: 2009-05-19
Comment on Termination: The more than 25 year long civil war in Sri Lanka ended in victory for the Sri Lanka government in May 2009. After LTTE had admitted defeat and the Sri Lankan government formally declared the war to be over in mid-May, there was no signs of renewed LTTE military activity.
Comment on Termination Date: On 17 May 2009, Selvarasa Pathmanathan, LTTE chief of international relations, announced that LLTE recognised defeat and that they would end their fighting in order to avoid further civilian deaths. On the following day, Lt-Gen. Sarath Fonseka, chief of the Sri Lankan Army, proclaimed that LTTE was defeated and that the final battle of Sri Lanka’s long civil war was over. Finally, on 19 May, President Mahinda Rajapakse formally declared the war to be over in his opening speech for a new session of Parliament.
2014 Conflict Archive
Terminated: NO
2018 Conflict Archive
Terminated: NO
