UCDP

General information

Type of Incompatibility: Territory
Comment on Type of Incompatibility: The common denominator for all rebel groups active in this conflict is that they wanted to change the status of the Somali-inhabited areas of south-eastern Ethiopia. Opinions on the size of the disputed area, what it should be called and what the new status should be differed between them, however.

The Ogaden National Liberation Front, the first rebel group to appear in the region, fought for independence for the Ogaden region, which is located in the lowlands of eastern Ethiopia. It is inhabited by a Somali population comprising many clans, the dominant one being the Ogaden, which gave the territory its name.

WSLF – in line with its sponsors in Mogadishu – claimed a large area named “Western Somalia”, incorporating primarily the Ogaden region, which is inhabited by a Somali population comprising many clans, the dominant one being the Ogaden, which gave the territory its name. Apart from Ogaden proper, Western Somalia also included adjoining areas in the Bale and Harerghe highlands, in which the Somalis were in minority. While its main backer, the regime in Mogadishu, aimed for Western Somalia to be included in Somalia proper, the movement’s apposition on this wavered over the years, alternating between full independence and autonomy within Somalia.

Also AIAI talks of “Western Somalia”, but never defines the extent of the area. The aim of the group was however for the Somali inhabited areas of Ethiopia to be incorporated into a pan-Somali, Salafist emirate.

Finally, coming full circle, ONLF aims for an independent Ogaden state with full sovereignty.
Territory: Ogaden

Date of first stated goal of incompatibility: 1963-01-01
Comment on date of first stated goals of incompatibility: Different sources set the formation of the Ogaden Liberation Front to different years, with some claiming that the group was founded in 1960, just after Somalia’s independence, and others arguing that it was only formed three years later. Nevertheless, finding statements from the group regarding its aims and goals have proven difficult, most probably due to the fact that the Ogaden region as such and the ongoing violence there did not receive much attention. However, a few things help to point in the direction of what the group was striving for.

For one, early accounts of the movement all have a similar take on the rationale behind its formation. Keesing’s reports that the group launched its rebellion after the Emperor had rejected the Ogadenis’ (the main Somali clan inhabiting the Ogaden region) demand for internal self-government, something that is also claimed in many other sources. Some analysts argue that the demands were more far-reaching, however, claiming that Ogaden Liberation Front was set up to secure independence for the Ogaden region. In any event, they all indicate that the movement’s incompatibility with the government was a territorial one. Something else that also points in the direction of the Ogaden Liberation Front fighting for territorial aspirations is the group’s very name. Third, and lastly, reports from 1963 state that the movement had established a “Liberation Government” in the region, even further pressing the importance of the territorial issue.

Since the Liberation Government is first mentioned in 1963, this is the year coded as the first stated goal of incompatibility in the conflict.

Date of first use of armed force: 1963-08-01
Comment on first use of armed force: It may very well be that the Ogaden Liberation Front used armed forces long before August 1963. Ever since Somalia gained independence in 1960 there had been both irredentist agitation and armed clashes in the Ogaden region. It is, however, unclear how organised the “armed bands” carrying out these early attacks were and no source talks about fighting carried out by the Ogaden Liberation Front until 1963.

In August 1963 it was clear that the Ogadeni rebels had launched an armed rebellion and the Ethiopian authorities stated that the situation in the Ogaden had deteriorated considerably, with sporadic fighting talking place.

Date of first battle related death: 1964-01-01
Comment on first battle related death: While it is clear that the Ogaden Liberation Front launched its rebellion in August 1963 and that there were sporadic fighting in the region through the rest of the year, there are no reports of fatalities during this period. However, on 11 January the Ethiopian Foreign Ministry stated that 15 Ethiopian policemen had been killed in attacks in the Ogden and that the army had pursued the rebels and killed around 40 of them.

Date of conflict reached 25 battle releated deaths: 1964-01-11
Comment on conflict reached 25 battle releated deaths: While it is clear that the Ogaden Liberation Front launched its rebellion in August 1963 and that there were sporadic fighting in the region through the rest of the year, there are no reports of fatalities during this period. However, on 11 January the Ethiopian Foreign Ministry stated that 15 Ethiopian policemen had been killed in attacks in the Ogden and that the army had pursued the rebels and killed around 40 of them.

Annual information

This section contains annual information systematically collected by the UCDP.

1976

Primary Parties: Government of Ethiopia - WSLF
Dimension: Internal

Estimated Fatalities
High	25
Best	25
Low	0

Numbers include fatalities for all dyads both active and inactive for this year

1977

Primary Parties: Government of Ethiopia - WSLF
Secondary Warring Parties Side A: Government of Cuba, Government of South Yemen
Secondary Warring Parties Side B: Government of Somalia
Dimension: Internationalized intrastate

Estimated Fatalities
High	1000
Best	1000
Low	0

Numbers include fatalities for all dyads both active and inactive for this year

1978

Primary Parties: Government of Ethiopia - WSLF
Secondary Warring Parties Side A: Government of Cuba, Government of South Yemen
Dimension: Internationalized intrastate

Estimated Fatalities
High	1000
Best	1000
Low	0

Numbers include fatalities for all dyads both active and inactive for this year

1979

Primary Parties: Government of Ethiopia - WSLF
Secondary Warring Parties Side A: Government of Cuba
Dimension: Internationalized intrastate

Estimated Fatalities
High	25
Best	25
Low	0

Numbers include fatalities for all dyads both active and inactive for this year

1980

Primary Parties: Government of Ethiopia - WSLF
Secondary Warring Parties Side A: Government of Cuba
Dimension: Internationalized intrastate

Estimated Fatalities
High	25
Best	25
Low	0

Numbers include fatalities for all dyads both active and inactive for this year

1981

Primary Parties: Government of Ethiopia - WSLF
Secondary Warring Parties Side A: Government of Cuba
Dimension: Internationalized intrastate

Estimated Fatalities
High	25
Best	25
Low	0

Numbers include fatalities for all dyads both active and inactive for this year

1982

Primary Parties: Government of Ethiopia - WSLF
Secondary Warring Parties Side A: Government of Cuba
Dimension: Internationalized intrastate

Estimated Fatalities
High	25
Best	25
Low	0

Numbers include fatalities for all dyads both active and inactive for this year

1983

Primary Parties: Government of Ethiopia - WSLF
Secondary Warring Parties Side A: Government of Cuba
Dimension: Internationalized intrastate

Estimated Fatalities
High	25
Best	25
Low	0

Numbers include fatalities for all dyads both active and inactive for this year

1986

Primary Parties: -
Dimension: Internal

Estimated Fatalities
High	0
Best	0
Low	0

Numbers include fatalities for all dyads both active and inactive for this year

1990

Primary Parties: -
Dimension: Internal

Estimated Fatalities
High	0
Best	0
Low	0

Numbers include fatalities for all dyads both active and inactive for this year

1992

Primary Parties: -
Dimension: Internal

Estimated Fatalities
High	0
Best	0
Low	0

Numbers include fatalities for all dyads both active and inactive for this year

1993

Primary Parties: Government of Ethiopia - AIAI
Dimension: Internal

Estimated Fatalities
High	36
Best	36
Low	36

Numbers include fatalities for all dyads both active and inactive for this year

1994

Primary Parties: Government of Ethiopia - ONLF
Dimension: Internal

Estimated Fatalities
High	51
Best	51
Low	51

Numbers include fatalities for all dyads both active and inactive for this year

1995

Primary Parties: -
Dimension: Internal

Estimated Fatalities
High	23
Best	14
Low	14

Numbers include fatalities for all dyads both active and inactive for this year

1996

Primary Parties: Government of Ethiopia - AIAI, ONLF
Dimension: Internal

Estimated Fatalities
High	481
Best	211
Low	211

Numbers include fatalities for all dyads both active and inactive for this year

1997

Primary Parties: -
Dimension: Internal

Estimated Fatalities
High	0
Best	0
Low	0

Numbers include fatalities for all dyads both active and inactive for this year

1998

Primary Parties: Government of Ethiopia - ONLF
Dimension: Internal

Estimated Fatalities
High	90
Best	25
Low	6

Numbers include fatalities for all dyads both active and inactive for this year

1999

Primary Parties: Government of Ethiopia - AIAI, ONLF
Dimension: Internal

Estimated Fatalities
High	640
Best	50
Low	50

Numbers include fatalities for all dyads both active and inactive for this year

2000

Primary Parties: Government of Ethiopia - ONLF
Dimension: Internal

Estimated Fatalities
High	855
Best	25
Low	0

Numbers include fatalities for all dyads both active and inactive for this year

2001

Primary Parties: Government of Ethiopia - ONLF
Dimension: Internal

Estimated Fatalities
High	117
Best	25
Low	25

Numbers include fatalities for all dyads both active and inactive for this year

2002

Primary Parties: Government of Ethiopia - ONLF
Dimension: Internal

Estimated Fatalities
High	637
Best	25
Low	25

Numbers include fatalities for all dyads both active and inactive for this year

2003

Primary Parties: Government of Ethiopia - ONLF
Dimension: Internal

Estimated Fatalities
High	260
Best	25
Low	25

Numbers include fatalities for all dyads both active and inactive for this year

2004

Primary Parties: Government of Ethiopia - ONLF
Dimension: Internal

Estimated Fatalities
High	525
Best	25
Low	25

Numbers include fatalities for all dyads both active and inactive for this year

2005

Primary Parties: Government of Ethiopia - ONLF
Dimension: Internal

Estimated Fatalities
High	695
Best	58
Low	58

Numbers include fatalities for all dyads both active and inactive for this year

2006

Primary Parties: Government of Ethiopia - ONLF
Dimension: Internal

Estimated Fatalities
High	818
Best	25
Low	0

Numbers include fatalities for all dyads both active and inactive for this year

2007

Primary Parties: Government of Ethiopia - ONLF
Dimension: Internal

Estimated Fatalities
High	737
Best	152
Low	152

Numbers include fatalities for all dyads both active and inactive for this year

2008

Primary Parties: Government of Ethiopia - ONLF
Dimension: Internal

Estimated Fatalities
High	416
Best	25
Low	25

Numbers include fatalities for all dyads both active and inactive for this year

2009

Primary Parties: Government of Ethiopia - ONLF
Dimension: Internal

Estimated Fatalities
High	995
Best	473
Low	473

Numbers include fatalities for all dyads both active and inactive for this year

2010

Primary Parties: Government of Ethiopia - ONLF
Dimension: Internal

Estimated Fatalities
High	1860
Best	126
Low	123

Numbers include fatalities for all dyads both active and inactive for this year

2011

Primary Parties: Government of Ethiopia - ONLF
Dimension: Internal

Estimated Fatalities
High	379
Best	25
Low	25

Numbers include fatalities for all dyads both active and inactive for this year

2012

Primary Parties: Government of Ethiopia - ONLF
Dimension: Internal

Estimated Fatalities
High	406
Best	25
Low	25

Numbers include fatalities for all dyads both active and inactive for this year

2013

Primary Parties: Government of Ethiopia - ONLF
Dimension: Internal

Estimated Fatalities
High	908
Best	52
Low	52

Numbers include fatalities for all dyads both active and inactive for this year

2014

Primary Parties: Government of Ethiopia - ONLF
Dimension: Internal

Estimated Fatalities
High	222
Best	25
Low	25

Numbers include fatalities for all dyads both active and inactive for this year

2015

Primary Parties: Government of Ethiopia - ONLF
Dimension: Internal

Estimated Fatalities
High	138
Best	25
Low	0

Numbers include fatalities for all dyads both active and inactive for this year

2016

Primary Parties: Government of Ethiopia - ONLF
Dimension: Internal

Estimated Fatalities
High	50
Best	25
Low	0

Numbers include fatalities for all dyads both active and inactive for this year

2017

Primary Parties: -
Dimension: Internal

Estimated Fatalities
High	10
Best	0
Low	0

Numbers include fatalities for all dyads both active and inactive for this year

2018

Primary Parties: -
Dimension: Internal

Estimated Fatalities
High	11
Best	0
Low	0

Numbers include fatalities for all dyads both active and inactive for this year

Peace agreements

Name of peace agreement: Joint Declaration Between the Federal Democratic Republic of Ethiopia And The Ogaden National Liberation Front
Date when warring parties signed the agreement: 2018-10-21
Comment of peace agreement: Peace process agreement

The Government of Ethiopia and ONLF agreed to end hostilities towards each other.

The parties agreed that the ONLF shall pursue its political objectives through peaceful means, with assurances that the FDRE will respect and uphold the provisions of its Constitution.

The parties also agreed to establish a joint committee to further discuss substantive issues pertaining to the root causes of the conflict in the region.
Signatories: The agreement between the FDRE and ONLF was signed by Dr. Workneh Gebeyehu, Minister of Foreign Affairs, on the Ethiopian side and by Admiral Mohammed-Omar Osman, Chairman of ONLF.
Comment of signatories: Comprehensive peace agreement The parties signed the peace agreement in Asmara, Eritrea, on 21 October 2018. The government delegation included the Ethiopian Minister of Finance, H.E. Ahmed Shide and the President of Somali Regional State, H.E. Mustafa Muhumed Omer. The ONLF delegation included Secretary General, Hon. Abdirahman Mahdi, Foreign Secretary, Hon. Ahmed Yassin Abdi and Finance Secretary, Hon. Ibado Herse Hassan.

Full-text peace agreement

2019

Primary Parties: -
Dimension: Internal

Estimated Fatalities
High	0
Best	0
Low	0

Numbers include fatalities for all dyads both active and inactive for this year

2024

Primary Parties: -
Dimension: Internal

Estimated Fatalities
High	0
Best	0
Low	0

Numbers include fatalities for all dyads both active and inactive for this year

2025

Primary Parties: -
Dimension: Internal

Estimated Fatalities
High	0
Best	0
Low	0

Numbers include fatalities for all dyads both active and inactive for this year

Conflict Archive

This section contains annual information no longer systematically collected by the UCDP.

1976 Conflict Archive

Comment on Activity: While WSLF launched its armed struggle in late 1975, it wa1976s not until in 1976 that fighting escalated to such a level that the 25 battle-related deaths threshold was crossed, whereby the conflict was coded as active. Receiving substantial material support from the Somali government, the group also had a number of rear bases in the country, the main one located in Hargeisa. From these bases the rebels infiltrated across the border into Ethiopia, where they carried out guerrilla raids, targeting the state apparatus in the region; government offices were destroyed and the police was attacked.
Negotiations: NO
Comment on Negotiation: There were no negotiations between the government and WSLF in 1976.

Third party involvement: NO
Third party involvement names: .
Comment on Third Party Involvement: There was no third party involvement in the conflict in 1976.

Victory: NO

Terminated: NO

1977 Conflict Archive

Comment on Activity: WSLF’s capacity had improved during 1976 and this process continued in early 1977, with attacks becoming both more frequent and effective. The rebels attacked army convoys, police stations and even fixed army positions and with the large popular support that they enjoyed, they were able to melt back into populace after each attack. This eventually led to the Ethiopian army largely being confined to garrison towns in the region, with WSLF controlling as much as 60 per cent of the countryside.

The main reason for WSLF’s increasing effectiveness was the large-scale support that it received from Somalia. With all this support, Mogadishu expected results. However, by early 1977 it was becoming clear that the WSLF’s progress was too slow for Somalia’s liking and Siad Barre subsequently sent in around 3000 Somali soldiers to fight alongside the rebels, thus providing what is termed secondary warring support by UCDP. Even this did not improve the situation, however, as the Somali soldiers entered Ethiopia disguised as rebels, having removed their uniforms and heavy equipment, and were thus obliged to resort to guerrilla warfare, in which they were not trained. In July Somalia subsequently decided to cut its losses and opted for a regular invasion, aiming for the Ogaden region to be included into a so-called “Greater Somalia” (see the section on the Ethiopia – Somalia conflict). During the rest of the year, two parallel conflicts raged in the region; the interstate one pitching Ethiopia against Somalia, and the intrastate one, in which WSLF continued to fight the Addis Ababa regime. In practice these two conflicts played out as one, as Somalia and WSLF coordinated their armed struggle and the latter more or less functioned as the former’s ancillaries.

The Somali and WSLF troops were initially successful, managing to push the Ethiopian troops out of Ogaden in only a few days. By mid-September they also succeeded in capturing Jijiga, after a couple of weeks of bloody battles. However, by late September the tide began to turn, with the Somali advance coming to a virtual standstill. This was mainly due to overextended fronts, bad weather and the harsh climate in the region. The rest of the year was characterized by a military stalemate, which neither side was able to break.
Negotiations: NO
Comment on Negotiation: As the intrastate conflict between WSLF and the Addis Ababa regime became entangled with the interstate war between Ethiopia and Somalia, it came into the international limelight for the first time. The Somali invasion led the OAU (Organisation of African Unity) to call into session its eight-nation mediation committee set up in 1973 to arbitrate in the Ethiopian-Somali border dispute. The committee subsequently met in Libreville on 5-9 August, joined by the Ethiopian and Somali Foreign Ministers. However, these talks came to an end when Somalia demanded that WSLF be included in the dialogue. Ethiopia staunchly refused, holding that WSLF was “a farce” and “financed, controlled and staffed by the regular Somali Army”.

In September WSLF secretary-general Abdulahi Hassan Mahmoud stated that he was not prepared to engage in ceasefire negotiations with Ethiopia until every “inch” of the land the group claimed had been “liberated”.

Third party involvement: NO
Third party involvement names: .
Comment on Third Party Involvement: Some third party actions were taken in the interstate war between Ethiopia and Somalia, in which the intrastate conflict between WSLF and Addis Ababa had become intrinsically entangled. However, while Somalia attempted to bring the intrastate conflict into these proceedings, this failed and no third party interventions were made in this conflict.

Victory: NO

Terminated: NO

1978 Conflict Archive

Comment on Activity: In late January 1978, Ethiopia launched its counter-offensive, planned together with Russian and Cuban officers. The Ethiopian army quickly pushed the Somali and WSLF troops eastwards and on 5 March Jijiga was re-captured. After this the Somali defeat was imminent. Somali President Siad Barre on 8 March announced the unilateral withdrawal of the Somali troops and on 23 March Addis Ababa declared that the last frontier post had been regained and that the war was officially over. However, for the WSLF fighters this was not the case. After retreating from Jijiga, WSLF officials stated that that their war would still continue with them returning to guerrilla warfare, operating to cut the communication of Ethiopia’s forces. Over the next few months, this was exactly what the rebels did, with Mogadisho radio broadcasting announcements of a range of operations. While it is very probable that the Ethiopian casualty figures given in these announcements were grossly exaggerated it is clear that WSLF constituted a real problem for Addis Ababa, with the latter threatening to invade Somalia unless Mogadishu withdrew its support to the rebels.

As the year passed, WSLF activity increased and according to journalists travelling in the area, 90 per cent of the lowlands were in rebel hands and the army was largely confined to the towns, the main roads and the air.
Negotiations: NO
Comment on Negotiation: There were no negotiations between the Ethiopian government and WSLF in 1978. At a news conference in Kuwait on 31 July 1978, the defense chief of WSLF said that the front rejected the principle of negotiations “Because Ethiopia uses the language of force”.

Third party involvement: NO
Third party involvement names: .
Comment on Third Party Involvement: There was no third party intervention in the conflict in 1978.

Victory: NO

Terminated: NO

1979 Conflict Archive

Comment on Activity: WSLF continued to pose a serious challenge to the regime in Addis Ababa in 1979. As during the previous year, the group controlled a majority of the lowland territories while the army was confined to the towns. According to international relief officers working in the region, the Ethiopian army’s response to the rebels’ military operations was a systematic campaign of terror and violence against the civilian population. These sweeps and patrols succeeded in temporarily reducing the rebels’ activities, but failed to weaken them in the long run.

In late 1979 the government changed its counterinsurgency strategy, adopting a four-pronged approach whereby much of the population was forced into shelters and so-called protected villages and the military launched offensives that targeted all people and economic assets remaining outside these shelters. Furthermore, Addis Ababa began sponsoring Somali insurgent groups against both WSLF and the Somali government and also worked to promote the repatriation of refugees.
Comment on Yearly Battle Related Deaths: Almost all fatality figures reported came from the rebel side in the conflict - a clearly biased source. However, a Reuters journalist travelling in the area reported of a three-day battle near Degehabur September, in which around 400 Ethiopians were killed. He said that some 500 WSLF fighters had waited in ambush for two days for a convoy protected by 1500 infantrymen, taking supplies from Degehabur to Kebridehar. The correspondent said that WSLF losses in the battle were 9 dead.
Negotiations: NO
Comment on Negotiation: A violent event in 1979 indicated that the Ethiopian regime for the first time had attempted to open a dialogue with the rebels. Indicating a willingness to negotiate a ceasefire with WSLF, the government accepted an invitation from the rebels for a meeting. The military governor of Harar designated a 10-man delegation to meet them. Instead of initiating talks, the team fell into a trap, however, with a concealed WSLF force attacking the visitors and killing seven members of the delegation and capturing the remaining three. It had apparently been the rebel’s aim all along to take hostages to use in future ventures.

Third party involvement: NO
Third party involvement names: .
Comment on Third Party Involvement: There was no third party intervention in the conflict in 1979.

Victory: NO

Terminated: NO

1980 Conflict Archive

Comment on Activity: In 1980, the Ethiopian government continued to pursue the counterinsurgency strategy that had been launched in late 1979. The civilian population was forced into so-called protected villages so as to deprive the rebels of their support and massive armed force was used in order to break and destroy the WSLF militarily. The rebel group had rear bases where they previously had been safe from Addis Ababa’s attacks, but also this changed with the new counterinsurgency strategy, since it entailed supporting Somali rebel groups, whereby they acted as proxies for the Ethiopian regime inside Somalia. All this served to drastically weaken WSLF.

In August a large-scale military offensive was launched by the Ethiopian government, aided by the Cuban mechanized brigade. Named “Operation Lash”, the offensive had by year’s end succeeded in pushing the rebels out of Ethiopia and into northern Somalia. The relative ease with which this was achieved is explained by a reputable source to be due to internal tensions within WSLF. The rebel group was made up of nine divisions, representing different clans, and these were fiercely competitive. This meant that when they were attacked by government forces they were often reluctant to aid one another.
Negotiations: NO
Comment on Negotiation: There were no negotiations between the government and WSLF in 1980.

Third party involvement: NO
Third party involvement names: .
Comment on Third Party Involvement: There was no third party intervention in the conflict in 1980.

Victory: NO

Terminated: NO

1981 Conflict Archive

Comment on Activity: After the heavy blows that WSLF had been dealt in 1980, 1981 continued in a similar fashion. Having been pushed out if the Ogaden region by late 1980, the rebels were during the year only able to make brief incursions across the border to carry out guerilla attacks. Also putting a strain on the rebel group were increasing attacks by SNM (Somali National Movement) – a Somali rebel groups that Ethiopia supported and that functioned as a proxy for the Addis Ababa regime.

The group also suffered from political differences with its main supporter – the regime in Mogadishu – which weakened it substantially. This was tied to the internal differences that racked the group, with its long-time leaders being challenged by young radicals who wanted to distance the movement from Somalia, aiming for what they called “true self-determination”. A conference was convened and the veteran Central Committee led by Abdullahi Hassan Mahmoud and his deputy, Abdi Nasir was overwhelmingly defeated. A new executive was elected with a “progressive”, Mohammed Diriyeh Urdoch, as secretary-general. Furthermore, central committee membership was increased from 25 to 50.
Negotiations: NO
Comment on Negotiation: There were no negotiations between the government and WSLF in 1981.

Third party involvement: NO
Third party involvement names: .
Comment on Third Party Involvement: There was no third party intervention in the conflict in 1981.

Victory: NO

Terminated: NO

1982 Conflict Archive

Comment on Activity: While WSLF had been substantially weakened during the past two years, the group still managed to conduct intermittent guerrilla operations from across the border in 1982. These largely consisted of hit-and-run attacks and night raids, and they were matched by search-and-pursuit operations by the Ethiopian army, in combination with heavy reprisals against the civilian population in villages in the vicinity of the rebel attacks.

Apart from being pursued by the army, WSLF was also involved in a conflict with the Addis Ababa – supported Somali rebel group SNM (Somali National Movement), serving as a proxy for Ethiopia. Clashes between WSLF and SNM were intense during 1982, which was one of the reason for the former’s low-key presence inside Ogaden.
Negotiations: NO
Comment on Negotiation: During the year, WSLF proposed two points “for solving the Western Somali issue”: First that Ethiopia should “recognize the WSLF as the legitimate and sole representative of the Western Somali people and second, that the Western Somali people should be allowed to run their own affairs without any preconditions, and, at the same time, that all foreign powers be withdrawn from Western Somali territory.” However, no negotiations were initiated.

Third party involvement: NO
Third party involvement names: .
Comment on Third Party Involvement: There was no third party intervention in 1982.

Victory: NO

Terminated: NO

1983 Conflict Archive

Comment on Activity: In 1983 conflict activity continued to be made up largely by intermittent guerrilla operations carried out by rebels temporarily infiltrating across the border from Somalia. There were a few exceptions however. WSLF managed to carry out some dramatic raids such as storming the prison in Jijiga in August. In reprisal for that action, the Ethiopian army destroyed the villages of Birgot, Midha and Burey and killed 300 civilians. By and large, WSLF more and more began to resemble a spent force, however.

Furthermore, the rebel group continued to be racked by internal problems. A sign of this was a decision taken on 4 December 1983 to postpone the annual congress of the WSLF, which was due to be held on 1 January 1984, until 1 January 1985.
Negotiations: NO

Third party involvement: NO
Comment on Third Party Involvement: There was no third party intervention in 1983.

Victory: NO

Terminated: YES
Type of termination: No or Low Activity
Date of termination: 1983-12-31
Comment on Termination: By late 1983 a combination of military pressure by Ethiopia and its allies SNM (Somali National Movement) and internal differences had served to weaken WSLF to the point that it was no longer a military threat to the Addis Ababa regime. Subsequently, in 1984 armed activity did not cross the 25 battle-related deaths threshold required for a conflict to be recorded as active in UCDP data.
Comment on Termination Date: By late 1983 a combination of military pressure by Ethiopia and its allies SNM (Somali National Movement) and internal differences had served to weaken WSLF to the point that it was no longer a military threat to the Addis Ababa regime. Subsequently, in 1984 armed activity did not cross the 25 battle-related deaths threshold required for a conflict to be recorded as active in UCDP data.

1986 Conflict Archive

Terminated: NO

1990 Conflict Archive

Terminated: NO

1992 Conflict Archive

Terminated: NO

1993 Conflict Archive

Comment on Activity: In 1993 the conflict fought over the Ogaden region became active for the first time in ten years. Much had changed since 1983; WSLF, the rebel group fighting for independence in the 1970s and 1980s had virtually disintegrated and did not maintain any significant military force any longer; the regimes in both Addis Ababa and Mogadishu had been toppled and in Ethiopia a so-called ethnic federation was being established.

Processes in both Ethiopia’s Ogaden region and in Somalia led to the renewed outbreak of violence in 1993. In Somalia, the Islamic movement AIAI (Al-Itahad al-Islami) had emerged in the 1980s, aiming to spread political Islam and establish a pan-Somali, Salafist emirate. With the opening up of the political space in Ethiopia after the fall of the Derg regime in 1991, an Ethiopian branch of AIAI, al-Itihaad al-Islaami ee Soomaaliya Galbeed (the Islamic Union of Western Somalia), present in the country since 1990, was registered as an official political party and its members were granted the right to campaign and express their views in the media. However, in parallel, the group continued to build up its military wing, convinced that its ultimate goal of liberating the Muslim population of the Ogaden region from what they viewed as a Christian, highland oppressor, could only be achieved by force. Training camps were set up across the region and military instructors from al-Qaida were brought in for assistance.

In late 1992, the Ethiopian wing of AIAI was joined by a large group of Somali AIAI fighters. The mother movement had left its main base at Laas Qoray and split into several groups, one of which crossed the border into Ethiopia, and another establishing a large presence in the Somali Gedo region, near the Ethiopian border.

During the year AIAI escalated its guerrilla activities and the Ethiopian government responded in kind, by stepping up ground and air attacks on the rebels along the Somali border. Furthermore, the group also claimed responsible for bombings and assassination attempts.
Negotiations: NO
Comment on Negotiation: There were no negotiations between AIAI and the Ethiopian government in 1993.

Third party involvement: NO
Third party involvement names: .
Comment on Third Party Involvement: There was no third party intervention in the conflict in 1993.

Victory: NO

Terminated: NO

1994 Conflict Archive

Negotiations: YES
Comment on Negotiation: In December AIAI agreed to meet with both ONLF, the Ogadeni political party in power in the region, and the transitional government. The parties subsequently met in Kebridehar, with AIAI represented by Deputy Chairman Abdillahi Omar. The government’s main demand was that the rebels disavow all ties with the movement in Somalia, but the group was reported to maintain that they had no relationship with the Somali branch. Also disarmament was discussed, but no progress was made since the AIAI delegation refused to hand over their weapons to anybody but clan elders.

Third party involvement: NO
Third party involvement names: .
Comment on Third Party Involvement: There was no third party intervention in the conflict in 1994.

Victory: NO

Terminated: YES
Type of termination: No or Low Activity
Date of termination: 1994-12-31

1995 Conflict Archive

Comment on Activity: After the negotiations between AIAI and the government had broken down in March intermittent fighting resumed. The intensity was low, however, and it did not cross the 25 battle-related deaths threshold.
Negotiations: YES
Comment on Negotiation: Negotiations, launched in December between AIAI and ONLF, the Ogadeni political party in power in the region, and the transitional government continued in the first three months of the year. As in 1994, the parties failed to get beyond the issues of the rebel group’s relationship with the Somali AIAI and disarmament. Subsequently, in March the talks broke down.

Third party involvement: NO
Third party involvement names: .
Comment on Third Party Involvement: There was no third party intervention in the conflict in 1995.

Victory: NO

Terminated: NO

1996 Conflict Archive

Comment on Activity: Conflict activity in the Ogaden region resumed in 1996, with AIAI again becoming active, and a new group – ONLF – appearing for the first time.

ONLF was a separatist group based among the Ogaden clan, which had been formed in 1984 but failed to make a mark as a fighting force during the last year of the conflict against the Derg regime. With the ousting of the regime in 1991 the main Ethiopian rebel group EPRDF (Ethiopian People’s Revolutionary Democratic Front) came to control the transitional council ruling the country. ONLF, having lost its main backer when President Barre in Somali was ousted, decided to take the offer of prospective regional autonomy offered by the new regime, even though the ultimate goal remained independence. The group subsequently received one seat in the council and was thus part of the government from 1991.

When the first local and regional elections were held in 1992 ONLF won with a wide margin and its inexperienced officers took over the newly named “Somali” region’s administration. Coexisting uneasily through 1992 and 1993, the relationship between ONLF and the central government broke down in February 1994, after regional parliamentarians voted to exercise the right of self-determination, enshrined in the national charter. ONLF official Abdulrahim Osman Hassen elaborated, saying that the region had "neither the same culture, nor the same history, nor even the same religion as Ethiopia" and that it had been "colonized since 1905". After this move the situation in the Somali region became increasingly chaotic. It was not until early in 1995 that a faction of ONLF decidedly left the political life – and regional government – and focused on an armed struggle, however. By 1996 this group had become effective to the extent that it could make a military impact, launching guerrilla operations in the Ogaden region.

Also AIAI became active again, after two years of low activity. During the year the group claimed responsibility for a number of bombings and assassination attempts in Ethiopia. Abdulkadir Mohamud Dhaqane, AIAI’s spokesman in Mogadishu, at a press conference, stated that the group would continue attacking senior Ethiopian officials and pursue its guerrilla attacks in the Ogaden until the region became independent. Apart from stepping up military operations in Ogaden, the Ethiopian government in August responded by launching a military assault on the Somali AIAI branch’s main base area in Gedo region. In heavy fighting the group’s main base at Luuq was destroyed. Further fighting was announced in Dolow, Somalia, in September, and again in December.
Negotiations: NO
Comment on Negotiation: There were no negotiations in the conflict in 1996.

Third party involvement: NO
Comment on Third Party Involvement: There was no third party intervention in the conflict in 1996.

Victory: NO

Terminated: YES
Type of termination: No or Low Activity
Date of termination: 1996-12-31
Comment on Termination: There were no reports of armed activity by either AIAI or ONLF in 1997, wherefore the conflict is coded as terminated by low activity by 31 December 1996.
Comment on Termination Date: There were no reports of armed activity by either AIAI or ONLF in 1997, wherefore the conflict is coded as terminated by low activity by 31 December 1996.

1997 Conflict Archive

Negotiations: NO

Third party involvement: NO

Victory: NO

Terminated: NO

1998 Conflict Archive

Comment on Activity: 1998 saw an increase in ONLF activity. This was largely due to military support forthcoming from Eritrea. With the eruption of an interstate conflict between Ethiopia and Eritrea in May, Asmara’s policy towards the rebels fighting against Addis Ababa changed substantially. Eritrea subsequently started providing support to among other groups ONLF as a part of its military strategy in the interstate conflict. This was done so that Addis Ababa would be forced to redeploy some of its troops from the northern border to the south.
Comment on Yearly Battle Related Deaths: Independent information on the fighting is scarce, and the majority of the concrete figures available are those given by ONLF. However, as independent reports focusing on other issues oftentimes unconsciously corroborates information given in ONLF statements (e.g. on attacks on civilians and cross-border activities), the figures are deemed as sufficiently reliable and the conflict is thus coded as active (i.e. having incurred at least 25 battle-related deaths) in 1998.
Negotiations: NO
Comment on Negotiation: There were no negotiations in the conflict in 1998.

Third party involvement: NO
Third party involvement names: .
Comment on Third Party Involvement: There was no third party intervention in the conflict in 1998.

Victory: NO

Terminated: NO

1999 Conflict Archive

Comment on Activity: The conflict fought over the status of the Ogaden region continued in 1999, with both ONLF and AIAI carrying out armed operations.

ONLF’s military activities continued on a relatively high scale in 1999. As in 1998, this was made possible by military support from Eritrea, which simultaneously was fighting Addis Ababa in a bloody interstate war (see the Eritrea – Ethiopia section in the database). The policy of supporting rebels fighting against the Ethiopian regime was based on the idea that this would force Addis Ababa to redeploy some of its troops from the northern border to the south.

In 1999 ONLF carried out a number of joint attacks with fellow rebel group OLF (Oromo Liberation Front), fighting for independence for the Oromiya region. Furthermore, apart from fighting inside Ethiopia, there were reports of Ethiopian troops crossing the border and attacking joint ONLF-AIAI camps in Somalia.

During the year the conflict between the Ethiopian government and AIAI became active again after two years of low activity. Intermittent fighting was reported from inside Ethiopia, and, as mentioned above, AIAI camps in Somalia were also the arena for fighting.
Comment on Yearly Battle Related Deaths: Independent information on the fighting is scarce, and the majority of the concrete figures available are those given by the rebels. However, as independent reports focusing on other issues oftentimes unconsciously corroborates information given in rebel statements (e.g. on attacks on civilians and cross-border activities), the figures are deemed as sufficiently reliable and the conflict is thus coded as active (i.e. having incurred at least 25 battle-related deaths in each dyad) in 1999.
Negotiations: NO
Comment on Negotiation: There were no negotiations in the conflict in 1999.

Third party involvement: NO
Third party involvement names: .
Comment on Third Party Involvement: There was no third party intervention in the conflict in 1999.

Victory: NO

Terminated: NO

2000 Conflict Archive

Third party involvement: NO
Third party involvement names: .
Comment on Third Party Involvement: There was no third party intervention in the conflict in 2000.

Victory: NO

Terminated: NO

2001 Conflict Archive

Comment on Activity: Apart from hit-and-run operations on troop movements in the Ogaden region, ONLF also launched attacks on military barracks and arms depots in 2001.
Comment on Yearly Battle Related Deaths: Independent information on the fighting is scarce, and the majority of the concrete figures available are those given by ONLF. However, as independent reports focusing on other issues oftentimes unconsciously corroborates information given in ONLF statements (e.g. on attacks on civilians and cross-border activities), the figures are deemed as sufficiently reliable and the conflict is thus coded as active (i.e. having incurred at least 25 battle-related deaths) in 2001.
Negotiations: NO
Comment on Negotiation: There were no negotiations in the conflict in 2001.

Third party involvement: NO
Third party involvement names: .
Comment on Third Party Involvement: There was no third party intervention in the conflict in 2001.

Victory: NO

Terminated: NO

2002 Conflict Archive

Comment on Activity: ONLF continued to launch intermittent attacks in the Ogaden region in 2002. During the first half of the year a lot of fighting took place in the area between Degehabur and Degemedo.
Comment on Yearly Battle Related Deaths: Independent information on the fighting is scarce, and the majority of the concrete figures available are those given by ONLF. However, as independent reports focusing on other issues oftentimes unconsciously corroborates information given in ONLF statements (e.g. on attacks on civilians and cross-border activities), the figures are deemed as sufficiently reliable and the conflict is thus coded as active (i.e. having incurred at least 25 battle-related deaths) in 2002.
Negotiations: NO
Comment on Negotiation: There were no negotiations in the conflict in 2002.

Third party involvement: NO
Third party involvement names: .
Comment on Third Party Involvement: There was no third party intervention in the conflict in 2002.

Victory: NO

Terminated: NO

2003 Conflict Archive

Comment on Activity: The conflict between the Ethiopian government and ONLF continued in 2003, characterized by intermittent fighting in the Ogaden region.

During the year it became clear that Eritrea was still supporting the Ogaden rebels, providing training and weapons, as some 34 ONLF fighters were arrested in Hargeisa, when seeking to infiltrate from Eritrea into Ethiopia’s Somali region via Somaliland. The arrest prompted ONLF’s leadership to call for Ogadenis to attack Somalilanders (i.e. Issaq) living in the Ogaden region, leading to an increase in violence between the two clans over the following year.
Comment on Yearly Battle Related Deaths: Independent information on the fighting is scarce, and the majority of the concrete figures available are those given by ONLF. However, as independent reports focusing on other issues oftentimes unconsciously corroborates information given in ONLF statements (e.g. on attacks on civilians and cross-border activities), the figures are deemed as sufficiently reliable and the conflict is thus coded as active (i.e. having incurred at least 25 battle-related deaths) in 2003.
Negotiations: NO
Comment on Negotiation: There were no negotiations in the conflict in 2003.

Third party involvement: NO
Third party involvement names: .
Comment on Third Party Involvement: There was no third party intervention in the conflict in 2003.

Victory: NO

Terminated: NO

2004 Conflict Archive

Comment on Activity: ONLF continued its armed struggle in 2000, carrying out hit-and-run attacks against the Ethiopian army throughout the Ogaden region.
Comment on Yearly Battle Related Deaths: Independent information on the fighting is scarce, and the majority of the concrete figures available are those given by ONLF. However, as independent reports focusing on other issues oftentimes unconsciously corroborates information given in ONLF statements (e.g. on attacks on civilians and cross-border activities), the figures are deemed as sufficiently reliable and the conflict is thus coded as active (i.e. having incurred at least 25 battle-related deaths) in 2004.
Negotiations: YES
Comment on Negotiation: In June representatives of ONLF held talks with the Ethiopian government in both Nairobi and London. The London talks were held between ONLF secretary-general, Muhammad Sirad Dolal and officials from the Ethiopian embassy, whereas the Nairobi talks involved ONLF chairman, Muhammad Umar Usman and an official from the Ethiopian Foreign Affairs Ministry. Very little concerning the proceedings are known, but it seems as if the negotiations touched upon issues basic to the conflict, since report emerging talked of political positions having been offered to the ONLF leadership on the condition that the group be disbanded.

Third party involvement: YES
Third party involvement names: United Kingdom, Kenya
Comment on Third Party Involvement: Kenya and the United Kingdom provided good office hosting talks in June.

Victory: NO

Terminated: NO

2005 Conflict Archive

Comment on Activity: The Ogaden region saw increasing insecurity during the first months of the year. Apart from intermittent ONLF hit-and-run attacks on government targets, some 300 rebels crossed into Ethiopia from Somalia in April. When they were detected by the army, fighting erupted and 30 rebel fighters were captured. The general insecurity in the region prompted the government to postpone parliamentary elections there from May to August.
Comment on Yearly Battle Related Deaths: Generally, in most years, independent information on the fighting is scarce, and the majority of the concrete figures available are those given by ONLF. However, in 2005 there were some eye witness accounts of battles and fatalities, as well as some own admitted losses, wherefore the best estimate could be more precise than > 25 (which is what is coded most other years).
Negotiations: NO
Comment on Negotiation: In mid-2005 a window of opportunity opened up for negotiations in the conflict. Due to insecurity in the Ogaden region, parliamentary elections had to be postponed from May to August. When the results from the rest of the country yielded surprisingly strong support for the opposition, it became evident that the result in the August Ogaden elections could tip the balance in favour of either the government or the opposition. Thus, aiming to seal an alliance with ONLF in order to stay in power, President Meles in July publicly expressed his willingness to talk to the rebels. Even though the rebels answered favourably, no talks had begun when the government won a number of disputed regions where the voting was re-cast, thus winning the overall majority in parliament. After this victory, there was no more talk of negotiations during the rest of the year.

Third party involvement: NO
Third party involvement names: .
Comment on Third Party Involvement: There was no third party intervention in the conflict in 2005.

Victory: NO

Terminated: NO

2006 Conflict Archive

Comment on Activity: The armed conflict between the Ethiopian government and ONLF continued in 2006. In fact, the year saw a military build-up in Ogaden, when reportedly thousands of government troops were deployed in the region beginning in May. The deployment may have been in response to ONLF statements in the world media in April, warning off international oil firms, including Gail India Limited, the Gujarat State Petroleum Corporation Limited of India, from exploring oil and gas in the region. Many military personnel were directed to areas where exploration had been discussed and the troop deployment coincided with a seismic survey in the region in the following month by Chinese oil firm Zhongyuan Petroleum Exploration Bureau (ZPEB) and Malaysian oil giant Petronas. With the increased troop presence came more frequent clashes with the rebels.

Another reason for Addis Ababa’s heightened military activity in Ogaden in 2006 was to secure the long porous border that the region shares with Somalia and thus to counter what was perceived as a threat by the Supreme Islamic Council of Somalia (see Somalia section). The Ethiopian government has supported the embattled transitional government in Somalia, led by Ethiopian close ally Abdullahi Yusuf, and were alarmed by the rise of the Islamic courts and their militia. Not wanting an Islamic state for its south-eastern neighbour, and worrying about the Pan-Somali nationalism used by the courts, which resonates deeply in some parts of the Ogaden region, Addis Ababa eventually openly sent in troops to Somalia, that by the end of the year had helped rout the militias. There were persistent rumours saying that ONLF rebels fought alongside the Islamists by the end of the year, but they remain uncorroborated and denied by ONLF leader Mr Dolaal.

The year saw some interesting political developments: in May ONLF, together with fellow rebel groups Oromo Liberation Front (OLF), Ethiopian Peoples Patriotic Front (EPPF), Sidama Liberation Front (SLF) and the political opposition party Coalition for Unity and Democracy (CUD) formed the Alliance for Freedom and Democracy (AFD). The ultimate aim of the new alliance was stated to be to establish a just, representative and a genuine democratic process through the convening of an all-inclusive conference where the countrys problems will be discussed and resolved.
Comment on Yearly Battle Related Deaths: Independent information on the fighting is scarce, and the majority of the concrete figures available are those given by ONLF. However, as independent reports focusing on other issues oftentimes unconsciously corroborates information given in ONLF statements (e.g. on attacks on civilians and cross-border activities), the figures are deemed as sufficiently reliable and the conflict is thus coded as active (i.e. having incurred at least 25 battle-related deaths) in 2006.
Negotiations: NO
Comment on Negotiation: In May, the group stated that they were prepared to engage in direct talks with the Ethiopian regime in a neutral country, on the condition that an internationally recognized entity would serve as a mediator and that there would be no preconditions placed on the talks by either side.

In mid-2006 an attempt was made to initiate talks, when Prime-Minister Meles sent Ogadenni elders to meet representatives of the ONLF in the USA and Europe. However, the attempt failed and Meles ordered military sweeps against the rebels, stating that the elders had requested it. The ONLFs Admiral Mohammed Omar Osman responded by saying that the government had sent mediators who were biased and that the current crackdown was "nothing new".

Third party involvement: YES
Third party involvement names: Somali elders
Comment on Third Party Involvement: Somali elders went to meet rebel representatives in the USA and Europe in an attempt to initiate negotiations. The attempt, which endorsed by Ethiopian Prime Minister Meles Zenawi, was not recieved well by ONLF and the leadership announced that the mediators had been biased.

Victory: NO

Terminated: NO

2007 Conflict Archive

Comment on Activity: The conflict in Ogaden escalated in 2007 and came into the limelight for the first time in many years. As a result of the conflict in Somalia, the Ethiopian Somali region (which is the official name for Oganden) grew increasingly insecure from the beginning of the year. With arms entering the region ONLF became more active and in late April the group stormed a Chinese-run oil field in Abole locality, Degehabour Zone, killing 74 people. This led to a major increase in counter-insurgency operations by the Ethiopian National Defence Force (ENDF) and in July a major military campaign was initiated, with large part of Somali regional state being cut off from the outer world. In late July 2007 the Ethiopian government ejected the ICRC from Somali region, announcing that the organisation had sided with the opposition forces and a few weeks later MSF were also forced to leave due to the security situation. They have not been allowed to return. While independent coverage of events in the region is thus largely lacking, some reports have emerged, indicating that gross human rights abuses are taking place, mainly carried out by the government forces.
Comment on Yearly Battle Related Deaths: With the attack on the Chinese oil workers, coverage of the conflict in Ogaden increased in 2007. Thus, unlike in earlier years there were some independent information on the 2007 fighting. However, as most figures were still given in ONLF statements, the gap between the best and the high estimate continues to be great.
Negotiations: NO
Comment on Negotiation: There were no negotiations in 2007.

Third party involvement: NO
Third party involvement names: .
Comment on Third Party Involvement: There was no third party intervention in 2007.

Victory: NO

Terminated: NO

2008 Conflict Archive

Comment on Activity: The conflict between the Ethiopian government and the ONLF continued in 2008, albeit on a lower scale than in the previous year. As in 2007 the region remained closed to organisations intending to investigate the human right situation and independent coverage of events in the region was thus largely lacking. However, some reports have emerged, indicating that gross human rights abuses were taking place, mainly carried out by the government forces. One strategy that appears to have been used by the Ethiopian National Defence Force (ENDF) in 2008 was to – amidst a severe drought – divert and misuse vital food aid as a weapon to starve out rebel-held areas.
Comment on Yearly Battle Related Deaths: Independent information on the fighting is scarce, and the majority of the concrete figures available are those given by ONLF. However, as independent reports focusing on other issues oftentimes unconsciously corroborates information given in ONLF statements (e.g. on attacks on civilians and cross-border activities), the figures are deemed as sufficiently reliable and the conflict is thus coded as active in 2008.
Negotiations: NO
Comment on Negotiation: There were no negotiations in 2008.

Third party involvement: NO
Third party involvement names: .
Comment on Third Party Involvement: There was no third party intervention in 2008.

Victory: NO

Terminated: NO

2009 Conflict Archive

Comment on Activity: The conflict in the Ogaden region continued in 2009, but it was difficult to determine the strength of the rebellion. While the government continued (as it has many times before over the years) to claim that ONLF was on its last leg, the rebels themselves released statements to the contrary, maintaining that their offensive capacity was “stronger than ever”.

In November the rebels launched an offensive, and claimed to have succeeded in capturing seven towns and killing hundreds of government troops. As always, the claims were denied by the government. However, while Addis Ababa initially stated that no clashes what so ever had occurred, aid workers present in the region were able to confirm that significant fighting had indeed taken place. The latter source also dismissed ONLF’s claims, stating that even though the rebels had in fact staged raids on over 20 government positions, causing instability in the region, they only managed to take one town, not seven.
Comment on Yearly Battle Related Deaths: Fatality information from the conflict zone most years tends to be biased and difficult to substantiate. However, 2009 was to some extent an exeption as there were some independent information on the fighting, with foreign aid workers estimating the number of deaths. Furthermore, there were some instances of ONLF admitting own losses.

However, as most figures were still given in ONLF statements, the gap between the best and the high estimate continues to be great.
Negotiations: NO
Comment on Negotiation: In April Communication Minister Bereket Simon stated that the government did not have any intentions to initiate negotiations with ONLF. According to Simon, Addis Ababa’s dual strategy of militarily weakening the rebels while at the same time diminishing its’ popular base by boosting development initiatives, had paid off and that the rebels had lost much ground.

Third party involvement: NO
Third party involvement names: .
Comment on Third Party Involvement: There was no third party intervention in the conflict in 2009.

Victory: NO

Terminated: NO

2010 Conflict Archive

Comment on Activity: The armed conflict between the Ethiopian government and ONLF continued in 2010. As in 2009 the fighting at times seemed to be relatively intensive with both the rebels and the government claiming large victories in both May and September.

Aside from the fighting, the year was characterized by the increasingly visible crack between two factions of the rebels. Already in 2006, growing leadership division resulted in a faction under Dr Mohamed Sirad Dolaal breaking away. When he was killed in January 2009, the leadership of the break-away faction was taken over by Salahdin Abdulrahman Ma’ow. Despite attempts at reconciling the two groups, they remain divided on important issues such as the relationship with Eritrea (ONLF’s chairman Osman Mohammed Omar being in favor of cooperation and ONLF–Ma’ow being opposed to it) and whether or not to initiate negotiations with the government. It was the latter question that led the divide to come into the limelight in 2010. During the year it became apparent that ONLF–Ma’ow was involved in negotiations with the government, as Addis Ababa announcements were made intermittently, hinting at the probability of an accord to be signed. Subsequently, in June a ceasefire was signed, and on 12 October a peace agreement was concluded. Throughout, the main ONLF body issued statements condemning the peace process, claiming that ONLF – Ma’ow did not have any forces on the ground, wherefore an accord would not have any impact on the situation on the ground.
Comment on Yearly Battle Related Deaths: Independent information on the fighting is scarce, and the majority of the concrete figures available are those given by ONLF. However, as independent reports focusing on other issues oftentimes unconsciously corroborates information given in ONLF statements (e.g. on attacks on civilians and cross-border activities), the figures are deemed as sufficiently reliable and the conflict is thus coded as active in 2010.
Negotiations: NO
Comment on Negotiation: There were no negotiations between the main body of the ONLF and the Ethiopian government in 2010. The talks held between the break-away faction ONLF – Ma’ow and the Addis Ababa regime are not included here, since the group has not been recorded as an active party in armed conflict in UCDP data.

Third party involvement: NO
Third party involvement names: .

Victory: NO

Terminated: NO

2011 Conflict Archive

Comment on Activity: In parallel to continued fighting, the year 2011 was characterized by a severe drought, which hit the Ogaden region, as well as parts of Kenya and Somalia. In August the BBC aired a commentary accusing the Ethiopian government of using food aid as a weapon in its conflict with ONLF. According to the report, food was only delivered to those supporting the regime, whereas villages classified as rebels supporters did not receive any, which had disastrous consequences. The Ethiopian government strongly denied these allegations, and since the region remained closed to organisations intending to investigate the human right situation and independent coverage of events in the region was thus largely lacking, the claims were impossible to substantiate.
Comment on Yearly Battle Related Deaths: Independent information on the fighting is scarce, and the majority of the concrete figures available are those given by ONLF. However, as independent reports focusing on other issues oftentimes unconsciously corroborates information given in ONLF statements (e.g. on attacks on civilians and cross-border activities), the figures are deemed as sufficiently reliable and the conflict is thus coded as active in 2011.
Negotiations: NO
Comment on Negotiation: There were no negotiations between the government and ONLF in 2011.

Third party involvement: NO
Third party involvement names: There was no third party involvement in 2011.

Victory: NO

Terminated: NO

2012 Conflict Archive

Comment on Activity: Amidst intermittent, low-intensity fighting, a process towards the initiation of formal negotiations started in September 2012. While the first meeting was a success (see comment on negotiations), the process ran into trouble at the second meeting, held in October, and no further progress was made during the year.
Comment on Yearly Battle Related Deaths: Independent information on the fighting is scarce, and the majority of the concrete figures available are those given by OLF. However, as independent reports focusing on other issues oftentimes unconsciously corroborates information given in OLF statements (e.g. on attacks on civilians and cross-border activities), the figures are deemed as sufficiently reliable and the conflict is thus coded as active in 2012.
Negotiations: NO
Comment on Negotiation: Even though the government and ONLF met twice during the year, they were not able to move beyond discussions on what to discuss, i.e. talks about talks, wherefore these meetings are not coded as negotiations in UCDP data.

A delegation from the Ethiopian government, led by Defence Minister HE Siraj Fegisa, met an ONLF delegation under the leadership of the group’s foreign secretary Abd-al-Rahman Mahdi between 6 and 7 September. At this initial meeting, the parties focused mainly on the modalities for future talks and at the end of it, they had agreed on ‘principles to end the conflict’. It was announced by ONLF that the two sides were committed to holding formal negotiations to solve the conflict; that the goal of the process was to attain just and lasting peace; that the negotiations were to be comprehensive, addressing the root causes of the conflict; that no preconditions were to be made of either party; that the substantive agenda was to include issues that would facilitated the implementation of a future agreement; and, finally, that both parties were to agree to specific measure of good-will and confidence-building in order to create a favorable climate for the negotiations.

The Nairobi talks resumed in October, but soon ran into difficulties as the government delegation insisted that the continuation of the talks depended on the ONLF first accepting the Ethiopian constitution, thereby accepting Ogaden as being part of Ethiopia. Little information is available on developments after this, and there were no indications that further talks were held during 2012.

Third party involvement: YES
Third party involvement names: Kenya
Comment on Third Party Involvement: An official Kenyan team under the leadership of Yusuf Haji, the minister of state and acting minister for provincial administration and internal security, functioned as facilitator during the process that aimed to start up official negotiations between the Ethiopian government and ONLF.

Victory: NO

Terminated: NO

2013 Conflict Archive

Comment on Activity: In 2013, fighting continued in the Ogaden region and the conflict was recorded as active. Despite Kenyan shuttle diplomacy, the process towards the initiation of formal negotiations that had begun in the second half of 2012 did not re-start during the year.
Comment on Yearly Battle Related Deaths: Independent information on the fighting is scarce, and the majority of the concrete figures available are those given by ONLF. However, as independent reports focusing on other issues oftentimes unconsciously corroborates information given in ONLF statements (e.g. on attacks on civilians and cross-border activities), the figures are deemed as sufficiently reliable and the conflict is thus coded as active in 2013.
Negotiations: NO
Comment on Negotiation: Despite Kenyan shuttle diplomacy, the process towards the initiation of formal negotiations that had begun in the second half of 2012 did not re-start during the year.

Third party involvement: YES
Third party involvement names: Kenya
Comment on Third Party Involvement: The mandate of the Kenyan team that in 2012 had been charged with facilitating the emerging peace process was extended in 2013. There were reports of the team attempting to re-start the process through shuttle-diplomacy during the year, but failing to yield any progress.

Victory: NO

Terminated: NO

2014 Conflict Archive

Negotiations: NO
Comment on Negotiation: Kenyan shuttle-diplomacy tried to get the stalled peace process back on track, but failed to do so in 2014.

Third party involvement: YES
Third party involvement names: Kenya
Comment on Third Party Involvement: Kenyan shuttle-diplomacy tried to get the stalled peace process back on track, but failed to do so in 2014.

Victory: NO

Terminated: NO

2015 Conflict Archive

Negotiations: NO
Comment on Negotiation: A major obstacle to re-launching the peace negotiations was removed with the freeing of the two ONLF delegates that had been kidnapped in 2015. However, despite the good will this created, there were no reports of negotiations being initiated through the rest of the year.

Third party involvement: YES
Third party involvement names: Kenya
Comment on Third Party Involvement: Kenya continued to work to get the stalled peace process between the Ethiopian government and ONLF back on track.

Victory: NO

Terminated: NO

2016 Conflict Archive

Negotiations: NO
Comment on Negotiation: There were no negotiations in 2016.

Third party involvement: NO
Comment on Third Party Involvement: There was no third party involvement in 2016.

Victory: NO

Terminated: YES
Type of termination: No or Low Activity
Date of termination: 2016-12-31
Comment on Termination: From late 2016 and through 2017, news from the region was dominated by the conflict between the Somali regional state and Oromiya regional state, which saw both tit-for-tat attacks by Oromos and Somalis across their common border and more organized attacks by mainly the Somali Liyu police against Oromo civilians. In this chaotic situation, next to no attention was paid to ONLF and possible fighting in the Somali region and it has thus not been possible to corroborate that there were 25 battle-related deaths in 2017, wherefore the conflict is recorded as inactive.

2017 Conflict Archive

Terminated: NO

2018 Conflict Archive

Negotiations: YES
Comment on Negotiation: The Government of Ethiopia and ONLF met on 11 February 2018 in Nairobi for negotiations. After changes in the government in the spring ONLF was removed from the list of terrorist organisations in the summer. On 12 August 2018 ONLF declared a unilateral ceasefire. On 21 October a peace process agreement was signed in Asmara in which the parties agreed to establish a joint committee to start negotiations on the root causes of the conflict.

Third party involvement: YES
Third party involvement names: Kenya, Eritrea

Terminated: NO

2019 Conflict Archive

Terminated: NO

2024 Conflict Archive

Terminated: NO

2025 Conflict Archive

Terminated: NO

Uppsala Conflict Data Program

Department of Peace and Conflict Research

UCDP

Ethiopia: Ogaden