General information
Type of Incompatibility: Government
Comment on Type of Incompatibility: The incompatibility concerns the political power in Afghanistan. After two communist coups in the 1970s, Islamist movements turned to armed struggle to topple the government and to create an Islamic state in Afghanistan. Between 1979 and 1992 there were a large number of groups active in the conflict, each framing the incompatibility somewhat different, but all striving to oust the communist government. Some groups wanted to reinstate monarchy while others claimed that the Quran was the only constitution the country needed and that an Islamic council should rule Afghanistan.
When the communist government was ousted in 1992, some of the Islamist groups were unpleased with the leadership of the new Islamic republic of Afghanistan, particularly regarding the representation of different ethnic groups. The conflict over political power continued, now between different Islamist organisations. When the Taleban movement first emerged in the mid-1990s, it stated that its goal was to restore peace in Afghanistan. In 1995, when it was facing government troops for the first time, the Taleban demanded that the President should resign and an interim Taleban government should be installed.
After the Taleban takeover in 1996, the Islamist groups previously in power organised themselves in UIFSA (United Islamic Front for Salvation of Afghanistan) in order to oust the Taleban and create a permanent government for Afghanistan. Two years after UIFSA, assisted by a US-led multinational force, had defeated the Taleban in 2001, Taleban leader Mullah Omar restated the movement’s incompatibility, saying that he declared jihad against the Kabul regime. Another Islamist group, Hizb-i Islami-yi Afghanistan, which had been active in the conflict since the early 1980s, restated its incompatibility in late 2002 saying that jihad would be waged against the government until a true government of the people could be established.
When the Taleban took control of Kabul again in 2021, the troops who remained loyal to the toppled government united under ousted First Vice President Amrullah Saleh and Ahmad Massoud, announcing the National Resistance Front of Afghanistan (NRF). Saleh claimed that he was the legitimate caretaker President and, together with Massoud, launched an armed resistance against the Taleban regime.
Date of first stated goal of incompatibility: 1974-12-31
Comment on date of first stated goals of incompatibility: As a reaction to a communist-backed coup in 1973, in which Mohammed Daud Khan ousted the king, the Islamists turned to armed resistance. In late 1973 or early 1974 a meeting was held at which the Islamists agreed that armed struggle was necessary to topple the government. Other sources report the incompatibility was stated in June 1974.
Date of first use of armed force: 1978-04-27
Comment on first use of armed force: PPDPA (Hizb-i Demokrati-i Khalq-i Afghanistan, People’s Democratic Party of Afghanistan) launched a coup on 27 April 1978. The forces attacked the Presidential Palace with tanks, supported by bomb planes from Bagram airbase north of Kabul. Although the new Prime Minister Nur Muhammad Taraki claimed that only 72 people had died in the coup, most sources estimate that thousands of people lost their lives in the violence.
Date of first battle related death: 1975-07-01
Comment on first battle related death: The records relating to the early phase of the insurgency is unclear. The first reports of fighting between Moslem rebel forces and the Afghan government in eastern Afghanistan emerge in July 1975 when Islamists led by Ahmad Shah Massoud captured a district in Panjsher Valley. The rebels retreated within 24 hours though, as the population turned against them and supported the army. This is thus set as the first battle related death in the conflict.
Date of conflict reached 25 battle releated deaths: 1978-04-27
Comment on conflict reached 25 battle releated deaths: PDPA (Hizb-i Demokrati-i Khalq-i Afghanistan, People’s Democratic Party of Afghanistan) launched a coup on 27 April 1978. The forces attacked the Presidential Palace with tanks, supported by bomb planes from Bagram airbase north of Kabul. Although the new Prime Minister Nur Muhammad Taraki claimed that only 72 people had died in the coup, most sources estimate that thousands of people lost their lives in the violence.
Annual information
This section contains annual information systematically collected by the UCDP.
1975
Primary Parties: -
Dimension: Internal
| Estimated Fatalities | |
|---|---|
| High | 1 |
| Best | 1 |
| Low | 0 |
Numbers include fatalities for all dyads both active and inactive for this year
1977
Primary Parties: -
Dimension: Internal
| Estimated Fatalities | |
|---|---|
| High | 0 |
| Best | 0 |
| Low | 0 |
Numbers include fatalities for all dyads both active and inactive for this year
1978
Primary Parties: Government of Afghanistan - PDPA
Dimension: Internal
| Estimated Fatalities | |
|---|---|
| High | 1000 |
| Best | 1000 |
| Low | 0 |
Numbers include fatalities for all dyads both active and inactive for this year
1979
Primary Parties: Government of Afghanistan - Jam'iyyat-i Islami-yi Afghanistan
Dimension: Internal
| Estimated Fatalities | |
|---|---|
| High | 1000 |
| Best | 1000 |
| Low | 0 |
Numbers include fatalities for all dyads both active and inactive for this year
1980
Primary Parties: Government of Afghanistan - Harakat-i Inqilab-i Islami-yi Afghanistan , Hizb-i Islami-yi Afghanistan, Hizb-i Islami-yi Afghanistan - Khalis faction, Jabha-yi Nijat-i Milli-yi Afghanistan , Jam'iyyat-i Islami-yi Afghanistan, Mahaz-i Milli-yi Islami-yi Afghanistan
Secondary Warring Parties Side A: Government of Russia (Soviet Union)
Dimension: Internationalized intrastate
| Estimated Fatalities | |
|---|---|
| High | 5025 |
| Best | 5025 |
| Low | 0 |
Numbers include fatalities for all dyads both active and inactive for this year
1981
Primary Parties: Government of Afghanistan - Harakat-i Inqilab-i Islami-yi Afghanistan , Hizb-i Islami-yi Afghanistan, Hizb-i Islami-yi Afghanistan - Khalis faction, Ittihad-i Islami Bara-yi Azadi-yi Afghanistan , Jabha-yi Nijat-i Milli-yi Afghanistan , Jam'iyyat-i Islami-yi Afghanistan, Mahaz-i Milli-yi Islami-yi Afghanistan
Secondary Warring Parties Side A: Government of Russia (Soviet Union)
Dimension: Internationalized intrastate
| Estimated Fatalities | |
|---|---|
| High | 5050 |
| Best | 5050 |
| Low | 0 |
Numbers include fatalities for all dyads both active and inactive for this year
1982
Primary Parties: Government of Afghanistan - Harakat-i Inqilab-i Islami-yi Afghanistan , Hizb-i Islami-yi Afghanistan, Hizb-i Islami-yi Afghanistan - Khalis faction, Ittihad-i Islami Bara-yi Azadi-yi Afghanistan , Jabha-yi Nijat-i Milli-yi Afghanistan , Jam'iyyat-i Islami-yi Afghanistan, Mahaz-i Milli-yi Islami-yi Afghanistan
Secondary Warring Parties Side A: Government of Russia (Soviet Union)
Dimension: Internationalized intrastate
| Estimated Fatalities | |
|---|---|
| High | 5050 |
| Best | 5050 |
| Low | 0 |
Numbers include fatalities for all dyads both active and inactive for this year
1983
Primary Parties: Government of Afghanistan - Harakat-i Inqilab-i Islami-yi Afghanistan , Hizb-i Islami-yi Afghanistan, Hizb-i Islami-yi Afghanistan - Khalis faction, Ittihad-i Islami Bara-yi Azadi-yi Afghanistan , Jabha-yi Nijat-i Milli-yi Afghanistan , Jam'iyyat-i Islami-yi Afghanistan, Mahaz-i Milli-yi Islami-yi Afghanistan
Secondary Warring Parties Side A: Government of Russia (Soviet Union)
Dimension: Internationalized intrastate
| Estimated Fatalities | |
|---|---|
| High | 6025 |
| Best | 6025 |
| Low | 0 |
Numbers include fatalities for all dyads both active and inactive for this year
1984
Primary Parties: Government of Afghanistan - Harakat-i Inqilab-i Islami-yi Afghanistan , Harakat-i Islami-yi Afghanistan, Hizb-i Islami-yi Afghanistan, Hizb-i Islami-yi Afghanistan - Khalis faction, Ittihad-i Islami Bara-yi Azadi-yi Afghanistan , Jabha-yi Nijat-i Milli-yi Afghanistan , Jam'iyyat-i Islami-yi Afghanistan, Mahaz-i Milli-yi Islami-yi Afghanistan
Secondary Warring Parties Side A: Government of Russia (Soviet Union)
Dimension: Internationalized intrastate
| Estimated Fatalities | |
|---|---|
| High | 6050 |
| Best | 6050 |
| Low | 0 |
Numbers include fatalities for all dyads both active and inactive for this year
1985
Primary Parties: Government of Afghanistan - Harakat-i Inqilab-i Islami-yi Afghanistan , Hizb-i Islami-yi Afghanistan, Hizb-i Islami-yi Afghanistan - Khalis faction, Ittihad-i Islami Bara-yi Azadi-yi Afghanistan , Jabha-yi Nijat-i Milli-yi Afghanistan , Jam'iyyat-i Islami-yi Afghanistan, Mahaz-i Milli-yi Islami-yi Afghanistan
Secondary Warring Parties Side A: Government of Russia (Soviet Union)
Dimension: Internationalized intrastate
| Estimated Fatalities | |
|---|---|
| High | 6025 |
| Best | 6025 |
| Low | 0 |
Numbers include fatalities for all dyads both active and inactive for this year
1986
Primary Parties: Government of Afghanistan - Harakat-i Inqilab-i Islami-yi Afghanistan , Hizb-i Islami-yi Afghanistan, Hizb-i Islami-yi Afghanistan - Khalis faction, Ittihad-i Islami Bara-yi Azadi-yi Afghanistan , Jabha-yi Nijat-i Milli-yi Afghanistan , Jam'iyyat-i Islami-yi Afghanistan, Mahaz-i Milli-yi Islami-yi Afghanistan
Secondary Warring Parties Side A: Government of Russia (Soviet Union)
Dimension: Internationalized intrastate
| Estimated Fatalities | |
|---|---|
| High | 6025 |
| Best | 6025 |
| Low | 0 |
Numbers include fatalities for all dyads both active and inactive for this year
1987
Primary Parties: Government of Afghanistan - Harakat-i Inqilab-i Islami-yi Afghanistan , Hizb-i Islami-yi Afghanistan, Hizb-i Islami-yi Afghanistan - Khalis faction, Ittihad-i Islami Bara-yi Azadi-yi Afghanistan , Jabha-yi Nijat-i Milli-yi Afghanistan , Jam'iyyat-i Islami-yi Afghanistan, Mahaz-i Milli-yi Islami-yi Afghanistan
Secondary Warring Parties Side A: Government of Russia (Soviet Union)
Dimension: Internationalized intrastate
| Estimated Fatalities | |
|---|---|
| High | 5050 |
| Best | 5050 |
| Low | 0 |
Numbers include fatalities for all dyads both active and inactive for this year
1988
Primary Parties: Government of Afghanistan - Harakat-i Inqilab-i Islami-yi Afghanistan , Hizb-i Islami-yi Afghanistan, Hizb-i Islami-yi Afghanistan - Khalis faction, Ittihad-i Islami Bara-yi Azadi-yi Afghanistan , Jabha-yi Nijat-i Milli-yi Afghanistan , Jam'iyyat-i Islami-yi Afghanistan, Mahaz-i Milli-yi Islami-yi Afghanistan
Secondary Warring Parties Side A: Government of Russia (Soviet Union)
Dimension: Internationalized intrastate
| Estimated Fatalities | |
|---|---|
| High | 5050 |
| Best | 5050 |
| Low | 0 |
Numbers include fatalities for all dyads both active and inactive for this year
1989
Primary Parties: Government of Afghanistan - Hizb-i Islami-yi Afghanistan, Hizb-i Islami-yi Afghanistan - Khalis faction, Hizb-i Wahdat, Jam'iyyat-i Islami-yi Afghanistan, Mahaz-i Milli-yi Islami-yi Afghanistan
Secondary Warring Parties Side A: Government of Russia (Soviet Union)
Dimension: Internationalized intrastate
Comment on Dimension: The last Soviet troops withdrew from Afghanistan on 15 February 1989 - the date agreed upon in the Geneve accords in April 1988. The rebel-attacks intensified in the path of the Soviet withdrawal, but most of the Soviet troops were allowed to retreat in a peaceful manner. The foreign involvement in the conflict, in the form of foreign troop-presence, was in its closure phase in early 1989, and the escalating civil war underway at this point should most properly be analysed in light of the power vacuum left behind by the Soviet troops. This is not to say that the legacy of Soviets invasion in the form of prevailing foreign alliances and secondary support did not continue to heavily influence the civil war.
| Estimated Fatalities | |
|---|---|
| High | 17074 |
| Best | 5174 |
| Low | 1904 |
Numbers include fatalities for all dyads both active and inactive for this year
1990
Primary Parties: Government of Afghanistan - Hizb-i Islami-yi Afghanistan, Hizb-i Islami-yi Afghanistan - Khalis faction, Hizb-i Wahdat, Jam'iyyat-i Islami-yi Afghanistan, Military faction (forces of Shahnawaz Tanay)
Dimension: Internal
| Estimated Fatalities | |
|---|---|
| High | 2276 |
| Best | 1479 |
| Low | 1324 |
Numbers include fatalities for all dyads both active and inactive for this year
1991
Primary Parties: Government of Afghanistan - Hizb-i Islami-yi Afghanistan, Hizb-i Islami-yi Afghanistan - Khalis faction, Hizb-i Wahdat, Jam'iyyat-i Islami-yi Afghanistan
Dimension: Internal
| Estimated Fatalities | |
|---|---|
| High | 3802 |
| Best | 3302 |
| Low | 3156 |
Numbers include fatalities for all dyads both active and inactive for this year
1992
Primary Parties: Government of Afghanistan - Hizb-i Islami-yi Afghanistan, Hizb-i Wahdat, Jam'iyyat-i Islami-yi Afghanistan
Dimension: Internal
| Estimated Fatalities | |
|---|---|
| High | 5471 |
| Best | 4287 |
| Low | 4270 |
Numbers include fatalities for all dyads both active and inactive for this year
Peace agreements
Name of peace agreement: Peshawar Accord
Date when warring parties signed the agreement: 1992-04-24
Comment of peace agreement: Partial peace agreement
This agreement set up an interim council for a provisional period of Afghanistan. It outlines the structure of the transitional government and divides power among Mujahideen political groups. The transitional period is to last two years.
With regard to the incompatibility, the agreement establishes a new government, after a process of ousting the existing government, and provides for the formation of the Islamic State of Afghanistan. In 1992, the Soviet-backed government in Afghanistan was overthrown by Mujahideen forces. Former President Najibullah Ahmadzai resigned on 16 April and the Mujaddidi was installed on 28 April. It is unclear who controlled the government during the two weeks in between, though according to UCDP coding, Jam’iyyat-i Islami-yi Afghanistan is understood to have controlled the government from 17 April.
The agreement states that Hazrat Sahib Sibghatullah Mojaddedi would lead the effort to take power in Kabul and install the Transitional State. He was to represent the Presidentship for two months following, and would remain as Chairman of the Islamic Council for a period of four months. It further stipulates a transfer of power with Rabbani holding Presidentship for four months and a transitional government to be composed of Hizb-e-Islami, Afghanistan for Prime Minister; Ittehad-e-Islami, Afghanistan for Deputy Prime Minister and Ministry of the Interior; Hizb-e-Islamic of Maulvi Khalis for Deputy Prime Minister and Ministry of Education; National Islamic Front for Deputy Prime Minister and Ministry of Foreign Affiars; Jamiat-e-Islami, Afghanistan for Ministry of Defense; and Harkat-e-Inqilab-e-Islami Organization as Supreme Court; with Hizb-e-Wahdat, Shura-e-Etelaf, Maulvi Mansoor and others to be granted Ministries by the Leadership Council. The agreement states that the Islamic Council is tasked with the decision in regards to the Transitional Government, to last for two years.
Signatories: No signatures, but agreement mentions: Jamiat-e-Islami (as government), Hazrat Sahib Sibghatullah Mojaddedi, Professor Burhan ud-Din Rabbani, Hizb-e-Islami, Ittehad-e-Islami, Hizb-e-Islamic of Maulivi Khalis, National Islamic Front, Harkat-e-Inquilab-e-Islami, Hizb-e-Wahdat, Shura-e-Etelaf, and Maulvi Mansoor.
Comment of signatories: Dyadic peace agreement signed in Peshawar, Pakistan on 24 April 1992.
The agreement united all Afghan parties except for Hezb-e Islami of Gulbuddin Hekmatyar.
Full-text peace agreement
1993
Primary Parties: Government of Afghanistan - Hizb-i Islami-yi Afghanistan, Hizb-i Wahdat, Junbish-i Milli-yi Islami
Dimension: Internal
| Estimated Fatalities | |
|---|---|
| High | 7805 |
| Best | 3721 |
| Low | 3713 |
Numbers include fatalities for all dyads both active and inactive for this year
Peace agreements
Name of peace agreement: Afghan Peace Accord and Annex on the Division of Powers ("Islamabad accord")
Date when warring parties signed the agreement: 1993-03-07
Comment of peace agreement: Partial peace agreement
A number of warring factions and the government of Afghanistan signed the Islamabad Accord on 7 March 1993.
The agreement stipulated an immediate ceasefire, and a permanent cessation of hostilities as soon as a new cabinet for Afghanistan had been put into place. A joint commission comprised of all of the signatory factions and the Organization of the Islamic Conference was created in order to monitor the ceasefire and the permanent cessation of hostilities.
One of the most important issues agreed upon in the accord was the formation of a 16-member defense council, composed of two delegates each from all of the eight signatory factions. The defense council was given the mandate to create a new national army, and to ensure the submission of the armed forces to the said council. Also, the defense council would be responsible for taking control of the heavy weapons deployed around Kabul.
The most important regulation of the incompatibility was the creation of a powersharing arrangement in the form of a transitional government (with a mandate for 18 months) in which Rabbani would remain as President and under which Hekmatyar (Hez-I-Islami) would assume the office of Prime Minister. The Cabinet was to be formed through consultations between the signatory parties in the time following the agreement. Further the agreement outlined the divisions of power between the Prime Minister and the President.Also, the parties agreed to hold elections not later than 18 months following on 29 December 1992. The elections process would be implemented by an independent Elections Commission, comprised of delegates from the warring parties. The goal of this process was to create a Grand Constituent Assembly that in turn would form and ratify a new constitution for Afghanistan.
The accord also contained provisions for the release of all Afghan detainees and prisoners held by the different parties to the conflict. Steps were also taken to consolidate the control of the Afghan state over banking and currency issues.
Signatories: Professor Burhan-ud-Din Rabbani of Jamiat-i-Islami (President)
Gulbadin Hekmatyar of Hezb-i-Islami
Moulvi Muhammad (with reservation to the President time) of Harkat-e-Inqilab-e-Islami
Sibghatullah Mujjadidi of Jabha-e-Nijat-e-Milli
Pir Syed Ahmed Galliani (with reservation to the President time) of Mahaz-e-Milli
Ahmad Shah Ahmadzai of Ittehad-i-Islami
Sheik Asif Mohseni of Harkat-e-Islamic
Ayatullah Fazil of Hezb-i-Wahdat-e-Islami
Comment of signatories: Dyadic peace agreement
The negotiations prior to the accord was boycotted by the Hezb-i-Islami faction of Yunus Khales. General Dostum, leader of the powerful Uzbek guerrilla, was excluded from the talks. The agreement was signed in Islamabad, Pakistan on 7 March 1993.
Third parties: The accord was brokered by Pakistan. Saudi Arabia and Iran were joint sponsors and guarantors of the agreement.
Comment of third parties role in peace agreement: The regional implications of Irans and Saudi Arabias participation was great as the two countries in the past had mounted what was in effect a proxy war in Afghanistan through their rival Mujahideen militias.
Ended: True
Date agreement ended: 1993-05-12
Comment of Duration: On 16 March 1993 Gulbuddin Hekmatyar returned to Afghanistan to select a cabinet, he sent a list to of members on 2 April 1993 and announced the dissolution of the government. Rabbani refused to comply accusing Hekmatyar of not consulting all the parties of the agreement. The main disagreement was over the post as Defence minister. Rabbani favored Ahmad Shah Masood while Hekmatyar insisted on his departure. At the same time Kabul was heavily attacked.
Full-text peace agreement
Name of peace agreement: Jalalabad accord
Date when warring parties signed the agreement: 1993-05-20
Comment of peace agreement: Partial peace agreement.
The Jalalabad Accord was signed in Jalalabad on 20 May 1993, between nine warring factions in the Afghan conflict. The agreement aimed to settle the power-struggle that lingered on between Hekmatyar () and President Rabbani despite the Islamabad Accord signed on 7 March the same year.
The accord stipulated a permanent ceasefire, which came into force on 23 May, and was to be monitored by a multiparty commission.
The main provision of the agreement was a further specification of the powersharing agreement reached in the Islamabad Accord. The new Afghan Cabinet was to include two ministers each from the nine signatory factions, with Rabbani remaining as President and Hekmatyar assuming the post of Prime Minister. Joint commissions were created to manage the most pressing issues; the control of the ministries of the interior and defense. Other sources say that it was agreed that the President would control the ministry of defense, and the Prime Minister the ministry of the interior. After two months the Mujahideen commanders would elect permanent ministers for interior and defense portfolios. Agreement was also reached, once again, on the establishment of an Electoral Commission which was charged with the task of setting up elections within 18 months.
Signatories: Burhanuddin Rabbani, President
Gulbuddin Hekmatyar, Prime-minister designate, Hezb-i-Islami
- 7 other Mujahideen factions that is to participate in the government.
Comment of signatories: Dyadic peace agreement
The Jalalabad Accord was signed in Jalalabad the capital of Nangarhar province, on 20 May 1993.
Ended: True
Date agreement ended: 1994-01-01
Comment of Duration: Gulbuddin Hekmatyar was sworn in as Prime Minister on 17 June 1993. Yet, he continued to oppose the Rabbani regime and only participated in one Cabinet meeting. Clashes between the two sides continued and on 24 November they signed a new ceasefire. In January 1994 Hekmatyar and Dostum Junbish-i Milli-yi Islami, formerly allied to the regime, mounted a joint offensive on Kabul to oust President Rabbani.
1994
Primary Parties: Government of Afghanistan - Hizb-i Islami-yi Afghanistan, Hizb-i Wahdat, Junbish-i Milli-yi Islami
Dimension: Internal
| Estimated Fatalities | |
|---|---|
| High | 11955 |
| Best | 8937 |
| Low | 8937 |
Numbers include fatalities for all dyads both active and inactive for this year
1995
Primary Parties: Government of Afghanistan - Hizb-i Islami-yi Afghanistan, Hizb-i Wahdat, Junbish-i Milli-yi Islami, Taleban
Dimension: Internal
| Estimated Fatalities | |
|---|---|
| High | 6490 |
| Best | 5516 |
| Low | 5516 |
Numbers include fatalities for all dyads both active and inactive for this year
1996
Primary Parties: Government of Afghanistan - Jam'iyyat-i Islami-yi Afghanistan, Taleban, UIFSA
Dimension: Internal
| Estimated Fatalities | |
|---|---|
| High | 3638 |
| Best | 3177 |
| Low | 3161 |
Numbers include fatalities for all dyads both active and inactive for this year
Peace agreements
Name of peace agreement: Mahipar agreement
Date when warring parties signed the agreement: 1996-05-24
Comment of peace agreement: Partial peace agreement
On May 24 the government of Afghanistan and the Hezb-I-Islami signed a peace agreement aimed at settling the dispute between these two major factions in the Afghan conflict.
The agreement contained a ceasefire, that aimed to end the current fighting and to restore nationwide peace in the territory of Afghanistan. Following this deal, Hezb-I-Islami forces joined the government troops in their struggle against the Taleban insurgents. The agreement also contained reforms of the military and security sector, with the goal of setting up a national and Islamic army of Afghanistan, and of creating Islamic security forces for deployment throughout the country.
The powersharing arrangements from the 1993 peace deals were further elaborated upon, ending with Hekmatyar gaining the post of Prime Minister in a transitional government. Also, Hekmatyar’s group (Hezb-I-Islami) were given the highly sought after posts of minister of finance and minister of defense. Further it was agreed that elections would be held and that an elected government would be put in charge of the country as soon as possible. It was also stated that a future government would be based on the foundations of a genuine Islamic order and Islamic principles.
On 26 June Hekmatyar was sworn in as Prime Minister, and a new government under his leadership was announced on 3 June.
Signatories: Burhanuddin Rabbani, President of the Islamic state of Afghanistan
Gulbuddin Hekmatyar, Hezb-i-Islami
Comment of signatories: Dyadic peace agreement
The agreement was signed in Mahipar near the Afghan capital.
The signing ceremony was furthermore attended by Abdorrab Rasul Sayyaf from the Ittehad-i-Islami and General Massoud, member of the high state council and Rabbanis associate, as well as delegations from both sides.
Ended: True
Date agreement ended: 1996-09-28
Comment of Duration: Some of the provisions in the accord was implemented. On 26 June Hekmatyar was sworn in as Prime Minister, and a new government under his leadership was announced on 3 June. When the Taleban forces captured Kabul in late September 1996, the coalition government was ousted, and they did not manage to stay united during the continuation of the civil war.
1997
Primary Parties: Government of Afghanistan - UIFSA
Dimension: Internal
| Estimated Fatalities | |
|---|---|
| High | 8281 |
| Best | 6396 |
| Low | 4244 |
Numbers include fatalities for all dyads both active and inactive for this year
1998
Primary Parties: Government of Afghanistan - UIFSA
Dimension: Internal
| Estimated Fatalities | |
|---|---|
| High | 7698 |
| Best | 6256 |
| Low | 6168 |
Numbers include fatalities for all dyads both active and inactive for this year
1999
Primary Parties: Government of Afghanistan - UIFSA
Dimension: Internal
| Estimated Fatalities | |
|---|---|
| High | 4945 |
| Best | 4629 |
| Low | 4594 |
Numbers include fatalities for all dyads both active and inactive for this year
2000
Primary Parties: Government of Afghanistan - UIFSA
Dimension: Internal
| Estimated Fatalities | |
|---|---|
| High | 5511 |
| Best | 5235 |
| Low | 4053 |
Numbers include fatalities for all dyads both active and inactive for this year
2001
Primary Parties: Government of Afghanistan - UIFSA
Secondary Warring Parties Side B: Government of Iran
Dimension: Internationalized intrastate
Comment on Dimension: On 7 October 2001 the US-led Multinational Coalition launched its military campaign in Afghanistan. The intervention was a response to the refusal of the Taleban regime to surrender Usama bin Laden and his al Qaeda associates, and was launched as a part of the "US war on terrorism". USA justified launching a full-scale assault as being in accordance with UN SC resolutions 1368 and 1373, passed by the UN following the terrorist attacks against New York and Washington on 11 September 2001, as well as article 51 in the UN charter that allows states to act in self-defence.
| Estimated Fatalities | |
|---|---|
| High | 7657 |
| Best | 2328 |
| Low | 2217 |
Numbers include fatalities for all dyads both active and inactive for this year
2002
Primary Parties: Government of Afghanistan - Hizb-i Islami-yi Afghanistan
Dimension: Internal
| Estimated Fatalities | |
|---|---|
| High | 40 |
| Best | 40 |
| Low | 40 |
Numbers include fatalities for all dyads both active and inactive for this year
2003
Primary Parties: Government of Afghanistan - Hizb-i Islami-yi Afghanistan, Taleban
Secondary Warring Parties Side A: Government of Australia, Government of Denmark, Government of France, Government of Germany, Government of Italy, Government of Netherlands, Government of New Zealand, Government of Norway, Government of Poland, Government of Romania, Government of United Kingdom, Government of United States of America
Dimension: Internationalized intrastate
Comment on Dimension: The government of Afghanistan is supported by the Multinational Coalition (led by the USA). The Multinational Coalition is tasked with finding and containing al-Qaeda and Taliban members. To this extent, the Multinational Coalition is a primary party in the USA v. al Qaeda conflict, and a secondary warring party in the Afghanistan v. Taliban conflict.
| Estimated Fatalities | |
|---|---|
| High | 984 |
| Best | 660 |
| Low | 646 |
Numbers include fatalities for all dyads both active and inactive for this year
2004
Primary Parties: Government of Afghanistan - Taleban
Secondary Warring Parties Side A: Government of Belgium, Government of Canada, Government of Czech Republic, Government of France, Government of Germany, Government of Italy, Government of Pakistan, Government of Poland, Government of Portugal, Government of Romania, Government of Slovakia, Government of Spain, Government of United Kingdom, Government of United States of America
Dimension: Internationalized intrastate
Comment on Dimension: Afghanistan continued to be supported by the Multinational Coalition led by the United States.
| Estimated Fatalities | |
|---|---|
| High | 1245 |
| Best | 711 |
| Low | 669 |
Numbers include fatalities for all dyads both active and inactive for this year
2005
Primary Parties: Government of Afghanistan - Taleban
Secondary Warring Parties Side A: Government of Australia, Government of Belgium, Government of Canada, Government of Denmark, Government of France, Government of Germany, Government of Italy, Government of Netherlands, Government of Norway, Government of Pakistan, Government of Poland, Government of Romania, Government of Slovakia, Government of Spain, Government of United Kingdom, Government of United States of America
Dimension: Internationalized intrastate
Comment on Dimension: Afghanistan continued to be supported by the Multinational Coalition led by the United States.
| Estimated Fatalities | |
|---|---|
| High | 1992 |
| Best | 1628 |
| Low | 1424 |
Numbers include fatalities for all dyads both active and inactive for this year
2006
Primary Parties: Government of Afghanistan - Hizb-i Islami-yi Afghanistan, Taleban
Secondary Warring Parties Side A: Government of Albania, Government of Australia, Government of Austria, Government of Azerbaijan, Government of Belgium, Government of Bulgaria, Government of Canada, Government of Croatia, Government of Czech Republic, Government of Denmark, Government of Estonia, Government of Finland, Government of France, Government of Germany, Government of Greece, Government of Hungary, Government of Iceland, Government of Ireland, Government of Italy, Government of Latvia, Government of Lithuania, Government of Luxembourg, Government of Netherlands, Government of New Zealand, Government of North Macedonia, Government of Norway, Government of Pakistan, Government of Poland, Government of Portugal, Government of Romania, Government of Slovakia, Government of Slovenia, Government of Spain, Government of Sweden, Government of Switzerland, Government of Turkey, Government of United Kingdom, Government of United States of America
Dimension: Internationalized intrastate
| Estimated Fatalities | |
|---|---|
| High | 5543 |
| Best | 4734 |
| Low | 4665 |
Numbers include fatalities for all dyads both active and inactive for this year
2007
Primary Parties: Government of Afghanistan - Taleban
Secondary Warring Parties Side A: Government of Albania, Government of Australia, Government of Austria, Government of Azerbaijan, Government of Belgium, Government of Bulgaria, Government of Canada, Government of Croatia, Government of Czech Republic, Government of Denmark, Government of Estonia, Government of Finland, Government of France, Government of Germany, Government of Greece, Government of Hungary, Government of Iceland, Government of Ireland, Government of Italy, Government of Jordan, Government of Latvia, Government of Lithuania, Government of Luxembourg, Government of Netherlands, Government of New Zealand, Government of North Macedonia, Government of Norway, Government of Pakistan, Government of Poland, Government of Portugal, Government of Romania, Government of Slovakia, Government of Slovenia, Government of Spain, Government of Sweden, Government of Switzerland, Government of Turkey, Government of United Kingdom, Government of United States of America
Dimension: Internationalized intrastate
| Estimated Fatalities | |
|---|---|
| High | 8386 |
| Best | 6848 |
| Low | 6303 |
Numbers include fatalities for all dyads both active and inactive for this year
2008
Primary Parties: Government of Afghanistan - Hizb-i Islami-yi Afghanistan, Taleban
Secondary Warring Parties Side A: Government of Albania, Government of Australia, Government of Austria, Government of Azerbaijan, Government of Belgium, Government of Bulgaria, Government of Canada, Government of Croatia, Government of Czech Republic, Government of Denmark, Government of Estonia, Government of Finland, Government of France, Government of Georgia, Government of Germany, Government of Greece, Government of Hungary, Government of Iceland, Government of Ireland, Government of Italy, Government of Latvia, Government of Lithuania, Government of Luxembourg, Government of Netherlands, Government of New Zealand, Government of Norway, Government of Pakistan, Government of Poland, Government of Portugal, Government of Romania, Government of Slovakia, Government of Slovenia, Government of Spain, Government of Sweden, Government of Turkey, Government of United Kingdom, Government of United States of America
Dimension: Internationalized intrastate
| Estimated Fatalities | |
|---|---|
| High | 7189 |
| Best | 5655 |
| Low | 5204 |
Numbers include fatalities for all dyads both active and inactive for this year
2009
Primary Parties: Government of Afghanistan - Hizb-i Islami-yi Afghanistan, Taleban
Secondary Warring Parties Side A: Government of Albania, Government of Australia, Government of Azerbaijan, Government of Belgium, Government of Bosnia-Herzegovina, Government of Bulgaria, Government of Canada, Government of Croatia, Government of Czech Republic, Government of Denmark, Government of Estonia, Government of Finland, Government of France, Government of Georgia, Government of Germany, Government of Greece, Government of Hungary, Government of Iceland, Government of Italy, Government of Latvia, Government of Lithuania, Government of Luxembourg, Government of Netherlands, Government of New Zealand, Government of North Macedonia, Government of Norway, Government of Pakistan, Government of Poland, Government of Portugal, Government of Romania, Government of Singapore, Government of Slovakia, Government of Slovenia, Government of Spain, Government of Sweden, Government of Turkey, Government of Ukraine, Government of United Arab Emirates, Government of United Kingdom, Government of United States of America
Dimension: Internationalized intrastate
| Estimated Fatalities | |
|---|---|
| High | 8063 |
| Best | 6390 |
| Low | 5659 |
Numbers include fatalities for all dyads both active and inactive for this year
2010
Primary Parties: Government of Afghanistan - Hizb-i Islami-yi Afghanistan, Taleban
Secondary Warring Parties Side A: Government of Albania, Government of Armenia, Government of Australia, Government of Austria, Government of Azerbaijan, Government of Belgium, Government of Bosnia-Herzegovina, Government of Bulgaria, Government of Canada, Government of Croatia, Government of Czech Republic, Government of Denmark, Government of Estonia, Government of Finland, Government of France, Government of Georgia, Government of Germany, Government of Greece, Government of Hungary, Government of Iceland, Government of Ireland, Government of Italy, Government of Jordan, Government of Latvia, Government of Lithuania, Government of Luxembourg, Government of Malaysia, Government of Mongolia, Government of Montenegro, Government of Netherlands, Government of New Zealand, Government of North Macedonia, Government of Norway, Government of Pakistan, Government of Poland, Government of Portugal, Government of Romania, Government of Singapore, Government of Slovakia, Government of Slovenia, Government of South Korea, Government of Spain, Government of Sweden, Government of Turkey, Government of Ukraine, Government of United Arab Emirates, Government of United Kingdom, Government of United States of America
Dimension: Internationalized intrastate
| Estimated Fatalities | |
|---|---|
| High | 8465 |
| Best | 7038 |
| Low | 6865 |
Numbers include fatalities for all dyads both active and inactive for this year
2011
Primary Parties: Government of Afghanistan - Hizb-i Islami-yi Afghanistan, Taleban
Secondary Warring Parties Side A: Government of Albania, Government of Armenia, Government of Australia, Government of Austria, Government of Azerbaijan, Government of Belgium, Government of Bosnia-Herzegovina, Government of Bulgaria, Government of Canada, Government of Croatia, Government of Czech Republic, Government of Denmark, Government of El Salvador, Government of Estonia, Government of Finland, Government of France, Government of Georgia, Government of Germany, Government of Greece, Government of Hungary, Government of Iceland, Government of Ireland, Government of Italy, Government of Latvia, Government of Lithuania, Government of Luxembourg, Government of Malaysia, Government of Mongolia, Government of Montenegro, Government of Netherlands, Government of New Zealand, Government of North Macedonia, Government of Norway, Government of Pakistan, Government of Poland, Government of Portugal, Government of Romania, Government of Singapore, Government of Slovakia, Government of Slovenia, Government of South Korea, Government of Spain, Government of Sweden, Government of Tonga, Government of Turkey, Government of Ukraine, Government of United Arab Emirates, Government of United Kingdom, Government of United States of America
Dimension: Internationalized intrastate
| Estimated Fatalities | |
|---|---|
| High | 8290 |
| Best | 7423 |
| Low | 7279 |
Numbers include fatalities for all dyads both active and inactive for this year
2012
Primary Parties: Government of Afghanistan - Taleban
Secondary Warring Parties Side A: Government of Albania, Government of Armenia, Government of Australia, Government of Austria, Government of Azerbaijan, Government of Bahrain, Government of Belgium, Government of Bosnia-Herzegovina, Government of Bulgaria, Government of Canada, Government of Croatia, Government of Czech Republic, Government of Denmark, Government of El Salvador, Government of Estonia, Government of Finland, Government of France, Government of Georgia, Government of Germany, Government of Greece, Government of Hungary, Government of Iceland, Government of Ireland, Government of Italy, Government of Latvia, Government of Lithuania, Government of Luxembourg, Government of Malaysia, Government of Mongolia, Government of Montenegro, Government of Netherlands, Government of New Zealand, Government of North Macedonia, Government of Norway, Government of Pakistan, Government of Poland, Government of Portugal, Government of Romania, Government of Singapore, Government of Slovakia, Government of Slovenia, Government of South Korea, Government of Spain, Government of Sweden, Government of Tonga, Government of Turkey, Government of Ukraine, Government of United Arab Emirates, Government of United Kingdom, Government of United States of America
Dimension: Internationalized intrastate
| Estimated Fatalities | |
|---|---|
| High | 8551 |
| Best | 7740 |
| Low | 7568 |
Numbers include fatalities for all dyads both active and inactive for this year
2013
Primary Parties: Government of Afghanistan - Hizb-i Islami-yi Afghanistan, Taleban
Secondary Warring Parties Side A: Government of Albania, Government of Armenia, Government of Australia, Government of Austria, Government of Azerbaijan, Government of Belgium, Government of Bosnia-Herzegovina, Government of Bulgaria, Government of Canada, Government of Croatia, Government of Czech Republic, Government of Denmark, Government of El Salvador, Government of Estonia, Government of Finland, Government of France, Government of Georgia, Government of Germany, Government of Greece, Government of Hungary, Government of Iceland, Government of Ireland, Government of Italy, Government of Latvia, Government of Lithuania, Government of Luxembourg, Government of Malaysia, Government of Mongolia, Government of Montenegro, Government of Netherlands, Government of New Zealand, Government of North Macedonia, Government of Norway, Government of Pakistan, Government of Poland, Government of Portugal, Government of Romania, Government of Singapore, Government of Slovakia, Government of Slovenia, Government of South Korea, Government of Spain, Government of Sweden, Government of Tonga, Government of Turkey, Government of Ukraine, Government of United Arab Emirates, Government of United Kingdom, Government of United States of America
Dimension: Internationalized intrastate
| Estimated Fatalities | |
|---|---|
| High | 10181 |
| Best | 8057 |
| Low | 7621 |
Numbers include fatalities for all dyads both active and inactive for this year
2014
Primary Parties: Government of Afghanistan - Taleban
Secondary Warring Parties Side A: Government of Albania, Government of Armenia, Government of Australia, Government of Austria, Government of Azerbaijan, Government of Belgium, Government of Bosnia-Herzegovina, Government of Bulgaria, Government of Canada, Government of Croatia, Government of Czech Republic, Government of Denmark, Government of El Salvador, Government of Estonia, Government of Finland, Government of France, Government of Georgia, Government of Germany, Government of Greece, Government of Hungary, Government of Iceland, Government of Ireland, Government of Italy, Government of Jordan, Government of Latvia, Government of Lithuania, Government of Luxembourg, Government of Malaysia, Government of Mongolia, Government of Montenegro, Government of Netherlands, Government of New Zealand, Government of North Macedonia, Government of Norway, Government of Pakistan, Government of Poland, Government of Portugal, Government of Romania, Government of Slovakia, Government of Slovenia, Government of South Korea, Government of Spain, Government of Sweden, Government of Tonga, Government of Turkey, Government of Ukraine, Government of United Arab Emirates, Government of United Kingdom, Government of United States of America
Dimension: Internationalized intrastate
| Estimated Fatalities | |
|---|---|
| High | 15736 |
| Best | 12361 |
| Low | 11568 |
Numbers include fatalities for all dyads both active and inactive for this year
2015
Primary Parties: Government of Afghanistan - Taleban
Secondary Warring Parties Side A: Government of Pakistan, Government of United States of America
Dimension: Internationalized intrastate
Comment on Dimension: In December 2014, the operation ISAF (International Security Assistance Force) was concluded. Two agreements provided for some 12 000 soldiers to remain in Afghanistan in 2015, the Bilateral Security Agreement (BSA) between Afghanistan and the US, as well as the Status of Forces Agreement (SOFA), signed by Afghanistan and NATO. Based on these agreements, the non-combat mission Operation Resolute Support was launched on 1 January 2015.
While the SOFA only gives the international troops the mandate to train, advice and assist the Afghan troops, the BSA gives the US troops the mandate to “combat terrorism, achieve a region which is no longer a safe haven for al-Qaida and its affiliates, and enhance the ability of Afghanistan to deter threats against its sovereignty, security, and territorial integrity”. The BSA states that US troops, based on mutual agreement, can conduct combat operations in Afghanistan, and that “US military operations to defeat al-Qaida and its affiliates may be appropriate”.
Consequently, the NATO forces remaining in Afghanistan under the Resolute Support mission cannot be considered secondary warring parties to the conflict, whereas the US forces according to their mandate are giving the Afghan government troop support as a secondary warring party, making the conflict internationalized.
| Estimated Fatalities | |
|---|---|
| High | 19832 |
| Best | 16606 |
| Low | 15587 |
Numbers include fatalities for all dyads both active and inactive for this year
2016
Primary Parties: Government of Afghanistan - Taleban
Secondary Warring Parties Side A: Government of Pakistan, Government of United States of America
Dimension: Internationalized intrastate
Comment on Dimension: In December 2014, the operation ISAF (International Security Assistance Force) was concluded. Two agreements provided for some 12 000 soldiers to remain in Afghanistan in 2015, the Bilateral Security Agreement (BSA) between Afghanistan and the US, as well as the Status of Forces Agreement (SOFA), signed by Afghanistan and NATO. Based on these agreements, the non-combat mission Operation Resolute Support was launched on 1 January 2015.
While the SOFA only gives the international troops the mandate to train, advice and assist the Afghan troops, the BSA gives the US troops the mandate to “combat terrorism, achieve a region which is no longer a safe haven for al-Qaida and its affiliates, and enhance the ability of Afghanistan to deter threats against its sovereignty, security, and territorial integrity”. The BSA states that US troops, based on mutual agreement, can conduct combat operations in Afghanistan, and that “US military operations to defeat al-Qaida and its affiliates may be appropriate”.
Consequently, the NATO forces remaining in Afghanistan under the Resolute Support mission cannot be considered secondary warring parties to the conflict, whereas the US forces according to their mandate are giving the Afghan government troop support as a secondary warring party, making the conflict internationalized.
Moreover, Pakistan and Afghanistan have agreed to combat terrorists on both sides of their common border, assisting each other in eradicating threaths against themselves as well as against neighboring countries.
| Estimated Fatalities | |
|---|---|
| High | 22165 |
| Best | 15777 |
| Low | 14405 |
Numbers include fatalities for all dyads both active and inactive for this year
Peace agreements
Name of peace agreement: Kabul Agreement
Date when warring parties signed the agreement: 2016-09-22
Comment of peace agreement: Full peace agreement
After periods of negotiations over the past few years, a peace agreement was signed in the presidential palace in Kabul on 22 September 2016. The leader of Hizb-i Islami-yi Afghanistan, Gulbuddin Hekmatyar, signed the agreement via a video link and the ceremony was broadcast on live television.
The agreement provided for permanent ceasing of war and violence and the dissolution of Hizb-i Islami's military structures. Hizb-i Islami promised not to establish relations with any illegal armed organization and the government pledged to recruit members of the rebel group to the defense forces. Land and other resources were to be provided for refugees and Hizb-i Islami officials living outside the country.
Regarding the incompatibility the agreement provided for the right of political activity of Hizb-i Islami, and the attendance of the group in the reform process of the electoral system. The government also pledged that the presence of Hizb-i Islami would be ensured in consultative process for arrangement and implementation of government and national policies.
The agreement also included the removal of sanctions imposed on Hizb-i Islami, that Hekmatyar was to be honored by a special decree by the president, amnesty for leaders and members of Hizb-i Islami, and release of imprisoned members of the group. The parties also agreed to create a joint commission to supervise and implement the agreement.
Signatories: For the Government of Afghanistan: President Mohammad Ashraf Ghani
For Hizb-i Islami-yi Afghanistan: Leader Gulbuddin Hekmatyar
Witnessed by: Chairman for the High Peace Council Pir Sayed Ahmad Gailani
Comment of signatories: Dyadic agreement signed in Kabul on 22 September 2016
Representatives from the other active rebel group, the Taleban, were not included in the negotiations or the peace agreement.
Third parties: High Peace Council
Comment of third parties role in peace agreement: Representatives of the High Peace Council were involved in the process leading up to the agreement, and chairman Pir Sayed Ahmad Gailani signed the agreement.
Full-text peace agreement
2017
Primary Parties: Government of Afghanistan - Taleban
Secondary Warring Parties Side A: Government of Pakistan, Government of United States of America
Dimension: Internationalized intrastate
Comment on Dimension: In December 2014, the operation ISAF (International Security Assistance Force) was concluded. Two agreements provided for some 12 000 soldiers to remain in Afghanistan in 2015, the Bilateral Security Agreement (BSA) between Afghanistan and the US, as well as the Status of Forces Agreement (SOFA), signed by Afghanistan and NATO. Based on these agreements, the non-combat mission Operation Resolute Support was launched on 1 January 2015.
While the SOFA only gives the international troops the mandate to train, advice and assist the Afghan troops, the BSA gives the US troops the mandate to “combat terrorism, achieve a region which is no longer a safe haven for al-Qaida and its affiliates, and enhance the ability of Afghanistan to deter threats against its sovereignty, security, and territorial integrity”. The BSA states that US troops, based on mutual agreement, can conduct combat operations in Afghanistan, and that “US military operations to defeat al-Qaida and its affiliates may be appropriate”.
Consequently, the NATO forces remaining in Afghanistan under the Resolute Support mission cannot be considered secondary warring parties to the conflict, whereas the US forces according to their mandate are giving the Afghan government troop support as a secondary warring party, making the conflict internationalized.
Moreover, Pakistan and Afghanistan have agreed to combat terrorists on both sides of their common border, assisting each other in eradicating threats against themselves as well as against neighboring countries.
| Estimated Fatalities | |
|---|---|
| High | 17689 |
| Best | 16179 |
| Low | 15404 |
Numbers include fatalities for all dyads both active and inactive for this year
2018
Primary Parties: Government of Afghanistan - Taleban
Secondary Warring Parties Side A: Government of Pakistan, Government of United States of America
Dimension: Internationalized intrastate
Comment on Dimension: In December 2014, the operation ISAF (International Security Assistance Force) was concluded. Two agreements provided for some 12 000 soldiers to remain in Afghanistan in 2015, the Bilateral Security Agreement (BSA) between Afghanistan and the US, as well as the Status of Forces Agreement (SOFA), signed by Afghanistan and NATO. Based on these agreements, the non-combat mission Operation Resolute Support was launched on 1 January 2015.
While the SOFA only gives the international troops the mandate to train, advice and assist the Afghan troops, the BSA gives the US troops the mandate to “combat terrorism, achieve a region which is no longer a safe haven for al-Qaida and its affiliates, and enhance the ability of Afghanistan to deter threats against its sovereignty, security, and territorial integrity”. The BSA states that US troops, based on mutual agreement, can conduct combat operations in Afghanistan, and that “US military operations to defeat al-Qaida and its affiliates may be appropriate”.
Consequently, the NATO forces remaining in Afghanistan under the Resolute Support mission cannot be considered secondary warring parties to the conflict, whereas the US forces according to their mandate are giving the Afghan government troop support as a secondary warring party, making the conflict internationalized.
Moreover, Pakistan and Afghanistan have agreed to combat terrorists on both sides of their common border, assisting each other in eradicating threats against themselves as well as against neighboring countries.
| Estimated Fatalities | |
|---|---|
| High | 24818 |
| Best | 22837 |
| Low | 21486 |
Numbers include fatalities for all dyads both active and inactive for this year
2019
Primary Parties: Government of Afghanistan - Taleban
Secondary Warring Parties Side A: Government of United States of America
Dimension: Internationalized intrastate
Comment on Dimension: In December 2014, the operation ISAF (International Security Assistance Force) was concluded. Two agreements provided for some 12 000 soldiers to remain in Afghanistan in 2015, the Bilateral Security Agreement (BSA) between Afghanistan and the US, as well as the Status of Forces Agreement (SOFA), signed by Afghanistan and NATO. Based on these agreements, the non-combat mission Operation Resolute Support was launched on 1 January 2015.
While the SOFA only gives the international troops the mandate to train, advice and assist the Afghan troops, the BSA gives the US troops the mandate to “combat terrorism, achieve a region which is no longer a safe haven for al-Qaida and its affiliates, and enhance the ability of Afghanistan to deter threats against its sovereignty, security, and territorial integrity”. The BSA states that US troops, based on mutual agreement, can conduct combat operations in Afghanistan, and that “US military operations to defeat al-Qaida and its affiliates may be appropriate”.
Consequently, the NATO forces remaining in Afghanistan under the Resolute Support mission cannot be considered secondary warring parties to the conflict, whereas the US forces according to their mandate are giving the Afghan government troop support as a secondary warring party, making the conflict internationalized.
| Estimated Fatalities | |
|---|---|
| High | 33288 |
| Best | 28828 |
| Low | 26972 |
Numbers include fatalities for all dyads both active and inactive for this year
2020
Primary Parties: Government of Afghanistan - High Council of Afghanistan Islamic Emirate, Taleban
Secondary Warring Parties Side A: Government of United States of America
Dimension: Internationalized intrastate
Comment on Dimension: In December 2014, the operation ISAF (International Security Assistance Force) was concluded. Two agreements provided for some 12 000 soldiers to remain in Afghanistan in 2015, the Bilateral Security Agreement (BSA) between Afghanistan and the US, as well as the Status of Forces Agreement (SOFA), signed by Afghanistan and NATO. Based on these agreements, the non-combat mission Operation Resolute Support was launched on 1 January 2015.
While the SOFA only gives the international troops the mandate to train, advice and assist the Afghan troops, the BSA gives the US troops the mandate to “combat terrorism, achieve a region which is no longer a safe haven for al-Qaida and its affiliates, and enhance the ability of Afghanistan to deter threats against its sovereignty, security, and territorial integrity”. The BSA states that US troops, based on mutual agreement, can conduct combat operations in Afghanistan, and that “US military operations to defeat al-Qaida and its affiliates may be appropriate”.
Consequently, the NATO forces remaining in Afghanistan under the Resolute Support mission cannot be considered secondary warring parties to the conflict, whereas the US forces according to their mandate are giving the Afghan government troop support as a secondary warring party, making the conflict internationalized.
| Estimated Fatalities | |
|---|---|
| High | 21387 |
| Best | 20159 |
| Low | 18696 |
Numbers include fatalities for all dyads both active and inactive for this year
2021
Primary Parties: Government of Afghanistan - NRF, Taleban
Secondary Warring Parties Side A: Government of United States of America
Dimension: Internationalized intrastate
Comment on Dimension: In December 2014, the operation ISAF (International Security Assistance Force) was concluded. Two agreements provided for some 12 000 soldiers to remain in Afghanistan in 2015, the Bilateral Security Agreement (BSA) between Afghanistan and the US, as well as the Status of Forces Agreement (SOFA), signed by Afghanistan and NATO. Based on these agreements, the non-combat mission Operation Resolute Support was launched on 1 January 2015.
While the SOFA only gives the international troops the mandate to train, advice and assist the Afghan troops, the BSA gives the US troops the mandate to “combat terrorism, achieve a region which is no longer a safe haven for al-Qaida and its affiliates, and enhance the ability of Afghanistan to deter threats against its sovereignty, security, and territorial integrity”. The BSA states that US troops, based on mutual agreement, can conduct combat operations in Afghanistan, and that “US military operations to defeat al-Qaida and its affiliates may be appropriate”.
Consequently, the NATO forces remaining in Afghanistan under the Resolute Support mission cannot be considered secondary warring parties to the conflict, whereas the US forces according to their mandate are giving the Afghan government troop support as a secondary warring party, making the conflict internationalized.
During 2021, the last international troops left Afghanistan following the Taleban-US agreement signed on 29 February 2020.
| Estimated Fatalities | |
|---|---|
| High | 39554 |
| Best | 35334 |
| Low | 33418 |
Numbers include fatalities for all dyads both active and inactive for this year
2022
Primary Parties: Government of Afghanistan - AFF, NRF
Dimension: Internal
| Estimated Fatalities | |
|---|---|
| High | 1363 |
| Best | 695 |
| Low | 416 |
Numbers include fatalities for all dyads both active and inactive for this year
2023
Primary Parties: Government of Afghanistan - AFF, NRF
Dimension: Internal
| Estimated Fatalities | |
|---|---|
| High | 223 |
| Best | 80 |
| Low | 61 |
Numbers include fatalities for all dyads both active and inactive for this year
2024
Primary Parties: Government of Afghanistan - NRF
Dimension: Internal
| Estimated Fatalities | |
|---|---|
| High | 252 |
| Best | 34 |
| Low | 21 |
Numbers include fatalities for all dyads both active and inactive for this year
2025
Primary Parties: Government of Afghanistan - NRF
Dimension: Internal
| Estimated Fatalities | |
|---|---|
| High | 202 |
| Best | 30 |
| Low | 15 |
Numbers include fatalities for all dyads both active and inactive for this year
Conflict Archive
This section contains annual information no longer systematically collected by the UCDP.
1975 Conflict Archive
Terminated: NO
1977 Conflict Archive
Terminated: NO
1978 Conflict Archive
Comment on Activity: PDPA (Hizb-i Demokrati-i Khalq-i Afghanistan, People’s Democratic Party of Afghanistan) had begun to plan a coup in 1977 and it is believed that the original plan was to launch the coup during the fall of 1978. However, due to some events in April 1978, the coup was launched earlier. On 17 April 1978, Mir Akbar Khaibar, a prominent PDPA leader, was assassinated in Kabul. Although it has never been established who killed him, PDPA charged President Mohammed Daud Khan’s Interior Minister, which led to massive demonstrations against Daud. The President, alarmed by the strength of PDPA, launched a crackdown against the party’s leadership and on 26 April, seven leaders of PDPA were arrested.
In response to the arrests, communist officers and PDPA launched a coup d’état on 27 April, called the Saur revolution after the Afghan lunar month of Saur (Taurus). Tanks, supported by bomb planes from Bagram airbase north of Kabul, attacked the army headquarters. In the afternoon, bomb planes started attacking the Presidential Palace and the President, several government officials, and most of the loyalist soldiers who defended them were killed. Radio Kabul was seized and information about the coup was broadcasted. The message reaching the population was “For the first time in the history of Afghanistan the last remnants of imperialist tyranny and despotism have been ended”. On 30 April the military commanders of the coup handed over power to the new Revolutionary Council headed by Nur Muhammad Taraki. Taraki, who was one of the PDPA leaders that had been arrested, was installed as the Prime Minister of the Democratic Republic of Afghanistan.
Negotiations: NO
Third party involvement: NO
Victory: YES
Victory side: b
Comment on Victory: PDPA (Hizb-i Demokrati-i Khalq-i Afghanistan, People’s Democratic Party of Afghanistan) overthrew President Mohammed Daud Khan in a coup d’état on 27 April 1978. Daud and his associates were killed and a Revolutionary Council took control over the country. On 30 April, Nur Muhammad Taraki was installed as Prime Minister and the Democratic Republic of Afghanistan was proclaimed. The Soviet Union immediately recognized the new government and several countries, for example Cuba, Iraq, the Warsaw-pact member states, India and Pakistan, followed. UK recognised the new regime on 6 May, and France and the US declared on 7 May that they would maintain their diplomatic relations with the new government.
Terminated: NO
1979 Conflict Archive
Comment on Activity: In early 1979 rural uprisings began to spread across the country. There is very little information about the fighting in early 1979 and the information available is very confused. Heavy fighting was going on in the beginning of the year in eastern Afghanistan, in the provinces of Kunar and Paktia. However, it is not possible to determine which groups were involved.
In March the government was challenged by the Jam’iyyat-i Islami-yi Afghanistan uprising in Herat. The government had launched a major literacy campaign with the aim to teach a million people to read and write. However, the thought of men teaching women to read caused extensive hostility among conservative Afghans. Demonstrations against the campaign started in Herat on 15 March and the government sent in an army division to break up the riot. However, the army division was not loyal to the government and led by Ismael Khan, thousands of soldiers joined the rebels who had participated in the uprising. Jam’iyyat took control over the city for a couple of days, and many of the Soviet advisers positioned in Herat were cut to pieces and spread on the streets. The military forces encircled the city and subjected it to numerous bomb attacks, eventually forcing the resistance to give up.
The growing unrest across Afghanistan caused the Soviet Union to step up their support for the communist government and the number of Soviet advisers in Afghanistan increased substantially after the Herat uprising. A number of mutinies took place across the country and tens of thousands of troops deserted to the rebels.
Jam’iyyat-i Islami-yi Afghanistan continued to engage the government forces in battles in Kunar province and was also very active in their stronghold north of Kabul, in the Panjsher Valley. The valley was used as a base for attacks on Soviet transports of supplies, traveling on the main road between Kabul and the Soviet Union, and also for attacks on Bagram, the important military airbase north of Kabul.
Comment on Yearly Battle Related Deaths: The records relating to the early phase of the insurgency is unclear. Fighting was recorded from various places during 1979, but information on groups involved is inconsistent and reports from other places than big cities are scarce. The numbers of deaths is therefore most likely considerably higher than the numbers given above.
Negotiations: NO
Third party involvement: NO
Victory: NO
Terminated: NO
Type of termination: Not terminated
1980 Conflict Archive
Comment on Activity: After the Soviet invasion in late December 1979, new leader Babrak Karmal tried to convince the population of Afghanistan that the Soviet troops were only in the country to defend it against external aggression and that the new regime was no “puppet” of Moscow. When addressing the nation in the beginning of January he stated that his aim was to restore the freedoms that had been taken away by Hafizullah Amin. Karmal promised that the new constitution would “respect and adhere to the sacred religion of Islam” in an attempt to stem the Islamist uprisings around the country. In spite of these attempts to win back popular support, anti-government demonstrations spread across Afghanistan, and many joined the Moslem guerrilla groups called Mujahideen. A large number of men deserted from the army and joined the guerrillas, as a protest to Karmal’s dependence on an anti-Islamic foreign power.
Outside Kabul, Soviet troops had a hard time controlling the country. During spring 1980, the Mujahideen took control over large parts of eastern Afghanistan along the Pakistani border. They moved freely across the border, established camps on Pakistani territory, and smuggled weapons into Afghanistan. The Shiite rebels from Hazara Jat in central Afghanistan established control over large parts of the provinces of Bamiyan, Ghowr and Uruzgan, and set up their own government in the area.
In March 1980 the Soviet troops launched an offensive in Kunar province in eastern Afghanistan where the Mujahideen groups were particularly strong. Afghan forces, together with around 25 000 Soviet troops, attacked the area supported by airborne artillery and helicopter gunships. By mid-March the Mujahideen had been eliminated from the Kunar valley, but continued to control the mountains.
Another problematic area for the Afghan and Soviet troops was the Panjsher Valley northeast of Kabul where the powerful Jam’iyyat-i Islami commander Ahmed Shah Massoud had his stronghold. The guerrillas carried out several ambushes on Soviet vehicles along the Salang road, linking the Soviet Union to Kabul. A first offensive in the Panjsher Valley was launched in late August and resulted in heavy casualties on both sides. In November a second offensive began.
In November an offensive was also launched south of Kabul in the Logar Valley. The valley had become an important stronghold for several guerrilla groups, including Hizb-i Islami-yi Afghanistan, Harakat-i Inqilab-i Islami-yi Afghanistan and the Shiite Hazaras from the Shura party. Fighting continued to late December 1980 with heavy casualties as a result.
Negotiations: NO
Third party involvement: NO
Victory: NO
Terminated: NO
1981 Conflict Archive
Comment on Activity: Although fighting in Afghanistan usually ceased during winter, there was heavy fighting in January 1981 in Logar province, south of Kabul, Kunar valley, northeast of Kabul, and in the Panjsher Valley, north of Kabul. Forces commanded by the powerful Ahmad Shah Massoud, belonging to the Jam’iyyat-i Islami-yi Afghanistan, were controlling the Panjsher Valley and used it to attack the important airbase in Bagram, north of Kabul. Jam’iyyat-i Islami also carried out several ambushes on Soviet convoys in the Salang Pass north of Kabul. All provinces in Afghanistan were experiencing guerrilla warfare during 1981.
For the Afghan army, the big problem during 1981 was the lack of manpower. Thousands of recruits had deserted and many of them had joined the resistance. The armed forces, which in the beginning of 1980 had consisted of around 100 000 troops, was in 1981 down to only 30 000. The support for the ruling party PDPA (Hizb-i Demokrati-i Khalq-i Afghanistan) was also diminishing and in June 1981, President Karmal created the National Fatherland Front in an attempt to rally all sections of the society against the Mujahideen. The Front, which included representatives from tribes and provinces, soon became a target for the rebels and in the first month after its creation, 27 of its members were killed.
Negotiations: NO
Third party involvement: YES
Third party involvement names: UN
Comment on Third Party Involvement: Javier Perez de Cuellar, a special representative of UN Secretary General Kurt Waldheim, visited the Soviet Union, Afghanistan and Pakistan during 1981 in an attempt to negotiate a peaceful withdrawal of Soviet troops and to seek a political solution that would enable the Afghans to choose their own government. No representatives of the resistance movement took part in those meetings.
Victory: NO
Terminated: NO
1982 Conflict Archive
Comment on Activity: The conflict in Afghanistan continued to escalate during 1982. In January, there was fierce fighting in the western city of Herat. The Herat front under the leadership of Ismael Khan was affiliated to Jam’iyyat-i Islami-yi Afghanistan and was one of the strongest guerrilla fronts in Afghanistan. After the guerrillas had executed 60 officials from the ruling party in early January 1982, the government forces tried to push them out of the city. The large-scale operations resulted in thousands of deaths.
During the summer of 1982, the Soviet troops launched their biggest offensive of the war so far when they once again tried to take the Panjsher Valley, a stronghold of Jam’iyyat commander Ahmad Shah Massoud. At least 15 000 government troops (around 11 000 of them drawn from the Soviet forces) were involved in the operation, against 3000 guerrilla fighters. At the end of the summer, after thousands of people had died in the fighting, the Soviets occupied the valley. Some guerrilla infrastructure was damaged, but Massoud’s army was almost intact, and a few weeks later, the Soviet troops pulled back.
Due to the escalation of violence in 1982, the civilian losses increased. The Soviet bombings also caused an increasing number of refugees. At the end of the year there were more than 2 million Afghan refugees in Pakistan and hundreds of thousands in Iran.
The manpower problems in the Afghan army continued, but during the year the number of desertions seemed to decrease. The ruling party PDPA increased its membership during the year, and in March a national conference was held. The conference, the first one since 1966, resulted in an updated party programme.
Negotiations: NO
Third party involvement: YES
Third party involvement names: UN
Comment on Third Party Involvement: The UN continued its efforts to negotiate a solution to the political situation in Afghanistan and a withdrawal of Soviet troops from the country. In April 1982, Diego Cordovez was appointed special envoy of the UN Secretary-General, Javier Pérez de Cuellar. During spring Cordovez visited Kabul, Tehran and Islamabad for exploratory talks. In June, a first round of talks was held in Geneva between the Foreign Ministers of Pakistan and Afghanistan, after which Cordovez reported that a framework for the talks was almost completed.
Victory: NO
Terminated: NO
1983 Conflict Archive
Comment on Activity: In 1983, the Mujahideen together controlled over 90 % of the country. No party made any clear strategic advances during the year, although the fighting continued unabated. One of the worst affected areas was Paktia province in eastern Afghanistan, where the proximity to the supply bases in Pakistan resulted in particularly well-armed guerrillas.
In the Panjsher Valley, which had experienced several large-scale offensives in previous years, Commander Ahmed Shah Massoud surprisingly negotiated a truce with the Soviet forces in January 1983. The Panjsher Valley was of great importance to the Soviets as the main supply route from the Soviet Union passed through it, and Massoud needed to rebuild his organisation after last years offensives. Although he did not loose many cadres in the battles, the civilian population had suffered immensely and the infrastructure was badly damaged. Although fighting ceased between Massoud’s forces and the Soviet troops, other groups stepped up attacks in areas surrounding the valley. In April, Hizb-i Islami-yi Afghanistan, Harakat-i Inqilab-i Islami-yi Afghanistan and Jam’iyyat-i Islami-yi Afghanistan (not Massoud’s forces) united in attacks in the area.
The UN continued their efforts to negotiate a withdrawal of Soviet troops and a solution for the political situation in Afghanistan. In January, the Special Representative of the UN Secretary General, Diego Cordovez, visited Iran, Pakistan and Afghanistan and in March UN Secretary General Javier Perez de Cuellar visited Moscow. In April and June, two rounds of talks were held in Geneva, but they did not result in any agreement. The Mujahideen opposed the UN measures and claimed that a complete Soviet withdrawal was a precondition for their participation in negotiations.
Negotiations: NO
Third party involvement: YES
Third party involvement names: UN
Comment on Third Party Involvement: The UN continued their efforts to negotiate a withdrawal of Soviet troops and a solution for the political situation in Afghanistan. In January, the Special Representative of the UN Secretary General, Diego Cordovez, visited Iran, Pakistan and Afghanistan and in March UN Secretary General Javier Perez de Cuellar visited Moscow. In April and June, two rounds of talks were held in Geneva, but they did not result in any agreement. The Mujahideen opposed the UN measures and claimed that a complete Soviet withdrawal was a precondition for their participation in negotiations.
Victory: NO
Terminated: NO
1984 Conflict Archive
Comment on Activity: The ceasefire between Jam’iyyat-i Islami-yi Afghanistan commander Ahmed Shah Massoud and the Soviet forces in the Panjsher Valley expired in January 1984. In March, Massoud was offered to extend the agreement but refused and in April, another large-scale offensive against the Panjsher Valley was launched. Massoud’s forces, who had regrouped during the ceasefire, was attacked by around 10 000 Soviet and 5000 Afghan troops. The rebels were warned of the offensive and evacuated many villages before the government forces arrived, yet they suffered heavy losses. Fighting continued throughout the summer, but when the Soviet troops withdrew from the area in September, Massoud regained control. Other offensives were going on in Paktia, Herat and Logar during 1984.
In Kabul, Abdol Haq from the Hizb-i Islami-yi Afghanistan – Khalis faction, continued to attack Soviet and government targets. During the fall of 1984, the Mujahideen in Kabul stepped up its activity and adopted new tactics. In previous years, assassinations and targeted bomb attacks had been the most common tactics, but from August 1984, unguided rockets became the most used weapon. The attacks resulted in civilian losses as the rockets were inaccurate and indiscriminate.
The UN continued their efforts to negotiate a withdrawal of Soviet troops and a solution for the political situation in Afghanistan. The Special Representative of the UN Secretary General, Diego Cordovez, visited Iran, Pakistan and Afghanistan and in July UN Secretary General Javier Perez de Cuellar visited Moscow. On 24 August, talks opened in Geneva, but no progress was achieved.
Negotiations: NO
Third party involvement: YES
Third party involvement names: UN
Comment on Third Party Involvement: The UN continued their efforts to negotiate a withdrawal of Soviet troops and a solution for the political situation in Afghanistan. The Special Representative of the UN Secretary General, Diego Cordovez, visited Iran, Pakistan and Afghanistan and in July UN Secretary General Javier Perez de Cuellar visited Moscow. On 24 August, talks opened in Geneva, but no progress was achieved.
Victory: NO
Terminated: NO
1985 Conflict Archive
Comment on Activity: In 1985, foreign aid to the Mujahideen increased significantly when the US decided to provide the rebels with $250 million, in contrast to the $80 million provided in 1984. Previously, the US aid to the Afghan Mujahideen had been covert and only Soviet-type weapons had been bought in an attempt to hide the fact that they came from the US. In 1985, there was a more open discussion about how best to destabilise the Kabul regime and when the rebels needed anti-aircraft defence, UK-built Blowpipe missiles were shipped to Afghanistan.
Several large-scale offensives were launched during 1985, mainly in the eastern areas of the country. In the Kunar Valley, close to the Pakistani border, government outposts were constantly under siege, and heavy fighting erupted when the government forces tried to block the Mujahideen’s supply routes from Pakistan. In late May, the resistance groups announced that they had abandoned the valley.
In May, a new attempt to unite the resistance groups based in Peshawar was made. The increasing strength of the Soviet/Afghan operations worried the Mujahideen leaders, and a new alliance, the Islamic Unity of Afghan Mujahideen, was announced. All the seven main resistance groups, both fundamentalist and moderate, were included in the alliance, and to prevent Hekmatyar from disrupting the alliance, he was made spokesman of it. In summer, parties from the new alliance together launched attacks against government positions around the city of Khost and in the Logar valley, east of Kabul.
The UN continued their efforts to negotiate a withdrawal of Soviet troops and a solution for the political situation in Afghanistan and several rounds of talks were held in Geneva during the second half of 1985. The talks were described as fruitful, but no agreement was met.
Negotiations: NO
Third party involvement: YES
Third party involvement names: UN
Comment on Third Party Involvement: The UN continued their efforts to negotiate a withdrawal of Soviet troops and a solution for the political situation in Afghanistan and several rounds of talks were held in Geneva during the second half of 1985. The talks were described as fruitful, but no agreement was met.
Victory: NO
Terminated: NO
1986 Conflict Archive
Comment on Activity: In 1986, the main areas of fighting shifted somewhat, as Jam’iyyat-i Islami-yi Afghanistan Commander Ahmed Shah Massoud left his stronghold in the Panjsher Valley in summer and headed north to Badakshan province. The offensives against Panjsher Valley during previous years had strengthened Soviet control in the area, and the death of Commander Zabiullah in 1984 had weakened Jam’iyyat-i Islami in the northern parts of Afghanistan. Massoud’s move to Badakshan resulted in several attacks against Soviet and Afghan forces in the province during the second half of 1986.
In April, a campaign was launched in the Khost area, in which the Soviet/Afghan forces attempted to take control over the important rebel base at Zhawar, close to the Pakistani border. The offensive resulted in heavy casualties on both sides and a victory for the government forces. They withdrew shortly thereafter and the Mujahideen occupied the area once again.
In the spring of 1986, President Babrak Karmal’s position was uncertain. His health was suffering and when he didn’t attend the 27 April celebrations marking the anniversary of the Communist coup of 1978, speculation about his whereabouts began. Karmal returned to Afghanistan on 3 May, announcing that he had undergone medical treatment in the Soviet Union. The following day Karmal resigned from the post as general secretary of the Afghan Communist Party, and the former chief of the secret police, Mohammad Najibullah, was elected as the new leader of Afghanistan. Karmal kept the ceremonial Presidential post until November when he was replaced by Acting President Haji Chamkani.
On 28 July, Soviet leader Mikhail Gorbachev announced a limited withdrawal of troops from Afghanistan in order to stimulate talks to end the conflict in Afghanistan. On 15 October, 8000 of the estimated 118 000 Soviet troops in Afghanistan left the country. The Soviets made it clear though, that further reduction of forces in Afghanistan would depend on a political solution for the country. The UN mediator, who conducted several rounds of talks in Geneva during the year, reported progress and explained that the only question left to solve was the timetable of Soviet withdrawal. However, a major problem was the absence of representatives of the Mujahideen in the talks, who vowed to continue fighting despite any peace deal reached in the talks.
Negotiations: NO
Third party involvement: YES
Third party involvement names: UN
Comment on Third Party Involvement: In the beginning of 1986 there seemed to be an increasing willingness among the Afghan and Soviet officials to negotiate a timetable for the withdrawal of Soviet troops from Afghanistan. UN-sponsored talks were held in Geneva in May and July, without resulting in any agreement. In December, the UN mediator Diego Cordovez, visited Islamabad and Kabul, and the parties finally managed to agree on how the withdrawal of troops should be monitored, but not when it should occur.
Victory: NO
Terminated: NO
1987 Conflict Archive
Comment on Activity: In 1987, the Soviets were getting closer to a withdrawal of troops from Afghanistan, and launched fewer offensives than in previous years. Furthermore, the delivery of advanced anti-aircraft missiles to the Mujahideen made Soviet air support less effective, which resulted in difficulties for large-scale operations against rebel strongholds.
In January, Afghan leader Najibullah proclaimed the policy of National Reconciliation, which included a unilateral ceasefire, an amnesty for rebel prisoners, safe passage for rebel leaders who wanted to attend peace talks, and formation of a government of national unity in which representatives from the Mujahideen would be included. The Mujahideen rejected the government plan and said they would continue the struggle until Soviet troops had left the country and an Islamic republic had been established in Afghanistan. The government called for a ceasefire on 15 January, but it was broken later the same day.
Even though the ceasefire did not reduce the violence in Afghanistan, the new approach towards the conflict made the work of the UN mediator easier. Talks were held in Geneva in February and in September, and the parties seemed to get closer to an agreement on a timetable for the withdrawal of Soviet troops. The Mujahideen did not participate in the Geneva talks, but stated in December that they were willing to meet the UN envoy Diego Cordovez in 1988.
The main areas of fighting in 1987 were the eastern parts of Afghanistan near the Pakistani border, the southern city of Kandahar and the area around Kabul
Negotiations: NO
Third party involvement: YES
Third party involvement names: UN, Armand Hammer
Comment on Third Party Involvement: UN-sponsored talks were held in Geneva in February and in September, and the parties (representatives from the Afghan and Pakistani government) seemed to get closer to an agreement on a timetable for the withdrawal of Soviet troops. The Mujahideen did not participate in the Geneva talks, but stated in December that they were willing to meet the UN envoy Diego Cordovez in 1988. Cordovez made several visits to Pakistan, Afghanistan, the Soviet Union and the US during the year.
In October, the American industrialist Armand Hammer was assigned by the Soviet Union to meet with the key figures in the Afghan conflict in search for a solution. He arranged meetings with officials in Moscow, Kabul and Islamabad, and he also went to Rome to meet the former Afghan King.
Victory: NO
Terminated: NO
1988 Conflict Archive
Comment on Activity: In January 1988, the Soviet Foreign Minister Eduard Shevardnadze stated that the Soviet Union “would like the year 1988 to be the last year of the Soviet troops stay”. This change in rhetoric paved the way for the Geneva Accords signed on 14 April 1988. After six years of UN-sponsored talks, Pakistan and Afghanistan finally pledged non-interference and agreed on a timetable for the withdrawal of Soviet troops. USA and the Soviet Union signed the agreement as guarantors, and in May a UN operational team (UNGOMAP) with the mission to monitor the implementation of the Geneva accords arrived in Kabul.
The first convoy of Soviet troops left Afghanistan in May, and by August half of the military contingent had returned to the Soviet Union. As the Soviet troops withdrew there were few reports of fighting between the retreating forces and the resistance groups. Instead, the Mujahideen occupied the positions the Soviets left behind. The government forces, positioned in outlying positions in the eastern provinces, realised that they would not be able to defend the garrisons against the Mujahideen and withdrew from over 100 outposts and forts during the spring of 1988.
In a general election in April, a new parliament was elected and President Najibullah declared that fifty seats were left open for the guerrillas if they stopped fighting. The Mujahideen presented their own government in June, which they hoped would take over power from Najibullah once the Soviet troops were gone.
In spite of the progress in the Geneva talks and the withdrawal of Soviet troops, fighting continued unabated during 1988. From June, an increasing number of rockets hit Kabul with the result of heavy civilian casualties. Often, more than 200 rockets per week landed in the capital. In September, the Mujahideen took control of Kandahar and in October, the eastern provinces of Kunar and Paktia fell to the rebels. At the end of the year, fighting escalated around the Jalalabad, east of Kabul. The Mujahideen had planned an attack on this strategic city ever since the Soviet troops left the area in May 1988.
Negotiations: NO
Third party involvement: YES
Third party involvement names: UN
Comment on Third Party Involvement: In January 1988, the Soviet Foreign Minister Eduard Shevardnadze stated that the Soviet Union “would like the year 1988 to be the last year of the Soviet troops stay”. This change in rhetoric paved the way for the Geneva Accords signed on 14 April 1988. After six years of UN-sponsored talks, Pakistan and Afghanistan finally pledged non-interference and agreed on a timetable for the withdrawal of Soviet troops. USA and the Soviet Union signed the agreement as guarantors, and in May a UN operational team (UNGOMAP) with the mission to monitor the implementation of the Geneva accords arrived in Kabul.
In February, the UN mediator Diego Cordovez met with the Mujahideen for the first time.
Victory: NO
Terminated: NO
1989 Conflict Archive
Comment on Activity: The Soviet Union completed the withdrawal of it troops from Afghanistan in mid-February, as stipulated under the Geneva accords signed in April 1988 by Afghanistan, Pakistan, the United States and the Soviet Union. The Mujahideen outfits, which had not participated in the Geneva negotiations, stated their determinacy to continue the war.
One week after the Soviet withdrawal, on 23 February 1989, the Pakistani based Mujahideen groups decided on the election of an interim government-in-exile. The establishment of Islamic Interim Afghan Government (IIAG) came after a long period of internal dispute, and negotiations over the participation of the Iranian based Mujahideen stalled over the issue of representation. The IIAG became marred by disunity and came under heavy criticism from both the USA and Afghan opposition groups from being unrepresentative.
As the Soviet army withdrew escalating fighting was reported between the Afghan army and Mujahideen forces in the western part of Afghanistan. An estimated 45 000 rebels were situated in the area between Kabul and the Pakistani border. According to President Najibullah, the rebels were under Pakistani patronage and assisted by Pakistan irregulars performing the first step of a Pakistani invasion of the country.
In May the fighting intensified over the important city of Jalalabad. Both Pakistani and United States officials expected a quick Mujahideen victory, as the Najibullah government was seen as to faction-riven to survive the Soviet withdrawal. It ended, however, with the forced withdrawal of the Mujahideen and a symbolically important victory for the Najibullah government. The hard fighting over the city of Jalalabad was reported to have caused 5000 casualties.
In spite of the predictions from outside observers, the Najibullah government consolidated its power throughout the year. Internal rivalry and fierce inter-group fighting between Jamiyyat-i Islami-yi Afghanistan and Hizb-i-Islami-yi Afghanistan on its side weakened the fundamentalist Mujahideen movement. The latter in fact suspended its participation in the IIAG in August.
Comment on Yearly Battle Related Deaths: There is little information on casualties in the period immediately following the Soviet troop-withdrawal. The above estimate serves only as an indicator of the absolute minimum of battle-related deaths; the actual figure might be much higher.
Negotiations: NO
Third party involvement: NO
Victory: NO
Terminated: NO
1990 Conflict Archive
Comment on Activity: In early 1990 it was stated that the Mujahideen groups controlled 80% of the Afghan countryside. Some of the commanders had allegedly made a form of peace agreement with the Najibullah government to obtain a free hand in the parts of Afghanistan under their control.
In March the Defence Minister, in collaboration with the Hizb-i-Islami-yi Afghanistan leader Hekmatyar, attempted a coup against the Najibullah government, but it failed to overthrow the government.
In October, amid a clear intensification of the conflict, Massoud of Jamiyyat-i Islami-yi Afghanistan met Hekamatyar of Hizb-i-Islami-yi Afghanistan and signed an agreement for military cooperation. The agreement also provided for election to a Mujahideen government in the 13 northern provinces where the Mujahideen forces had their stronghold. Massoud also had talks with other commanders and their Pakistani hosts to co-ordinate attacks on government-centres.
During the autumn there were some promising moves towards a political settlement of the conflict, mainly initiated by the Afghanistan government. No concrete results were however reported.
Negotiations: YES
Comment on Negotiation: In October President Najibullah took promising initiatives to settle the conflict through a peace proposal. In late November President Najibullah travelled to Geneva to meet some of the guerrilla-leaders as well as representatives of the former king for negotiations over a transitional government. The rebel leaders denied that any such meeting had taken place.
During 1990 there were talks between Soviet Union and USA aimed at a solution of the conflict. The talks concerned stopping arm-supplies to both sides, implementing a ceasefire and holding of elections supervised by the UN and the Islamic Conference. The two parties came closer, but the issue of cutting of arm-supplies and the status of President Najibullah stood in the way of any final agreement.
Third party involvement: YES
Third party involvement names: UN Secretary General Perez De Cuellar, the Soviet Union
Comment on Third Party Involvement: The UN Secretary General proposed a meeting of 100 prominent Afghans belonging to the resistance to take place in Europe. These should nominate 10 persons that could negotiate with the Kabul regime.
In February Eduard Shevardnadze, foreign minister of the Soviet government presented a peace proposal, which included a six-month ceasefire, UN-supervised elections and demilitarization of Afghanistan.
Victory: NO
Terminated: NO
1991 Conflict Archive
Comment on Activity: Last autumns promising moves towards a political settlement were hampered by hardened attitudes between the Soviet Union and USA. The two countries also this year supplied the warring parties with aid worth approximately US$ 900 000 000 per year. But, towards the latter half of the year there were signs that the willingness to support the war was fading both in Washington and Kreml. The demise of the former Soviet Union implied that the Afghan government lost its key backers in the Soviet army and on 13 September the two countries announced the withdrawal of all weapon-deliveries and military aid to the Afghan warring parties from 1 January 1992.
Another significant step towards finding a political solution was talks in Moscow between representatives of the Mujahideen groups and the Soviet government, which led to an agreement on 15 November that President Najibullah and his regime should hand over power to an "Islamic" interim government, until free elections could be held. In December the Soviet foreign minister officially announced that the Soviet Union no longer insisted that President Najibullah should play a key part in a forthcoming peace process. The demand for Najibullahs participation had up until then been one of the main hindrances for Mujahideen participation in possible peace talks.
In the battlefield the Mujahideen groups won some important victories, most significantly, the capture of the city of Khost in March. The Afghan armys defensive posture, the buying up of local guerrilla commanders and local ceasefire arrangements in areas under Mujahideen control ensured that the major fighting between the parties were confined to the Pashtun borderlands. The Mujahideen groups were said to control approximately 80 % of the Afghan countryside.
The diplomatic moves towards a settlement of the conflict did, however, make the situation in the battlefield more insecure. The proposed peace talks intensified the scramble for territory among the warring parties. In eastern Afghanistan there was a situation of emerging anarchy.
The presence of foreign cadres became more visible in 1991, and it was estimated that about 5000 Arab fighters had volunteered to fight alongside the Mujahideens. The most powerful and numerically large of these groups was al Qaeda, headed by Usama bin Laden.
Comment on Yearly Battle Related Deaths: The information of casualties in the period following Soviet troop withdrawal is sparse. The above number should merely be regarded as a low estimate built on sporadic reporting throughout the year. The actual number of battle related deaths can be assumed to be much higher. If subsequent years are taken to be representative the estimate could be as high as 7000.
Negotiations: NO
Comment on Negotiation: On 27 May Najibullah announced that his government would accept a ceasefire with the Mujahideen in order to allow for the implementation of the UN peace plan, presented by the UN Secretary General earlier in the month. The plan envisaged a ceasefire between the warring parties, a cessation of arms supplies by all countries involved in the conflict and the right of Afghans to chose their own government. Prominent Mujahideen leaders, including Hizb-i-Islami-yi Afghanistans Hekmatyar and the President of the Afghan Interim Government rejected the plan.
In May diplomatic reports stated that there were secret talks underway between Afghanistan officials and unidentified rebel commanders, but the information was not confirmed.
In June President Najibullah again reiterated his proposal for a ceasefire with the Mujahideen to facilitate the implementation of the UN peace proposal. There was no immediate response from the Mujahideen, which on their side was attempting to forge unity within their own movement in order to establish a joint committee that could discuss the Afghan issue. The main differences were between the Pakistan and Iranian based groups.
In July the differences seemed to have been overcome, as tripartite talks between Iran, Pakistan and 16 associated Mujahideen outfits ended in an agreement to take a united stand on the UN peace plan: supporting the five broad principles for a political solution to the conflict. This was an apparent reversal of the Mujahideen movements recent policy. Three of the major rebel groups did not participate in the talks, among them the radical Hizb-i-Islami-yi Afghanistan headed by Hekmatyar.
In September the Soviet Union and the USA announced a joint agreement to suspend weapon- deliveries to all sides in the Afghan war from 1 January 1992. They also agreed that a neutral, transitional body should be created to organise elections in cooperation with the UN. Following this move President Najibullah offered a countrywide ceasefire with the Mujahideen outfits and presented a number of peace proposals, including his willingness to step down from office as long as it was a part of a broader peace process. The Mujahideen groups did not make any reciprocal move towards a ceasefire and rejected all the peace proposals without suggesting any of their own.
At the end of the year talks between representatives of the Mujahideen groups and the Soviet government led to the latter withdrawing its demand for Najibullah’s participation in the forthcoming peace process. The two parties agreed on the formation of an "Islamic" interim government to lead the country until free elections could be held. Three hard-line rebel outfits did not participate in the talks, among them Hekmatyar’s Hizb-i-Islami-yi Afghanistan.
Third party involvement: YES
Third party involvement names: UN, Switzerland, Soviet Union, Iran, Pakistan
Comment on Third Party Involvement: On 21 May 1991 UN Secretary General Perez de Cuellar announced a proposal for a political solution of the conflict. It was referred to as the five point plan, and included: recognition of Afghanistans sovereign status as a politically non-aligned Islamic state; acceptance of the right of self-determination for the Afghans in choosing their form of government and social system; need for a transitional period of dialogue leading to the establishment of a government with broad-based support; termination of secondary support to the warring parties; and funding from the international community to support the return of Afghan refugees and the countrys reconstruction.
United States, Soviet Union and Pakistan all agreed on the principles, but there was no military means of endorsing it. Several of the most important rebel leaders opposed it, such as Rabbani, Sayyaf and Hekmatyar, who all held out for a total victory over the Kabul government. (For attempts to implement the accords see third party involvement 1992)
In an apparent reversal of their recent policy several of the prominent Mujahideen leaders on 30 July agreed to consider the UN peace plan as "a possible basis for a settlement of the Afghanistan problem". The united stand followed intense Pakistani-Iranian contacts that were concluded with tripartite talks between the two countries as well as 16 Mujahideen groups.
On 13 September the USA and the Soviet Union announced a joint agreement to cease weapon deliveries to the parties in the Afghan conflict. Saudi Arabia and Pakistan supported the peace proposals but refrained from making any committing moves regarding their military and financial support to the Mujahideens.
During the year both a Swiss and Soviet delegation held direct talks with the Mujahideen leaders as well as Pakistani representatives in Islamabad as well as in Moscow in an effort to find a political solution to the conflict. No substantial progress was reported following these initiatives.
Victory: NO
Terminated: NO
1992 Conflict Archive
Comment on Activity: The UN decided to press on with the implementation of its peace proposal, in spite of the reluctance of three fundamentalist outfits to participate. Pakistan for the first time officially fully endorsed the UN plan and put hard pressure on its associate groups to follow its lead. On 18 March another of the central pieces in the UN backed peace plan fell into place, as President Najibullah, after several meetings with UN envoys, announced that he was prepared to resign and hand over all executive power on the establishment of an interim government.
The UN diplomacy failed, however, to keep track with the series of events triggered by the fragmentation of the Najibullah government. Non-Pashtun ethnic groups feared that the powerful Pashtun generals in the army would attempt to take power in the vacuum created by Najibullah’s virtual resignation. The local militias in northern Afghanistan dominated by Uzbek, Tajik and Shia Ismaeli ethnic groups hence decided to join forces. Formerly allied with President Najibullah’s regime, the militias mutinied and allied themselves with local Mujahideen units, including those commanded by Ahmed Massoud associated with Jamiyyat-i Islami-yi Afghanistan. This changed the strategic situation on the ground since the Mujahideen then managed to capture the strategically important city of Mazar-i-Sharif, as well as other northern strongholds. Massoud’s forces closed in on Kabul from north and east, the Shia Hezb-i-Wahdat-i-Islami from the west, while fighters from Hekmatyar’s rival, hard-line Hizb-i-Islami-yi Afghanistan closed on the city from the south and east. By this time the army was no longer reliable, and Kabul was defenceless.
On 15 April 1992 Najibullah was removed from power in a low key coup by ruling elements of his own party as well as parts of the military. The government formally abdicated three days later. Mujahideen-control over Kabul airport prevented Najibullah from leaving the country, and he had to take refugee in a UN compound where he remained for four years. The situation was confusing following the Najibullah’s removal from power. The administration that had taken power in his place was virtually powerless. Stuck in the hands of the Mujahideen units surrounding the city, they entered into urgent negotiations with the rebels. In the rest of the country local militias abandoned all links with the formed government and surrendered or joined the Mujahideen groups.
On 25 April 1992 Massoud and Hekmatyar decided to enter Kabul, meeting no resistance from the army forces. After a few days of intense inter-rebel fighting it was evident that Hekmatyar had lost the battle over Kabul. Short thereafter the victorious factions met in Peshwar. They agreed on a ceasefire and a complex formula for the establishment of a provisional coalition government to replace the ousted regime. Hekmatyars Hizb-i-Islami-yi Afghanistan refused to approve the plan and the Iranian based Hezb-i-Wahdat-i-Islami also withheld their support. In the period of transition executive power was vested with the newly established Islamic Jihad Council. Hizb-i-Islami-yi Afghanistan troops, headed by Hekmatyar, withdraw to the outskirts of Kabul from where he launched a series of rocket attacks in an attempt to recapture his lost positions.
On 28 June Burhanuddin Rabbani, the Tajik leader of Jamiyyat-i Islami-yi Afghanistan, became interim President of the Islamic Republic of Afghanistan. The security situation remained extremely fragile throughout the year, with the rebel groups continued fight for supremacy taking a heavy toll on civilian life. In accordance with the Peshwar accord between the victorious warring group President elections were finally held by the end of the year. On 30 December 1992, Rabbani, as the sole candidate was formally elected first President of the new republic by an assembly made up of 1335 delegates from all over the country.
Negotiations: YES
Comment on Negotiation: After one month of intense fighting and aerial bombardment of Kabul, Massoud and Hekmatyar met, under heavy international presence, on 25 May. They signed a truce and an agreement that called for elections to be held within six months and the withdrawal of the Uzbek militia from Kabul, as demanded by Hekmatyar. The latter was, however, still reluctant to embrace the new government. By late June Hekmatyar was again threatening to attack Kabul and there was fierce fighting between different Mujahideen factions in Kabul. A new formal ceasefire was on place on 19 September, but subsequent periods of relative calm were, however, within short replaced by renewed fighting and a breakdown of existing arrangements.
Third party involvement: YES
Third party involvement names: UN, Pakistan
Comment on Third Party Involvement: After USA and the Soviet Union formally cut off military aid to the warring parties, UN decided to press ahead with the peace plan, in spite of the reluctance of three fundamentalist Mujahideen groups to participate.
Throughout the first three months of the year several positive moves created an impression that a peaceful solution of the conflict was underway. After intense diplomatic efforts by the UN delegation Pakistan for the first time officially endorsed the UN peace plan and put heavy pressure on the Mujahideen groups under its patronage to follow its lead. A further step in the right direction was Najibullah’s announcement, following several meetings with UN envoys, that he was prepared to resign and hand over all executive power on the establishment of an interim government. While the Mujahideen forces were closing in on Kabul, UN mediators were making desperate efforts to broker a peaceful transfer of power, but did not succeed in the race against time to stop the war. When the war was a matter of fact the five point UN peace plan was played out on the sideline. UN delegates tried to revive UN involvement in the inter-group negotiations underway to reach agreement on power-sharing solutions.
In this phase Pakistan played an important role as facilitator and host in the efforts to agree on a ceasefire and a power-sharing arrangement between the rival rebel groups following the invasion of Kabul in April.
Victory: NO
Terminated: NO
1993 Conflict Archive
Comment on Activity: Four of the nine major Mujahideen leaders decided to support Rabbanis government. Both Iran and Pakistan, the major secondary supporting parties after Soviet withdrawal, also expressed their support. There was, however, a strong Mujahideen opposition to his rule under the leadership of Hizb-i-Islami-yi Afghanistan’s Hekmatyar. Former allies of Rabbani, most importantly the Uzbek militia lead by General Dostum, were also increasingly challenging Rabbanis rule, siding with Hekmatyar for a period of the year. The government thus remained unable to effectively assert its power over much of the country and the struggle for supremacy between the different factions continued in and around Kabul, pushing the government to the verge of collapse.
In early March the parties signed the Islamabad accord in an attempt to end the hostilities. It encompassed power sharing arrangements through which Mr Rabbani would remain President while Hekmatyar were to become prime minister. The accord was widely criticized because it presupposed a cooperative spirit between the two leaders, who had up until then been the main rivals. Furthermore it appeared to be deliberately vague on the issues of power-sharing between them.
The accord did not accomplish to stop the violence and clashes between Hizb-i-Islami-yi Afghanistan and government forces resumed within a few days of the accords conclusion. Forces under Hekmatyars control battered the city with rockets and artillery simultaneously as Hizb-i-Islami-yi Afghanistan was nominally a part of the government. Within a month also the political provisions of the accord were under intense pressure. An intense power-struggle took place between Rabbani and Hekmatyar over the issue of formation of a new cabinet - especially who should hold the important position of Defence minister. Rabbani refused to sanction the removal of his associate General Massoud from the post, and the accord effectively collapsed.
On 20 May a new accord was signed in Jalalabad in an attempt to settle the power struggle between Rabbani and Hekmatyar. Under the terms of the accord two ministers, each from the nine major factions, would form the new cabinet. In addition to commissions would be established to administer the defence and interior ministries, headed by Rabbani and Hekmatyar respectively. After two months Mujahideen commanders would elect permanent ministers for interior and defence portfolios. It also provided for a permanent ceasefire, in place from 23 May. On 17 June Hekmatyar was formally sworn in as prime minister of the new government. Clashes between government forces, loyal to Rabbani and under de facto control of ousted defence minister Massoud, and rival militias loyal to Hekmatyar, continued.
Negotiations: YES
Comment on Negotiation: After weeks of intense fighting between the forces under government control and the allied Hizb-i-Islami-yi Afghanistan and Hezb-i-Wahdat-i-Islami, a ceasefire came into effect on 14 February. The fragile truce ended after one week.
In early March the Rabbani government and the Hekmatyar-led opposition again met in Islamabad. They agreed on a peace formula that encompassed power sharing in Kabul, where Mr Rabbani would remain President and Mr Hekmatyar would become Prime Minister. Several different problems remained unaddressed in the accord, such as the power sharing between the two, who should control the armed forces and it did not address the role of powerful General Dostum, who controls much of northern Afghanistan.
A majority of the Mujahideen leaders stated their adherence to the proposal. The only one who boycotted the negotiation was the Hizb-i-Islami-yi Afghanistan faction headed by Yunus Khalis. A delegation sent by Dostum was excluded on the insistence of the oppositions delegates. The Iranian-backed Hezb-i-Wahdat-i-Islami signed the agreement one week later in Mecca, with Pakistani prime minister and King of Saudi Arabia acting as "guarantors".
The permanent ceasefire agreed upon in the accord was never made utterly efficient, and aerial bombing of Kabul was again a matter of fact within a week after the conclusion of the agreement. Fierce clashes and heavy rocket attacks on Kabul in May led to renewed efforts to end hostilities. On 22 May the parties signed the Jalabad accord, that more specifically regulated the appointment of cabinet and settled the pivotal question of control over the Defence Ministry through a compromise. The accord also provided for a permanent ceasefire in place from 23 May that never came fully into force.
A new truce was announced in late December.
Third party involvement: YES
Third party involvement names: Pakistan, Iran and Saudi Arabia
Comment on Third Party Involvement: The Islamabad accord signed on 3 March 1993 was brokered by Pakistan Prime Minister Sharif in Islamabad. Saudi Arabia and Iran did also intervene in this phase to create a united front behind the power-sharing agreement.
Victory: NO
Terminated: NO
1994 Conflict Archive
Comment on Activity: Renewed intense fighting broke out on 01 January 1994, when Prime Minister G. Hikmatyar, in a new alliance with Uzbek-militia leader General Dostum, attempted to force President Rabbani to step down from office. The coup-attempt failed, but with the intrusion of the opposition forces fierce and devastating factional fighting flared up in the capital. By late February half of Kabul’s population had fled the city. Kabul was divided, with different parts in the hands of different factions and groups.
During the early months of 1994 a similar fragmentation happened in the rest of the country, especially in southern Afghanistan. Territory was carved up among different warring factions, and the Mujahideen commanders established themselves as local warlords in the area under their temporary control. The central authority of Afghanistan virtually collapsed and complete anarchy prevailed in large parts of the country. The northern part of Afghanistan became a scene for intense battles between General Massoud’s Tajik troops and General Dostum’s Uzbek troops.
It was against this background that the Taliban movement first emerged in September 1994. The movement of Islamic students coalesced around Mullah Mohammad Omar, a former Mujahideen, and quickly upset the power balance in the Kandahar region. By October they had ousted local commanders and begun to set up a local administrations in the area under their control. According to diplomats and local observers the well-trained and -armed group had already attracted the support of Pakistan and Saudi Arabia. Its stated aim was to restore stability and enforce Islamic law, and the Taliban movement immediately outlawed the production and trafficking of Opium, which had been a major source of income for the former warlords.
Comment on Yearly Battle Related Deaths: The above low estimate serves only as an indicator of the absolute minimum of battle-related deaths; the actual figure might be much higher.
Negotiations: NO
Comment on Negotiation: The political initiatives to end the civil war were mainly taken by third parties and made conspicuously little headway during the year. (See third party involvement) . The main domestic initiative was the conference held in Herat in July that managed to gather 700 Afghan "notables", as well as prominent expatriate Afghans. All Mujahideen leaders were also invited, but General Dostam was excluded. Rabbani was, however, the only party leader that attended, and most of the present delegates were also pro-Rabbani. The Herat Council thus failed to reach any importance as a peace forum.
President Rabbani on a few occasions throughout the year declare his willingness to step down from office and transfer power to a neutral administration with a broad representation among the various Mujahideen factions. The President also called for a loya jirga - i.e. a traditional grand assembly, to decide on a future political framework. None of these initiatives achieved anything substantial.
A number of temporary ceasefire arrangements were concluded between the main warring factions. All of them failed to provide any lasting cessation of hostilities and generally broke down within a week.
Third party involvement: YES
Third party involvement names: Iran, Saudi Arabia and Pakistan, UN, Organisation of Islamic Conference
Comment on Third Party Involvement: Iran, Saudi Arabia and Pakistan all undertook unilateral efforts to end the hostilities and find a political solution. The measures employed included public appeals and mediation attempts as well as hosting negotiations orchestrated by international missions.
A UN peace delegation arrived in March to held separate meetings with Rabbani and Hekmatyar, and subsequently had a second round of talks were held with different leaders of warring factions based in the northern towns. In late April a UN Peace Mission again visited the warring factions in an attempt to find a formula that could end the fierce fighting. At its departure in early July, following heavy violence, the UN mission concluded that there was a consensus in favour of an immediate ceasefire, a broad-based transitional government and UN supervised elections. There was, however, no support for a UN peacekeeping operation. Following serious setbacks in the dialogue, talks due to have taken place in September was cancelled. The peace process remained deadlocked until October, when the UN special mission to Afghanistan resumed the efforts to end the civil war. The UN mission held consultations with a series of Afghan leaders, among them Rabbani and Hekmatyar. The talks centred on an immediate ceasefire as well as the creation of a consultative commission composed of government representatives as well as leaders of neutral parties, whose main task would be to draft a constitution a prepare grounds for the holding of free elections in Afghanistan. The pro-Rabbani factions declared their adherence to the principle parts of the plan, but no similar approval was received from the opposition, headed by rebel Prime Minister Hekmatyar and General Dostum. The attempt fell through and in December UN stated that it would downgrade its role in Afghanistan after the failure of repeated efforts to end the fighting. A fourth round of dialogue still commenced on 27 December over a peace proposal from the UN in which executive power should be handed over to an elite group of 23. The dialogue continued in January 1995.
The Organisation of Islamic Conference also took initiatives to find a political solution. In late June they launched a peace plan, and following-up talks were conducted in Teheran in November.
Victory: NO
Terminated: NO
1995 Conflict Archive
Comment on Activity: After intense diplomatic effort from the UN mission all the nine major warring factions agreed upon a UN brokered peace plan on 11 February 1995. Meanwhile the Taleban movement achieved important strategic battles in the southeastern parts of the country. By mid-February it had taken control over 10 of the country’s 30 provinces, and fought its way to the outskirts of Kabul where it effectively defeated the Hizb-i-Islami-yi Afghanistan forces. In early March the Taleban militia launched its first offensive attacks on Kabul, but was forced to retreat after a heavy encounter with Rabbani’s forces. With both Hezb-i-Wahdat-i-Islami and Hizb-i-Islami-yi Afghanistan on the defensive, the forces of Jamiyyat-i Islami-yi Afghanistan were in total control of Kabul since the ousting of President Najibullah in 1992, and relative calm returned to the capital.
Government forces made further advances in the following months consolidating their gains over the Taleban fighters. Following the military success of the government the former adversaries in the opposition decided to join hands. An informal alliance was established between the Taleban, General Dostum’s Jumbish-i-Milli-ye Islami and Hekmatyar’s Hizb-i-Islami-yi Afghanistan, that provided the opposition with the military initiative. In October fighting over Kabul resumed, and in November the Taleban forces launched destructive air attacks on the city. Meanwhile, the troops of Uzbek guerrilla leader Dostum closed in on the city from the north, and intense fighting in the city took a heavy toll on civilian lives and property.
Comment on Yearly Battle Related Deaths: The above estimate serves only as an indicator of the absolute minimum of battle-related deaths; the actual figure might be much higher. A high estimate, built on the revision of a number of sources, is 5000.
Negotiations: NO
Comment on Negotiation: After a series of military defeats President Rabbani apparently reversed his policy in late September and offered to hold unconditional peace talks with all opposition factions seeking to topple him. The offer extended to all warring factions, including Taleban and General Dostum.
Amid heavy military pressure from the opposition alliance, President Rabbani on 7 November offered to resign, but attached some conditions, such as an immediate ceasefire by the Talebans and an end to all foreign interference - understood to be a reference to Pakistans alleged support for the Taliban.
On 27 December a last offer for negotiations were extended to the opposition forces, but the dominating Taleban forces declined the offer.
(For more information see third party involvement.)
Third party involvement: YES
Third party involvement names: UN, OIC, Saudi Arabia and Pakistan
Comment on Third Party Involvement: After several rounds of negotiations with the leaders of Afghans warring parties, the UN special mission to Afghanistan proposed a new formula for a political settlement in mid January 1995. On 11 February the UN mission announced that the nine warring Islamic factions in Afghanistan had agreed to form a multi-party governing council. Rabbani declared that he would abide by the UN plan, which implied that he was removed from office. As the UN mission was about to conclude the agreement, the mounting Taleban force declared their refusal to participate in the interim administration. The military success of the Taleban militia in February efficiently thus undermined the UN-supervised transfer of power envisaged in the peace plan, and as fighting escalated the peace plan was put on hold. In mid March Rabbani announced that that he would no longer be bound by the plan, and would "wait for a reliable mechanism" before transferring power.
In June a ceasefire between government forces and the Taleban militia was brokered by Pakistan. The truce coincided with the reported resumption of the peace process, which had been on hold since mid March. At least four mediation attempts were then being launched, led respectively by the UN, the Organisation of the Islamic Conference, Pakistan and Saudi Arabia. The Rabbani government did, however, reject the latter three proposals on the ground that "peace activities should be concentrated in Afghanistan". He did, however, urge the adoption of a government peace plan which envisaged a loya jirga - a grand council incorporating civilian Afghan representatives.
Following months of recurring peace talks organised by the UN, President Rabbani on 7 November offered to resign. He attached some conditions, such as an immediate ceasefire by the Talebans and an end to all foreign interference - understood to be a reference to Pakistans alleged support for the Taliban.
Victory: NO
Terminated: NO
1996 Conflict Archive
Comment on Activity: The humanitarian situation in Kabul deteriorated as the city’s main supply routs remained under blockage from different warring parties, cutting off the food and fuel supplies. The peace deal signed with Hezb-i-Wahdat-i-Islami in mid January eased the situation as the roads under Hezb-i-Wahdat-i-Islami control was opened.
Despite the conduct of exploratory talks between President Rabbani and the other main opposition parties, fighting intensified in and around Kabul. In a critical development in May Rabbani managed to persuade his archrival Hekmatyar to rejoin the government - as had originally been agreed upon in the 1993 Islamabad accord. The Mahipar agreement, as it was later referred to, provided for fresh elections and a “real Islamic government”. It offered Hekmatyar’s Hizb-i-Islami-yi Afghanistan the strategically important posts as Prime Minister, Defence Minister and Finance Minister. In the light of the previous power struggle between Hekmatyar and Rabbani this was a major concession to Hekmatyar. It implied the removal once more of General Massoud. Hekmatyar’s troops returned to Kabul in May, to join forces with Rabbani against a mounting military threat from the Taleban forces. On 26 June Hekmatyar was sworn in as Prime Minister, and a new government under his leadership was announced on 3 June. A further rallying of forces against the military successful Taleban took place in August when Hekmatyar and his government announced a ceasefire with one of its main rivals Junbish-i Milli-yi Islami, headed by General Abdul Rashid Dostum.
After a string of military victories, including the capture of the strategically important city of Jalalabad, the Taleban troops closed in on Kabul in late September. Following fierce battles with the Government forces Taleban took control of the capital city on 28 September and Massoud’s troops were forced to retreat to the north, together with President Rabbani and Prime Minister Hekmatyar. The Taleban immediately proclaimed the Islamic State of Afghanistan and the enforcement of Sharia- Islamic rule. One of the first acts of the new regime was to order the execution of the former communist President Najibullah, outside the presidential palace. International recognition of the new regime was universally withheld, with the exception of Pakistan, who was widely accused of backing the Taleban military offensive. The USA also gave its support to the new regime, but stopped short of formal recognition.
The invasion of Kabul radically altered the political situation in Afghanistan. General Dostum, commander of the Junbish-i Milli-yi Islami, controlled the northern Afghanistan, the only large area of the country that was not held by the Talebans. General Dostum was regarded as a decisive factor in determining the outcome of the latest conflict, but his position remained unclear for a period of time. He initiated talks with the Taleban forces, but when these broke down, he formed a logistical and military alliance with General Massoud of Jamiyyat-i Islami-yi Afghanistan and Khalili of Hezb-i-Wahdat-i-Islami, referred to as the Supreme Council for the Defence of Afghanistan (SCDA).
In October the anti-Taleban groups launched a joint offensive against Kabul, and regained some of the territory lost from the Taleban forces. Fighting continued all through the year, despite repeated calls from foreign governments and the UN to cease hostilities and find a political solution to the conflict.
In August it was reported that Usama bin Laden had returned to Afghanistan after six years. Bin Laden was the leader of the Arab Afghans who in the 1980s fought with Afghan rebels against Soviet occupation, and was accused of financing subversive activities by Muslim militants in Egypt, Algeria, Yemen and Saudi Arabia.
Comment on Yearly Battle Related Deaths: The above estimate serves only as an indicator of the absolute minimum of battle-related deaths; the actual figure might be much higher. A high estimate, build on the revision of a number of sources, is 5000.
Negotiations: YES
Comment on Negotiation: The government, headed by President Rabbani on 11 January signed a peace pact with one of its former rivals, the Hezb-i-Wahdat-i-Islami. The two parties agreed to cease all hostilities immediately, open the roads between the areas under their control, as well as exchange prisoners.
In January there were also reports of a series of peace-talks between representatives of the government, Taliban leaders and rival Mujahideen forces in Jalalabad and Islamabad. The talks continued between rival Mujahideen groups, opposed to the President, in February, but ended without any agreement.
On 7 March the Hizb-i-Islami-yi Afghanistan and the Rabbani government signed a joint action against the opposition Taleban militia. The agreement also resulted in the restoration of electricity to Kabul after a two-year break.
After protracted negotiations, Hekmatyars Hizb-i-Islami-yi Afghanistan decided to ally itself with Rabbanis government. Hekmatyar thus agreed to rejoin the government as had originally been agreed upon in the Islamabad accord from 1993. The Mahipar agreement, signed on 24 May, offered Hekmatyar’s Hizb-i-Islami-yi Afghanistan the strategically important posts as Prime Minister, Defence Minister and Finance Minister. Rabbani was to continue as President. Following these events Pakistani officials announced that they now recognized the Rabbani government as the de facto government of Afghanistan. Hekmatyar was sworn in as Prime Minister on 26 June 1996. (For details see Peace Agreements)
Following the Taleban capture of Kabul in late September the situation on the ground changed drastically. The main rivals became the Taleban and Junbish-i Milli-yi Islami, headed by General Dostum, in control over virtually the entire northern area. These two warring parties engaged in peace talks in October.
Third party involvement: YES
Third party involvement names: UN, USA, Pakistan, Uzbekistan
Comment on Third Party Involvement: The UN immediately resumed its mediation attempts at the beginning of the year, attempting to facilitate talks between the warring factions.
In June the US government proposed a five-point peace plan to a negotiated settlement. It envisaged a ceasefire, a neutral security force and the demilitarisation of Kabul. No progress was reported on this initiative.
Intense diplomatic activity, headed by the UN mission to Afghanistan, convened after the Taleban seizure of Kabul in September. The military stalemate in place after Kabuls fall was taken as an opportunity to find a political solution. No substantial progress emerged from these efforts.
In October Pakistan brokered a meeting that opened direct peace talks between the Taleban and the northern warlord General Dostum. Both parties agreed to continue talks.
UN sponsored peace talks opened in Islamabad, Pakistan, on 8 November between the Taleban Interim Council constituting the de facto government of Afghanistan and opposition forces under the control of General Dostum and General Massoud, but no progression was reported from these efforts during the following two months.
Victory: YES
Victory side: b
Comment on Victory: The Taleban forces seized Kabul on 28 September 1996, and Massouds troops were forced to retreat to the north, together with President Rabbani and Prime Minister Hekmatyar. The Taleban immediately proclaimed the Islamic State of Afghanistan and the enforcement of Sharia- Islamic rule. International recognition of the new regime was universally withheld, with the exception of Pakistan. USA also gave its support to the new regime, but stopped short of formal recognition. As the Taleban forces was in control over the capital city and two third of Afghanistan territory it is regarded as the Government of Afghanistan from this date on.
Comment on Victorious Side: The military victory of the Talebans is not decisive and their hold on Kabul remains tenuous in the period following their invasion. There is, however, a change of regime as the Taleban announces themselves to be the new government of the country, and there is no force in place that can military dispute this.
Terminated: NO
1997 Conflict Archive
Comment on Activity: In the north of Afghanistan General Dostum together with his allies in the Nortern Alliance had carved out a mini state comprised of five provinces that were administrated from Dostum’s head quarter west of Mazar-i-Sharif. The Taleban forces did, however, made significant military progresses in the early part of the year, giving rise to reports that the Northern Alliance showed signs of weakening. In mid May the Northern Alliance experienced its first major crack, as one of Dostum’s key commanders defected to the Taleban forces. Together with a group of local commanders he made an agreement with the Taleban forces, and this mutiny was a decisive key in the Taleban capture of the northern stronghold of Mazar-i-Sharif in late May 1997. At this point of time the Taleban forces controlled 90 % of the territory, and Pakistan, Saudi Arabia and the Arab Emirates decided to accord formal recognition to the Taleban government.
The integration of Dostum’s troops into the pro-Taleban forces quickly deteriorated, and in a second turn-around violence between the different outfits intensified and Mazar-i-Sharif was recaptured. On 3 June the Supreme Council for the Defence of Afghanistan, commonly referred to as the Northern alliance announced that they had renamed and restructured their opposition as the “United Islamic Front for Salvation of Afghanistan” (UIFSA). This alliance also enlisted groups not formerly under joint command. These were troops loyal to former Prime Minister Hekmatyar of Hizb-i-Islami-yi Afghanistan and followers of Ahmed Galilani of the Mahaz-i Milli-yi Islami-yi Afghanistan.
The military advances of the United Front brought the alliance within firing range of Kabul by mid 1997, and the United Front launched its own parallel government, headed by Rabbani, in their northern stronghold. Dostum became vice President and commander of the forces. Hekmatyar, by now more or less marginalized, refused to accept the administration.
In October the Taleban government renamed the country the Islamic Emirate of Afghanistan.
Comment on Yearly Battle Related Deaths: The above estimate serves only as an indicator of the absolute minimum of battle-related deaths; the actual figure might be much higher. A best estimate, build on the revision of a number of sources, is 3000.
Negotiations: YES
Comment on Negotiation: UN sponsored talks between the Taleban government and the Dostum/Massoud alliance, referred to as the Supreme Council Alliance resumed in Islamabad in January. The talks appeared to make no progression.
Third party involvement: YES
Third party involvement names: UN, Pakistan
Comment on Third Party Involvement: UN sponsored talks between the Taleban government and the Dostum/Massoud alliance, referred to as the SCDA, resumed in Islamabad in January. The talks appeared, however, to have made no progression.
In June Pakistan tried to initiate talks between the parties in the form of a regional peace conference that could help settle the conflict. The initiative was supported by Iran, Kazakhstan, China, Uzbekistan, Turkmenistan and Tajikistan. No progression was reported on this initiative.
In December a series of three meetings were brokered by the UN in New York, which brought together representatives of Afghanistan neighbouring countries, the USA and Iran. The meetings were aimed at halting the flow of arms to the warring factions in Afghanistan and marked a change in US policy on Afghanistan that could put Pakistan under pressure to stop the weapon supply to the Taleban forces.
Victory: NO
Terminated: NO
1998 Conflict Archive
Comment on Activity: In spite of peace talks between the warring parties in April spearheaded by USA’s diplomatic re-entry into the conflict, fighting continued on a large scale. In August the fighting rapidly intensified and the Taleban troops managed to take control over the important city of Mazar-i Sharif, which was the last major city outside their control. By the end of August it was again estimated that the Taleban government controlled about 90 per cent of the country.
Inter-state relations between Iran and Afghanistan in September seemed to be on the verge of open warfare, as both countries deployed large troops along their common border. The military build-up was a response to the murder on nine Iranian officials during a military offensive by the Taleban forces. The tension intensified as the two parties accused each other of opening fire on their respective troops, and was furthermore exacerbated by reports of Taleban massacres of Shiite Muslim´civilians in Mazar-i-Sharif. The situation was eventually calmed through conciliatory moves from the Taleban government and diplomatic initiatives from the UN. (See third party involvement)
Not directly connected to the intra-state war, USA launched air strikes against reputed terrorist bases in eastern Afghanistan in September, killing 21 people. The bases were allegedly operated by Usama bin Laden, leader of the militant al Qaeda organization that since two years back had been sheltered by the Taleban regime inside Afghanistan. Following these attacks and retaliatory attacks from the Taleban forces, most international humanitarian agencies withdrew from the country.
Comment on Yearly Battle Related Deaths: The above estimate serves only as an indicator of the absolute minimum of battle-related deaths; the actual figure might be much higher. A high estimate, build on a revision of several sources is 7000.
Negotiations: YES
Comment on Negotiation: In late April UN-and OIC- sponsored talks were conducted between the United Front and the Taleban government in Islamabad. These were the first formal peace negotiations between the two sides for more than a year. In early May the talks broke down and were indefinitely postponed. One of the reported reasons for the failure of the negotiations was that the Taleban refused to lift its blockade on the central Hazarajat region, the stronghold of Hezb-i-Wahdat-i-Islami, where thousands of people were reported to be at risk of starvation.
Third party involvement: YES
Third party involvement names: UN, OIC, USA, Pakistan
Comment on Third Party Involvement: In April the USA launched a major diplomatic initiative to find a political solution to the conflict. Following USAs re-entry into the conflict, the warring parties entered into negotiations for the first time for more than a year. The talks were sponsored by the UN and the OIC.
In October the UN special envoy to Afghanistan held a series of talks with officials from the Taleban government, Iran and Pakistan to defuse tension in the region caused by the military build up. These talks were more directly addressing the diplomatic issues, and not the incompatibility of the conflict.
The relationship between the UN and the Taleban government deteriorated during the year, and in December UN threatened the regime with the imposition of sanctions and called on the regime to negotiate with the United Front. Pakistan defended the Taleban government and urged the UN-memberstate to recognize the regime, thus only contributing to its own diplomatic isolation.
Victory: NO
Terminated: NO
1999 Conflict Archive
Comment on Activity: Fighting continued all through the year, and the efforts launched to find a political solution to the conflict did not make any progress.
Comment on Yearly Battle Related Deaths: The above estimate serves only as an indicator of the absolute minimum of battle-related deaths; the actual figure might be much higher.
Negotiations: YES
Comment on Negotiation: From 10 March direct UN monitored peace talks between Taleban officials and representatives of the UIFSA took place in Turkmenistan. Substantial progression was reported from these negotiations as the parties, in principle, had agreed to establish a broad based government with a shared executive, legislature and judiciary. The parties also decided to hold further talks at a later date, as well as exchange of prisoners. The negotiations did, however, not result in any ceasefire. In April UN officials announced that further talks between the warring parties had collapsed, and that the power-sharing arrangement was no longer seen as a solution to the conflict.
UN sponsored peace talks were again held on 19-20 July, this time in Uzbekistan. The negotiations were also accompanied by all of Afghanistans neighbouring countries, in addition to USA and Russia. This "Six-Plus-Two" contact group for Afghanistan issued a joint statement, but the primary warring parties failed to produce any significant agreement.
Third party involvement: YES
Third party involvement names: UN
Comment on Third Party Involvement: UN sponsored talks were held in Turkmenistan in February and March, between representatives of the two warring factions. Further talks were conducted in Uzbekistan in July. Little substantive progression was made during these meetings, and as the final round of talks closed down on 28 July the Taleban launched a large-scale attack against their opponents.
Following multilateral talks in Tashkent in July the "six plus two" contact group for Afghanistan, involving all neighbouring countries as well as Russia and the USA, issued the "Tashkent declaration on the Fundamental Principles of a peaceful settlement of the conflict in Afghanistan".
It concluded that there was no military solution to the conflict, that should be settled through peaceful, political negotiation in order to establish a broad-based, multi-ethnic and fully representative government. It urged the Afghan parties to resume negotiations and agreed not to provide military support to any of the warring parties.
In October the UN imposed sanctions on the Taleban, banning Taleban aircrafts from take-off and landing and freezing Taleban assets abroad. These complemented the sanctions unilaterally imposed on the Taleban regime by the US government from July 1999.
Victory: NO
Terminated: NO
2000 Conflict Archive
Comment on Activity: Serious fighting continued throughout the year. In early September 2000 the Taleban forces captured the Northern Alliances political capital, Taloquan. This was the seat of President Rabbanis government and the headquarter of UIFSA. In October Taleban advanced further to control 95 % of Afghanistans territory. Some observers argued that the war now had entered into its final phase.
Strict UN sanctions were imposed on the Taleban regime in December 2000 in response to the regimes refusal to surrender bin Laden following his indictment in the USA for his alleged involvement in the 1998 bombing of US embassies in east Africa.
Comment on Yearly Battle Related Deaths: The above estimate serves only as an indicator of the absolute minimum of battle-related deaths; the actual figure might be much higher.
Negotiations: YES
Comment on Negotiation: In November/ December the two warring parties held informal peace talks for the first time this year.
Third party involvement: YES
Third party involvement names: UN
Comment on Third Party Involvement: UN sponsored peace talks were conducted in November/ December. In December the UN security Council approved fresh sanctions, including an arms embargo, against the Taleban regime. The resolution aimed to force them to close terrorist training camps and surrender Usama bin Laden.
Victory: NO
Terminated: NO
2001 Conflict Archive
Comment on Activity: Sporadic fighting continued throughout 2001. Under the military pressure of the Talebans several commanders of the UIFSA defected with their forces to Taleban’s side. The intervention of the US-led Multinational Coalition in October radically altered the balance of power between the Taleban and the UIFSA.
USA’s approach to the Afghan civil war has been somewhat ambiguous since the conflict has not directly threatened US national security interests. Its approach to the conflict and the Taleban regime was drastically changed on 11 September, when New York and Washington became targets for terrorist-actions blamed on the Afghanistan-based Usama bin Laden and his al Qaeda organization. Following the refusal of the Taleban regime to surrender Usama bin Laden and his al Qaeda associates USA launched a major military build up directed at Afghanistan. At the political level USA, together with the United Kingdom, started to consolidate an anti-terrorist coalition. Under considerable pressure even Pakistan, the strongest backer of the Taleban regime, reversed its policy and agreed to cooperate with the USA-led coalition. Both Pakistan and Uzbekistan agreed to grant US forces access to their air bases. Inside Afghanistan the Northern Alliance engaged in talks with the US government on how they could participate in the offensive against the Taleban regime.
On 7 October 2001 the multinational coalition began the aerial bombardment of Taleban and al Qaeda positions. As the month progressed the US forces widened their attacks from fixed targets to mobile targets, and US Special Forces were deployed on the ground. Officially the US government had held a certain distance from the Northern Alliance. In November the US air strikes started to hit the Taleban front lines, indicating that the US after some initial hesitation was prepared to facilitate the Northern Alliance’ capture of Kabul. During the first weeks of November the Northern Alliance achieved important territorial gains. It re-captured the important cities of Mazar-e-Sharif and Herat. Faced with the imminent collapse of the Taleban regime, the government and military withdrew from Kabul to its traditional stronghold in Kandahar. The Northern Alliance entered Kabul on 12 November, meeting only sporadic resistance from foreign mercenaries.
As the balance of power shifted from the Taleban to the UIFSA, diplomatic efforts intensified to agree on a plan for the creation of a stable transitional government for the country. In early November the UN presented a first plan for the establishment of a provisional government, backed by Afghan and international peacekeepers. It turned out, however, that the political process aimed at establishing an interim government did not manage to keep track with the rapid military advance of the Northern Alliance. The Afghan factions did not manage to agree on a transitional power sharing arrangement before Kabul fell, and as anticipated UIFSA indicated unwillingness to cede power to a broad-based government.
Following intense diplomatic pressure, the major anti-Taleban factions, including UIFSA and former King Zahir Shah, still met for UN sponsored talks in Germany in late November. The parties agreed on a two-step solution, where a short-term government would rule for a limited number of months, and then be replaced by a more representative two-year administration. Following intense negotiations the factions signed the Bonn accords on 5 December. It created a 29-member interim government headed by Hamid Karzai, who had formerly served as Deputy Foreign Minister in Rabbani’s interim government in 1992. In a formal ceremony in Kabul on 23 December Rabbani, recognized as Afghanistan’s de jure president under the period of Taleban rule, handed over power to Karzai’s administration. General Dostum who had been among the most central military figures in the UIFSA was appointed Deputy Defence Minister. This was seen as an important step in the process of consolidating the new government and include members of all ethnic minorities in the new administration.
The Taleban stronghold of Kandahar fell on 7 December as a result of a heavy military campaign from the US forces and diplomatic activity from the new government to agree on conditions for surrender. Some isolated pockets of Taleban fighters remained. After the fall of Kandehar, US troops stepped up the effort to locate Usama bin Laden, but did not succeed.
Comment on Yearly Battle Related Deaths: Prior to the US coalition entering the conflict on the side of UIFSA on 7 October, there had been 843 battle-related deaths reported. The aerial boming campaign that followed was accompanied by UIFSA offensives that led to increased intensity of fighting during the following month until the Afghan Taliban government fell.
Negotiations: NO
Comment on Negotiation: There is no information of negotiations between the primary warring parties: the Taleban government and the UIFSA. There is, however, a series of negotiation within the anti-Taleban opposition from November and onwards, reflecting the imminent collapse of the Taleban regime. In late November four factions of the Afghan opposition participated in UN sponsored talks in Germany. These four factions were UIFSA, the Pakistan backed Peshwar group, the Iranian backed Cyprus delegation of Afghan refugees and exiles and the Rome group, headed by former King Zahir Shah. A two-step plan was adopted on 27 November, where a short term administration would be replaced by a more representative two-year administration.
The negotiations to form a provisional government continued in early December and on 5 December the leaders of the different factions signed the Bonn accords, which created a 29 member interim government lead by Hamid Karzai.
Third party involvement: YES
Third party involvement names: UN, Germany
Comment on Third Party Involvement: The UN sanctions regime that was imposed on the Taleban government in December 2000, was further strengthened in late July. The sanctions followed the refusal to surrender Saudi-born, Afghan-based Islamic militant Osama bin Laden to the appropriate authorities.
With the intervention of the US-led multinational coalition in the war, the UN embarked on an intense diplomatic effort to make the parties agree on the creation of a stable transitional government for Afghanistan. On 6 November the UN presented a first plan for the establishment of a provisional government, backed by Afghan and international peacekeepers. Talks aimed at establishing a provisional government were launched under the auspices of the UN in late November.
On 20 December the UN security Council adopted resolution 1386, which authorised a UK led multinational peacekeeping force to enter Kabul for 6 months. The force, designated the International Security Assistance Force in Afghanistan was equipped with the most robust mandate possible under the UN charter.
Victory: YES
Victory side: b
Comment on Victory: On 12 November the UIFSA forces marched into Kabul, following the withdrawal of the Talebans from the capital city. On 7 December, Kandehar, the Talebans last remaining stronghold fell to UIFSA troops, backed by UK and US Special Forces. This military victory signalled the end of the Talebans regime hold on the country. Only a few isolated pockets of Taleban resistance remained, many of them foreign mercenaries.
In accordance with the Bonn accord, signed by the four major anti-Taleban factions of Afghan society on 5 December, Hamid Karzai took over power as the head of the interim government on 23 December 2001. He was to lead a 29 member administrative council in the first immediate phase of the reconstruction of Afghanistan.
Terminated: YES
Type of termination: Victory
Date of termination: 2001-11-12
Comment on Termination: On 12 November the UIFSA forces marched into Kabul, following the withdrawal of the Talebans from the capital city. This date is considered by UCDP as the date of victory.
The few remaining Taleban forces declared their support of al-Qaida against the US (see conflict: USA). The last military stronghold by the al-Qaida/Taleban troops, Kandahar, was captured on 7 December by UIFSA troops, UK and US Special Forces. Only a few isolated pockets of Taleban resistance remained.
In accordance with the Bonn accord, signed by the four major anti-Taleban factions of Afghan society on 5 December, Hamid Karzai was officially sworn in as Interim President on 23 December 2001. He was to lead a 29-member administrative council in the first immediate phase of the reconstruction of Afghanistan.
2002 Conflict Archive
Negotiations: NO
Third party involvement: NO
Victory: NO
Terminated: NO
2003 Conflict Archive
Comment on Activity: By 2002, many of the leaders of the Northern Alliance had gained positions in the Afghan Transitional Administration. The Multinational Coalition continued to hunt remnant al-Qaeda elements throughout the year, but while there were sporadic attacks by Taliban remnants against the US forces, they did not appear to be organized or constitute a new conflict. By early 2003 the Taleban forces had, however, managed to regroup and reorganize. In late February, statements coming from the Taleban expressed not only their desire to perform jihad (holy war) against Coalition forces, but also against the Afghan government, asserting that Mullah Omar was the real leader of Afghanistan and that Karzai’s government did not enjoy the support of the people. The Taliban quickly confirmed the force behind this statement with an increased number of attacks on Afghan security forces. Thus, by 2003 a new dyad had developed, “Afghanistan vs. Taleban.”
The Afghan government continued to receive military support from the Multinational Coalition. With only an approximate 6000 troops, the Afghan government was reliant upon the Coalition forces to fight the Taleban, particularly in the southeast of the country. The Afghan army remained relatively small compared to the large private militias of various warlords (many of whom fought for UIFSA) throughout the country. While there were plans to recruit and train a new Afghan army - as well as incorporate the private militias into the National Army - the Afghan government was able to provide effective security only for the Kabul area.
On 18 March, the Taliban ambushed a checkpoint near Spin Boldak, Kandahar province. Local security officials immediately blamed the Taliban, and these accusations were confirmed when a Taliban member claimed responsibility for the incident. The Taliban had been suspected of committing a number of attacks against US and Afghan forces before this, but the group had not claimed credit for specific events. A letter dated 3 March 2003 from the Taliban claims responsibility for as many as 50 recent attacks on US coalition and Afghan forces, but no information is given as to which specific incidents it refers to.
Comment on Yearly Battle Related Deaths: There were also numerous incidents when the opposition group is unclear. If all of those were included, it is possible that the conflict caused over 1000 fatalities in 2003.
Negotiations: NO
Comment on Negotiation: The government stated that it no longer recognizes the Taliban as a movement, thus any talks with former or current Taliban members will only be held on an individual basis.
Third party involvement: YES
Third party involvement names: The International Security Assistance Force (ISAF) was a peacekeeping operation mandated by the United Nations, composed of approximately 500 troops.
Countries which contributed to ISAF for at least part of 2003 include: Albania, Azerbaijan, Belgium, Bulgaria, Canada, Croatia, Czech Rep., Denmark, Estonia, Finland, France, Germany, Greece, Ireland, Italy, Latvia, Lithuania, Luxembourg, Macedonia, Netherlands, New Zealand, Norway, Poland, Romania, Spain, Sweden, Switzerland, Turkey, UK, US.
Comment on Third Party Involvement: The International Security Assistance Force (ISAF) was a peacekeeping operation mandated with the maintaining order in Kabul and supporting the Afghan authorities. ISAF operated under a UN mandate until 11 August 2003, when it came under NATO leadership, with Canada as the lead country.
The primary role of ISAF was to assist the Afghan Transitional Authority in providing a safe and secure environment within Kabul and its surrounding areas, which would assist in the reconstruction of a new Afghanistan. In carrying out this mission, ISAF conducted patrols throughout the 16 different police districts in Kabul and its surrounding areas. Over a third of these patrols were carried out jointly with the Kabul City Police.
The UNSC unanimously approved on 13 October a decision in principle to extend ISAF’s role beyond Kabul and several hundred German troops sent to the northern region of Kunduz.
Victory: NO
Terminated: NO
2004 Conflict Archive
Comment on Activity: The security situation continued to deteriorate in 2004. The 9 October election was preceeded by threats and intimidation towards candidates, election officials, and voters. In perhaps the most shocking incident, 16 civilians were killed by the Taliban when they were found to be carrying voters registration cards. The year 2004 also saw stepped-up attacks against local and international NGOs, as well as against military and peacekeeping personnel, and Afghan citizens believed to be cooperating with the government or Western forces. The result of these attacks was a significant increase in the number of people killed in Afghanistan.
Comment on Yearly Battle Related Deaths: It is unlikely that the actual number of deaths is close to the high estimate, as that number includes many claims by the Taliban that were unconfirmed, and which are highly unlikely to have actually occurred.
Negotiations: NO
Third party involvement: YES
Third party involvement names: International Security Assistance Force (ISAF-4)
Comment on Third Party Involvement: The International Security Assistance Force (ISAF) was mandated under Chapter VII of the UN Charter by the UN Security Resolutions 1386, 1413, and 1444. Under the UN mandate, the role of ISAF was to assist in the maintenance of security to help the Afghan Transitional Authority and the UN in Kabul and its environs. ISAF was established with the Bonn Agreement of 6 December 2001, and was in 2004 in its fourth phase (its often reffered to as ISAF-4). On 11 August 2003, NATO assumed command of the ISAF mission. ISAF was in 2004 comprised of approximately 8500 troops from the following countries: Albania, Austria, Azerbaijan, Belgium, Bulgaria, Canada, Croatia, Czech Rep., Denmark, Estonia, Finland, France, Germany, Greece, Hungary, Iceland, Ireland, Italy, Latvia, Lithuania, Luxembourg, Macedonia, Netherlands, New Zealand, Norway, Poland, Portugal, Romania, Slovakia, Slovenia, Spain, Sweden, Switzerland, Turkey, UK, USA.
Victory: NO
Terminated: NO
2005 Conflict Archive
Comment on Activity: The security situation continued to deteriorate in 2005 and the number of casualties doubled compared to the previous year. The US troops suffered their highest number of losses since the invasion begun in 2001. The Taleban became more aggressive, not only in targeting Afghan and US troops, but also in killing humanitarian personnel, election candidates and civilian election workers and clerics. Apart from the escalation, observers also noted a marked change of tactics among the rebels, away from guerrilla styled warfare to suicide attacks and infiltration with security organs to carry out acts of sabotage.
Afghanistan parliamentary elections and elections for the local provincial councils were held on 18 September. The election suffered from a surprisingly low voter turnout, and observers cited both fear of intimidation, disappointment with the democratic process and the presence of numerous candidates linked to former warring groups as possible explanations.
Negotiations: NO
Comment on Negotiation: Optimistic reports about "reconciliation talks" between a Taleban delegation (including former Taleban foreign minister and the Karzai administration) came in February 2005. However, the Taleban later declared the report of talks as baseless.
Third party involvement: YES
Third party involvement names: International Security Assistance Force (ISAF)
Comment on Third Party Involvement: NATO took command of the International Security Assistance Force (ISAF) in August 2003. The force is working under UN mandate to assist the Government of Afghanistan and the International Community in maintaining security within its area of command. As of 2005 ISAF numbered around 8000 troops from 36 NATO and 9 partner countries. These were Belgium, Bulgaria, Canada, Czech Republic , Dennmark, Estonia, France, Germany, Greece, Hungary, Iceland, Italy, Latvia, Lithuania, Luxemburg, Netherlands, Norway, Poland, Portugal, Romania, Slovakia, Slovenia, Spain, Turkey, United Kingdom, United states and the partner countries: Albania, Austria, Azerbaijan, Croatia, Finland, Macedonia, Ireland, Sweden and Switzerland.
NATO has expanded its deployment of military reconstruction teams during 2005, and there are negotiations among NATO member states to supply sufficient numbers of troops for NATO to carry a greater responsibility of the military operation. The stated intention is to merge Operation Enduring Freedom with ISAF. However, US troop withdrawal is unlikely to happen in the immediate future.
Victory: NO
Terminated: NO
2006 Conflict Archive
Comment on Activity: 2006 saw the deadliest increase in violence in Afghanistan since the overthrown of the Taleban government in 2001. Fierce fighting took place in the southern provinces and the border provinces to Pakistan, in addition to occasional terrorist incidents in urban centers such as Kabul. The Taleban increasingly employed the tactics of asymmetrical warfare, seen in a dramatic increase in suicide bombings and attacks on ‘soft targets’ such as civilians and government officials. However, there were also standing battles between the Afghan government’s coalition and the Taleban insurgents. In operation Medusa, launched in September 2006, ISAF claimed to have killed more than 520 insurgents.
Part of the general upsurge in violence was ascribed to the fact that international troops were expanding their presence into new areas, but observers also agreed that the Taleban, boosted by money from the opium trade and by cross border infiltrators from Pakistan, had been able to regroup.
After a gradual takeover, the NATO led International Security Assistance Force formally took control over the international military presence in Afghanistan on 5 October 2006 from the U.S. led coalition forces. The U.S. retained about 10 000 soldiers under its own command, and was also the predominant supplier of forces to the ISAF led force.
Comment on Yearly Battle Related Deaths: High estimate: 4211. Low estimate: 3087
Negotiations: NO
Comment on Negotiation: In early January, Afghanistan’s President Hamid Karzai invited Taliban’s leader, Mullah Mohammad Omar, for talks to end the war. The offer was rejected by the Taliban leadership.
Third party involvement: YES
Third party involvement names: International Security Assistance Force (ISAF)
Comment on Third Party Involvement: NATO took command of the International Security Assistance Force (ISAF) in August 2003. The force is working under UN mandate to assist the Government of Afghanistan and the International Community in maintaining security within its area of command. As of 2006 ISAF troops numbered 31 000 from NATO and 10 partner countries. These were Belgium, Bulgaria, Canada, Czech Republic , Dennmark, Estonia, France, Germany, Greece, Hungary, Iceland, Italy, Latvia, Lithuania, Luxemburg, Netherlands, Norway, Poland, Portugal, Romania, Slovakia, Slovenia, Spain, Turkey, United Kingdom, United states and the partner countries: Albania, Australia, Austria, Azerbaijan, Croatia, Finland, Macedonia, Ireland, Sweden and Switzerland.
In 2006 ISAF took over control of the international military operation in Afghanistan from the U.S forces.
On 31 July ISAF took over command of the south provinces, and on 5 October the ISAF completed its takeover, with the transfer of authority over 14 remaining eastern provinces from U.S. led coalition forces. As of 31 July the ISAF countries are recorded as secondary warring parties to the conflict.
Victory: NO
Terminated: NO
2007 Conflict Archive
Comment on Activity: In 2007 the armed conflict between the Taleban and the government of Afghanistan reached the highest recorded intensity level ever during the period of contemporary international involvement (from 2001 and onwards). At least 5,800 battle-related deaths were recorded, the vast majority of these being Taleban casualties. Afghanistan lost approximately 900 policemen in the fighting, and over 200 international troops were also killed in action.
In part this increase in intensity can be explained by the Taleban’s efforts to establish a stable foothold in southern Afghanistan, but the more aggressive stance taken by ISAF troops is also of importance. For example, instead of waiting for an expected Taleban spring offensive in the south, British and Canadian forces went on the offensive during the first months of the year, incurring heavy losses on the Taleban.
Insurgency-related violence was recorded in most of Afghanistan’s provinces, but the bulk of the fighting took place in the southern provinces of Kandahar, Helmand, Ghazni, Uruzgan and Zabul, and in the eastern provinces of Paktia, Paktika, Kunar and Khost. Farah province in the west also saw significant amounts of violence. International and Afghan troops made use of their technological superiority in the fighting, using a massive amount of air strikes in combat situations. The Taleban in turn exploited the weaknesses of security in the country, with suicide bombings reaching an all-time high and killing many police, soldiers and civilians. Whilst ISAF troops were fighting mainly in the south the US-led coalition (part of Operation Enduring Freedom) hunted al-Qaeda, Taleban and other militants in the mountains of the east, killing some 70 al-Qaeda operatives (see USA-Al Qaeda conflict for more information).
Whilst fighting reached new levels of intensity, signalling that the insurgency was far from over, some positive signs were also visible. The Afghan National Army continued to be expanded, with Afghan troops becoming both more numerous and more competent; yet still reliant on Western air support. In the north reconstruction moved forward, and the insurgency failed to take hold in these provinces. Insecurity was however still a large problem in most parts of the country, and opium production reached an all-time high. Profits from the drug trade fed the coffers of the Taleban, but also empowered warlords and criminal gangs, which at time attacked Afghan police to defend their economic interests.
President Karzai invited Taleban leaders for talks on several occasions during the year, wanting to end the insurgency peacefully. The Taleban leadership did not accept these overtures, demanding that international troops leave before negotiations could begin.
Negotiations: NO
Comment on Negotiation: President Karzai invited Taleban leaders for talks on several occasions during the year, wanting to end the insurgency peacefully. The Taleban leadership did not accept these overtures, demanding that international troops leave before negotiations could begin.
Third party involvement: NO
Third party involvement names: None
Comment on Third Party Involvement: In late 2006 ISAF took full operational control of the international military mission in Afghanistan from the US, with the mission to conduct military operations against the insurgents. Thus the ISAF mission can no longer be seen as being of a third party nature. Contributing nations are instead viewed as being secondary warring parties on the side of the government of Afghanistan.
Victory: NO
Terminated: NO
2008 Conflict Archive
Comment on Activity: The insurgency in Afghanistan, mainly fought by the Taleban movement, continued in force in 2008. Most observers stated that the conflict increased in intensity, something which is however not reflected in UCDP’s data on battle-related deaths (see comment on battle-related deaths for more info). There was definitely an increase in the number of suicide and road side bombings –and western casualties as a result- but it is far from clear that the aggregated number of deaths increased. Regardless of whether or not the conflict increased further intensity the insurgency at the least continued to be very vibrant, also witnessing the return to conflict by Gulbuddin Hekmatyar’s Hizb-i-Islami-yi Afghanistan group.
During the year the Taleban had a clear and strong presence in many parts of Afghanistan’s west, south and east. Fighting was at its most fierce in the Helmand, Kandahar, Zabul, Uruzgan, Ghazni, Khost, Paktia and Paktika provinces, with a significant amount of fighting also in Herat, Wardak, Logar, Farah, Nangarhar, Nuristan, Kapisa and Kunar provinces. As in previous years the Northern provinces were the ones most firmly under government control.
The Hizb-i-Islami-yi Afghanistan was most active in the Kapisa and Nuristan provinces, but was also hit by coalition air strikes across the border in Pakistan, where the movement has considerable influence in refugee camps.
The Taleban strategy continued to be focused on road side bombings and suicide bombings, mainly targeting Western and Afghan troops and police, but also killing many civilians. The group also carried out a number of larger attacks, the most prominent examples being the Kandahar city prison break in mid-June (where approximately 400 Taleban prisoners escaped after the prison came under attack), the ambush and killing of 10 French troops on patrol in the Uzbin valley in August, and the July killing of 9 US troops in an attack by hundreds of militants in Nuristan province. Few operations were undertaken by the Taleban to actually capture and hold territory, next to a botched attempt to assault Lashkar Gah (capital of Helmand province) in October.
ISAF and the US-led coalition focused its efforts mainly on clearing territory already under its control. Several large-scale sweeps were carried out in Helmand (Operation Eagle’s Summit, among other operations), Zabul, Wardak, Kandahar, Farah and Paktika provinces, to mention some of the largest ones.
While the most intense fighting was located in the south, Afghan and international forces launched several operations in the east (primarily in Khost), targeting Taleban commander Siraj Haqqani who was seen as instrumental in facilitating the movement of militants from Pakistan into Afghanistan. These operations also included several air and missile strikes in Pakistan’s North Waziristan area. Taleban militants continued to find refuge in the abovementioned area in Pakistan, and also in other tribal areas in the same country. It is possible that the ongoing insurgency by Pakistani Taleban facilitated the ease with which border crossings could be made.
The expansion of the Afghan National Army continued during the year, with force size reaching approximately 70 000 men. Whilst the Afghan army became more professional it was still reliant on Western air support and overall guidance.
No negotiations were held between the Government of Afghanistan and the Taleban or Hizb-i-Islami-yi Afghanistan movement. Towards the autumn of 2008 reports began to surface that a first round of explanatory talks had taken place between government and Taleban and Hizb-i-Islami-yi Afghanistan representatives in Saudi Arabia, as guests of King Abdullah. But both the government and the Taleban denied that any such talks had taken place at the meeting. The government of Afghanistan conceded, however, that it had, on several occasions, requested Saudi Arabia to sponsor peace talks.
Overall, a state of bloody status quo might best represent the situation in Afghanistan at the end of 2008.
Comment on Yearly Battle Related Deaths: "Best estimate: 4489, high estimate: 5842, low: 4099
Two dyads were active in 2008, the Government versus the Taleban, and the Government versus the Hezb-i-Islami.
The UCDP estimates for the Afghanistan conflict 2008 are significantly lower than the estimates given for 2007. This does not necessarily indicate that the conflicts intensity decreased in 2008. Instead, during 2008, ISAF and the US-led coalition were extremely cautious in releasing casualty estimates from the battles they were involved in, leading to problems in coding event-based deaths. The estimates should therefore be used with caution."
Negotiations: NO
Comment on Negotiation: No negotiations took place between the Government of Afghanistan and the Taleban or Hizb-i-Islami-yi Afghanistan during 2008. The Taleban and Hizb-i-Islami-yi Afghanistan continued instead to insist that all foreign troops had to leave Afghanistan before any negotiations could commence. This demand appeared to be unacceptable to the government of Karzai. During the year the political opposition to Karzai’s government stated that they had had contacts with the Taleban on the possibility of beginning negotiations; something which was denied by Taleban spokesmen
The Government of Afghanistan, however, continued to issue calls for the Taleban to come to the negotiating table, to no avail.
Towards the autumn of 2008 reports began to surface that a first round of exploratory talks had taken place between government and Taleban representatives in Saudi Arabia, as guests of King Abdullah. But both the government and the Taleban denied that any such talks had taken place at the meeting. The government of Afghanistan conceded, however, that it had, on several occasions, requested Saudi Arabia to sponsor peace talks. Representatives of Hizb-i-Islami-yi Afghanistan were also said to have been present.
Third party involvement: NO
Third party involvement names: None.
Comment on Third Party Involvement: No third party involvement in 2008.
Victory: NO
Terminated: NO
2009 Conflict Archive
Comment on Activity: In 2009 the armed conflict in Afghanistan continued to increase in intensity, with a marked increase in battle-related deaths as compared to 2008. It is also possible that there was a comparative increase from 2007, although the international forces’ reluctance to report on estimated rebel fatalities in their operations hinders the possibilities to draw any final conclusions in this regard (see also Comment on battle-related deaths for more information). In addition to the continuing fight of the Taleban against the government of Afghanistan and the international forces the Hizb-i-Islami-yi-Afghanistan of Gulbuddin Hekmatyar was also active in fighting the government during the year.
The clearest indications of the heightened intensity were the increase in the number of international soldiers killed and the relatively intense fighting that spread to previously almost untouched areas of Afghanistan. The Taleban’s main presence was still found in southern and eastern Afghanistan, with provinces such as Helmand, Kandahar, Ghazni, Uruzgan, Khost, Zabul and Kunar bearing the brunt of fighting. The Hezb-i-Islami was mainly active in Khost, in their stronghold in the Tagab Valley.
However, 2009 also saw previously unrecorded levels of violence in Farah, Herat, Nimroz (western and southwestern Afghanistan) as well as in the Kunduz and Badghis provinces. Signs of an increase in activity were also registered in Balkh; previously untouched by any large-scale insurgency-related activities.
As in earlier years the Taleban mainly relied on road side bombings, suicide bombings and ambushes as their main tactics. The use of IEDs (Improvised Explosive Devices) peaked in 2009. The Taleban, however, also made frequent use of more brazen tactics, on several occasions attacking and temporarily taking over government buildings in provincial capitals throughout the country. Kabul suffered several such coordinated attacks.
ISAF and other international forces continued to try and capture and hold territory from Taleban influence. Especially after the ascension of General Stanley McChrystal as commanding officer of ISAF the international forces focus’ shifted from hunting pockets of Taleban fighters to securing territory, maintaining a presence and gaining the trust of the locals through aid and development. McChrystal also attempted to decrease the use of airstrikes, which had become a threat to public support for the international mission due to the many civilian casualties they incurred. Several large operations to seize territory were initiated during the years, such as Operation Panther’s Claw (to seize and hold territory in Helmand province) and Operation Strike of the Sword (with the same objective).
The presidency of Karzai became more intensely questioned during the year, as a result of the massive fraud that accompanied the presidential elections held in August. The elections themselves saw relatively little violence from the Taleban and the main topic of discussion was instead the obvious fraud in favour of Karzai. Nevertheless, Karzai’s victory in the second round of the elections allowed him to stay on as president.
As in previous years the expansion of the Afghan army continued, with total troop numbers reaching 100 000 in December 2009. The army, however, continued to be reliant on international training, air support and leadership.
No negotiations were held between the warring parties during the year. The government of Afghanistan employed the use of Saudi Arabia as a possible third party to bring the Taleban to the negotiating table, but not overt talks were held. The government continued to urge the Taleban to come to table, whilst the Taleban in turn argued that all international troops must first leave the country.
Comment on Yearly Battle Related Deaths: "Two dyads were active in 2009, the Government of Afghanistan versus the Taleban, and the Government of Afghanistan versus the Hezb-i-Islami-yi-Afghanistan.
The UCDP estimates for the Afghanistan conflict in 2009 should be treated with caution. Just as was the case in 2008 the US-led coalition and ISAF were cautious in reporting their estimates for enemies killed in confrontations. While this information was available through ISAF and US news reporting throughout the first months of the year, General Stanley McChrystal (commander of the ISAF operation) decided to end such reporting in mid-June.
Thus, the number of people killed in the conflict is likely higher than the estimates given, as many clashes have gone completely unreported. The figures, however, show an increase in activity from 2008 to 2009. It is probable that in reality an increase in activity has occurred also compared to 2007."
Negotiations: NO
Comment on Negotiation: No negotiations were held during the year between the government of Afghanistan and its adversaries (the Taleban and the Hizb-i-Islami-yi Afghanistan). The government appears to have negotiated with local Taleban militants for their abandonment of the armed struggle, but did not engage in activities that qualify as being regular talks with the Taleban movement itself. However, it did become clear during the year that the government of Afghanistan made use of Saudi Arabia as an interlocutor to attempt to get the Taleban to accept talks.
During 2009 the government openly expressed wishes to begin talks with the Taleban to bring an end to the war. At some points during the year the government also stated that talks had begun with the Taleban “at various levels”, although the government did not given neither names nor any specific topics for these talks. The Taleban denied the existence of any such talks and this variable is thus coded as having contained no negotiations during the year. The Taleban instead continued to demand the exit of all foreign troops before talks could be held.
In regard to the Hizb-i-Islami, rumours circulated during the year that the group’s leader, Gulbuddin Hekmatyar, had attempted to initiate contacts with the USA in order to arrange peace talks. It has not been possible to verify the truth of this claim and it was denied by the government of Afghanistan.
Third party involvement: YES
Third party involvement names: Saudia Arabia
Comment on Third Party Involvement: Saudi Arabia was, during 2009, employed by the government of Afghanistan to act as an interlocutor between the government and the Taleban movement and arrange peace talks. Saudi officials are known to have met with former Taleban commanders back in 2008.
The exact dealings of Saudi Arabia as a third party are somewhat unclear, but the country appears to have attempted to initiate contacts between the government and the Taleban’s top leadership.
Victory: NO
Terminated: NO
2010 Conflict Archive
Comment on Activity: Violence continued to increase in intensity in 2010, with more international troops present in the country and more attacks being carried out by the Taleban and Hizb-i Islami-yi Afghanistan. Most of the violence was concentrated to the Taleban strongholds of southern and eastern Afghanistan, with provinces such as Helmand, Kandahar, Uruzgan, Khost, Zabul and Kunar bearing the brunt of fighting. Hizb-i Islami-yi Afghanistan was mainly active in the eastern parts of the country, in provinces such as Kapisa and Kunar, but also in the northern province of Baghlan. Almost all provinces in Afghanistan were touched by violence in 2010 and it became increasingly clear that violence has spread to previously calm areas. As in earlier years the Taleban mainly relied on road side bombings, suicide bombings and ambushes as their main tactics. The use of IEDs (Improvised Explosive Devices) continued to increase in 2010.
In December 2009, US President Barack Obama announced that the US would send an additional 30 000 troops to the country. Other countries promised to send an additional 9000 troops as part of the peacekeeping force ISAF (International Security Assistance Force). The US commander of the coalition forces in Afghanistan, Stanley McChrystal was replaced by David Petraeus in June 2010, after the former had made some remarks about the Obama administration in an interview in the Rolling Stones Magazine. Petraeus formally took command of the 130 000 strong force on 4 July.
In January 2010, an international conference on Afghanistan was held in London. The conference was hosted by UK Prime Minister Gordon Brown, UN Secretary-General Ban Ki Mon and Afghan President Hamid Karzai, and attracted representatives from over 70 countries and international organisations. During the conference, a strategy for the future was agreed upon, including a bigger responsibility for the Afghan security forces and financial incentives for national reconciliation. During a NATO summit held in Portugal in November, the leaders of the NATO countries agreed to hand over control of security to the Afghan forces by the end of 2014.
In February, ISAF launched one of the biggest offensives in its history in Marjah District in Helmand Province. Operation Mushtarak strived to take control of villages held by the Taleban and introduce a ‘government in a box’, a team of police and administrators, in order to keep control of the area and prevent the Taleban from recapturing it. Although proclaimed a successful operation, fighting continued in the area. Another large-scale operation was launched in Kandahar Province in September in an attempt to take control of a traditional Taleban stronghold.
On 18 September, national elections to the lower chamber of the National Assembly were held. Due to difficulties of estimating the number of potential number of voters, the turnout is disputed. Official estimates claimed that around 40% of the population voted, while independent source said that the turnout was more likely around 10-18%. The level of violence was reportedly higher in 2010 than in the presidential elections in 2009 and the turnout probably lower. There were also widespread allegations of electoral fraud.
No negotiations were held between the Taleban and the Afghan government in 2010, although there were several reports of secret talks taking place. The Taleban continued to deny any contacts with the government, saying that all foreign troops must leave the country before negotiations could start. Three rounds of talks in the Maldives gathered members, although not representatives, of the Taleban, Hizb-i Islami and the government. However, no progress was reported from the meetings. In March 2010, a Hizb-i Islami delegation arrived in Kabul to negotiate with President Hamid Karzai. Hizb-i Islami presented a 15-point peace plan which included the withdrawal of all foreign troops from Afghanistan and new presidential, parliamentary and provincial council elections to be held in 2011. The negotiations ended without an agreement being signed by the parties.
In 2010 the armed conflict in Afghanistan continued to increase in intensity, with a marked increase in battle-related deaths as compared to 2009.
As in previous years, most fighting took place in the Taleban strongholds of Southern Afghanistan. However, fighting in the previously calm Northern provinces also increased, a trend visible already in 2009.
Comment on Yearly Battle Related Deaths: Two dyads were active in 2010, the Government of Afghanistan versus the Taleban, and the Government of Afghanistan versus the Hizb-i Islami-yi-Afghanistan.
The UCDP estimates for the Afghanistan conflict in 2010 should be treated with caution. Just as was the case in 2009 the US-led coalition and ISAF were cautious in reporting their estimates for enemies killed in confrontations during the first half of the year. When General David Petraeus took command of the ISAF forces in July 2010, reports of fatalities became more common.
Thus, the number of people killed in the conflict is likely higher than the estimates given, as many clashes have gone completely unreported. The figures, however, show an increase in activity from 2009 to 2010.
Negotiations: YES
Comment on Negotiation: In January 2010, reports claimed that a meeting had been held between the UN Special Representative in Afghanistan, Kai Eide, and the Taleban in Dubai. The Taleban later denied that such a meeting had taken place. Soon thereafter it was reported that representatives from the government, Taleban and Hizb-i Islami-yi Afghanistan had met in the Maldives to discuss peace. Both resistance groups denied that the participants were there on behalf of the groups and stated that they would not negotiate as long as foreign forces remained in the country. A second round of talks was held in the Maldives in May, but it became increasingly clear that no official representative from the Afghan government was present in the Maldives talks. Another round was hosted by the Maldives in November, this time with members, although not formal representatives, of the Taleban, Hizb-i Islami and the Afghan parliament.
In July, rumours said that the Afghan government and a representative from the Haqqani network, a group under Taleban command, had met in Kabul assisted by Pakistani mediators. However, it has not been possible to verify the reports.
New reports about meetings between the Afghan government and the Taleban emerged in October, although denied by the Taleban. The United Arab Emirate reportedly mediated talks held in Kabul, in which also representatives from the government of Pakistan participated. Some contact between the Afghan government and the Taleban is likely to have been made during the year, but it is unlikely that any formal negotiations took place.
Formal talks were held between the Afghan government and Hizb-i Islami-yi Afghanistan in March 2010. During several days of meetings in Kabul between President Karzai and Hizb-i Islami representatives, the resistance group presented a 15-point peace plan with demands such as the removal of foreign troops from Afghanistan and an interim government to be formed. New presidential, parliamentary and provincial council elections were to be held in spring 2011, and the newly elected parliament would have the right to rework the constitution. Hizb-i Islami also met with the newly appointed UN Special Representative in Afghanistan, Staffan de Mistura. The negotiations ended without an agreement being signed by the parties.
Third party involvement: YES
Third party involvement names: UN Special Representatives in Afghanistan Kai Eide and Staffan de Mistura, Maldives, United Arab Emirate, High Peace Council
Comment on Third Party Involvement: In January 2010, UN Special Representative in Afghanistan, Kai Eide, reported that he had met with the Taleban in Dubai. The Taleban later denied that such a meeting had taken place. In March, Hizb-i Islami-yi Afghanistan met the UN Special Representative succeeding Eide, Staffan de Mistura.
The Maldives hosted three rounds of talks between members of the Afghan government, Taleban and Hizb-i Islami-yi Afghanistan. However, the participants were not official representatives of the groups.
In July, rumours said that the Afghan government and a representative from the Haqqani network, a group under Taleban command, had met in Kabul assisted by Pakistani mediators. However, it has not been possible to verify the reports.
In September, a 70-members High Peace Council was set up with the aim to support peace and facilitate negotiations between the government and the Taleban. Although formed by President Hamid Karzai, the Council included former Taleban, representatives from political parties, former members of the communist regime, religious leaders, former Mujahideen commanders, and representatives from ethnic groups, civil society. Leader of the Council was Burhanuddin Rabbani, leader of Jam’iyyat-i Islami-yi Afghanistan, and former president.
The United Arab Emirate reportedly mediated talks held in Kabul, in which representatives from the government of Pakistan also participated.
Victory: NO
Terminated: NO
2011 Conflict Archive
Comment on Activity: In 2011, the conflict in Afghanistan continued to increase in intensity as the NATO-led forces started handing security control to Afghan forces. In an attempt to undermine the confidence in the local forces ability to provide security, the insurgents stepped up suicide attacks and other bombings. The first transfer occurred in Bamyan province in the central parts of Afghanistan on 17 July. A few days later ISAF handed security control to Afghan forces in Lashkargah, the provincial capital of the volatile Helmand province in southern Afghanistan.
Most of the violence was concentrated to the Taleban strongholds in southern and eastern Afghanistan, with provinces such as Helmand, Kandahar, Konar, Paktika, Nangarhar and Ghazni bearing the brunt of fighting. All of Afghanistan’s 34 provinces were touched by violence in 2011 and although a handful of provinces still were relatively calm, no area was completely free of rebel violence. Hizb-i Islami-yi Afghanistan was mainly active in the eastern parts of the country, in provinces such as Nangarhar, Konar and Wardag, but also in other provinces around the country. The two groups also fought against each other for control of Nerkh District in Wardag province during 2011.
As in earlier years both the Taleban and Hizb-i Islami mainly relied on road side bombings, suicide bombings and ambushes as their main tactics. The use of IEDs (Improvised Explosive Devices) continued to increase in 2011. In April 2011, the Taleban launched their “Operation Badr” targeting “foreign troops, members of their spy networks, high-ranking government officials, and members of the cabinet and parliament." Many attacks were focused on Jowzjan province, a previously calm province that saw increasing levels of violence during 2011.
The international forces, together with the Afghan Army, launched several operations during 2011. For example, in February coalition air strikes reportedly killed over 60 civilians in Konar province, fighting in Nuristan province in May resulted in over 160 deaths and in June, an offensive in Konar killed at least 100 people. In July, ISAF attacked a training camp in eastern Paktia province and in September an offensive in Nuristan province resulted in at least 100 deaths. Operation “ridge of sword” was launched in October and targeted the Haqqani network in the eastern parts of the country.
Although several countries announced their withdrawal from Afghanistan, and big troop contributors such as Canada and the Netherlands started to pull back their forces during 2010 and 2011, the total number of ISAF troops in the country stood at 130 000 by the end of the year. In July General David Petraeus handed over command of US and NATO-led troops in Afghanistan to General John Allen.
No negotiations were held between the insurgents and the Afghan government in 2011, although there were several reports of secret talks taking place. In the beginning of 2011, Hizb-i Islami representatives met with the High Peace Council (HPC) in Islamabad but although a meeting in Kabul was planned and announced by the HPC, Hizb-i Islami did not attend and failed to engage in talks with the government during 2011. In March, the Afghan newspaper Weesa reported that secret talks between US officials and Mullah Omar’s spokesman Taib Agha had taken place in Germany and in Qatar and in May, another meeting was reported to have taken place in Germany. In December, media reported that officials from the US and Qatar had agreed with the Taleban to set up a Taleban office in Qatar to facilitate negotiations.
Negotiations: NO
Comment on Negotiation: No formal negotiations were held in the conflict during 2011, although there were numerous reports of secret talks involving both the Taleban and the Hizb-i Islami-yi Afghanistan. The Taleban continued to deny any contacts with the government, saying that all foreign troops must leave the country before negotiations could start. Reports claimed that President Karzai held direct talks with the Taleban during his visit in London in early March, and when Karzai visited Saudi Arabia in late August, representatives from both the Taleban movement and Hizb-i Islami-yi Afghanistan were present in the country. However, no direct talks between the parties have been confirmed.
In January, it was reported that representatives from the High Peace Council (HPC), the Pakistani military and Hizb-i Islami had met in Islamabad, Pakistan to discuss peace. During the meeting, Hizb-i Islami presented a 15-point peace proposal to the HPC. The document, called the “National Rescue Pact” had been presented to the Afghan government in 2010. Hizb-i Islami demands included the announcement of foreign forces withdrawal during the first half of 2011, that power was transferred to a temporary government and a review of the constitution.
In late January, the HPC reported that a Hizb-i Islami delegation planned a visit to Kabul to hold talks, and in February they said that they had prepared answers to the demands presented by the insurgents. However, in early March the HPC announced that Hizb-i Islami had not come to Kabul.
In February, reports of direct talks between the US and the Taleban started to appear. In March, the Afghan newspaper Weesa reported that secret talks between US officials and Mullah Omar’s spokesman Taib Agha had taken place in Germany and in Qatar. In May, another meeting was reported to have taken place in Germany, and the German newspaper Der Spiegel claimed that Germany had mediated the secret talks held 7-8 May. The US did not confirm that they were involved in talks with the Taleban, and the Taleban denied that any talks had taken place. However, in mid-June President Karzai confirmed that the US had been in contact with the Taleban and a few days later US Defense Secretary Robert Gates said there had been contacts between the US and the Taleban.
In December, media reported that officials from the US and Qatar had agreed with the Taleban to set up a Taleban office in Qatar to facilitate negotiations. The Afghan government recalled its ambassador from Qatar and said that they could agree on a Taleban office in Turkey or Saudi Arabia, but not in Qatar. However, a week later the High Peace Council reported that the Afghan government agreed on setting up a political office for the Taleban in Doha, Qatar.
Third party involvement: YES
Third party involvement names: UN Special Representative in Afghanistan Staffan de Mistura, High Peace Council, Qatar
Comment on Third Party Involvement: The High Peace Council (HPC), set up in 2010, continued to promote peace and negotiations during 2011. Activities during the year included for example meeting with Hizb-i Islami-yi Afghanistan in Pakistan, lobbying for the release of Taleban prisoners in Guantanamo, meeting with the NATO civil representative for Afghanistan, arranging a conference aimed at discussing the peace process, and meeting with British Prime Minister David Cameron, the Chinese ambassador to Afghanistan and UN Special Envoy to Afghanistan Staffan de Mistura to discuss peace and negotiations.
Qatar hosted secret talks between US officials and Taleban representatives on several occasions during the year. In December they agreed to set up a political office for the Taleban in Doha.
UN Special Representative in Afghanistan Staffan de Mistura met with HPC leader Burhanuddin Rabbani in May 2011 to discuss the peace process.
Victory: NO
Terminated: NO
2012 Conflict Archive
Comment on Activity: In 2012, the conflict in Afghanistan continued to increase in intensity as the NATO-led forces continued to hand over security control to Afghan forces. Afghan security forces increasingly took on the leadership of military operations, with an increased number of fatalities among Afghan soldiers and police as a result.
Most of the violence was concentrated to the Taleban strongholds in southern and eastern Afghanistan, with provinces such as Helmand, Kandahar, Nangarhar, Ghazni, and Konar bearing the brunt of fighting. All of Afghanistans 34 provinces were touched by violence in 2012 and although a handful of provinces still were relatively calm, no area was completely free of rebel violence.
As in earlier years the Taleban mainly relied on road side bombings, suicide bombings and ambushes as their main tactics. The widespread use of IEDs (Improvised Explosive Devices) continued in 2012. In early May 2012, the Taleban launched their spring offensive Al-Faruq. A statement from the Taleban leadership announced that their targets would be both foreign and Afghan security forces as well as political and government officials. They urged civilians to stay away from military bases and explosion sites. Despite the group’s claim to spare civilians, the Taleban continued to commit atrocities against the Afghan population and several suicide attacks were carried out against civilian targets, resulting in numerous fatalities.
The number of insider attacks, so called green-on-blue attacks, increased substantially in 2012 and accounted for 15% of the total ISAF casualties during the year. Some of the attacks were reported as carried out by Taleban infiltrators while others seemed to be caused by personal enmity. In September, several attacks led the ISAF to temporarily suspend training for new police recruits and to suspend most joint operations with Afghan security forces. After a green-on-blue attack on French soldiers in January, France suspended military operations and announced that they were to withdraw their forces earlier than planned. From almost 4000 troops in the beginning of the year, all but 500 had been withdrawn by the end of the year.
Several other countries started to pull back their forces during 2012, and the US decreased their presence in the country from 90 000 troops to 68 000 troops by the end of 2012. The total number of ISAF troops in the country stood at around 100 000 in December 2012, down from 130 000 in the beginning of the year.
Talks between the US and the Taleban concerning prisoner exchange took place in the beginning of the year but in March the Taleban announced that they suspended all talks with the US. The Taleban office in Qatar, that was supposed to open in 2012, had by the end of the year still not been established.
On at least three occasions during the year, representatives from the Taleban met with the High Peace Council and/or representatives from the Afghan government. The most important of these meetings was held in Paris in late December and included talks on Afghanistan’s future.
Fighting in the Government of Afghanistan – Hizb-i Islami-yi Afghanistan dyad did not result in 25 battle-related deaths in 2012. A delegation from Hizb-i Islami visited Kabul in early January and met with President Karzai and representatives from the US to discuss the peace process. New negotiations were held in April but after the signing of the Afghan-US Strategic Agreement on1 May Hizb-i Islami announced that they would halt negotiations with the Afghan government. In spite of this, representatives from the group attended meetings in Paris and Tokyo during which the future of Afghanistan was discussed.
Negotiations: YES
Comment on Negotiation: On at least three occasions during the year, representatives from the Taleban met with the High Peace Council and/or representatives from the Afghan government. The most important of these meetings was held in Paris, France in late December during which representatives from the High Peace Council, the Afghan government, the Taleban and Hizb-i Islami-yi Afghanistan attended. Very few details from the meeting are known and the Taleban said no peace negotiations were held. However, they admitted that they presented their demands of a new constitution for Afghanistan and also stated that they were open for power sharing. The Afghan government has previously said that before negotiations can start between the warring parties, the Taleban must accept the Afghan constitution, renounce violence and cut their ties with al-Qaida.
A delegation from Hizb-i Islami visited Kabul in early January and met with President Karzai and representatives from the US to discuss the peace process. New negotiations were held in April but after the signing of the Afghan-US Strategic Agreement on1 May Hizb-i Islami announced that they would halt negotiations with the Afghan government. In spite of this, representatives from the group attended meetings in Paris and Tokyo during which the future of Afghanistan was discussed.
Third party involvement: YES
Third party involvement names: Foundation for Strategic Research, High Peace Council
Comment on Third Party Involvement: The High Peace Council (HPC), set up in 2010, continued to promote peace and negotiations during 2012.
The French think tank Foundation for Strategic Research organized the Paris Conference on Afghanistan 20-21 December 2012.
Victory: NO
Terminated: NO
2013 Conflict Archive
Comment on Activity: In 2013, the conflict in Afghanistan caused an increasing number of fatalities among Afghan soldiers and police as the NATO-led forces formally handed over security control to Afghan forces. The number of insider attacks, so called green-on-blue attacks, decreased substantially during 2013, but civilian casualties increased.
In March 2013, full responsibility of Bagram prison was transferred to Afghan forces, a symbolically important event and described as a fundamental change in relations between Afghanistan and USA. Bagram prison is one of the biggest jails in the country and has been used to keep most Taleban and al-Qaida prisoners. On 18 June, “Milestone 2013” was announced, marking the formal transfer of security responsibility to the Afghan National Security Forces (ANSF). Reflecting the Afghan forces’ lead role in security operations and their lower counter-IED (Improvised Explosive Device) capabilities, the number of ANSF fatalities increased considerably in 2013. In 2013’s “fighting season” fatalities peaked at 100 per weak, double the peak of the same period in 2012.
Most of the violence was concentrated to the Taleban strongholds in southern and eastern Afghanistan, with provinces such as Helmand, Kandahar, Nangarhar, Ghazni, bearing the brunt of fighting. Almost all of Afghanistans 34 provinces were touched by violence in 2013, although a handful of provinces still were relatively calm.
As in earlier years the Taleban mainly relied on road side bombings, suicide bombings and ambushes as their main tactics. The widespread use of IEDs continued in 2013. In late April 2013, the Taleban launched their spring offensive Khalid bin al-Walid, reiterating their aim of “freeing the nation from the cusps of occupation and establishing in it an Islamic rule”. Political and government officials, and anyone considered to be connected to the foreign forces, continued to be seen as legitimate targets of Taleban attacks. The Taleban spokesman, talking about civilian government employees, stated in February that “No Afghan can accept that the above mentioned people are civilian. We have pledged in the beginning of our yearly operations that these people are criminals. They are directly involved in the protraction of our countrys invasion and legally we do not find any difficulty in their elimination, rather we consider it our obligation". The UNAMA mid-year report revealed an increase in civilian fatalities by 14% in the first six months of 2013, when compared to 2012.
In January 2013 Karzai and the US agreed to open up an office for the Taleban in Qatar, and in mid-June the office finally opened. However, after only a few weeks the office closed and it did not open again during 2013. The office was supposed to provide a venue for formal negotiations between the Taleban and the Afghan government, but no such meeting was arranged. When the office opened in mid-June, it was decorated with the Taleban flag and the banner of the Islamic Emirate (the name of the Taleban government). The Afghan government, fearing that the Taleban would use the office as an official embassy or a base for a government-in-exile, was angered by the move and said that “as long as the peace process is not Afghan-led, the HPC (High Peace Council) will not participate in the talks in Qatar”. An Afghan official said "The U.S. officials told us the office will be used to move peace talks forward, but not to give them an identity. The Talebans flag and the banner of the Islamic Emirate was something we did not expect." Shortly after the opening, the Afghan government announced that they suspended the bilateral security agreement talks with the US in protest against the Taleban flag, and a few weeks later the closure of the Taleban office in Qatar was announced.
Drawdown of international forces continued in 2013 and by the end of the year the total number of ISAF troops in Afghanistan stood at around 87 000, down from 100 000 in the beginning of the year. During 2014, all ISAF combat troops are supposed to be withdrawn from the country. However, some forces could remain to train the Afghan security forces, if a security agreement is signed between the US and Afghanistan. Negotiations to agree on such a bilateral security agreement (BSA) took place during 2013, and in October president Karzai and US Secretary of State John Kerry reached an agreement on all contents of the security pact. The final decision on judicial jurisdiction for the US forces was to be referred to a Loya Jirga, Afghanistan’s grand assembly. After two days of meetings in late November, the Loya Jirga approved the draft security agreement and urged the president to sign it immediately. President Karzai, however, defied the consensus and said that he would not sign unless certain conditions were met, and even then, not until after the presidential elections in April 2014.
Negotiations: YES
Comment on Negotiation: Negotiations took place in the Government of Afghanistan - Hizb-i Islami-yi Afghanistan dyad. In April 2013, a Hizb-i Islami-yi Afghanistan delegation travelled to Kabul to hold talks with the Afghan government. Discussions focused on the 15-article proposal which had earlier been presented to the Afghan government. After the talks, a Hizb-I Islami representative said that they will launch peace negotiations and join the political process if foreign forces are removed from the country completely.
In the Government of Afghanistan - Taleban dyad no formal negotiations were held. As in previous years, unconfirmed reports and rumours about peace talks and meetings circulated. In March, President Karzai claimed that the US and the Taleban had held talks in Qatar. These claims were denied by both the US and the Taleban, the latter emphasized that no talks had taken place since the suspension of talks was announced in March 2012.
In June it was reported that Taleban representatives travelled to Iran to discuss the Afghan peace process. Although the talks were confirmed by the Taleban, the Iranian Foreign Ministry denied the visit.
Karzai travelled to Qatar on several occasions during the year to discuss the peace process with Qatari officials. During some of these visits he may have met with Taleban representatives based in Qatar. There is also a possibility that talks took place in Oslo, Norway during the first half of the year. In June, Norway reported that they had hosted secret negotiations with the Taleban over the past few months, resulting the opening of the Doha office. The reports did not reveal whom the Taleban negotiated with, but Karzai visited Oslo in February.
In February 2014, Karzai’s spokesman said that the Afghan president had met Taleban representatives to discuss a possible peace accord. The secret negotiations reportedly began in October 2013, on the Taleban’s initiative. A spokesman for the Taleban denied the claims.
Third party involvement: YES
Third party involvement names: Pugwash, Qatar, Iran, HPC, Norway, Jan Kubis
Comment on Third Party Involvement: In January 2013 a conference on peace talks was held in Dubai, arranged by an analytical body called Pugwash. Representatives from the Afghan government, the Taleban, Hizb-I Islami-yi Afghanistan, the National Coalition and the UN participated.
Qatar hosted the Taleban office that was open for a few weeks during June-July 2013. Qatari officials met with Afghan president Karzai on several occasions to discuss the Afghan peace process.
Iran held talks with the Taleban in June 2013 in order to promote peace in Afghanistan.
The High Peace Council (HPC), set up in 2010, continued to promote peace and negotiations during 2013. Activities during the year included for example meeting with Karzai and Qatari officials in March, meeting the UN Special Representative for Afghanistan Afghanistan Jan Kubis to discuss peace and negotiations in November, and visiting Pakistan to discuss the Afghan peace process.
In June, Norway reported that they had hosted secret negotiations with the Taleban over the past few months, resulting the opening of the Doha office. The reports did not reveal whom the Taleban negotiated with, but Karzai visited Oslo in February.
Victory: NO
Terminated: NO
2014 Conflict Archive
Comment on Activity: In 2014, violence in Afghanistan reached the highest levels since the American-led invasion in 2001. The security forces suffered an increasing number of fatalities as they took on the full responsibility for security in Afghanistan. Civilian casualties also increased during 2014, and for the first time, ground battles between the Taleban and the Afghan government became the main cause of civilian deaths, not IED’s as in previous years.
The Taleban spring offensive, named Khaibar, was launched on 12 May with a suicide attack against the justice department in Jalalabad town in the eastern parts of Afghanistan. Police and government employees were killed, as well as two civilians and the three attackers. A statement from the Taleban leadership concluded that the target of this year’s offensive was going to be “the foreign invaders and their backers under various names like spies, military and civilian contractors and everyone working for them like translators, administrators and logistics personnel. Similarly the blessed ‘Khaibar’ Jihadi spring operations shall target all high ranking government officials, cabinet ministers, members of Parliament, security officials, occupation backing officers in the Interior and Foreign Ministries, attorneys and judges that prosecute Mujahideen as well as agents in the National Directorate that pursue and torture Mujahideen.”
In June 2014, the Taleban launched major assaults against several districts in Hilmand province, with Sangin district being particularly affected by the violence. It is estimated that between 800 and 1000 insurgents took part in the fighting in Hilmand. Although being able to challenge government control over the districts, the Taleban were defeated after weeks of fighting. The rebels then shifted their focus to Kunduz province in the northern parts of Agfhanistan, as well as to Nuristan in the northeast and Faryab in the northwest. In the absence of foreign troops, the insurgents have been able to mass bigger groups of fighters and are now more frequently engaging in ground battles against the Afghan security forces.
Several high profile attacks also took place in Kabul city, including the suicide attack on a Lebanese restaurant frequented by foreigners, the murder of Swedish journalist Nils Horner, a suicide attack in the Kabul police headquarters, and several attacks against Kabul international airport.
In April, the first round of the presidential elections was held. The Taleban had threatened to attack voters, polling stations and security forces guarding these stations. Although the election day was described as one of the most violent days of the year, media did not report on the violence which created an impression of calm. Abdullah Abdullah, a former Minister of Foreign Affairs, and Ashraf Ghani Ahmadzai, former Finance Minister and World Bank employee, received most votes in the first round. Since neither candidate had received more than 50 percent of the votes, a second round was planned for 14 June 2014. Both candidates accused each other of fraud, and after preliminary result showing Ghani in the lead, Abdullah supporters threatened violent action. After a US-brokered deal on 12 July to audit all of the votes, the candidates finally signed an agreement on 21 September, to create a unity government with Ghani as president and Abdullah as the newly instated position chief executive offier. The CEO answers to the president but functions as a prime minister. The agreement provided for a constitutional change to transform the CEO to become the official prime minister within two years’ time. The agreement also included the creation of a special commission to suggest reforms for the electoral system.
Ghani was inaugurated on 29 September, and on 30 September Afghanistan signed the Bilateral Security Agreement (BSA) with the US as well as a similar agreement with NATO. The agreements provided for 12000 soldiers to remain in Afghanistan after the end of ISAF in December 2014. The mandate for the new non-combat mission is to train, advise and assist Afghan forces. On 12 December the UN Security Council adopted Resolution No 2189 on the creation of Operation Resolute Support.
Most of the violence was concentrated to the Taleban strongholds in southern and eastern Afghanistan, with provinces such as Helmand, Kandahar, Nangarhar, and Ghazni, bearing the brunt of fighting. Almost all of Afghanistans 34 provinces were touched by violence in 2014, although a handful of provinces still were relatively calm.
Negotiations: YES
Comment on Negotiation: A meeting between the High Peace Council of Afghanistan and a Taliban faction took place in Dubai at the start of the year. The government of Afghanistan declared that the arrest of a former Taliban leader in the Emirates was an obstacle to the peace process, as Agha Jan Motasim, the former Taliban finance minister, would have been mediating between the Afghan Government and the Taliban leadership. In January, a person claiming to be a Taleban official anonymously said that secret talks had been ongoing since November 2013 in the United Arab Emirates. A Taleban spokesman, as well as the High Peace Council (HPC), denied the reports.
In February, a meeting was arranged in the United Arab Emirates, in which HPC, diplomats, scholars, and Taleban members participated. The Taleban group was led by Agha Jan Mutassim, the finance minister during the Taleban government. Although Mutassim claimed that several current Taleban commanders took part in the meeting, it remains unclear if he is a representative of the group. The Taleban officially stated that they had nothing to do with the meeting in Dubai.
After the new president was inaugurated in September 2014 and shortly thereafter signed a security agreement with the US and NATO, the Taleban issued a statement saying that they will not talk to the new government calling it “a slave administration to the Americans”.
However, in December new repots of talks emerged, saying that secret talks had been held between the Taleban and President Ghani under UN supervision. While the UN didn’t confirm nor reject the reports, the HPC said no talks had taken place.
In late December, the HPC said that talks would begin in Qatar within a week and during the final days of the year, a Taleban delegation visited China to hold talks on China’s role in the future peace talks. The Taleban reportedly presented a list of four proposals asking for the removal of all Taleban from the blacklist, the handover of some provinces to the Taleban, a place in Kabul and finally changes to the constitution.
No negotiations took place in the Government of Afghanistan - Hizb-i Islami-yi Afghanistan dyad in 2014 but Hizb-i Islami signaled that they are willing to talk to the new government and that they want to open a political office in Kabul. Reports that the parties had met emerged in November but they were denied by both the government and Hizb-i Islami.
In December, about 500 Taliban abandoned their weapons and joined the peace process.
Confusion was created by the existence of two fronts of mediation: one represented by China, Afghanistan and Pakistan and the other being the “6+1”, namely the USA, Russia, China, India, Pakistan, Iran and Afghanistan. China allowed the Taliban to visit their country and seemed to be the best positioned country for future negotiations under its facilitation. The new Afghan president initiated a dialogue with the insurgency in view of possible peace negotiations in Qatar.
Third party involvement: YES
Third party involvement names: United Arab Emirates, HPC, China, UN
Comment on Third Party Involvement: In February 2014 a meeting was held in Dubai. The High Peace Council (HPC) as well as a group of Taleban led by Agha Jan Mutassim participated.
China hosted a Taleban delegation in the end of December, discussing the country’s role in peace talks.
The UN and its Special Representative Jan Kubis, were involved in solving the political turmoil that followed the elections in June, and the UN also allegedly supervised secret talks between the new president Ghani and the Taleban in December. However, the talks were denied by the parties.
Victory: NO
Terminated: NO
2015 Conflict Archive
Comment on Activity: The violence in Afghanistan continued to escalate during 2015 causing well over 15000 fatalities. Indirect and informal talks between the conflict parties during the first half of the year resulted in the first, direct peace talks in early July. However, following the announcement of Mullah Omar’s death in late July, the negotiations stalled and a leadership dispute broke out within the Taleban movement. Under their new leader, Mullah Akhtar Mansour, the Taleban managed to take control of Kunduz city in late September, their biggest achievement since their forces were pushed out of Kabul in 2001. Some 12000 foreign troops remained in the country during 2015 as part of the non-combat training mission Operation Resolute Support.
Negotiations: YES
Comment on Negotiation: In late December 2014 or in early January 2015, China reportedly hosted a Taleban delegation discussing peace issues. The Taleban had four proposals for the Chinese officials to pass on to the Afghan government; the removal of all Taleban from the blacklist, the handover of some provinces in the south of Afghanistan, a place in Kabul, and changes to the constitution. No official statements were made about the visit and the Taleban denied it took place.
In early February there were rumours about a meeting between president Ghani and Taleban representatives in United Arab Emirates, but these were also rejected by the Taleban.
In March, both parties expressed hope that peace talks could start within weeks, and in April the High Peace Council suggested that indirect talks were taking place with the Taleban, and that Hizb-I Islami-yi Afghanistan was planning an official visit to Kabul for peace talks.
In early May 2015, Qatar hosted a peace conference organized by the Pugwash Council. A Taleban delegation as well as members from Hizb-i Islami, UNAMA and the High Peace Council attended the conference. However, all participants were there as individuals and not as representatives of any organization or conflict party. The two-day conference in Qatar was followed by an informal meeting between the High Peace Council and the Taleban in Urumqi, China to discuss conditions of official talks.
In early June, another round of informal talks were held in Oslo, Norway between representatives of the Afghan government and the Taleban followed by a round of peace talks hosted by United Arab Emirates and the Pugwash Council on 6-7 June. Another round of meeting took place in Norway in mid-June, and on 7 July the first direct, face-to-face, official peace talks between the conflict parties started in Murree, Pakistan with China and the US being observers. The talks resulted in an agreement to meet again in late July or early August. The Taleban also presented their demands, including the removal of Taleban leaders from the blacklist, amendments to the constitution and the withdrawal of all foreign troops from Afghanistan.
Following the announcement of Mullah Omar’s death in late July, the negotiations stalled and a leadership dispute broke out within the Taleban movement.
Third party involvement: YES
Third party involvement names: China, Qatar, Norway, Pugwash Council, Pakistan, USA
Comment on Third Party Involvement: China, United Arab Emirates, and Norway hosted informal talks during the first half of the year. Qatar hosted two peace conferences, organized by the Pugwash Council. In early July, the first direct, face-to-face, official peace talks between the the Taleban and the Afghan government started in Murree, Pakistan with China and the US being observers.
Victory: NO
Terminated: NO
2016 Conflict Archive
Comment on Activity: The violence in Afghanistan continued on a very high level during 2016 causing well over 15000 fatalities. In April, the Taleban launched their spring operation "Omari", and during the year they controlled more territory than during any other year since the US-led invasion in 2001. In May, the Taleban named a new leader, Haibatullah Akhunzada, following the death of previous leader Mullah Akhtar Mansour in a US drone strike in Pakistan. Despite efforts to revive peace talks with the Taleban in early 2016, no indirect or direct talks were reported during the year and the Taleban announced in March that they would not participate in talks until all precondtions had been met, including foreign troop withdrawal. In July the government confirmed that they had no plans to revive peace talks with the Taleban. Peace negotiations did, however, take place with Hekmatyar's Hizb-i Islami-yi Afghanistan and in September 2016, the group signed a peace agreement with the government. The deal, which granted Hekmatyar amnesty, was the first peace agreement to be concluded between the warring parties in Afghanistan since 1996. Some 13000 foreign troops remained in the country during 2016 as part of the non-combat training mission Operation Resolute Support.
Negotiations: YES
Comment on Negotiation: On 22 September 2016, a peace agreement was signed by the government of Afghanistan and Gulbuddin Hekmatyar, leader of Hizb-i Islami-yi Afghanistan, after months of negotiations.
No negotiations took place between the Taleban and the Afghan government despite efforts to revive the peace talks.
Third party involvement: YES
Third party involvement names: Quadrilateral Coordination Group (Pakistan, China, United States), High Peace Council
Comment on Third Party Involvement: The Quadrilateral Coordination Group (QCG) consisting of representatives from Afghanistan, Pakistan, United States and China, met at least five times during 2016, with the aim of reviving talks with the Taleban. Pakistan hosted the meetings in January, February, and May.
The High Peace Council facilitated the talks and subsequent signing of a peace agreement between the government of Afghanistan and Hizb-i Islami-yi Afghanistan.
Victory: NO
Terminated: NO
2017 Conflict Archive
Comment on Activity: The violence in Afghanistan continued on a very high level during 2017 causing over 16,000 fatalities. In late April, the Taleban launched their spring operation "Mansouri", and during the year they controlled more territory than during any other year since the US-led invasion in 2001. One of the most lethal events during the year was the Taleban attack on a military base near Mazari Sharif in April, killing more than 140 soldiers. Several peace conferences were held during the year, aiming to find a political settlement to the conflict in Afghanistan. However, no talks involving the warring parties were held. Some 13,000 foreign troops remained in the country during 2017 as part of the non-combat training mission Operation Resolute Support. In addition to the NATO training mission, US troops assisted the Afghan government in its fight against the Taleban. During the year, the US dropped almost 4000 bombs and missiles over Afghanistan, a three-fold increase from 2016.
Negotiations: NO
Comment on Negotiation: No formal negotiations were held even though multiple meetings were held and preparations were made for eventual talks. At the end of the year, the High Peace Council offered peace negotiations to the Taliban that could lead to them having a political office in Kabul.
Third party involvement: YES
Third party involvement names: Russia, Iran, China, Pakistan, India
Comment on Third Party Involvement: In February 2017, Russia hosted the second meeting of the Afghanistan peace conference. The aim was to find a political settlement to the conflict in Afghanistan, and to halt the expansion of IS. Representatives from Russia, India, Pakistan, China, Iran, and Afghanistan participated.
Terminated: NO
2018 Conflict Archive
Comment on Activity: The violence in Afghanistan escalated dramatically in 2018, causing almost 23,000 fatalities in fighting between against the Taleban. In late April, the Taleban launched their spring operation "al Khandaq", and during the year they controlled more territory than during any other year since the US-led invasion in 2001. Some of the most violent battles stood over Farah city and Ghazni city. The Taleban also launched offensives against previously calm districts in Ghazni province, primarily inhabited by Hazaras. Several peace conferences were held during the year, aiming to find a political settlement to the conflict in Afghanistan. No talks involving the warring parties were held, but negotiations between a US envoy and the Taleban took place on several occasions during the year, preparing for a withdrawal of foreign forces and a process towards more inclusive peace talks. In June, both the government and the Taleban announced historic ceasefires, and during three days violence dropped and Taleban were seen celebrating together with Afghan soldiers. Fighting resumed, however, and intensified ahead of the parliamentary elections on 20 October. Some 17,000 foreign troops remained in the country during 2018 as part of the non-combat training mission Operation Resolute Support. In addition to the NATO training mission, US troops assisted the Afghan government in its fight against the Taleban. In late December, US President Trump announced the withdrawal of 7,000 US troops from Afghanistan.
Negotiations: NO
Comment on Negotiation: No negotiations took place in this conflict during the year. But the context was getting way more favorable: at the beginning of the year, President Ashraf Ghani’s offered unconditional peace negotiations, including measures such as a ceasefire and prisoner exchanges. The government would recognise the Taliban as a political organisation in exchange for recognition as a legitimate government.
While the Taliban did not respond to Ghani’s offer, the president announced a ceasefire between 17 and 19 of June, to celebrate the end of Ramadan. The Taliban then answered the announcement with a promise to stop all attacks against Afghan forces for three days. It was the first ceasefire since 2001. Moreover, the US declared it had asked Pakistan for support to facilitate direct negotiations between Afghanistan and the Taliban insurgency and that multiple paths to promote peace in the country were being pursued. US diplomats also met with the Taliban directly. In November, the Taliban were said to be optimistic about the way forward with the US path but in the end declined to meet with the Afghan government in December. A path led by Russia also took form, called the "Moscow format".
Third party involvement: YES
Third party involvement names: Russia, Kazakhstan, Kyrgyzstan, Tajikistan, Uzbekistan, Iran, China
Some 39 countries also provided troops to the non-combat mission Operation Resolute Support.
Comment on Third Party Involvement: Russia hosted an international peace conference for Afghanistan in Moscow in November. Representatives from Pakistan, Kazakhstan, Kyrgyzstan, Tajikistan, Uzbekistan, Iran and China participated.
Some 39 countries also provided troops to the non-combat mission Operation Resolute Support.
Victory: NO
Terminated: NO
Type of termination: Not terminated
2019 Conflict Archive
Comment on Activity: The violence in Afghanistan continued to escalate in 2019, causing almost 29,000 fatalities in fighting against the Taleban. In April, the Taleban launched their spring operation "al-Fath", and during the year they controlled more territory than during any other year since the US-led invasion in 2001. Some of the most violent battles stood over Murghab city and Kunduz city. Several peace conferences were held during the year, aiming to find a political settlement to the conflict in Afghanistan. Negotiations between the US and the Taleban took place on several occasions during the year, preparing for a withdrawal of foreign forces and a process towards more inclusive peace talks. In August, they seemed to be close to reaching an agreement, but following an attack in Kabul in early September, which killed a US soldier, President Trump canceled the talks. In December 2019, the US-Taleban peace talks resumed. Some 16,500 foreign troops remained in the country by the end of 2019 as part of the non-combat training mission Operation Resolute Support. In addition to the NATO training mission, US troops have continued to assist the Afghan government in its fight against the Taleban.
Negotiations: NO
Comment on Negotiation: No negotiations between the warring parties took place. However, negotiations between the US and the Taleban took place on several occasions during the year, preparing for a withdrawal of foreign forces and a process towards more inclusive peace talks. In August, they seemed to be close to reaching an agreement, but following an attack in Kabul in early September, which killed a US soldier, President Trump canceled the talks. In December 2019, the US-Taleban peace talks resumed.
Third party involvement: YES
Third party involvement names: Qatar, Albania, Armenia, Australia, Austria, Azerbaijan, Belgium, Bosnia-Herzegovina, Bulgaria, Croatia, Czech Republic, Denmark, Estonia, Finland, Georgia, Germany, Greece, Hungary, Italy, Latvia, Lithuania, Luxembourg, Mongolia, Montenegro, Netherlands, New Zealand, North Macedonia, Norway, Poland, Portugal, Romania, Slovakia, Slovenia, Spain, Sweden, Turkey, Ukraine, United Kingdom, United States
Comment on Third Party Involvement: Some 16,500 foreign troops remained in the country by the end of 2019 as part of the non-combat training mission Operation Resolute Support. Troop contributing nations were: Albania, Armenia, Australia, Austria, Azerbaijan, Belgium, Bosnia-Herzegovina, Bulgaria, Croatia, Czech Republic, Denmark, Estonia, Finland, Georgia, Germany, Greece, Hungary, Italy, Latvia, Lithuania, Luxembourg, Mongolia, Montenegro, Netherlands, New Zealand, North Macedonia, Norway, Poland, Portugal, Romania, Slovakia, Slovenia, Spain, Sweden, Turkey, Ukraine, United Kingdom, and United States.
Qatar hosted peace talks between the USA and the Taleban on several occasions.
Victory: NO
Terminated: NO
2020 Conflict Archive
Comment on Activity: The intrastate armed conflict over the government between the government of Afghanistan and the Taleban has increased in intensity since 2013, and has been the bloodiest conflict in the world since 2018. UCDP recorded 29,000 battle-related deaths there in 2019. In 2020, however, fatalities decreased substantially. The main reason is the peace process, and the drastic drop in airstrikes carried out by the USA in support of Afghan forces. Following eighteen months of negotiations, the Taleban signed an agreement with USA on 29 February 2020. The ‘Agreement for Bringing Peace to Afghanistan’ provided for a complete withdrawal of foreign forces from Afghanistan, the start of intra-Afghan talks, and that the Taleban should prevent armed groups from using Afghanistan as a base for attacks against USA and its allies. During the first half of 2020, battle-related deaths dwindled and the Taleban refrained from announcing their annual spring offensive, which they have done every year since at least 2008. When intra-Afghan talks finally started in September, violence had begun to increase again, however, and in October, large-scale offensives took place in the southern provinces of Hilmand and Kandahar.
In addition to the fighting against the Taleban, the dyad between the government of Afghanistan and the High Council of Afghanistan Islamic Emirate became active for the first time in 2020. High Council of Afghanistan Islamic Emirate is an Afghan rebel group which split from the Taleban due to a leadership conflict in August 2015.
Negotiations: YES
Comment on Negotiation: Following eighteen months of negotiations, the Taleban signed an agreement with USA on 29 February 2020. The ‘Agreement for Bringing Peace to Afghanistan’ provided for a complete withdrawal of foreign forces from Afghanistan, the start of intra-Afghan talks, and that the Taleban should prevent armed groups from using Afghanistan as a base for attacks against USA and its allies. The Afghan government was not part of the negotiations, and did not sign the agreement.
Direct talks between the Government of Afghanistan and the Taleban took place in late March, but the parties claimed that they only discussed technical issues concerning a prisoner swap, and that no political matters were dealt with. Official intra-Afghan talks finally started on 12 September in Doha, Qatar, focusing on a framework for discussions. Common ground proved hard to find, and after weeks of deadlock, both parties agreed for Qatar to be a facilitator. In December, both parties revealed they had an agreement regarding the code of conduct for the negotiations and would resume them in January.
Third party involvement: YES
Third party involvement names: Albania, Armenia, Australia, Austria, Azerbaijan, Belgium, Bosnia-Herzegovina, Bulgaria, Croatia, Czech Republic, Denmark, Estonia, Finland, Georgia, Germany, Greece, Hungary, Italy, Latvia, Lithuania, Luxembourg, Mongolia, Montenegro, Netherlands, New Zealand, North Macedonia, Norway, Poland, Portugal, Romania, Slovakia, Slovenia, Spain, Sweden, Turkey, Ukraine, United Kingdom, United States, Qatar
Comment on Third Party Involvement: Albania, Armenia, Australia, Austria, Azerbaijan, Belgium, Bosnia-Herzegovina, Bulgaria, Croatia, Czech Republic, Denmark, Estonia, Finland, Georgia, Germany, Greece, Hungary, Italy, Latvia, Lithuania, Luxembourg, Mongolia, Montenegro, Netherlands, New Zealand, North Macedonia, Norway, Poland, Portugal, Romania, Slovakia, Slovenia, Spain, Sweden, Turkey, Ukraine, United Kingdom, and United States as part of the NATO mission Resolute Support
Qatar hosted peace talks starting in September 2020.
Victory: NO
Terminated: NO
Type of termination: Not terminated
2021 Conflict Archive
Comment on Activity: In April 2021, US President Biden announced that all US and NATO troops would be withdrawn from Afghanistan by 11 September 2021. In May 2021, the Taleban intensified its struggle to capture the province capitals, and following heavy escalation of fighting more territory fell to the group. On 15 August, the Taleban finally took Kabul and the ousted president Ashraf Ghani fled the country.
Following the Taleban takeover, Panjshir valley north of Kabul was the last pocket of resistance against the Taleban regime. Former vice president Amrullah Saleh, together with Ahmad Massoud (son of the legendary Mujahideen Ahmad Shah Massoud) formed the National Resistance Front of Afghanistan (NRF) to fight the Taleban regime. On 6 September 2021, the Taleban declared victory in Panjshir, but NRF claimed to continue the armed opposition from the mountains.
Negotiations: YES
Comment on Negotiation: Intra-Afghan talks took place in Doha, Qatar on several occasions during 2021. However, they failed to produce any substantive progress. The last talks before the Taleban takeover started on 12 August.
Talks between the new Taleban regime and the National Resistance Front (NRF) occurred in late August but failed to yield any results.
Third party involvement: YES
Third party involvement names: Qatar, Albania, Armenia, Australia, Austria, Azerbaijan, Belgium, Bosnia-Herzegovina, Bulgaria, Czech Republic, Denmark, Estonia, Finland, Georgia, Germany, Greece, Hungary, Italy, Latvia, Lithuania, Luxembourg, Mongolia, Netherlands, New Zealand, North Macedonia, Norway, Poland, Portugal, Romania, Slovakia, Slovenia, Spain, Sweden, Turkey, Ukraine, United Kingdom, and United States.
Comment on Third Party Involvement: NATO mission Resolute Support consisted of 9500 troops in February 2021, contributed by Albania, Armenia, Australia, Austria, Azerbaijan, Belgium, Bosnia-Herzegovina, Bulgaria, Czech Republic, Denmark, Estonia, Finland, Georgia, Germany, Greece, Hungary, Italy, Latvia, Lithuania, Luxembourg, Mongolia, Netherlands, New Zealand, North Macedonia, Norway, Poland, Portugal, Romania, Slovakia, Slovenia, Spain, Sweden, Turkey, Ukraine, United Kingdom, and United States. By September, all international troops had left the country.
Qatar hosted peace talks during 2021
Victory: YES
Victory side: b
Comment on Victory: Following months of large-scale fighting in which the Taleban took control of more and more of the country, the Taleban entered the capital Kabul on 15 August 2021 and the ousted President Ghani fled to Tajikistan.
Terminated: NO
Type of termination: Not terminated
2022 Conflict Archive
Comment on Activity: Although anti-Taleban forces, such as National Resistance Front of Afghanistan (NRF) and Afghanistan Freedom Front (AFF), continued the fight, violence decreased significantly in 2022. For the first time since 2004, the conflict did not reach the intensity level of war.
Negotiations: YES
Comment on Negotiation: A meeting reportedly took place between NRF leaders Ahmad Massoud and Ismael Khan, and the Taleban foreign minister in January 2022 in Iran. Iran mediated the talks.
Third party involvement: YES
Third party involvement names: Iran
Comment on Third Party Involvement: Iran hosted and mediated talks in Tehran in January 2022.
Victory: NO
Terminated: NO
Type of termination: Not terminated
2023 Conflict Archive
Comment on Activity: Although anti-Taleban forces, such as National Resistance Front of Afghanistan (NRF) and Afghanistan Freedom Front (AFF), continued the fight, violence decreased significantly in 2023.
Negotiations: NO
Third party involvement: NO
Victory: NO
Terminated: NO
Type of termination: Not terminated
2024 Conflict Archive
Comment on Activity: Although anti-Taleban forces, such as National Resistance Front of Afghanistan (NRF) and Afghanistan Freedom Front (AFF), continued the fight, violence decreased significantly in 2024. The only group that reached the threshold of inclusion (i.e. 25 battle-related deaths) was NRF
Negotiations: NO
Third party involvement: NO
Victory: NO
Terminated: NO
Type of termination: Not terminated
2025 Conflict Archive
Comment on Activity: Although anti-Taleban forces, such as National Resistance Front of Afghanistan (NRF) and Afghanistan Freedom Front (AFF), continued the fight, violence decreased significantly in 2025. The only group that reached the threshold of inclusion (i.e. 25 battle-related deaths) was NRF
Negotiations: NO
Third party involvement: NO
Victory: NO
Terminated: NO
Type of termination: Not terminated
