General information
Type of Incompatibility: Government
Comment on Type of Incompatibility: In 1971 the Sudanese Communist Party carried out a failed coup attempt, aiming at ousting the Sudanese government.
In 1976 National Front carried out an attempted coup aiming at ousting the Sudanese government.
SPLM/A was fighting to establish a united Socialist Sudan.
SAF was claiming to fight for the overthrow of the Islamic government of Sudan and replacing it with a democratic system.
NDA aimed at removing the regime.
JEM was fighting for unified Sudan with justice and equality in place of social injustice and political tyranny, for a "radical and comprehensive constitutional reform" that would "guarantee the regions their rights in ruling the country" and for basic services for every Sudanese and a balanced economic and human development in all regions of Sudan.
SLM/A and its factions fought for a secular Sudan with a decentralised form of governance.
NRF joined their forces over the following principles:
- Uphold Sudan as a multicultural, multi-religious and multiethnic country where diversity constitutes the basis of citizenship for individuals, and unity of our nation.
- Citizenship is the sole basis for all rights and obligations without discrimination on religious, ethnic, cultural or regional background.
- Guarantee all human rights, basic freedoms, rule of law, along with the recognition that accountability and transparency are necessary conditions for good governance.
- Safeguarding democracy, political pluralism, freedom of expression as fundamental principals for sharing and transferring state power.
- Ensuring priority of human development programs and capacity building as prerequisites for social and sustainable development. Introducing affirmative action in support of free basic social services; health, and education as well as introducing job creation policies.
- Realizing harmony and interaction between people in various regions, and thereby consolidate national unity by facilitating travel and communication facilities throughout Sudan.
Date of first stated goal of incompatibility: 1971-07-19
Comment on date of first stated goals of incompatibility: The Sudanese Communist Party carried out an attemped coup against the Sudanese government on 19 July 1971, taking control of the presidential palace.
Date of first use of armed force: 1971-07-19
Comment on first use of armed force: The Sudanese Communist Party carried out an attemped coup against the Sudanese government on 19 July 1971, taking control of the presidential palace.
Date of first battle related death: 1971-07-22
Comment on first battle related death: Three days after the coup makers took control of the presidential palace, army units loyal to Nimeiri stormed the palace, freed Nimeiri and arrested the coup makers.
Date of conflict reached 25 battle releated deaths: 1971-07-22
Comment on conflict reached 25 battle releated deaths: Three days after the coup makers took control of the presidential palace, army units loyal to Nimeiri stormed the palace, freed Nimeiri and arrested the coup makers.
Annual information
This section contains annual information systematically collected by the UCDP.
1976
Primary Parties: Government of Sudan - National Front
Dimension: Internal
| Estimated Fatalities | |
|---|---|
| High | 25 |
| Best | 25 |
| Low | 0 |
Numbers include fatalities for all dyads both active and inactive for this year
1983
Primary Parties: Government of Sudan - SPLM/A
Dimension: Internal
| Estimated Fatalities | |
|---|---|
| High | 1000 |
| Best | 1000 |
| Low | 0 |
Numbers include fatalities for all dyads both active and inactive for this year
1984
Primary Parties: Government of Sudan - SPLM/A
Dimension: Internal
| Estimated Fatalities | |
|---|---|
| High | 1000 |
| Best | 1000 |
| Low | 0 |
Numbers include fatalities for all dyads both active and inactive for this year
1985
Primary Parties: Government of Sudan - SPLM/A
Dimension: Internal
| Estimated Fatalities | |
|---|---|
| High | 1000 |
| Best | 1000 |
| Low | 0 |
Numbers include fatalities for all dyads both active and inactive for this year
1986
Primary Parties: Government of Sudan - SPLM/A
Dimension: Internal
| Estimated Fatalities | |
|---|---|
| High | 1000 |
| Best | 1000 |
| Low | 0 |
Numbers include fatalities for all dyads both active and inactive for this year
1987
Primary Parties: Government of Sudan - SPLM/A
Dimension: Internal
| Estimated Fatalities | |
|---|---|
| High | 1000 |
| Best | 1000 |
| Low | 0 |
Numbers include fatalities for all dyads both active and inactive for this year
1988
Primary Parties: Government of Sudan - SPLM/A
Dimension: Internal
| Estimated Fatalities | |
|---|---|
| High | 1000 |
| Best | 1000 |
| Low | 0 |
Numbers include fatalities for all dyads both active and inactive for this year
Peace agreements
Name of peace agreement: DUP/SPLM Sudan Peace Agreement
Date when warring parties signed the agreement: 1988-11-16
Comment of peace agreement: Partial peace agreement.
Talks in Addis Ababa between Democratic Unionist Party (DUP), one of three parties in Khartoums ruling coalition, and SPLM/A resulted in the signing on 16 November of the DUP/SPLM Sudan Peace Agreement also called the November Accords.
The agreement between SPLM/A and DUP called for a ceasefire, the abrogation of all military agreements and the lifting of the state of emergency.
The incompatibility would be solved through the holding of a national constitutional conference by 31 December 1988. The agreement also called for a freeze in the implementation of Islamic Sharia laws by the postponement of the introduction of the proposed new legal code until the national constitutional conference would be held.
Signatories: Uthman al-Mirghani for DUP and John Garang for SPLM/A
Comment of signatories: DUP (Democratic Unionist Party), one of three parties in Khartoums ruling coalition and the rebel group opposing the government, SPLM/A (Sudan Peoples Liberation Movement/Army) signed the agreement in Addis Ababa.
Third parties: Egypt
Comment of third parties role in peace agreement: Even though Egypt was biased in the conflict by supplying the Sudanese government with military assistance they managed to open up contacts between Democratic Unionist Party (DUP) and SPLM/A in the mid-1988.
Some observers also suggest the involvement of Ethiopia in getting the actors together.
Ended: True
Date agreement ended: 1988-12-21
Comment of Duration: The agreement was to be of short duration due to events in the government later the same year. The opposition in the coalition government, National Islamic Front (NIF), did not accept the Addis Ababa agreement and were reluctant to freezing Islamic law and towards abrogating pacts with Egypt and Libya. NIF, which denounced the Addis Ababa talks as ‘conspiracy’ to block Islamic law, and the Prime Minister Sadiq al- Mahdi voted down a DUP amendment to recognize the terms of the SPLA-DUP accord. Although al-Mahdi initially encouraged the peace talks, he himself was not committed to the accord. Some observers have criticized this move from al-Mahdi as trying to appear to support peace while keeping the NIF in the Government. However, DUP resigned from government as of 27 December that year.
Full-text peace agreement
1989
Primary Parties: Government of Sudan - SPLM/A
Dimension: Internal
| Estimated Fatalities | |
|---|---|
| High | 5253 |
| Best | 4253 |
| Low | 4253 |
Numbers include fatalities for all dyads both active and inactive for this year
1990
Primary Parties: Government of Sudan - SPLM/A
Dimension: Internal
| Estimated Fatalities | |
|---|---|
| High | 4335 |
| Best | 4335 |
| Low | 4335 |
Numbers include fatalities for all dyads both active and inactive for this year
1991
Primary Parties: Government of Sudan - SPLM/A
Dimension: Internal
| Estimated Fatalities | |
|---|---|
| High | 4317 |
| Best | 1317 |
| Low | 1317 |
Numbers include fatalities for all dyads both active and inactive for this year
1992
Primary Parties: Government of Sudan - SPLM/A
Dimension: Internal
| Estimated Fatalities | |
|---|---|
| High | 4083 |
| Best | 1083 |
| Low | 1083 |
Numbers include fatalities for all dyads both active and inactive for this year
1993
Primary Parties: Government of Sudan - SPLM/A
Dimension: Internal
| Estimated Fatalities | |
|---|---|
| High | 942 |
| Best | 942 |
| Low | 942 |
Numbers include fatalities for all dyads both active and inactive for this year
1994
Primary Parties: Government of Sudan - SPLM/A
Dimension: Internal
| Estimated Fatalities | |
|---|---|
| High | 337 |
| Best | 337 |
| Low | 337 |
Numbers include fatalities for all dyads both active and inactive for this year
1995
Primary Parties: Government of Sudan - SPLM/A
Dimension: Internal
| Estimated Fatalities | |
|---|---|
| High | 1882 |
| Best | 1000 |
| Low | 1000 |
Numbers include fatalities for all dyads both active and inactive for this year
1996
Primary Parties: Government of Sudan - NDA, SPLM/A
Dimension: Internal
| Estimated Fatalities | |
|---|---|
| High | 2291 |
| Best | 2289 |
| Low | 2289 |
Numbers include fatalities for all dyads both active and inactive for this year
1997
Primary Parties: Government of Sudan - NDA, SPLM/A
Dimension: Internal
| Estimated Fatalities | |
|---|---|
| High | 7228 |
| Best | 3709 |
| Low | 3709 |
Numbers include fatalities for all dyads both active and inactive for this year
1998
Primary Parties: Government of Sudan - NDA, SPLM/A
Dimension: Internal
| Estimated Fatalities | |
|---|---|
| High | 5572 |
| Best | 4891 |
| Low | 4891 |
Numbers include fatalities for all dyads both active and inactive for this year
1999
Primary Parties: Government of Sudan - NDA, SPLM/A
Dimension: Internal
| Estimated Fatalities | |
|---|---|
| High | 1597 |
| Best | 1408 |
| Low | 1408 |
Numbers include fatalities for all dyads both active and inactive for this year
2000
Primary Parties: Government of Sudan - NDA, SPLM/A
Dimension: Internal
| Estimated Fatalities | |
|---|---|
| High | 3610 |
| Best | 2841 |
| Low | 2841 |
Numbers include fatalities for all dyads both active and inactive for this year
2001
Primary Parties: Government of Sudan - NDA, SPLM/A
Dimension: Internal
| Estimated Fatalities | |
|---|---|
| High | 3658 |
| Best | 3408 |
| Low | 3408 |
Numbers include fatalities for all dyads both active and inactive for this year
2002
Primary Parties: Government of Sudan - SPLM/A
Dimension: Internal
| Estimated Fatalities | |
|---|---|
| High | 3324 |
| Best | 2021 |
| Low | 2021 |
Numbers include fatalities for all dyads both active and inactive for this year
Peace agreements
Name of peace agreement: Machakos Protocol
Date when warring parties signed the agreement: 2002-07-20
Comment of peace agreement: Peace process agreement
On 20 July SPLM/A and the government signed a framework agreement, the Machakos Protocol, which included the general procedures for a transitional process and an agreement that further negotiations would be held to specify the terms of this framework. They also reached a specific agreement that was annexed to the framework with the purpose of subsequently being incorporated in the final agreement. The specifications included a pre-transition perioed of six months, a six-year transition period, followed by an internationally supervised referendum for southern Sudan where one option was to be secession.During the transition period a broad-based government would rule in Khartoum and the southern states would be given some degree of autonomy.
It further stated that Sharia law would be applied only in the north. There were however issues concerning sharing of power and wealth, human rights and a ceasefire that were still to be clarified.
Signatories: For the Government of Sudan: Dr. Ghazi Salahuddin Atabani; For SPLM/A: Cdr. Salva Kiir Mayardit;
Witnessed by: Lt. Gen. Lazaro K. Sumbeiywo, Special Envoy, IGAD Sudan Peace Process, on behalf of the IGAD envoys.
Comment of signatories: Dyadic peace agreement
Third parties: Kenya
Comment of third parties role in peace agreement: The agreement was signed in Kenya
Full-text peace agreement
Name of peace agreement: Memorandum of Understanding on Cessation of Hostilities between the Government of the Sudan and the Sudan People´s Liberation Movement/Army
Date when warring parties signed the agreement: 2002-10-15
Comment of peace agreement: Peace process agreement
This short agreement between the Government of Sudan and SPLM/A resumed negotiations and called for a ceasefire. The agreement stated that negotiations, which had last been held in Machakos, Kenya on 2 September 2002, should be resumed on the 15 October. The negotiations would aim to address all outstanding issues. A cessation of hostilities was called for during the period of negotiations, including ending media wars and the use of propaganda. Humanitarian access was granted to reach people in need and the parties requested mediators to assist with establishing means of communication between them to facilitate the cessation of hostilities.
Signatories: Hon. Idris Mohammed Abdel Gadir
For: the Government of the Sudan
Cdr. Nhial Deng Nhial For: The Sudan People's Liberation Movement/Army
Lt. Gen Lazaro K. Sumbeiywo, Special Envoy, IGAD Sudan Peace Process and on behalf of IGAD Envoys
Comment of signatories: Comprehensive peace agreement signed on 15 October 2002.
Third parties: IGAD
Comment of third parties role in peace agreement: IGAD facilitated the peace process to end the South Sudan conflict.
Full-text peace agreement
Name of peace agreement: Memorandum of Understanding between the Government of the Sudan and the Sudan People´s Liberation Movement/Army on Aspects of Structures of Government
Date when warring parties signed the agreement: 2002-11-18
Comment of peace agreement: Partial peace agreement
This agreement outlines principles for governance that were agreed upon in this document and decided to be incorporated in the final Peace Agreement. The principles outlined power sharing and process for the interim period.
Regarding the incompatibility, this agreement recognized the national sovereignty of Sudan and acknowledged the aspirations of the people of South Sudan. It incorporated South Sudanese representation in the National Legislature, National Civil Service, and Cabinet Ministries. A Government of National Unity was established for the Interim Period and general elections were to be held during the period.
The agreement also stipulates protection of human rights and remaining issues to be agreed through further negotiations.
Signatories: Dr. Ghazi Salahuddin Atabani
For: The Government of the Sudan
Cdr. Salva Kiir Mayardit For: The Sudan People's Liberation Movement/Army
Witnessed by: Lt. Gen. Lazaro K. Sumbeiywo, Special Envoy, IGAD Sudan Peace Process and on Behalf of IGAD Envoys
Comment of signatories: Dyadic peace agreement signed in Nairobi, Kenya on 18 November 2002.
The peace process did not include other active rebel groups.
Third parties: IGAD
Comment of third parties role in peace agreement: IGAD facilitated the Sudanese peace process.
Full-text peace agreement
2003
Primary Parties: Government of Sudan - JEM, SLM/A, SPLM/A
Secondary Warring Parties Side A: Government of Chad
Dimension: Internationalized intrastate
Comment on Dimension: In 2003 is Sudan an intrastate conflict with foreign involvment since Chad contributed with troops to the Government of Sudan in its fight against the SLM/A.
| Estimated Fatalities | |
|---|---|
| High | 2856 |
| Best | 1999 |
| Low | 1899 |
Numbers include fatalities for all dyads both active and inactive for this year
Peace agreements
Name of peace agreement: Agreement on Security Arrangements During the Interim Period
Date when warring parties signed the agreement: 2003-09-25
Comment of peace agreement: Partial peace agreement
This is a partial agreement, part of the Machakos process, and concerns security issues for the interim period.
The parties agreed that an internationally monitored ceasefire would come into place once the Comprehensive Peace Agreement was signed. Following such an agreement both parties’ forces would be downsized appropriately. During the interim period the bulk of the parties’ forces were to remain separate entities, but if the outcome of the final referendum on Southern Sudan’s territorial status would be unity, and not secession, the armies were to become a unified, integrated, army. It was also agreed that during the interim period a small number of joint/integrated units would be created to be stationed in Southern Sudan, Khartoum, the Nuba Mountains and the Blue Nile territories.The issue of police forces was to be dealt with in future negotiations.
Signatories: For the Government of Sudan: Hon. Idris Mohamed Abdelgadir;
For SPLM/A: Cdr. Pa’gan Amun Oklech;
Witnessed by: Lt. Gen. Lazaro K. Sumbeiywo (Rtd), Special Envoy, IGAD Sudan Peace Process, on behalf of the IGAD envoys
Comment of signatories: Dyadic peace agreement
Third parties: Kenya
Comment of third parties role in peace agreement: The agreement was signed in Kenya.
Full-text peace agreement
2004
Primary Parties: Government of Sudan - JEM, SLM/A, SPLM/A
Dimension: Internal
| Estimated Fatalities | |
|---|---|
| High | 4588 |
| Best | 3278 |
| Low | 3277 |
Numbers include fatalities for all dyads both active and inactive for this year
Peace agreements
Name of peace agreement: Framework on Wealth Sharing During the Pre-Interim and Interim Period
Date when warring parties signed the agreement: 2004-01-07
Comment of peace agreement: Partial peace agreement
This is a partial agreement, part of the Machakos process. The most important point in the agreement is that the parties agree on a 50-50 split of oil revenues in southern Sudan. Moreover, separate banking systems are to be applied in the north and the south.
Signatories: For the Government of Sudan: Hon. Idris Mohamed Abdelgadir;
For SPLM/A: Cdr. Nhial Deng Nhial;
Witnessed by: Lt. Gen. Lazaro K. Sumbeiywo (Rtd), Special Envoy, IGAD Sudan Peace Process, on behalf of the IGAD envoys
Comment of signatories: Dyadic peace agreement
Third parties: Kenya
Comment of third parties role in peace agreement: The agreement was signed in Kenya
Full-text peace agreement
Name of peace agreement: Protocol Between the GOS and SPLM on Power Sharing
Date when warring parties signed the agreement: 2004-05-26
Comment of peace agreement: Partial peace agreement
This is a partial agreement, part of the Machakos process, and attempts to regulate the incompatibility through establishing a power-sharing regime in the Sudan.There are three arrangements within the protocol that stand out as the most important. The first is the establishment of an interim constitution, the second the creation of a Government of Southern Sudan and the third is a power-sharing arrangement at the central government level of the Sudan.The establishment of a Government of Southern Sudan is for the interim period only, and should be seen as autonomy arrangement with the GOS having a somewhat lower level of authority than the central government of Sudan, but still with a legislative assembly and executive powers. In the legislature of Southern Sudan the SPLM will have 70% of the seats, and the ruling Khartoum party (NCP) 15%. Other Southern Sudan political forces receive 15% of the seats. The same formula is applied to the executive authority of Southern Sudan. The GOS is also given the right to control its own police and security forces.At the national level a power-sharing arrangement was brokered, which meant that the SPLM leader John Garang was appointed first Vice-President and that a formula of 52% of seats for the NCP and 28% of seats for the SPLM was applied to the National Assembly.The two governments will deal with the issue of resettlement of refugees and IDP’s in concert.
Signatories: The Government of Sudan and SPLM/A.
Vice-President Ali Osman Taha and the head of the Sudan People's Liberation Army (SPLA) John Garang
Comment of signatories: Dyadic peace agreement
Third parties: Kenya
Comment of third parties role in peace agreement: The agreement was signed in Kenya.
Kenyan government officials and foreign dignitaries, including United States Acting Assistant Secretary for African Affairs Charles Snyder, African Union Commission Chairperson Alpha Oumar Konare, Norwegian International Development Minister Hilde Frafjord Johnson and Kenyan Minister for Foreign Affairs Kalonzo Musyoka, witnessed the signing ceremony.
Full-text peace agreement
Name of peace agreement: The Protocol Between the GOS and SPLM on the Resolution of Conflict in Abyei Area
Date when warring parties signed the agreement: 2004-05-26
Comment of peace agreement: Partial peace agreement
This is a partial agreement, part of the Machakos process, dealing with the issue of the much-contested Abyei area on the border between Northern and Southern Sudan.
The agreement stated that a joint battalion, comprised of forces from SPLM/A and the Government of the Sudan, was to be stationed in the area through the Interim period. Also, an Abyei Area Security Committee is created, in which the police chief will be a member, to ensure law and order.Simultaneously with the referendum for the south, the people in Abyei will cast a separate ballot, choosing between retaining its special administrative status in the north, or becoming a part of Bahr el Ghazal (in southern Sudan). It is also stated how the oil revenues shall be divided: 50 % to the National Government, 42% to the Government of Southern Sudan, and the rest shared locally. A fund will be set up to facilitate the return of refugees and displaced persons.
Signatories: The Government of Sudan and SPLM/A
Comment of signatories: Dyadic peace agreement
Full-text peace agreement
Name of peace agreement: The Protocol Between the GOS and SPLM on the Resolution of Conflict in Southern Kordofan/Nuba Mountains and Blue Nile States
Date when warring parties signed the agreement: 2004-05-26
Comment of peace agreement: Partial peace agreement
This is a partial agreement, part of the Machakos process. The parties agreed on the administration of these contested areas on the border between the north and the south.The agreement reaffirms the standing of the two entities of Southern Kordofan and the Blue Nile States as federal states of Sudan. The parties agreed to a power-sharing arrangement in the state legislature of these two entities, with 55% of seats in the hands of the NPC (the party governing the Sudan) and 45% of seats under the control of the SPLM. The states are given no special standing, as was the case in the Abyei area settlement. The power-sharing arrangement is for the interim period only, elections will be held after the interim period to allow for a democratically elected government and assembly in these areas. The GOS and the government of the Sudan will agree jointly on a program for the resettlement of refugees and IDPs.
Signatories: The Government of Sudan and SPLM/A.
Comment of signatories: Dyadic peace agreement
Third parties: Kenya
Comment of third parties role in peace agreement: The agreement was signed in Kenya.
Full-text peace agreement
Name of peace agreement: Nairobi Declaration on the Final Phase of Peace in the Sudan
Date when warring parties signed the agreement: 2004-06-05
Comment of peace agreement: Partial peace agreement
This agreement was signed under the auspices of the IGAD peace process. It reaffirms commitments to a number of previous agreements: 2002 Machakos Protocol, 2003 Agreement on Security Arrangements During the Interim Period, 2004 Agreement on Wealth Sharing During the Pre-Interim and Interim Period, 2004 Protocol Between the Government of Sudan and the Sudan People's Liberation Movement on Power Sharing, 2004 Protocol Between the Government of Sudan and the Sudan People's Liberation Movement on the Resolution of Conflict In Southern Kordofan/Nuba Mountains and Blue Nile States, 2004 Protocol Between the Government of Sudan and the Sudan People's Liberation Movement on the Resolution of the Conflict in Abyei Area, and 2002 Memorandum of Understanding on Cessation of Hostilities.
Regarding the incompatibility, the agreement recommits to principle components of each of the previously signed agreements, taking specific note of the right of self-determination and power sharing arrangements. These agreements, annexes, and modalities are decided to constitute the Comprehensive Peace Agreement to initiate the Pre-Interim Period. These points are committed to for future negotiations, to constitute the final phase of the Sudan Peace Process to resolve the issues in the Sudan conflict.
Signatories: H.E. Ali Osman Mohamed Taha, First Vice-President of the Government of the Republic of the Sudan;
Dr. John Garang de Mabior, Chairman of the Sudan People’s Liberation Movement (SPLM);
Witness by: Hon. Stephen Kalonzo Musyoka, Minister of Foreign Affairs of the Republic of Kenya and on behalf of the IGAD Ministerial Sub-Committee on Sudan
Comment of signatories: Dyadic peace agreement signed in Nairobi on 5 June 2004.
The agreement did not include other rebel grounps in Sudan, namely SLM/A and JEM.
Third parties: IGAD
Comment of third parties role in peace agreement: IGAD facilitated the Sudanese peace process.
Full-text peace agreement
Name of peace agreement: Declaration on the Conclusion of the IGAD Negotiations on Peace in the Sudan
Date when warring parties signed the agreement: 2004-11-19
Comment of peace agreement: Partial peace agreement
In this short agreement, parties reaffirm the Nairobi Declaration signed 5 June 2004 and affirm their commitment to the related Protocols. They invite the UN to endorse these agreements. They agree to complete negotiations for the Ceasefire Agreement and Implementation Modalities to facilitate the signing of the Comprehensive Peace Agreement no later than 31 December 2004.
Signatories: Hon Yahya Hussin Babikar for the Government of the Republic of the Sudan
Cdr. Nhial Deng Nhial for the SPLM/A
WITNESSED BY: Lt. Gen. Lazaro K. Sumbeiywo (Rtd.), On Behalf of the IGAD Envoys; Dr. Jan Pronk, Special Representative of the Secretary-General of the United Nations;
IN THE PRESENCE OF: The United Nations Security Council; Ambassador Abdallah Baali, Permanent Representative of Algeria to the United Nations; Ambassador Ismael Gaspar Martins, Permanent Representative of Angola to the United Nations; Ambassador Joel Adechi, Permanent Representative of Benin to the United Nations; Ambassador Ronaldo Sardenberg, Permanent Representative of Brazil to the United Nations; Ambassador Jean-Marc de La Sablière, Permanent Representative of France to the United Nations; Ambassador Gunter Pleuger, Permanent Representative of Germany to the United Nations; Ambassador Munir Akram, Permanent Representative of Pakistan to the United Nations; Ambassador Lauro Baja, Jr, Permanent Representative of the Philippines to the United Nations; Ambassador Mihnea Motoc, Permanent Representative of Romania to the United Nations; Ambassador Andrey Denisov, Permanent Representative of the Russian Federation to the United Nations; Ambassador Juan Antonio Yáñez-Barnuevo, Permanent Representative of Spain to the United Nations; Ambassador Emyr Jones Parry, Permanent Representative of the United Kingdom to the United Nations; Ambassador John Danforth, Permanent Representative of the United States to the United Nations
Comment of signatories: Dyadic peace agreement signed in Nairobi on 19 November 2004.
The agreement did not include other rebel grounps in Sudan, namely SLM/A and JEM.
Third parties: Algeria, Angola, Benin, Brazil, Chile, China, France, Germany, Pakistan, Philippines, Romania, Russian Federation, Spain, United Kingdom (UK), United States (US), IGAD, UN
Comment of third parties role in peace agreement: IGAD facilitated the Sudanese peace process.
Full-text peace agreement
Name of peace agreement: Agreement Between the Government of the Sudan (GOS) and the Sudan People’s Liberation Movement/Sudan People’s Liberation Army (SPLM/SPLA) on Implementation Modalities of the Protocols and Agreements
Date when warring parties signed the agreement: 2004-12-31
Comment of peace agreement: Partial Peace Agreement
This agreement introduces subsequent agreements that outline the modalities for the different components of the Comprehensive Peace Agreement (CPA). The agreement reaffirms commitment to the 2002 Machakos Protocol, 2003 Agreement on Security Arrangements During the Interim Period, 2004 Agreement on Wealth Sharing During the Pre-Interim and Interim Period, 2004 Protocol Between the Government of Sudan and the Sudan People's Liberation Movement on Power Sharing, 2004 Protocol Between the Government of Sudan and the Sudan People's Liberation Movement on the Resolution of Conflict In Southern Kordofan/Nuba Mountains and Blue Nile States, 2004 Protocol Between the Government of Sudan and the Sudan People's Liberation Movement on the Resolution of the Conflict in Abyei Area. It further acknowledges that these documents together constitute the CPA. It introduces mechanisms to be included in the CPA.
Signatories: Government, SPLM/A
Comment of signatories: Dyadic peace agreement signed in Naivasha, Kenya on 31 December 2004.
The agreement did not include other rebel groups in Sudan, namely SLM/A and JEM.
Full-text peace agreement
Name of peace agreement: The Implementation Modalities for the Protocol on the Resolution of Conflict in Southern Kordofan and Blue Nile States, dated 26th May, 2004
Date when warring parties signed the agreement: 2004-12-31
Comment of peace agreement: Partial Peace Agreement
This agreement is one of the documents comprising the implementation modalities for the Comprehensive Peace Agreement. It details modalities to resolve the conflict in Southern Kordofan and Blue Nile States. The agreement contains provisions on the establishment of a state legislature and appointment or electoral processes for local governance positions, security arrangements, and pre-election arrangements for each state.
Regarding the incompatibility, the agreement details power-sharing arrangements, incorporating the rebel group into the political process, and providing for greater opportunity of representation at the local level through creation of state level governance structures.
The agreement also details monitoring arrangements, establishment of state judiciary, wealth sharing and allocation of resources to the state, and creation of a State Land Commission. An appendix expands upon integration of rebel forces in government and the modalities for local governance systems in Southern Kordofan.
Signatories: Government, SPLM/A
Comment of signatories: Dyadic peace agreement signed in Naivasha, Kenya on 31 December 2004.
The agreement did not include other rebel groups in Sudan, namely SLM/A and JEM.
Third parties: Though not a signatory, IGAD facilitated the Sudanese peace process.
Full-text peace agreement
Name of peace agreement: The Implementation Modalities of the Protocol on Power Sharing, dated 26th May, 2004
Date when warring parties signed the agreement: 2004-12-31
Comment of peace agreement: Partial Peace Agreement
This agreement is one of the documents comprising the implementation modalities for the Comprehensive Peace Agreement. It details modalities of the Machakos and Power Sharing Protocols. Key components include provision for a referendum for the people of South Sudan, national reconciliation process, general elections, local governing structures, and power sharing.
With regard to the incompatibility, this agreement provided structure, timeline, and other modalities for power sharing processes and institutions. It provided for integration of rebel forces in certain governing bodies at the national level and stipulated percentages of seats to be held by certain members for balanced representation.
Other provisions allowed for the development and promotion of national languages and the establishment of a Human Rights commission, drafting of the national constitution.
Signatories: Government, SPLM/A
Comment of signatories: Dyadic peace agreement signed in Naivasha, Kenya on 31 December 2004.
The agreement did not include other rebel groups in Sudan, namely SLM/A and JEM.
Comment of third parties role in peace agreement: Though not a signatory, IGAD facilitated the Sudanese peace process.
Full-text peace agreement
Name of peace agreement: The Implementation Modalities of the Protocol on the Resolution of the Abyei Conflict, dated 26th May, 2004
Date when warring parties signed the agreement: 2004-12-31
Comment of peace agreement: Partial Peace Agreement
This agreement is one of the documents comprising the implementation modalities for the Comprehensive Peace Agreement. It details modalities to resolve the conflict in the Abyei Conflict. The agreement specifies administrative status and structure, financial resources to be allocated, the establishment of a commission to decide geographical boundaries, rights of residence and representation, security arrangements, a referendum, and reconciliation processes. An appendix details the structure and mandate of the Abyei Boundaries Commission.
With regard to the incompatibility, the agreement provides structures for representation in central and local governance for people in the Abyei region and outlines the process for a referendum.
Signatories: Government, SPLM/A
Comment of signatories: Dyadic peace agreement signed in Naivasha, Kenya on 31 December 2004.
The agreement did not include other rebel groups in Sudan, namely SLM/A and JEM.
Third parties: Though not a signatory, IGAD facilitated the Sudanese peace process.
Full-text peace agreement
2005
Primary Parties: Government of Sudan - SLM/A
Dimension: Internal
| Estimated Fatalities | |
|---|---|
| High | 191 |
| Best | 161 |
| Low | 161 |
Numbers include fatalities for all dyads both active and inactive for this year
Peace agreements
Name of peace agreement: Sudan Comprehensive Peace Agreement
Date when warring parties signed the agreement: 2005-01-09
Comment of peace agreement: Full peace agreement
This final peace agreement concludes the Machakos process that have been ongoing since July 2002. Having signed several partial agreements during these past two and a half years, the parties have now managed to agree on all details. Summing up the contents of the agreement, the most important points are: the south will be given autonomy for an interim period of 6 years, followed by a referendum in 2011 with the option of independence from Sudan; John Garang, the leader of SPLM/A, shall be First Vive President, and SPLM/A are also given 28 percent of the seats in the National Government; Sharia law is to be applied only in the north and only to Muslims; the oil revenues in the south are to be shared 50-50 between the north and the south; the forces of the National Government and SPLA are to remain separate, but integrated units of 21 000 troops are to be formed; the government has two and a half years to withdraw 91 000 troops from the south, and SPLA has eight months to withdraw its troops from the north, and; the north and the south shall have separate banking systems and currencies.
Consult the individual protocols making up this agreement for specific details.
Signatories: For the government of Sudan:H.E. Ali Osman Mohamed Taha
For SPLM/SPLA Dr. Johan Garang de Mabior
Witnessed by H.E. Hon. Mwai Kibaki (President of the Republic of Kenya on behalf of the IGAD Sub-committee on the Sudan ) H.E. Hon. Yoweri Kaguta Museveni (President of the Republic of Uganda on Behalf of IGAD Member States) H.E. Mr. Ahmed Aboul Gheit (Egyptian Minister of Forein Affairs on behalf of the Government of the Republic of Egypt ) Senator Alfredo Mantica (Italian Deputy Minister for Foreign Affairs on behalf of the Government of Italy) H.E Mr. Fred Racke (Special Envoy of the Netherlands) H.E. Ms. Hilde F Johnson (Minister of International Development on behalf of the Royal Norwegian Government) Right Hon. Hilary Benn, M.P. (Secretary of State for International Development On behalf of the United Kingdom and Northern Ireland) Mr. Colin L. Powell (United States Secretary of State On behalf of the United States of America) H.E. Mr. Alpha Oumar Konare (Chairperson of the African Union on behalf of the African Union) Hon. Charles Goerens (Minister of developrnent Co-operation of Netherlands on behalf of the European Union) H.E. Ms. Hilde F Johnson (Minister of International development on behalf of the IGAD Partners Forrum (IPF)) Senator Alfredo Mantica (Deputy Minister for Forein Affairs on behalf of the IGAD Partners Forrum (IPF)) H.E Mr. Amre Moussa Secretary General of the League of of Arab States on behalf of the League of of Arab States) H.E. Mr. Jan Pronk Special Representative od the Secretary General in the Sudan on behalf of the United Nations
Comment of signatories: Dyadic peace agreement
Third parties: IGAD, EU, UN, AU, Kenya, Uganda, Egypt, Italy, Netherlands, Norway, UK, USA, League of Arab States
Comment of third parties role in peace agreement: The agreement was signed in Nairobi.
H.E. Hon. Mwai Kibaki (President of the Republic of Kenya on behalf of the IGAD Sub-committee on the Sudan ) H.E. Hon. Yoweri Kaguta Museveni (President of the Republic of Uganda on Behalf of IGAD Member States) H.E. Mr. Ahmed Aboul Gheit (Egyptian Minister of Forein Affairs on behalf of the Government of the Republic of Egypt ) Senator Alfredo Mantica (Italian Deputy Minister for Foreign Affairs on behalf of the Government of Italy) H.E Mr. Fred Racke (Special Envoy of the Netherlands) H.E. Ms. Hilde F Johnson (Minister of International Development on behalf of the Royal Norwegian Government) Right Hon. Hilary Benn, M.P. (Secretary of State for International Development On behalf of the United Kingdom and Northern Ireland) Mr. Colin L. Powell (United States Secretary of State On behalf of the United States of America) H.E. Mr. Alpha Oumar Konare (Chairperson of the African Union on behalf of the African Union) Hon. Charles Goerens (Minister of developrnent Co-operation of Netherlands on behalf of the European Union) H.E. Ms. Hilde F Johnson (Minister of International development on behalf of the IGAD Partners Forrum (IPF)) Senator Alfredo Mantica (Deputy Minister for Forein Affairs on behalf of the IGAD Partners Forrum (IPF)) H.E Mr. Amre Moussa Secretary General of the League of of Arab States on behalf of the League of of Arab States) H.E. Mr. Jan Pronk Special Representative od the Secretary General in the Sudan on behalf of the United Nations
Full-text peace agreement
Name of peace agreement: Cairo Framework Agreement between the GoS and the NDA
Date when warring parties signed the agreement: 2005-01-16
Comment of peace agreement: Peace process agreement
After months of talks in Cairo, Egypt, the Government of Sudan and the rebel umbrella group NDA signed a peace process agreement in Cairo on 16 January 2005.
This framework agreement outlined the issues involved in reaching a comprehensive peace and complements the SPLM peace agreement of the same month and year. It calls for abolishing emergency laws and statutes restricting freedoms, establishing new laws for Sudanese political parties, methods of allowing for power sharing and the dissolution of NDA forces. The agreement set up a number of commissions to discuss these issues in order to reach a comprehensive peace agreement.
Signatories: Nafi Ali Nafi
Gen Abdalrahman Saeed
Comment of signatories: Dyadic peace agreement
Nafi Ali Nafi signed on behalf of the government while Gen Abdalrahman Saeed, head of the NDA delegation, signed on behalf of his party.
Third parties: Egypt
Comment of third parties role in peace agreement: Negotiations were held in Egypt, and Egyptian officials precided over the signing ceremony.
Name of peace agreement: Agreement between the GoS and the NDA (Cairo Agreement)
Date when warring parties signed the agreement: 2005-06-18
Comment of peace agreement: Full peace agreement
After months of protracted negotiations following on the peace process agreement signed between the two parties in Cairo in January 2005 the Government of Sudan and the NDA signed another peace agreement in Cairo on 18 June 2005.
The peace agreement is linked to the agreement signed the same year by the GoS and the SPLM, calling for power- and wealth sharing for Sudan (9 January 2005), and binds the two settlements together. It covers a wide-range of issues, but does not completely specify its power-sharing and military aspects.
The agreement stipulates that Sudan will be a multiparty non-confessional democracy with equal rights for all citizens and be open to all political parties. The NDA, previously being banned and in exile, are allowed to return to Sudan to conduct democratic politics and will take part in the drafting of the new Sudanese constitution as stipulated in the 9 January 2005 comprehensive peace agreement. It further binds the NDA to taking part in the Interim Government of Unity and the federal decentralization process in the interim time period of six years. The state of emergency is to be lifted to allow for a democratic transition throughout the interim period leading up to free and fair multiparty elections.
Further, the peace agreement commits the two parties to form a number of commissions, for example a constitutional, a political and a military committee, to discuss implementation of the peace agreement. The civil servant forces and the national armed forces are to be restructured on the basis of equality for all the peoples of Sudan.
The agreement however does not specify the exact number/quota of NDA participation in the Government of National Unity, or the exact fate of the NDA’s military forces. These issues are instead placed within the mandate of two committees that are to work out these details during the course of more negotiations. In October and November 2005 the NDA joins the Government of National Unity and the parliament of Sudan following discussions on these issues.
Signatories: For the GoS: President Omar Al-Bashir
For the NDA: Chairman Osman Mirghani
Witnessed by: SPLM Chairman John Garang
Egyptian President Hosni Mubarak
Comment of signatories: Dyadic peace agreement
Third parties: Egypt
Comment of third parties role in peace agreement: Negotiations were held in Cairo leading up to the agreement. The signing ceremony was also held in Cairo, and was witnessed by Egyptian President Hosni Mubarak.
Full-text peace agreement
Name of peace agreement: Declaration of Principles for the Resolution of the Sudanese Conflict in Darfur
Date when warring parties signed the agreement: 2005-07-05
Comment of peace agreement: Peace process agreement
This agreement reaffirms the parties' commitment to negotiations and identifies issues for further discussion in future rounds of talks. The agreements reached through future negotiations are to be presented to the people of Darfur for national dialogue.
With regard to the incompatibility, this agreement affirms the parties decision to support a federal system of government and to share power through political processes.
The agreement outlines issues for negotiation including democratic and effective participation in political processes, citizenship, wealth and power sharing, humanitarian assistance and rights of refugees, and rehabilitation and development in Darfur.
Signatories: Government of Sudan: Mohamed Yousif Abdallah, State Minister for Humanitarian Affairs;
SLM/A: Khamis Abdallah Abakar, Vice-President;
JEM: Ahmed Mohamed Tugod Lissan, Head of Delegation;
Witnessed by: the AU Special Envoy for the Peace Talks on Darfur on behalf of the Mediation: Dr. Salim Ahmed Salim
Comment of signatories: Dyadic peace agreement signed in Abuja, Nigeria on 5 July 2005.
Third parties: AU
Full-text peace agreement
2006
Primary Parties: Government of Sudan - NRF, SLM/A, SLM/A - MM
Dimension: Internal
| Estimated Fatalities | |
|---|---|
| High | 3346 |
| Best | 1017 |
| Low | 1011 |
Numbers include fatalities for all dyads both active and inactive for this year
Peace agreements
Name of peace agreement: Darfur Peace Agreement
Date when warring parties signed the agreement: 2006-05-05
Comment of peace agreement: Partial peace agreement
On 5 May 2006 the Government of Sudan and the SLM/MM (Minni Mannawi faction) signed a peace agreement concerning the three states of Darfur, in the Nigerian city of Abuja. The agreement contains a total of 6 annexes, all which are reaffirmed. The peace agreement was meant to be signed by SLM/AW and JEM as well as SLM/MM, but the two former groups refused to sign, leading to the peace agreement mentioning all groups, but applying only to SLM/MM.
This dyadic peace agreement, being wide in scope, covered such issues as national and state power-sharing, demilitarization of the Janjaweed and other militias, an integration of SLM/A and JEM troops into the Sudanese Armed Forces and police, a system of federal wealth-sharing for the promotion of Darfurian economic interests, a referendum on the future status of Darfur and measures to promote the flow of humanitarian aid into the region.
The agreement contained a comprehensive ceasefire agreement (CFA), which reaffirmed in particular the NDajema Agreement of April 2004. The CFA forbade mobilization, recruitment, military actions and propaganda, and stipulated the release of all detainees. It also contained measures to protect humanitarian aid routes and IDPs. The CFA was to be monitored and verified mainly by AMIS, whose force strength was to be enhanced by international partners. An important part of the CFA was the neutralization of the Janjaweed and the Popular Defence Forces, for which the GoS was responsible. The agreement stipulated that the GoS was to take all measures available to neutralize the threat posed by these groups operating in GoS territory. Disengagement, redeployment and demobilization were sequenced according to a step-by-step plan according to a specified time-frame.
The chapter on Final Security Arrangements outlined the final moves for demobilization and reintegration of ex-combatants. Forces of SLM/A and JEM were to be integrated into the security institutions of Sudan, with a total of 4000 soldiers being integrated into the armed forces, 1000 being integrated into the police and another 3000 being given professional and educational training for reintegration into civilian life. Integrated battalions were to be composed of between 33% and 50% SLM/A or JEM troops. Senior positions in SAF command and HQ were also to be granted to the movements, at a total of 20%. The agreement further stipulated reforms of various security institutions, for instance the Border Intelligence Units, the Popular Defence Forces and the Popular Police, in order to increase equitable representation and professionalism.
Regarding the incompatibility the agreement both touched on political representation and the future status of Darfur. In the political sphere the most important provisions were power-sharing at the national and state level, the creation of a Transitional Darfur Regional Authority (TDRA), a referendum and general moves towards the equitable representation of Darfurians in Sudanese affairs. Up until elections, i.e. in the interim period, the SLM/A and JEM would be represented at the national level by a Senior Assistant to the President, to be selected from a list of nominees by these two movements. This Senior Assistant was to be placed at the head of a number of councils and committees in order to ensure influence over national policy. Further, the 3 posts of Cabinet Minister held by Darfurians would remain, and an additional Cabinet Minister and 2 posts of State Minister would be allocated to SLM/A and JEM nominees. 12 seats in the legislative would also be awarded to such nominees. Power-sharing arrangements were also agreed upon within Darfur, with the seat of Governor of 1 of the 3 Darfurian states to be held by a SLM/A and JEM nominee, and with 2 seats of Deputy Governor in all other states. Ministerial positions were also to be given to these movements, along with 21 seats out of the 66 seat legislatures of the three states. Lastly, the GoS was to ensure the fair and equitable representation of Darfurians in the national judiciary and civil services. The TDRA would be responsible in the interim period for certain aspects of the implementation process, with the responsibility also of recommending national and state legislation to enhance cooperation and coordination. Pending elections 6 SLM/A nominees and 6 JEM nominees would run local governments. The permanent status of Darfur would be determined by a referendum, to be held no later than July 2010. In this referendum the two alternatives would be; 1) the creation of a unified Darfur region, or 2) status quo with 3 existing Darfurian states (north, south and west).
On wealth-sharing and fiscal redistribution the peace agreement stipulated a complex structure of federal fiscal relations, with the general aim of fiscal equalization of the Sudanese states. For this purpose Darfur would be given priority in resource redistribution, and also benefit from the Darfur Reconstruction and Development Fund. This part of the agreement also outlined some moves towards land reform, with the affirmation of tribal land ownership and the principal of restitution in cases of lost land. To arbitrate in land disputes the agreement stipulated the creation of a Land Commission, which would make binding decisions on land rights. The distribution of land between different groups, however, was not specifically regulated.
The GoS, the TDRA and international partners were responsible for the reconstruction of Darfur, and of the creation of conditions susceptible to the voluntary return of refugees and IDPs. AMIS would monitor and patrol humanitarian aid routes and demilitarized IDP camps to ensure the return of IDPs and refugees. The agreement also stipulated a donor conference to accumulate the necessary resources for the reconstruction and development of Darfurs economy.
One of the final provisions was the stipulated holding of a Darfur-Darfur dialogue conference, to which all stakeholders in the conflict would be invited to discuss the conflict, reconciliation, community building and issues of land and natural resources. Such a conference would recommend policy and advise the government on legislation to promote peace and reconciliation.
Signatories: For the GoS: Dr. Magzoub al-Khalifa
For the Sudan Liberation Movement/Army: Minni Arkou Minnawi
Witnessed by:
For the AU: Dr. Salim Ahmed Salim, AU Special Envoy and Chief Mediator
For the AU: Denis Sassou-Nguesso, Chairman of the AU
For the AU: Alpha Oumar Konare, Chairperson of the AU Commission
For the Republic of Nigeria: President Olusegun Obasanjo
For the Libyan Arab Jamahiriya: Dr. Ali Treki
For the USA: Robert Zoellick, Deputy Secretary of State
For the UK: Hilary Benn, Secretary of State for International Development
For the UN: Jan Pronk, Special Representative of the Secretary-General of the UN in Sudan
For the EU: Pekka Haavisto
For the Arab League: Zeid Al Sabban, Counsellor
For the Arab Republic of Egypt: Ahmed A. Haggag, Ambassador
For Canada: Allan Rock, Ambassador
For Norway: Dr. Kjell Hodnebo
For France: Henri de Coignac, Ambassador
For the Netherlands: Agnes Van Ardenne, Minister for Development Cooperation
Comment of signatories: Dyadic peace agreement
Minni Minnawi, signatory for the SLM/A (MM) did not at the signing represent the whole of the SLM/A movement, but only his own faction, leaving the movement split on this peace agreement since the SLA lead by Abdel Wahid el-Nour refused to sign. Also, the JEM refused to sign the agreement, stating that it did not adress the root causes of the conflict.
Third parties: AU, AMIS, UN
Comment of third parties role in peace agreement: The AU was the chief mediator in these negotiations, and during the seventh round the DPA was signed in Abuja, Nigeria. The seventh round began on 29 November 2005, alternated between different locations but finished in Abuja.
Ended: True
Date agreement ended: 2010-12-31
Comment of Duration: The duration of the DPA ended at the end of 2010. At that time the government and SLM/A (MM) clashed at three different times. Also, Mini Minawi said that he was thinking of joining forces with SLM/A led by Abdul Wahid. In addition the government declared Mini Minawi and his forces being a legal target.
Full-text peace agreement
2007
Primary Parties: Government of Sudan - JEM, SLFA
Dimension: Internal
Comment on Dimension: The conflict in Sudan is an intrastate conflict since there are no secondary-warring parties involved in the conflict. However, the Government of Sudan is supporting rebels in Chad and the Government of Chad is supporting rebels in Darfur so there is a clear international dimension of the conflict. But the UCDP definition of an “intra-state conflict with foreign involvement” is that it should be a secondary-warring party something that is lacking in Sudan. Hence the conflict in Sudan is defined as an intrastate conflict.
| Estimated Fatalities | |
|---|---|
| High | 318 |
| Best | 249 |
| Low | 231 |
Numbers include fatalities for all dyads both active and inactive for this year
2008
Primary Parties: Government of Sudan - JEM, SLFA, SLM/A
Dimension: Internal
Comment on Dimension: The Darfurian rebel groups, especially JEM, are supported by Chad and Chadian rebels are supported by Khartoum. However, the dimension is still coded as intrastate since Chad is not a secondary warring but a secondary supporting party in the Sudanese conflict.
| Estimated Fatalities | |
|---|---|
| High | 1476 |
| Best | 598 |
| Low | 598 |
Numbers include fatalities for all dyads both active and inactive for this year
2009
Primary Parties: Government of Sudan - JEM, SLM/A
Dimension: Internal
| Estimated Fatalities | |
|---|---|
| High | 370 |
| Best | 353 |
| Low | 353 |
Numbers include fatalities for all dyads both active and inactive for this year
2010
Primary Parties: Government of Sudan - JEM, SLM/A, SSDM/A
Dimension: Internal
| Estimated Fatalities | |
|---|---|
| High | 1890 |
| Best | 1012 |
| Low | 1012 |
Numbers include fatalities for all dyads both active and inactive for this year
Peace agreements
Name of peace agreement: Doha Agreement
Date when warring parties signed the agreement: 2010-02-23
Comment of peace agreement: Peace process agreement
On 23 February 2010 JEM and the government of Sudan signed a peace process agreement in Doha, capital of Qatar. The agreement was negotiated by Chad and three days before the signature of this agreement a ceasefire agreement was signed in the Chadian capital, N’Djamena. The agreement states that JEM will become a political party after the signing of a final agreement. Moreover, it is stipulated that JEM should share power at all levels and that the administration of Darfur will be part of a final agreement. Finally, the agreement also state that death sentences against 100 JEM rebels should be cancelled.
Signatories: Amin Hassan Omar (Government)
Ahmed Tugod Lsan (JEM)
Witnessed for the State of Qatar: Ahmed Bin Abdullah Al Mahmood, the state Minister for the Foreign Affair, member of the council of ministers.
For the joint AU- UN mediation: Djibriel Basole, Joint mediator MA/MA
Third parties: Chad, Qatar, AU, UN
Comment of third parties role in peace agreement: The agreement was brokered by Chad in Qatar
Ended: True
Date agreement ended: 2011-12-19
Comment of Duration: According to the agreement a final agreement would be negotiated and concluded by 15 March 2010. However new negotiations were scheduled for May 2010. Elections in Sudan in April was criticized by JEM who rejected the results. According to JEM the government launched a military offensive against the group in early May, in response they walked out of the May negotiations and threatened to leave the peace process. Ahmed Tugod Lsan stated ""We have not decided yet if we will pull out of the Doha process,". In June the leader of JEM Dr Khalil Ibrahim, stated regarding the Doha agreement "The Khartoum Government has not abided by the agreements and it has now transcended the agreements we signed in Doha. Further, the battles are still going on. We are now living a new reality which is not in favour of the Regime which has to bear its responsibility.". Negotiations continued in December but JEM again left negotiations in January 2011. After the assassination in an airstrike of Khalil Ibrahim the government sought new negotiations with JEM in January 2012, Ahmed Tugod Lsan, then stated that "the assassination has only strengthened JEM's resolve to overthrow the government by any means." The agreement is seen as ended on 19 December 2011, the date of the airstrike killing Khalil Ibrahim.
Full-text peace agreement
2011
Primary Parties: Government of Sudan - JEM, SLM/A, SPLM/A-North, SRF, SSDM/A, SSLM/A
Secondary Warring Parties Side B: Government of South Sudan
Dimension: Internationalized intrastate
| Estimated Fatalities | |
|---|---|
| High | 2079 |
| Best | 1259 |
| Low | 1235 |
Numbers include fatalities for all dyads both active and inactive for this year
Peace agreements
Name of peace agreement: Addis Ababa Agreement (Framework Agreement between the Government of Sudan and the Sudan People´s Liberation Movement (North) on Political Partnership between NCP and SPLMN, and Political and Security Arrangements in Blue Nile and Southern Kordofan States)
Date when warring parties signed the agreement: 2011-06-28
Comment of peace agreement: Peace process agreement
On 28 June 2011 the government of Sudan and SPLM/A-North signed a peace agreement in the Ethiopian capital, Addis Ababa. In the agreement some issues were touched upon but others were left for later. Thus, the settlement was a peace process agreement. The framework agreement pledges to pave the way for comprehensive political and security arrangements of the two contested states of South Kordofan and Blue Nile. Stipulated in the agreement was also that a joint political committee will be formed and that the issue of governance in the states should be resolved by the joint committee. The agreement also includes principles on cessation of hostilities and the intention to reach a ceasefire. Also, the contested issue of disarmament was included in the agreement and it was agreed that any disarmament should be done in amicably.
Signatories: Nafie Ali Nafie, Government of Sudan
Malik Agar, SPLM/A-North
Thabo Mbeki, African Uniun Chief Mediator
Third parties: African Union
Comment of third parties role in peace agreement: The chief negotiator for the agreement was the former South African President Thabo Mbeki. The negotiations leading up to the agreement was led by Mbeki who represented the African Union.
Ended: True
Date agreement ended: 2011-07-01
Comment of Duration: The agreement was never implemented and fighting between the government of Sudan and SPLM/A-north continued despite the signing of the agreement. On 1 July the warring parties fought in El Hamra, about 25 miles (40 kilometers) from the South Kordofan state capital of Kadugli and this date is coded as when the agreement ended.
Full-text peace agreement
2012
Primary Parties: Government of Sudan - SRF
Dimension: Internal
| Estimated Fatalities | |
|---|---|
| High | 1818 |
| Best | 1188 |
| Low | 1138 |
Numbers include fatalities for all dyads both active and inactive for this year
2013
Primary Parties: Government of Sudan - SRF
Dimension: Internal
| Estimated Fatalities | |
|---|---|
| High | 3837 |
| Best | 599 |
| Low | 533 |
Numbers include fatalities for all dyads both active and inactive for this year
2014
Primary Parties: Government of Sudan - Darfur Joint Resistance Forces, SARC, SRF
Dimension: Internal
| Estimated Fatalities | |
|---|---|
| High | 3386 |
| Best | 856 |
| Low | 815 |
Numbers include fatalities for all dyads both active and inactive for this year
Peace agreements
Name of peace agreement: Agreement on the National Dialogue and Constitutional Process
Date when warring parties signed the agreement: 2014-09-04
Comment of peace agreement: Peace process agreement
On 4 September 2014 the Agreement on the National Dialogue and Constitutional Process was signed between the Government of Sudan and the SRF in Addis Ababa. The agreement was a peace process agreement that provided a framework for future dialogue between the parties.
This agreement was part of the National Dialogue process that was initiated earlier in 2014 by President Bashir. The SRF and the opposition party called the National Umma Party took part in the negotiations with the government, which was represented by the National Dialogue Committee, also called the Committee of 7+7. The agreement was signed in two separate but identical documents.
The signatories agreed that a cessation of hostilities was an absolute priority, and that a comprehensive political settlement was the ideal option to resolve the problems in Sudan. Some basic provisions for the dialogue and constitutional process was set. All participants were to freely express their views and positions, and a guarantee of the inclusion of all stakeholders in the dialogue and constitutional process was to be given. The process itself was to commence upon that the parties had agreed on the rules and procedures of how the dialogue would be conducted.
Different confidence building measures was agreed to be prioritized in the process, the insurance of freedoms and basic human rights, the addressing of the humanitarian situation, and the release of political detainees.
Signatories: For the Government of Sudan: Mr. Ahmed Saad Omer and Dr. Ghazi Salahuddin Al Atabani, both representatives of the Committee of 7+7.
For SRF: Mr. Malik Agar Eyre, chairperson of the Sudanese Revolutionary Front.
For the National Umma Party: Sayed Al Sadig Al Mahdi, chairman.
Mediated and witnessed by: President Thabo Mvuyelwa Mbeki, chairman of the African Union High-Level Implementation Panel (AUHIP).
Comment of signatories: Dyadic peace agreement between the Government of Sudan and SRF. Other warring parties in Sudan such as Darfur Joint Resistance Forces and SARC have not been involved in the negotiations or signed the agreement. The agreement was signed in Addis Ababa, Ethiopia on 4 September 2014.
Third parties: AU
Comment of third parties role in peace agreement: The Chairman of African Union High-Level Implementation Panel, former South African president Thabo Mbeki, led the talks in Addis Ababa.
Full-text peace agreement
2015
Primary Parties: Government of Sudan - Darfur Joint Resistance Forces, SPLM/A-North, SRF
Dimension: Internal
| Estimated Fatalities | |
|---|---|
| High | 2379 |
| Best | 1264 |
| Low | 1264 |
Numbers include fatalities for all dyads both active and inactive for this year
2016
Primary Parties: Government of Sudan - SPLM/A-North, SRF
Dimension: Internal
| Estimated Fatalities | |
|---|---|
| High | 2328 |
| Best | 1316 |
| Low | 1310 |
Numbers include fatalities for all dyads both active and inactive for this year
Peace agreements
Name of peace agreement: Roadmap Agreement
Date when warring parties signed the agreement: 2016-08-08
Comment of peace agreement: Peace process agreement
The government signed the road map agreement on 21 March 2016, and some parts of the SRF, after refusing to do so initially, finally signed the same agreement on 8 August 2016. The agreement committed parties to an inclusive National Dialogue and outlined the agenda for future negotiations. The parties prioritized talks to conclude Cessation of Hostilities and Permanent Ceasefire Agreement, and to negotiate around the Darfur and the Southern Kordofan and Blue Nile areas. The Joint Committee(s) are established with regard to coordinating between a Permanent Ceasefire, security arrangements, and conclusion of relevant political processes that may arise from the National Dialogue. Finally, the parties agreed to set a timeline for steps laid out in the Roadmap Agreement.
Signatories: Sudan: Hon. Eng. Ibrahim Mahmoud Hamid on 21 March 2016
JEM: Dr. Gibril Ibrahim Mohamed on 8 August 2016
SLM/A-MM: Mr. Mini Arko Minawi on 8 August 2016
SPLM-North: Mr. Yasir Arman on 8 August 2016
National UMMA Party: Al-Imam Al-Sadig Al-Mahdi on 8 August 2016
H.E. Thabo Mvuylwa Mbeki Chairman of the African Union High Level Implementation Panel.
Comment of signatories: Dyadic peace agreement signed in Addis Ababa by the government on 21 March 2016 and by the opposition on 8 August 2016.
JEM and SLM/A – MM were part of the SRF alliance in 2016.
Third parties: AU
Comment of third parties role in peace agreement: The meeting was facilitated by the AU High Level Implementation Panel on Sudan and South Sudan.
Ended: True
Date agreement ended: 2016-08-15
Comment of Duration: Ceasefire talks began between the Government of Sudan and the different opposition groups within SRF began right after the signature of the groups. These were known as the two-track process as negotiations in Darfur were held between the government and the two SRF members SLM-M and JEM
and negotiations in the Two Areas of South Kordofan and Blue Nile were held between the government and the SRF member SPLM-N. On 15 August the peace talks broke down over the SPLM-N's request that, following the ceasefire, humanitarian aid be delivered by airlift to rebel areas in South Kordofan and the Blue Nile from Ethiopia, South Sudan and Kenya. This request was rejected by the government delegation. The Darfur track was also suspended. Efforts to revive the negotiations within the two tracks continued in 2017 but failed.
The National Dialogue in Sudan was officially concluded in 2016 was continuously boycotted by the groups signing the road map agreement.
Full-text peace agreement
2017
Primary Parties: Government of Sudan - SARC, SLM/A, SRF
Dimension: Internal
| Estimated Fatalities | |
|---|---|
| High | 366 |
| Best | 166 |
| Low | 154 |
Numbers include fatalities for all dyads both active and inactive for this year
2018
Primary Parties: Government of Sudan - SLM/A
Dimension: Internal
| Estimated Fatalities | |
|---|---|
| High | 519 |
| Best | 262 |
| Low | 210 |
Numbers include fatalities for all dyads both active and inactive for this year
2019
Primary Parties: -
Dimension: Internal
Comment on Dimension: There was no foreign troop involvement in the Sudanese conflict over government in 2019.
| Estimated Fatalities | |
|---|---|
| High | 32 |
| Best | 23 |
| Low | 23 |
Numbers include fatalities for all dyads both active and inactive for this year
Peace agreements
Name of peace agreement: The Juba Declaration for Trust Building Measures and Pre-Negotiations Principles
Date when warring parties signed the agreement: 2019-09-11
Comment of peace agreement: Peace process agreement
The Juba Declaration for Trust Building Measures and Pre-Negotiations Principles was signed on 11 September 2019 by the Government of Sudan, SRF and SPLM/A-North in the South Sudan capital Juba.
The parties to the agreement had agreed upon the formation of joint committees to follow up on issues regarding the release of prisoners, the cessation of hostilities and preparations for negotiations.
The government had also agreed to annul travel banns, review of decisions issued in relation to dam lands and decision No. 206 on lands granted to investors in the Northern Stat, delay the formation of the Legislative Council and respond to the issue of o amendment of Article 70 of the Constitutional Charter, which provided for the inclusion of Peace agreements in the Constitution.
The peace process was divided into four tracks: Darfur, the Two Areas, East, and North Sudan.
Signatories: Parties
Lieutenant General Mohamed Hamdan Dagalo
Government of the Sudan
Sudan Revolutionary Front:
Dr. Elhadi Idriss Yahya, Chairman of the Revolutionary Front and Chairman of SLM-Transitional
Council
Dr. Gibril Ibrahim, JEM
Lieutenant General Malik Agar, SPLM-N
Commander Mini Arko Minnawi, SLM
Osama Saeed, Beja Opposition Congress:
Alamin Daoud Mahmoud, United Popular Front for Liberation and Justice:
Mohamed Daoud Mohamed, Kush Liberation Movement:
Eltom Hajo Democratic United Party-Revolutionary Front:
Sudan Liberation Forces Alliance:
Altahir Abubaker Hajar,
Third parties: Witnesses General Salva Kiir Mayardit, President of the Republic of South Sudan
Comment of third parties role in peace agreement: In the agreement the Parties agreed that regional parties, including the AU, IGAD, Chad and Arab countries, including Egypt, Saudi Arabia, UAE, Qatar, Kuwait and all Gulf countries and the international community, including USA, UK, Norway, EU, France, Germany, Canada, Russia, China and the UN must be engaged in all stages of peace making and peace building
Full-text peace agreement
Name of peace agreement: Political Declaration between the Government of the Republic of Sudan and the Sudan Revolutionary Front
Date when warring parties signed the agreement: 2019-10-21
Comment of peace agreement: Peace process agreement
The Political Declaration between the Government of the Republic of Sudan and the Sudan Revolutionary Front was concluded on 21 October 2019 between the Government of Sudan and SRF in Juba, South Sudan.
The Parties recognized the issuance of the joint declaration to renew the cessation of hostilities.
The Parties agreed on a negotiation agenda:
(1) National issues including (citizenship, development, resource distribution
and allocation, governance and administration, security arrangements and
other fundamental issues).
(2) Negotiation tracks which shall include Darfur, Two Areas (South
Kordofan/Nuba Mountains and Blue Nile), East Sudan, Central Sudan,
and North Sudan.
(3) Issues of specific particularities.
(4) Negotiation methodology and approach.
Signatories: Government of Sudan
Lt. Gen. Mohamed Hamdan Dagalo
Sudan Revolutionart Front
Dr. Elhadi Idriss Yahya
Malik Agar, SPLM-N
Abu Obaida Khalifa Al Taishi, SLM
Ethar Khalil Ibrahim, JEM
Saleh Hamed Ismael, SLFA
Alamin Daoud Mahmoud, UPFLJ
Eltom Shaikh Hajo, DUP-SRF
Mohamed Daoud Mohamed Daoud, Kush Liberation Movement
Musa Seedy Mohamed Ali, Beja Opposition Congress
Nimr Abdelrahman, SLM-TC
Witness
Tut Qaluak Manime
Presidential Advisor on Security Affairs – Chief Mediator
Third parties: South Sudan
Full-text peace agreement
Name of peace agreement: Agreement on the Provision of Humanitarian Assistance and Cessation of Hostilities For the Two Areas of Blue Nile and Nuba Mountains/South Kordofan
Date when warring parties signed the agreement: 2019-12-17
Comment of peace agreement: Peace process agreement
Agreement on the Provision of Humanitarian Assistance and Cessation of Hostilities For the Two Areas of Blue Nile and Nuba Mountains/South Kordofan was a peace process agreement between the Government of Sudan and the Malik Agrar faction of SPLM/A-North. The agreement was a Frame-work agreement for the Two Areas track of the Juba Peace Process. The agreement would come into force from the date of its signing, and would remain in force until a comprehensive peace agreement is reached, and should form an integral part of that agreement.
The agreement included a ceasefire and formed a Mechanism for Monitoring Cessation of Hostilities to oversee it.
Regarding the incompatibility one of the objectives of the agreement was to provide for a path forward for achieving durable peace for the Two Areas in a manner that promoted and complemented the efforts for the successful completion of a just, comprehensive, and durable peace for all of Sudan and a transition from the oppression of the Former Regime to a democratic new Sudan, based on equal citizenship.
The agreement also provided for the establishment of a Joint Humanitarian Committee to coordinate and oversee the delivery of humanitarian assistance. Another objective of the agreement was to create an environment conducive for the safe and voluntary return of internally displaced persons (IDPs) and refugees to their homes.
Signatories: Sudan: Gen. Mohamed Hamdan Dagalo, Head of the Transitional Government Negotiation Delegation
For SRF: SPLM/A-North - MA faction: Lt. Gen. Malik Agar Eyre, Chairman of the Sudan People´s Liberation Movement-North (SPLM-N) and Commander in Chief of the Sudan People's Liberation Army-North (SPLM/A-N/SRF)
Witnessed by: Hon. Tut Galuak Manime, Special Adviser to the President of the Republic on Security Affairs, Chairman of the Mediation Committee On behalf of the President of the Republic of South Sudan
Full-text peace agreement
Name of peace agreement: Framework Agreement between the Transitional Government of Sudan and the Darfur Track
Date when warring parties signed the agreement: 2019-12-28
Comment of peace agreement: Peace process agreement
The Framework Agreement between the Transitional Government of Sudan and the Darfur Track was a peace process agreement signed in Juba, South Sudan, between the Government of Sudan and SRF on 28 December 2020 as part of the Juba Peace Process.
Regarding the incompatibility the agreement listed some General Principals such as stopping the war and addressing the root causes, equality between sexes, as well as reforming Sudanese state institutions during the transitional period to reflect its independence and nationalism and ensuring a fair distribution of opportunities within them, bridging the development gap between Sudan’s regions and wealth sharing. As well as Promoting and protecting democracy as well as the right to engage in political activities.
The Agreement listed a number of different negotiation issues, both National Issues and Darfur specific issues.
Signatories: The Transitional Government of the Republic of Sudan
Lieutenant General Shams ad-Din Kabbashi,
The Darfur Track Sudan Liberation Movement Mohammed Bashir Abdullah
Sudanese Justice and Equality Movement Ahmed Mohamed Tugod Lisan
Sudanese Liberation Forces Alliance Mubarak Bakhit Ibrahim
Sudan Liberation Movement - Transitional Council
Nimr Muhammad Abdulrahman
Comment of third parties role in peace agreement: Mediation
Counselor Tut Qaluak Manime
Adviser to the President of the Republic for Security Affairs
Full-text peace agreement
2020
Primary Parties: Government of Sudan - SLM/A
Dimension: Internal
| Estimated Fatalities | |
|---|---|
| High | 51 |
| Best | 48 |
| Low | 48 |
Numbers include fatalities for all dyads both active and inactive for this year
Peace agreements
Name of peace agreement: Juba agreement Two areas Framework agreement
Date when warring parties signed the agreement: 2020-01-24
Comment of peace agreement: Partial peace agreement
The Government of Sudan and the Agrar faction of SPLM/A-North signed a Partial peace agreement in Juba, South Sudan on 24 January 2020. The agreement provided for a binding Framework for the parties to adhere to throughout the negotiations.
The agreement stated that the Republic of Sudan will have a single national professional army. The agreement proposed to unify all militias and government soldiers into a single unified Sudanese military body. Implementation of the agreement on final security arrangements will include an Independent Commission for Disarmament, Demobilization and Reintegration (DDR).
Regarding the incompatibility the agreement granted legislative autonomy to South Kordofan and Blue Nile within the framework of decentralized governance (whether federal or autonomous) , and proposed solutions for sharing land and other resources. The agreement also handled some cultural rights and stated that all Sudanese indigenous languages are considered national languages that should be respected, promoted and celebrated equally. The Parties also agreed addressed the percentages of representation in the legislative and executive levels in the Two Areas in the Political Committee but decided that women will have a 40% share of representation in the legislative and executive bodies.
The agreement provided for the formation of a committee on political arrangements and a committee on security arrangements. The Parties commit to establishing a Commission for the voluntary return and resettlement of IDPs and refugees in the Two Areas.
Signatories: Hemetti on behalf of the Sovereignty Council and
Ahmed El Omda Badi on behalf of SPLM-N (Agar)
Full-text peace agreement
Name of peace agreement: Eastern Track Agreement between the Transitional Government of Sudan and the Sudan Revolutionary Front
Date when warring parties signed the agreement: 2020-02-21
Comment of peace agreement: Partial peace agreement
Eastern Track Agreement between the Transitional Government of Sudan and the Sudan Revolutionary Front, a partial peace agreement under the Juba peace process, was concluded between the Government of Sudan and SRF on 21 February 2020.
The Parties recognized the reintegration of former combatants as an important element for a peaceful and secure Sudan and the Transitional Government of Sudan committed to review the problems of the procedures of disarmament, demobilization and reintegration (DDR) stipulated in the East Agreement of 2006.
The agreement created an administrative status for the eastern Sudan states, Red Sea, Gedaref and Kassala states within the framework of the federal government system. It also provided for the political participation of the eastern Sudanese people and allocated 30% of the representation for the opposition’s Beja Congress and the United Popular Front for Liberation and Justice at legislative and executive levels in Eastern Sudan’s three states. The agreement also stipulated that the Federal Government should employ men and women of Eastern Sudan in all national civil service posts by a percentage of up to 14% of all public employment posts.
The parties agreed to to establish a fund for the east Sudan reconstruction with local funding along with the establishment of a private bank that will support the development of political structures, education, health, and capacity building.
Signatories: The Government of Sudan
Sudan Revolutionary Front
Osama Saeed for the Beja Opposition Conference
Comment of signatories: For the government Mohamed al-Hassan al-Taishi ?
Osama Saeed Beja Opposition Conference
Full-text peace agreement
Name of peace agreement: Juba Agreement
Date when warring parties signed the agreement: 2020-08-31
Comment of peace agreement: Partial peace agreement
The Juba Agreement was not signed but initialled in South Sudan's capital Juba by representatives of the Government and SRF on 31 August 2020. The Juba Agreement was a partial peace agreement, concluded as part of a peace process that ended with the signing of a final peace agreement on 3 October 2020.
The agreement provided for a permanent ceasefire, the disarmament, demobilization, and reintegration of forces as well as integration into the national army. The agreement stipulated that the signatories would commit to promoting geographic and social diversity and employing equal opportunity policies in the membership of the Armed Forces and other security services.
Political provisions The agreement provided for a Federal Sudan with clear powers divided between the Federal Government and the Regional Government of Darfur. The Parties agreed to address the imbalance in the national civil service in favor of citizens of Darfur at all levels of employment and to accommodate 20% of appointments made by political decree to the men and women of Darfur. The agreement did not stipulate a system of governance of Sudan, the question was delegated to a conference to be held within no more than six months after the signing of the agreement.
The agreement also provided for the release of the remaining prisoners of war,
a general amnesty for sentences and warrants issued against political leaders and members of the armed movements due to their membership therein but precludes the possibility of any amnesty or immunity for perpetrators of genocide, crimes against humanity, or war crimes. The Parties agreed to form a joint high committee to oversee and monitor the implementation of the Agreement. The agreement also provided for positive discrimination and the exemption of tuition fees for students from Darfur in public universities in Darfur for a period of ten years.
Signatories: For the Government Mohamed Hamdan "Hemedti" Dagalo
For SRF Dr Gibril Ibrahim Mohammed (JEM) Minni Arko Minnawi (SLA)
Comment of signatories: The Darfur Agreement was initialled by Mohamed Hamdan "Hemedti" Dagalo for the Government of Sudan and SRF. SRF was representing JEM, SLM/Minnawi, SLM/Transitional Council, Sudan Liberation Forces Alliance and the Sudan Alliance and Dr Gibril Ibrahim Mohammed from JEM and Minni Arko Minnawi from SLA signed the agreement for SRF.
The signing ceremony also included Prime Minister Abdalla Hamdok and the head of the transitional sovereign council, General Abdel Fattah al-Burhan but they did not sign the protocol.
Third parties: South Sudan, Chad, Egypt
Name of peace agreement: Addis Ababa Agreement on Principles
Date when warring parties signed the agreement: 2020-09-03
Comment of peace agreement: Partial peace agreement
The Addis Ababa Agreement on Principles was signed on 3 September 2020 by the Government of Sudan and SPLM-North in the Ethiopian capital Addis Ababa. It was a partial peace agreement signed with the faction of SPLM/A-North, led by Abdel-Aziz Adam al-Hilu who had left the Juba peace process
The parties agreed to maintain the cessation of hostilities throughout the peace process until they had agreed upon security arrangements. They also agreed that the people of Nuba Mountain and the Blue Nile should retain the right to self-protection until new agreements and until ‘separation between religion and state’ had been actualized.
Regarding the incompatibility the agreement stated that Sudan should become a democratic state and that the constitution should be based on the principle of separation of religion and state. And that the constitution should guarantee appropriate and fair sharing of power and wealth among the various people of Sudan.
The agreement declared that "Sudan is a multi-racial, multi-ethnic, multi-religious and multi-cultural society. Full recognition and-accommodation of these diversities must be affirmed."
Signatories: For the Government of Sudan: Prime Minister Abdalla Hamdok
For SPLM/A North: Abdel-Aziz Adam al-Hilu
Comment of signatories: https://www.voanews.com/africa/south-sudan-focus/sudan-holdout-group-peace-deal-fails-address-conflicts-root-causes
https://www.voanews.com/africa/south-sudan-focus/sudans-government-agrees-separate-religion-and-state
https://www.dabangasudan.org/en/all-news/article/sudan-govt-splm-n-el-hilu-agreement-in-addis-ababa-rebels-to-retain-arms
and Abelwahid El Nur
Full-text peace agreement
Name of peace agreement: Juba Agreement for Peace in Sudan
Date when warring parties signed the agreement: 2020-10-03
Comment of peace agreement: Partial peace agreement
The Juba Agreement for Peace in Sudan was signed between the Government of Sudan and several armed group members of SRF on 3 October 2020 in Juba, South Sudan. The agreement consisted of 10 chapters which, for the most part, were different partial agreements negotiated in the Juba peace process.
The agreement provided for a permanent ceasefire and the integration of individual members of armed groups into a restructured National Army.
Regarding the incompatibility Sudan was to be established as a federal state where different regions will exercise a different set of powers listed in different chapters of the agreement. The Blue Nile and Kordofan was to become autonomous while Darfur would become a region within the Federal State. The Federal State would have three levels of government. The Agreement provided for a conference on the system of government, a time frame, an agenda and some indication on the participants in which constitutional negotiations would be held. The Juba Agreement for Peace in Sudan also provides for power-sharing at both the national and regional level.
The Juba Agreement for Peace in Sudan established some transitional justice mechanisms, including truth and reconciliation mechanisms, investigations and the amnesties. The agreement also provided for the establishment of a National Revenue Fund and a National Revenue Commission to Divide, Allocate and Oversee Resources and Financial Revenues. The peace agreement also dealt with the relationship between religion and state and stipulated a "complete separation between religious institutions and state institutions to guarantee that religion will not be exploited in politics, and that the state will remain equidistant from all religions and sacred beliefs, which should be guaranteed in the country’s constitution and in its laws".
Signatories: The Transitional Government of Sudan
General Mohammed Hamdan Dagalo First Vice President of the Transitional Sovereign Council
The Sudanese Alliance Khamis Abdallah Abkar
Gathering of Sudan Liberation Forces Altahir Abubaker Hajer
Sudan Liberation Movement/Army Minni Arko Minawi
Sudan Liberation Movement/Army – Transitional Council Dr. Elhadi Idris Yahya
Sudanese Justice and Equality Movement Dr. Gibril Ibrahim Mohammed
Sudan People’s Liberation Movement-North / Revolutionary Malik Agar Ayr
United Popular Front for Liberation and Justice Khalid Idris Jaweish
Opposition Beja Conference Osama Said
Sudanese Kush Liberation Movement Mohammed Daoud Bandaq
Kayan Al-Shamal (The Northern Entity) Mohammed Said Ahmed Sir-alkhatim
Opposition Democratic Union Party / Revolutionary Front Eltom Elsheikh Mousa Hajo
The Third Front /Tamazuj Mohammed Ali Quraishi
Sudan Liberation Movement/Army – Ahmed Ibrahim Kazisky Mr. Ali Ahmed Hamid Advisor
Witnesses: General Abdulfatah Burhan Abdulrahman President of the Transitional Sovereign Council
The Arab Republic of Egypt
The State of Qatar
The African Union
The United Nations
The European Union
Representative of the Arab League
Ambassador Khalid Abdulrahim Abdalghafar
Comment of signatories: Dyadic Agreeement
The Juba Agreement for Peace in Sudan is a final agreement that consists of 10 different chapters, negotiated and signed by different signatories. Article 4 of Chapter 8 (Final provisions) provided that regardless of which agreement the parties have signed, all parties are bound by the Agreement’s preamble, the final provisions and to the national issues and that the parties are ‘equally responsible’ to this Agreement. At the same time, according to article 7 of Chapter 8, individual parties were only bound by the individual chapters that they negotiated and signed.
Two of the main rebel groups, SPLM-N and SLM/A did not sign on to the Juba Agreement.
Third parties: Witnesses:
General Abdulfatah Burhan Abdulrahman
President of the Transitional Sovereign Council
The Arab Republic of Egypt
The State of Qatar
The African Union
The United Nations
The European Union
Representative of the Arab League Ambassador Khalid Abdulrahim Abdalghafar
Full-text peace agreement
2021
Primary Parties: Government of Sudan - SLM/A
Dimension: Internal
| Estimated Fatalities | |
|---|---|
| High | 72 |
| Best | 31 |
| Low | 31 |
Numbers include fatalities for all dyads both active and inactive for this year
Peace agreements
Name of peace agreement: Declaration of Principles between the Transitional Government of Sudan and the Sudan People's Liberation Movement - North
Date when warring parties signed the agreement: 2021-03-28
Comment of peace agreement: Peace Process agreement
The Declaration of Principles between the Transitional Government of Sudan and the Sudan People's Liberation Movement - North was signed on 28 March 2021 in Juba, South Sudan.
The Peace process agreement listed principles to guide the peace process and also issues that would be part of a final peace agreement.
One issue to be part of a final peace agreement was the unification of armed forces. The parties would agree on a permanent ceasefire after the security arrangements of the final agreement is settled.
The agreement also listed principles regarding the incompatibility. For example that Sudan is racially, ethnically, religiously and culturally a diverse state and the establishment of a civil, democratic, federal State in Sudan free of an official religion.
Human, women and children rights will be incorporated in the final peace agreement.
Signatories: Gen. Abdulfatah El-Burhan Abdulrahman, Chairman of the Transitional Sovereign Council, Republic of Sudan
CDR. Abdalaziz Adam Al-Hilu, Chairman, Sudan People's Liberation Movement / Army - North, SPLM/A-N
Third parties Witnesses: Gen. Salva Kiir Mayardit, President of the Republic of South Sudan
Gov. David M. Beasley, Executive Director, World Food Programme
Third parties: Gen. Salva Kiir Mayardit, President of the Republic of South Sudan
Gov. David M. Beasley, Executive Director, World Food Programme
Comment of third parties role in peace agreement: Gen. Salva Kiir Mayardit, President of the Republic of South Sudan and Gov. David M. Beasley, Executive Director, World Food Programme signed the agreement as third parties
Full-text peace agreement
2022
Primary Parties: Government of Sudan - SLM/A
Dimension: Internal
| Estimated Fatalities | |
|---|---|
| High | 47 |
| Best | 47 |
| Low | 47 |
Numbers include fatalities for all dyads both active and inactive for this year
2023
Primary Parties: Government of Sudan - RSF, SPLM/A-North
Dimension: Internal
| Estimated Fatalities | |
|---|---|
| High | 17241 |
| Best | 11760 |
| Low | 11737 |
Numbers include fatalities for all dyads both active and inactive for this year
2024
Primary Parties: Government of Sudan - RSF
Dimension: Internal
Comment on Dimension: The conflict between the government of Sudan and RSF remained internal throughout 2024. There was substantial evidence of external support from the UAE to the RSF, including arms transfers, logistical assistance, financing, and political backing. Some reporting also suggests that weapons and supplies may have been routed through third countries, such as Chad and Libya. These allegations are well documented but do not indicate direct UAE military participation in the conflict.
There is also considerable evidence of external support to the SAF. Turkey has been involved through defense cooperation and arms-related support, including drone sales and transfers, while Egypt has been accused of providing training and equipment to the SAF. Iran has likewise been reported to supply drones to the SAF. However, these forms of involvement constitute material and political support rather than direct military intervention. For this reason, and in line with UCDP’s criteria, the conflict in Sudan is currently classified as internal rather than internationalized.
| Estimated Fatalities | |
|---|---|
| High | 4974 |
| Best | 4684 |
| Low | 4360 |
Numbers include fatalities for all dyads both active and inactive for this year
2025
Primary Parties: Government of Sudan - RSF, SFA, SPLM/A-North
Dimension: Internal
Comment on Dimension: The conflict between the Government of Sudan and Sudan Founding Alliance (SFA) was internal throughout 2025, despite continued and in some cases expanded external involvement.
Substantial evidence persisted of material, financial, and logistical support from the United Arab Emirates (UAE) to the RSF, including arms transfers, drone technology, financing, and supply coordination through regional networks. Reports throughout 2025 continued to identify eastern Chad, Libya, South Sudan, and other neighboring territories as important logistical corridors for SFA resupply. While this external backing significantly enhanced SFA operational capacity, including its expanded use of long-range drones and advanced weaponry, they do not indicate direct military participation and intervention in the conflict.
The Government of Sudan, represented by the Sudanese Armed Forces (SAF), likewise continued to receive considerable foreign support. Egypt remained one of SAF’s principal regional backers, providing diplomatic support, military coordination, and reported training and equipment transfers. Turkey expanded its defense cooperation with SAF, particularly through arms transfers and drone-related support, while Iran continued to supply military drones and related technologies that played an increasingly important role in SAF battlefield operations.
Although foreign involvement in Sudan’s conflict became increasingly pronounced in 2025, including expanded proxy support, arms transfers, and regional logistical facilitation, these forms of involvement constituted material and political support rather than direct military intervention. For this reason, and in line with UCDP criteria, the conflict remained classified as internal rather than internationalized.
| Estimated Fatalities | |
|---|---|
| High | 12654 |
| Best | 12262 |
| Low | 11711 |
Numbers include fatalities for all dyads both active and inactive for this year
Conflict Archive
This section contains annual information no longer systematically collected by the UCDP.
1976 Conflict Archive
Comment on Activity: President Nimeiri returned from a trip to Europe early morning on 2 July, with a majority of the ministers present at the airport to greet the president. Due to weather circumstances the president’s airplane arrived prior to schedule, which might have had relevance concerning the outcome of the events. The attack was well prepared, and due to the factor of surprise, the rebels managed to cause large damage and instability. On 2 July 1976, serious clashes took place on the streets of Khartoum; however, the Sudanese army managed to force a withdrawal of the rebels and order was restored in the capital.
Negotiations: NO
Third party involvement: NO
Victory: YES
Victory side: a
Comment on Victory: The Sudanese army managed to force a withdrawal of the rebels and order was restored in the capital.
Terminated: YES
Type of termination: Victory
Date of termination: 1976-07-03
Comment on Termination: The Sudanese army managed to force a withdrawal of the rebels and order was restored in the capital. The direct result of the coup attempt was, except from the material damage in Khartoum and the death of numerous civilians, the death of approximately 700 rebels and 83 government soldiers.
1983 Conflict Archive
Comment on Activity: In the beginning of 1983, the Sudanese government suffered several mutinies in the south leading to serious clashes between troops loyal to the government and a widespread rebellion in the south. The armed resistance in the South was undertaken by a tribally-based separatist group calling itself Anya Nya II, with resemblances to the rebel group of Anya Nya in the 1970s, but was soon superseded by the more sophisticated and powerful SPLM/A. Followed by the mutiny in Bor, Col. Joh Garang established SPLM/A, the Sudanese army was demoralized therefore, initially, SPLM/A won a series of strategic victories. Followed by the violent developments in Southern Sudan, the organized opposition against the Nimeiri government led by John Garang was established as SPLM (Sudan Peoples Liberation Movement) with its armed wing SPLA (Sudan Peoples Liberation Movement/Army), known as SPLM/A. Developments, caused by growing discontent amongst the southern population against Khartoum, in Southern Sudan spilled over into wide scale violent clashes between government and SPLM/A troops.
The conflict was characterized by small clashes between SPLM/A and the Sudanese army, mainly along the Sudan-Ethiopian border.
In Septermber Sharia laws was introduced by President Nimeiri on the whole country, in effect relegating the non-Muslims in the South to second-class inhabitants. Through this he enhanced southern discontent against the government and took part in reignating the war he had ended a decade earlier. These moves was widely unpopular even in the North, and Nimeirys hold on power grew even more tenous, and even more dependent on the Jihad, holy war, against the infidels for their legitimacy.
Negotiations: YES
Third party involvement: YES
Victory: NO
Terminated: NO
1984 Conflict Archive
Comment on Activity: Early 1984 were characterized by rapid escalation of violence in he south by SPLM/A against government forces. Rebel activities had by this time led to suspended operations by Chevrons Oil Company in Bentiu area and the construction of the Jonglei Canal by the Frensh Compagnie de Construction internationale (CCI), the two most important developing projects in Sudan.
Negotiations: NO
Comment on Negotiation: No negotiations took place between the parties; it is worth noting, however, an initiative to negotiate from president Nimeiri. In December 1984, Nimeiri sent a team to negotiate with Garang, however, the emissaries were captured and later reported to have defected to the rebels.
Third party involvement: YES
Victory: NO
Terminated: NO
1985 Conflict Archive
Comment on Activity: On 6 April 1985, while on a state visit to the U.S., the Sudanese Army removed president Nimeiri in his absence. Former defence minister Abd al-Rahman Suwar al-Dahab replaced Nimeiri, who took refuge in Egypt, and the Transitional Military Council was set up. Dahab expressed his ambition to initiate a peace process with the southern rebels. However, Dahab lacked the skills of unifying leadership that Sudan needed.
The leader of SPLM/A, John Garang, made it clear in speeches that fighting would continue, although Nimeiri had been removed. Garang saw little difference in the new government and vowed that the SPLM/A would continue its fight against both racism and bigotry.
By the end of 1985 the SPLA was in control of the entire southern area, with the exception of some major towns, and had effectively isolated it from the rest of the country, cutting most of the road and river transport links.
Negotiations: YES
Third party involvement: YES
Victory: NO
Terminated: NO
1986 Conflict Archive
Comment on Activity: In May the Sudanese army handed over the power to a civilian government and a less legitimate election took place. The winner of this election was Nimeiri’s arch-rival Sadiq al-Mahdi, leader of the abortive coup of 1976.
By mid-1986, the humanitarian situation in southern Sudan was getting critical as the SPLM/A intensified and spread out its military operations across Equatoria and Bahr el Ghazal, leading to thousands of people trapped in the area. The hunger was explored as a war instrument, employed by both warring parties in order to get international assistance and aid. The situation was also aggravated by the influx of refugees from Chad into Darfur and of Ethiopian refugees into eastern border regions.
Negotiations: YES
Comment on Negotiation: Although the government was not one of the signatories in the so called Koka Dam declaration it is worth noting hence its future importance in the dialogue between the parties. Before coming to power, Sadiq al-Mahdi made positive efforts in trying to enter in peace-talks with the SPLM/A. Between 20-24 March 1986, representatives of the NAS (National Alliance for the National Salvation), led by Mr Awad el Karim Mohammed and SPLM/A led by Garang met for discussions in the Ethiopian town of Koka. The talks resulted in the ‘Koka Dam declaration’. The SPLM/A representatives stated that the movement would participate in a national constitutional conference in Khartoum, if the government agreed to its conditions.
The Koka Dam declaration included conductive conditions which would facilitate the proposed national Constitutional Conference. They agreed upon the lifting of the State of Emergency, repeal of the “September 1983 laws” (Sharia law), cut military ties with Egypt and Libya, however, they failed to agree upon a cease-fire. The national Constitutional Conference (originally planned for June 1986) was postponed several occasions.
On 31 July, Garang and Prime Minister Sadiq Al- Mahdi met for talks on a settlement where they discussed the two key demands of SLPM/A, suspension of the Sharia and of military pacts with Libya and Egypt, as conditions for a cease-fire. However, in August the new government’s initiatives for peace talks were suspended due to the SPLM/A bombings of a civil airplane on 16 August, killing 60 passengers.
Third party involvement: YES
Third party involvement names: National Alliance for the National Salvation
Comment on Third Party Involvement: Between 20-24 March 1986, representatives of the NAS (National Alliance for the National Salvation), a grouping of professional bodies, trade unions and civilian politicians led by Mr Awad el Karim Mohammed and SPLM/A led by Garang met for discussions in the Ethiopian town of Koka. The talks resulted in the ‘Koka Dam declaration’. The SPLM/A representatives stated that the movement would participate in a national constitutional conference in Khartoum, if the government agreed to its conditions.
Victory: NO
Terminated: NO
1987 Conflict Archive
Comment on Activity: The situation in southern Sudan was characterized by a growing lawless and several large-scale clashes between the warring parties took place during the year. However a majority of the fighting was characterized by clashes between SPLM/A and government armed surrogates such as Anya Nya II, Fertit, Mundari and Merli tribe in the Southern part which affected the civilian population to great extent. SPLM/A accused government troops of the killing of 600 civilians southern of the town Wau. The rebels succeeded to capture a number of strategically important towns on northern part of the border dividing southern and northern Sudan.
Negotiations: YES
Third party involvement: YES
Victory: NO
Terminated: NO
1988 Conflict Archive
Comment on Activity: In April SPLM/A launched big attack on Juba and heavy fighting took place between government troops and rebels in the towns of Juba, Nasir and Kapoeta. It was obvious that the government lost control of the situation in southwestern Sudan and that it was getting out of hand. In March 1988 the Anya Nya II leader Major General Gordon Kong joined the SPLM/A bringing with him two-thirds of Anya Nya II forces.
Systematic attacks on food convoys from Uganda to the besieged town of Juba in southern Sudan, became, during the year, a new policy for the SPLM/A.
Negotiations: YES
Comment on Negotiation: Talks in Addis Ababa between Democratic Unionist Party (DUP), one of three parties in Khartoums ruling coalition, and SPLM/A resulted in the signing on 16 November of an agreement representing significant compromise by both. However, the agreement was to be of short duration due to events in the government later the same year.
The opposition in the coalition government, National Islamic Front (NIF), did not accept the Addis Ababa agreement and were reluctant to freezing Islamic law and towards abrogating pacts with Egypt and Libya. NIF, which denounced the Addis Ababa talks as ‘conspiracy’ to block Islamic law, and the Prime Minister Sadiq al- Mahdi voted down a DUP amendment to recognize the terms of the SPLM/A-DUP accord.
Although al-Mahdi initially encouraged the peace talks, he himself was not committed to the accord. Some observers have criticized this move from al-Mahdi as trying to appear to support peace while keeping the NIF in the Government. However, DUP resigned from government as of 27 December that year.
Third party involvement: YES
Third party involvement names: Egypt
Comment on Third Party Involvement: Even though Egypt was biased in the conflict by supplying the Sudanese government with military assistance they managed to open up contacts between Democratic Unionist Party (DUP) and SPLM/A in the mid-1988.
Some observers also suggest the involvement of Ethiopia in getting the actors together.
Victory: NO
Terminated: NO
1989 Conflict Archive
Comment on Activity: During 1989 SPLM/A had started winning not just countryside but garrisons town such as Kapotea, Torit Bor and Nasir. Many of these victories took place in eastern Upper Nile and in early 1989 the better part of that region was in SPLM/A hands. An extensive part of this victory was due to the Nuer SPLM/A commander Riek Machar who had succeeded in unifying and organising the Nuer. These victories for the SPLM/A put pressure on the Government and negotiations with some steps forward took place during the year.
However, on 30 June 1989 the dynamics of the war in Sudan changed completely when a coup was carried out in Khartoum. This coup was conducted one day before the Sudanese National Assembly was due to suspend Islamic law and four days before the Prime Minister Sadiq al-Mahdi was due to meet face-to-face with John Garang. A group of mid-level army officers overthrew Sudans’ parliamentary government in a blood-les coup. The coup proclaimed a “Revolution of National Salvation”. Soon they were revealed to be protégés of Hassan al-Turabi and the National Islamic Front. The coup ended Sudan’s time of Democracy and the war as Turabi had always considered a holy jihad was on again.
During the fall the government claimed to be willing to offer the South independence in exchange for a free hand to implement Islamic law in the Muslim north. However, Garang insisted that the rebels did not want to separate from the north. Instead he maintained they wanted a secular constitution for the whole of Sudan with assurances for ethnic and religious minorities. This position was intolerable to the fundamentalist government, which argued that in a society government had no other purpose than to impose divine law.
In December 1989 the Government threatened to shoot down planes carrying aid to the Southern Sudan without their permission. At the same the Sudanese air force started to bomb relief centres were large numbers of civilians gathered in search of food.
Negotiations: YES
Comment on Negotiation: In March a new government was announced, and it proposed a peace plan that was based on the peace deal that was reached between SPLA and DUP in November 1988, calling for a freeze on Islamic laws. In early May SPLA declared an immediate one-month ceasefire in their fight against government forces. It was later extended for another two weeks. The government accepted the SPLA-DUP peace deal and later it was also ratified by the parliament. The parties met for negotiations in Addis Ababa on 10-13 June, but the talks ended without any tangible results. On 30 June there was a military coup, and the new government declared a unilateral month long ceasefire and offered amnesty for all rebels who laid down arms. The ceasefire was later to be extended until the end of September. They met in Addis Ababa in August but the talks broke down when the government rejected the rebel demand for the repeal of Sharia. On 1 December they met again in Nairobi, under the unofficial mediation of former US president Jimmy Carter, but also these talks collapsed due to disagreement in basic issues.
Third party involvement: YES
Third party involvement names: United Nations, Jimmy Carter, Ethiopia, Kenya.
Comment on Third Party Involvement: The UN was involved trying to make both parties accept a ceasefire. Former US president Jimmy Carter mediated in negotiations in December between SPLA and the new military government. Ethiopia hosted negotiations in June. Kenya hosted negotiations in December.
Victory: NO
Terminated: NO
1990 Conflict Archive
Comment on Activity: The conflict between the Government of Sudan and SPLM/A was active in 1990. In November the SPLM/A captured some major governmental garrisons in Western Equatoria including Tambura and Nzara.
Negotiations: YES
Comment on Negotiation: In January 1990 SPLM/A and the Government of Sudan held peace talks in Zaire under the auspices of the US State Department. However, the negotiations brook down when the government refused to agree to hold a convention to write a national constitution based on multiple party democracy and to withdraw from some garrison towns in areas controlled by the rebels including some oil fields.
Third party involvement: YES
Third party involvement names: United States
Comment on Third Party Involvement: Negotiations between the regime in Khartoum and SPLM/A were held in Zaire under the auspices of the US State Department.
Victory: NO
Terminated: NO
1991 Conflict Archive
Comment on Activity: The conflict in Sudan was active in 1991 but some important incidents changed the character of the fighting. On 21 May 1991 the government of the Ethiopian dictator Mengistu fell and the Ethiopian government fled the country. Mengistu had been backed by Soviet Union but whit the break-down of that country his power decreased substantially. This had tremendous impact on the war in Sudan since he had been a main backer to the SPLM/A and the loss of military bases and supply lines in Ethiopia for the SPLM/A was a tremendous victory for Khartoum. Another for Southern Sudan was that Sudanese refugees in Ethiopian refugee camps feared victimization from the Ethiopian locals and rebels. This fear made them return to Southern Sudan. In total the fall of Mengistu drove some 350 000 southern Sudanese from their hiding places in Ethiopia back to Sudan. While these refugees were fled back to Sudan they were bombed by the government. Moreover when they were inside Sudan the UN could not help them without permission from the Government of Sudan. Another major incident in 1991 was that the SPLM/A split into two different factions. Some commanders under the leadership of Riek Machar and Lam Akol lead an upsurge against John Garang and they formed a new movement called. SPLM/A (Nasir). This led to extensive fighting between the SPLM/A under the leadership of Garang and the opposing SPLM/A (Nasir). The Government of Sudan supported the Nasir faction with the purpose of increasing the internal fighting within the SPLM/A. There are no confirmed clashes between this break-away faction of SPLM/A and the Government but the fighting between the two factions was extensive and it is probable that it killed more than the fighting between the Government and the mainstream SPLM/A.
Comment on Yearly Battle Related Deaths: Number of deaths uncertain for this year
Negotiations: NO
Comment on Negotiation: Peace talks were to begin in Nigeria in October, but they were repeatedly postponed due to splittings within SPLM/A.
Third party involvement: NO
Third party involvement names: No third party involvment in the Sudanese conflict is coded for 1991.
Victory: NO
Terminated: NO
1992 Conflict Archive
Comment on Activity: The conflict between the Government of Sudan and SPLM/A was still active in 1992. However, in Upper Nile people began to say that more people died in the fighting between SPLM/A and SPLM/A Nasir than in all the battles the rebels had fought against the army. Details about these figures are hard to find but the fighting between the Riek Machar’s and John Garang’s faction of the SPLM/A was doubtless were extensive. It also had huge political impact for instance it led to that regions inhabited by Nuer no longer were actively in rebellion against the government. This made it possible for the government in Sudan to sell rights to start drill for oil to oil companies. This was something that a generation of northern governments had tried to do and now when Hassan Al-Turabi and his military allies achieved this it was a huge success for them that gave them new economic possibilities. Garang threatened to attack any oil company that dared to start working in Upper Nile. But without the support of the local Nuer population Garang did not have the opportunity to conduct these attacks. Instead the Government started to move in it troops into the oilfields and with help of Baggara militias they started removing civilians that were suspected of supporting the SPLM/A. Even though the leaders of SPLM/A (Nasir) continued to deny it they were still depending on weapons from the government to not be victimized by the Bor Dinka fury. The Dinka fury had increased since massacres on Dinkas carried out by Nuer in the proceeding years and Dinkas was already revenging on Nuers on several occasions.
The support for the SPLM/A (Nasir) decreased during the year even among the Nuer population. Some people argued that the betrayal of Riek Machar and Lam Akol on John Garang had made the SPLM/A to loose all the important towns and the big areas it had won under their nine years since they started their rebellion in 1983.
Negotiations: YES
Comment on Negotiation: Peace talks between the Government of Sudan and SPLM/A began on 26 May in Abuja. These talks were hosted by the Nigerian president Ibrahim Babangida in his capacity as chair of the OAU.
Third party involvement: YES
Third party involvement names: OAU (Organisation of African Unity)
Comment on Third Party Involvement: The Nigerian president Ibrahim Babangida hosted negotiations in his capacity as chair of the OAU.
Victory: NO
Terminated: NO
1993 Conflict Archive
Comment on Activity: In 1993 the conflict between the Government and the SPLM/A was still active but at a lower level than the previous years. However, the number of deaths from all types of violence was not lower this year because of Dinka-Nuer fighting and internal fighting both within the Dinka and within the Nuer tribe. The fighting also continued between SPLM/A and SPLM/A (Nasir). Another incident that influenced the war in Sudan was the US intervention in Somalia. This intervention made the regime in Khartoum nervous that US also would intervene in Southern Sudan. This worries increased when the US ambassador to Sudan Donald Petterson toured rebel areas to meet John Garang and Riek Machar without the permission of the Government of Sudan. To avoid giving United States an excuse to intervene the Government started to allow UN food transport to war-affected areas through the “Operation Lifeline”. Earlier the government had refused to give the UN the permission to deliver food to rebel held areas. In March 1993 the SPLM/A (Nasir) faction included some Dinka officers in its leadership and changed it name to SPLM/A (united) to indicate their all-inclusive non-tribal identity. However, this name change did not change things so much on the ground. In August the Government carried out an offensive in the far South to cut supply lines to the SPLM/A.
Negotiations: YES
Comment on Negotiation: On 18 March SPLA announced a unilateral, open-ended ceasefire. Following preliminary talks in Abuja, Nigeria on 8 April negotiations between the government and SPLA began on 26 April, also in Abuja. The talks failed on 17 May after the rebels had demanded a referendum about Sharia law, concerning if it should be applied in the whole country.
Third party involvement: YES
Third party involvement names: Ugandan president Yoweri Museveni, Nigeria, Kenya
Comment on Third Party Involvement: Museveni mediated and prepared the parties for negotiations. Nigeria and Kenya hosted negotiations.
Victory: NO
Terminated: NO
1994 Conflict Archive
Comment on Activity: The conflict between SPLM/A and the Government of Sudan continued in 1994 but as in 1993 the battle-related deaths were fever than they had been before 1993. This was mostly due to continued fighting between the different SPLM/A factions. In January the government launched an offensive that was even bigger than the latest offensive carried out in august 1993. In October 1994 the Government attempted to break supply lines to the SPLM/A from adjacent countries.
Negotiations: YES
Comment on Negotiation: Preliminary separate peace talks were held in Nairobi in the beginning of January. Kenyan president arap-Moi hosted the talks as chairman of IGADD (Inter-Governmental Authority on Drought and Development) that mediated between the government and SPLA. Further separate talks were held in Nairobi on 8-23 March, also hosted by IGADD. The parties then signed an agreement for safe passage of relief supplies and humanitarian assistance. Negotiations resumed on 18-20 May and later on in July on 18-28, also in Nairobi. The parties signed a Declaration of Principles on 20 July, that was supposed to be a basis for resolving the conflict, but not much seemed to come out of that. On 23 July the government declared a unilateral ceasefire, which was first, rejected by SPLA that continued to fight, but eventually it was accepted. The ceasefire was later broken, probably by both sides. The parties met again in Nairobi on 5-7 September for IGADD-sponsored peace talks, and also this time the talks ended in a deadlock.
Third party involvement: YES
Third party involvement names: IGADD (Inter-Governmental Authority on Drought and Development) - peace committee consiting of Ethiopia, Eritrea, Kenya and Uganda.
Comment on Third Party Involvement: IGADD hosted and sponsored several rounds of peace talks throughout the year.
Victory: NO
Terminated: NO
1995 Conflict Archive
Comment on Activity: In 1995 the conflict in Sudan was active and with more battle-related deaths than the two previous years and again reaching the threshold of 1000 battle-related deaths. Negotiations lead to several ceasefires during the year but they were all broken. In April the Government intensified its campaign in the Nuba Mountains at the same time as they offered ceasefire in the south. This followed the same procedure as had been conducted in 1989 and 1991. In June the Government took Pariang town in the Upper Nile district and north of the Bentiu oilfield after 12 years of SPLM control. By late 1995 the conflict intensified and in November SPLM/A did some big advances when they took Take Pagere in the White Nile Province. After that they unsuccessfully tried to take control of the main town in Southern Sudan, Juba. In addition to this the humanitarian situation in Southern Sudan was catastrophic during the year. In mid 1995 some 553 000 were refugees, and 650 000 internally displaced lived a marginal existence in the north.
Negotiations: YES
Comment on Negotiation: Former US president Jimmy Carter managed to negotiate a two-month ceasefire that was unilaterally announced by the government on 28 March. Rebels were offered amnesty if they laid down weapons. SPLA-Mainstream accepted the ceasefire two days later, also calling for international monitoring. According to Carter the ceasefire was holding, with a few minor exceptions, but all parties accused each other of violation. Subsequently, all parties extended the ceasefire by two months. In August the government and SPLA-Mainstream agreed to resume peace talks, but not to extend the ceasefire. The talks never took place though. On 26 April a faction of the former SPLA-United (Arok Thon and Chol Deng) signed a political charter with the government that was formulated as a peace process agreement. The most important points that the parties agreed on were the preservation of the unity of Sudan, decentralisation of the south, the application of Sharia law (with the possibility of enacting complementary legislation), and the sharing of power and national wealth between the citizens. Since that faction was no longer active it did not affect the conflict in general.
Third party involvement: YES
Third party involvement names: Jimmy Carter
Comment on Third Party Involvement: Former US president Jimmy Carter mediated a ceasefire between all parties in late March.
Victory: NO
Terminated: NO
1996 Conflict Archive
Comment on Activity: The civil war in Sudan was ongoing in 1996. SPLM/A continued its war against the government of Sudan and in 1996 two new groups was also active for the first time. SAF (Sudan Alliance Forces) launched its first military attacks in April 1996 and was active throughout the year as part of NDA (National Democratic Alliance). All the attacks took place in the north-eastern part of the country around the town of Kassala and close to the Eritrean border. NDA is both an umbrella organisation covering a vast number of different groups from civil society to militant rebel groups and an organisation with its own military and commanders as well as civilian administrative structures that oversee its operations and functions. This means that it was two active rebel groups in 1996 but the vast majority of the fighting was between the SPLM/A and the Government of Sudan.
Comment on Yearly Battle Related Deaths: In 1996 NDA and SPLM/A were active in fighting against the government of Sudan. However, the vast majority of the battle-related deaths occurred in clashes between SPLM/A and the Government of Sudan.
Negotiations: NO
Comment on Negotiation: Two break away factions of the SPLM/A had negotiations with the government and signed a peace agreement. However, these negotiations and peace agreement was rejected by the SPLM/A.
Third party involvement: NO
Third party involvement names: No third party involvment in the Sudanese conflict is coded for 1996.
Victory: NO
Terminated: NO
1997 Conflict Archive
Comment on Activity: The civil war in Sudan was ongoing in 1997 with the same active rebel groups as the previous year. SPLM/A continued its war against the government and NDA also continued its military activities that it started the previous year. In addition to this the government in April signed a cease-fire with some factions that had broken with the SPLM/A mainstream at an earlier point. This agreement called for sharing of oil revenues and a referendum for the South on independence but the agreement was never held by the government and none of the points were implemented. The agreement are not recorded in this database since the factions that signed it with the government have not been fighting the government but just other factions of the SPLM/A.
Comment on Yearly Battle Related Deaths: The vast majority of these battle related deths was a result of the fighting between the SPLM/A and the government.
Negotiations: YES
Comment on Negotiation: In July the government agreed to resume peace talks with the SPLM/A. It also accepted a framework for negotiations proposed by IGAD (Inter-Governmental Authority on Development, mediating in the conflict) but stated that it was not binding. SPLM/A said it would not resume talks unless the framework was considered binding. In August the government called for a ceasefire but SPLM/A rejected the request. However, after some mediation by Nelson Mandela the peace talks finally began on 28 August in Nairobi under the aegis of IGAD. It was chaired by the Kenyan Foreign Minister, but Eritrea, Ethiopia and Uganda were all there as mediators. The SPLM/A proposed a referendum on southern self-determination, and the government said it accepted it in principle but proposed a north-south federations instead. The negotiations were adjourned on 11 November until April. The IGAD peace process only included the government and the SPLA, hence the NDA as an alliance was excluded from all negotiations.
Third party involvement: YES
Third party involvement names: IGAD (Inter-Governmental Authority Development)- peace committee consisting of Ethiopia, Eritrea, Kenya and Uganda; Nelson Mandela
Comment on Third Party Involvement: IGAD organised negotiations in July and August between the government and the SPLA. Nelson Mandela also mediated between the two parties, trying to get the peace talks about.
Victory: NO
Terminated: NO
1998 Conflict Archive
Comment on Activity: The civil war in Sudan was ongoing in 1998 with the same active rebel groups as the previous year. SPLM/A continued its war against the government and NDA (National Democratic Alliance) also continued its military activities that it started in 1996.
Negotiations: YES
Comment on Negotiation: The peace talks between the SPLM/A and the government opened again on 4 May (after having been adjourned in August 1997) in Nairobi under the auspices of IGAD, but ended only two days later without any substantial results. On 15 July the SPLM/A declared a 3-month ceasefire in Bahr el-Ghazal to allow humanitarian aid and the government followed. In August the government declared a unilateral ceasefire throughout southern Sudan but this was dismissed by the SPLM/A though since it did not cover the whole country. The IGAD-sponsored peace talks between the SPLM/A and the government were held in Nairobi on 6-8 August. In October the humanitarian ceasefire was extended by both parties for another 3 months. The IGAD peace process only included the government and the SPLA, hence the NDA as an alliance was excluded from all negotiations.
Third party involvement: YES
Third party involvement names: IGAD (Inter-Governmental Authority Development) - peace committee consisting of Ethiopia, Eritrea, Kenya and Uganda.
Comment on Third Party Involvement: IGAD organised negotiations in May and August between the government and the SPLA.
Victory: NO
Terminated: NO
1999 Conflict Archive
Comment on Activity: The civil war in Sudan was ongoing in 1999 with the same active rebel groups as the previous year. SPLM/A continued its war against the government and NDA (National Democratic Alliance) also continued its military activities that it started in 1996.
Negotiations: YES
Comment on Negotiation: In January the government and the SPLM/A both agreed to extend a humanitarian ceasefire in Bahr el-Ghazal for another 3 months. The SPLM/A also said that the ceasefire would be unilaterally extended to cover Central Upper Nile relief assistance. The humanitarian ceasefire was continuously extended by both parties for 3 month-periods throughout the whole year. Former vice president Alier proposed a peace plan including a confederal solution that was rejected by the government. Peace talks sponsored by IGAD were re-opened in Nairobi on 20 July. The parties agreed on procedural issues for further talks, but they failed to make any progress on substantial issues like self-determination for the south, defining a border, religion and state and a comprehensive ceasefire. The IGAD peace process only included the government and the SPLM/A, hence the NDA as an alliance was excluded from all negotiations. Another peace initiative with a five-point peace plan was launched by Libya and Egypt, that included the whole NDA in the process. No negotiations took place within this initiative though. During this year there were some internal conflicts within the NDA. After having had secret negotiations, the NIF (National Islamic Front, government party) and the Umma Party (member of the NDA) signed an agreement called "The Call of the Homeland" which subsequently meant the withdrawal of the Umma from the NDA.
Third party involvement: YES
Third party involvement names: Abel Alier; IGAD (Inter-Governmental Authority on Development) - peace committee consisting of Ethiopia, Eritrea, Kenya and Uganda; Egypt and Libya
Comment on Third Party Involvement: Abel Alier, former vice president in Sudan, made some efforts in mediating in the conflict, and he met with both Garang (SPLA/NDA) and the government. IGAD continued with their peace process and held negotiations in July. Another peace initiative with a five-point peace plan came from Libya and Egypt, that included the whole NDA in the process (while the IGAD initiative only included the SPLA and the government). This was welcomed by the NDA that thought it was the best comprehensive political solution. The government also approved of the five-point plan, perhaps since it would not deal with the issue of self-determination for the south. Garang said that he backed the Libyan-Egyptian initiative in principle, but called for a co-ordination with the IGAD process.
Victory: NO
Terminated: NO
2000 Conflict Archive
Comment on Activity: Despite negotiations taking place the civil war in Sudan continued for another year in 2000. SPLM/A and NDA continued its military actions against the government but there were no attacks carried out by SAF as it had been for the four previous years.
Comment on Yearly Battle Related Deaths: The vast majority of deaths were from fighting between SPLM/A and the government. But there were also significant fighting between the government and NDA. The remaining battle-related deaths comes from fighting where it was either jointly attacks by the SPLM/A and NDA or it was not clear which of the organisations it was that conducted the attacks. These battle-related deaths are counted as NDA deaths since they most likely were under NDA command.
Negotiations: YES
Comment on Negotiation: IGAD-sponsored peace talks were held in Nairobi in January between the SPLM/A and the government. After the negotiations the parties issued a joint communiqué wherein they reiterated their commitment to a peaceful solution and said they agreed on self-determination for the people of southern Sudan. The humanitarian ceasefire in Bahr el-Ghazal from 1998 was first extended by both parties, but then broken in June when SPLM/A captured a garrison town, according to the SPLM/A following government attacks. Peace talks held with IGAD took place again on 21-30 September. The mediators proposed a two-tier arrangement where all institutions on a national level were to be neutral on religion. It was accepted by the SPLM/A but rejected by the government. The IGAD peace process only included the government and the SPLM/A; hence the NDA as an alliance was excluded from all negotiations.
Third party involvement: YES
Third party involvement names: IGAD (Inter-Governmental Authority Development)- peace committee consisting of Ethiopia, Eritrea, Kenya and Uganda; Egypt.
Comment on Third Party Involvement: IGAD held two rounds of peace talks during 2000, in January and September. Egypt tried to mediate by meeting a representative from the government and the leaders of the NDA and the SPLA separately.
Victory: NO
Terminated: NO
2001 Conflict Archive
Comment on Activity: The civil war in Sudan continued for another year in 2001. However, in this year SPLM/A was the only warring party. NDA that had been active for the previous five year’s was not active in 2001. The reason for this was low military activity by NDA during the year.
Comment on Yearly Battle Related Deaths: The only active rebel group in Sudan in 2001 was SPLM/A.
Negotiations: YES
Comment on Negotiation: The Libyan-Egyptian peace initiative launched in 1999 faced great obstacles due to Egypts opposition to self-determination for the south, which was one of the cornerstones of the IGAD peace process (where only the SPLM/A and the government were included, and not the NDA). There was also another peace initiative by Eritrea that made possible the first meeting between president Bashir and NDA leader al-Mirghani, probably by the end of 2000 or the very beginning of 2001. However, it did not lead to any concrete results or a follow up. In May the government called for a comprehensive ceasefire, but the SPLM/A rejected the call and instead proposed a conditional ceasefire saying that the SPLA would ceasefire if the government stopped producing oil. The government in turn rejected this. The IGAD organised a peace summit in Nairobi on 2 June, where both the SPLM/A leader John Garang and president Bashir were present. There they decided to form permanent committees to pursue dialogue. Further IGAD-talks scheduled for 5 September were cancelled when the SPLM/A-delegation did not arrive, and negotiations then set for 24 September were postponed. The government said it would pull out of the IGAD-talks if no progress were made. In November the government and the SPLM/A agreed on a four-week long period of tranquillity to allow food deliveries, and a month later the parties agreed on an internationally monitored cease-fire to cover the Nuba Mountains, southern Darfur and south-central Sudan. On 6-13 December representatives from the government and the SPLM/A met with a US technical team.
Third party involvement: YES
Third party involvement names: IGAD (Inter-Governmental Authority Development) - peace committee consisting of Ethiopia, Eritrea, Kenya and Uganda; Libya and Egypt; Eritrea; Nigeria; OAU (Organisation of African Unity); United States
Comment on Third Party Involvement: IGAD continued its peace process with the government and the SPLA, although the scheduled meetings for this year were all postponed. Eritrea also tried to mediate on its own, bringing together president Bashir and NDA leader al-Mirghani for a meeting. The Libyan-Egyptian peace process was more or less inactive following the resistance from SPLA to accept it, but the parties were still somewhat active in Sudan. Nigeria sent an envoy to Sudan to pursue a new peace initiative, but this did not result in anything concrete. OAU-backed peace talks were planned but postponed. United States sent an envoy to Sudan, John Danforth, who during separate meetings in November with the government and the SPLA proposed four confidence-building measures. In December a US technical team followed up the mission and held talks with the two parties.
Victory: NO
Terminated: NO
2002 Conflict Archive
Comment on Activity: Despite negotiations taking place the civil war in Sudan continued for another year in 2002 and as in 2001 SPLM/A was the only active rebel group. Moreover, under pressure from Washington, Riek Machar and John Garang announced that they were reuniting to resist the government on 8 January 2002. This ended a war between these two main factions of the SPLM/A that had been going on for eleven years and killed thousands of people.
Comment on Yearly Battle Related Deaths: The difference between the best and high estimate is due to an incident where SPLM/A claim a much higher casulty number than the government. Moreover, the government also said that the clash started with a militia and not ordinary governmental troops."
Negotiations: YES
Comment on Negotiation: The government and SPLM/A met for a week of talks in January in Switzerland where they agreed to a ceasefire in the Nuba Mountains, one of the conflict areas. In June the parties met for peace talks in Machakos, Kenya sponsored by IGAD. They first agreed to extend the ceasefire in Nuba Mountains for another six-month period. On 20 July SPLM/A and the government signed a framework agreement, the Machakos Protocol, which included the general procedures for a transitional process and an agreement that further negotiations would be held to specify the terms of this framework. They also reached a specific agreement that was annexed to the framework with the purpose of subsequently being incorporated in the final agreement. The specifications included a six-year transition period, followed by an internationally supervised referendum for southern Sudan where one option was to be secession. During the transition period a broad-based government would rule in Khartoum and the southern states would be given some degree of autonomy. It further stated that Sharia law would be applied only in the north. There were however issues concerning sharing of power and wealth, human rights and a ceasefire that were still to be clarified. Negotiations began again on 12 August in Machakos, but collapsed on 2 September after the rebels seized the strategically important town of Torit. Before the next round of negotiations opened the parties signed an initial ceasefire on 15 October. On 18 November when the negotiations closed for the year a Memorandum of Understanding (MoU) was signed but no comprehensive agreement had been reached. The talks were adjourned until 6 January 2003 due to Ramadan, Christmas and the Kenyan elections. The parties were however invited to Washington for informal talks on 19-20 December. The IGAD peace process only included the government and the SPLA; hence the NDA as an alliance was excluded from all negotiations, even though they wished to participate.
Third party involvement: YES
Third party involvement names: IGAD (Inter-Governmental Authority on Development, with envoys from Eritrea, Ethiopia, Kenya and Uganda), the United States, Britain, Italy, Norway, France, the Netherlands, Switzerland and the United Nations.
Comment on Third Party Involvement: The negotiations in Machakos were chaired by Kenya and overseen by Eritrea, Ethiopia and Uganda (all IGAD members). The mediation team was led by Kenyan General Lazaro Sum Geiyno, and there was an active engagement from the four official observer countries in the peace process: Britain, the USA, Norway and Italy. The UN has also been engaged in the process. The ceasefire in Nuba Mountains was monitored by Britain, France, Italy, the Netherlands, Norway, Switzerlans and the USA.
Victory: NO
Terminated: NO
2003 Conflict Archive
Comment on Activity: In 2003 two new rebel groups started a military campaign against the Sudanese government. The name of these two groups is SLM/A (Sudan Liberation Movement/Army) and JEM (Justice and Equality Movement) and they are located in the Darfur region which is the most western part of Sudan. The government and SPLM/A had a ceasefire throughout the whole year, and only one clash in January has been reported. However, since that clash resulted in between 44 and 164 battle related deaths, the SPLM/A was active in 2003.
Comment on Yearly Battle Related Deaths: The high estimate includes clashes were the reported number of causalities differs from different sources.
Except one clash between the SPLM/A and governmental troops all the fighting took place in the western part of the country, in the Darfur region. The reporting from this area has been scarce and mostly not independently confirmed. However, information from later reports has made this figure more reliable. Still the correct figure is probably higher than the one stated here."
Negotiations: YES
Comment on Negotiation: In 2003 the Sudanese government were involved in negotiations with both SPLM/A and SLM/A. The government and SPLM/A held negotiations in Kenya under the auspices of IGAD during the whole year and made great progress but without reaching a final peace agreement. The ceasefire agreement was extended several times and was respected by the parties the whole year, except for a clash in early January. In the negotiations they discussed power and wealth sharing and security issues. In February they agreed on a framework of a government of national unity where SPLM will be the major partner in the national government. The peace process took a positive turn when Vice President Ali Osman Mohamed Taha and John Garang entered into negotiations on 4 September. On 25 September they signed a security agreement stating that SPLM/A will retain its own troops but withdraw from eastern Sudan, the government will reduce forces in the south and the two parties will merge forces in the three disputed areas. In December the parties agreed in principle on a 50-50 sharing of oil wealth in the south during the interim period. By the end of the year the talks were still ongoing.
In addition to this the government and SLM/A signed a ceasefire agreement on 3 September after five days of negotiations. The talks, which were held in Abéché in Chad under the auspices of President Idriss Deby, were mediated by the Chadian government. Despite the agreement the fighting continued. In late October the parties met again in Abéché, where the Chadian government proposed a draft for a peace agreement. SLA demanded presence of international monitors in Darfur, something the government rejected. The talks ended without any results. On 15 December they met again in Chad, but the talks broke down after less than 24 hours. JEM did not take part in any peace talks.
Third party involvement: YES
Third party involvement names: IGAD (Inter-Governmental Authority Development) - peace committee consisting of Ethiopia, Eritrea, Kenya and Uganda; USA (US special envoy John Danforth); UK; Norway; Italy; UN; Arab League.
Comment on Third Party Involvement: Kenya has been hosting all the IGAD-negotiations between the government and SPLM/A during the year, led by the chief mediator Lazarus Sumbeiyno. USA, UK, Norway and Italy all had observer status during the talks and took part in the mediation. Norway also funded peace talks in Kenya. Samir Hosni, head of Arab League, announced in May that it would also begin attending the peace talks as an observer. Possible that also African Union attended the talks, but there are no clear reports of this.
In addition to this Chad mediated some talks between the Sudanese government and SLM/A but since they are also a secondary warring party on the government side in 2003 they can not be seen as a third party.
Victory: NO
Terminated: NO
2004 Conflict Archive
Comment on Activity: Despite a ceasefire agreement between the SPLM/A and the government, there were a few clashes recorded. However, the year ended with the signing of a permanent ceasefire on 31 December. However, almost all of the fighting during 2004 took place in the Darfur region where clashes between the government and the rebels escalated to a very high level. Most active was SLM/A but also JEM carried out many attacks and on several occasions the two rebel groups conducted joint operations against the governments forces.
Comment on Yearly Battle Related Deaths: SLA accounts for most of the battle deaths, but some large joint operations between SLA and JEM were also carried out during the year. Also SPLM/A clashed with governmental troops on some occasions during the year."
Negotiations: YES
Comment on Negotiation: The Government of Sudan and SPLM/A held negotiations throughout the year, which finally led up to the Comprehensive Peace Agreement signed on 9 January 2005. These talks were part of the IGAD peace process held in Kenya, and based on the process agreed on in the Machakos Protocol singed in 2002. The continuous negotiations resulted in the signing of several protocols and agreements that were to make up the foundation of the final comprehensive peace agreement. On 7 January 2004 the Agreement on Wealth Sharing During the Pre-Interim and Interim Period was signed in Naivasha, Kenya, in which the parties agreed on the 50-50 split of oil revenues in southern Sudan. The next round of talks resulted in the signing of three agreements on 26 May, also in Naivasha. These were: the Protocol Between the Government of Sudan and the Sudan People’s Liberation Movement on Power Sharing, the Protocol Between the Government of Sudan and the Sudan People’s Liberation Movement on the Resolution of Conflict in Southern Kordofan/Nuba Mountains and Blue Nile States, and the Protocol Between the Government of Sudan and the Sudan People’s Liberation Movement on the Resolution of Conflict in Abyei Area. Among the most important points in the power sharing is that the SPLM Chairman (i.e. John Garang) shall be the first Vice President. Further it posits that until elections, the current government of Sudan (i.e. the National Congress Party, NCP) will hold the majority of the seats in both the national government and the national assembly (52 %), other Northern political forces get 14%, SPLM will be given 28% and the remaining 6 % are reserved for other Southern political forces. In the two other protocols, they managed to agree on the administration in the three border areas between the north and the south, and in short the government will hold just over half of the positions.
On 5 June, the two parties declared their commitment to the six so-far signed agreements, plus the ceasefire and the verification and monitoring mechanism, by signing the Nairobi Declaration on the Final Phase of Peace in the Sudan. This finalised the political negotiations. Left to deal with were the more technical issues of a comprehensive ceasefire, security arrangements and the implementation of the peace agreement. For two months after that no negotiations took place, the government claiming to be too busy with the situation in Darfur. On 7 October, Garang and Taha met again to continue the talks. On 19 November, the government and SPLA signed a Memorandum of Understanding, committing to signing a comprehensive peace agreement no later than 31 December 2004. Talks resumed again on 7 December between Garang and Taha, and these were said to continue until Christmas Eve. The parties marked the end of the conflict on 31 December by the signing of a permanent ceasefire, and on 9 January the comprehensive peace agreement was finally singed. The most important part of the agreement were following: a 6 year interim period followed by a referendum in the South regarding secession from Sudan; the North and South are to maintain separate armed forces; the oil revenues in Southern Sudan are split equal between the government and the South; the two regions are to have separate currencies; John Garang is to be First Vice President and SPLM are given seats in the government; Sharia law is only to be applied in the North, and only to Muslims.
In late March, peace talks between the government and the to rebel groups SLA and JEM began in N’djamena in Chad. Both SLA and JEM were dissatisfied with the mediation by Chad, whom they considered too biased towards the government. For the first days the government refused to hold face-to-face talks, but when SLA threatened to walk out of the talks they gave in and sat down with the rebels. On 8 April, the parties signed a ceasefire agreement, agreeing on a 45-day cessation of hostilities, the release of prisoners of war and the facilitation of humanitarian access to Darfur. The government also committed to neutralising the armed militias. All parties violated the ceasefire agreement at numerous occasions throughout the year.
In May the African Union (AU) initiated negotiations between the government on the one hand and the SLA and JEM on the other, which resulted in an agreement on the establishment of a Ceasefire Commission and the deployment of 130 observers in Darfur. The documents were signed on 28 May at the AU headquarters in Abuja. The parties met again on 15-17 July at the AU headquarters.
The second round of the Abuja talks (the AU-led peace process) started on 23 August under the auspices of President Olusegun Obasanjo, the chairman of the AU. They resulted in the Protocol on the Improvement of the Humanitarian Situation in Darfur, signed on 1 September by the government, SLA and JEM. The talks were concluded on 17 September. The third round of talks started on 21 October, resulting in the Humanitarian and Security Protocols signed on 9 November. The parties met between 11 and 21 December for the fourth round of the Abuja talks, which ended with a commitment by the parties to respect the ceasefire agreement signed on 8 April, and the Humanitarian and Security Protocols from November, and to seek a peaceful solution to the conflict.
Third party involvement: YES
Third party involvement names: IGAD (Inter-Governmental Authority Development) - peace committee consisting of Ethiopia, Eritrea, Kenya and Uganda; US; UK; Norway; Italy and UN.
Chad, African Union, the US, the EU.
Comment on Third Party Involvement: There were several third parties involved in the Sudan conflict in 2003 and two parallel processes were taking place. IGAD led the peace process between the SPLM/A and the government during the year, which resulted in the signing of the Comprehensive Peace Agreement on 9 January 2005. Talks were held in Naivasha, Kenya. US, UK, Norway and Italy were all present with observers. The UN SC members all signed the Memorandum of Understanding on 19 November as witnesses. It should be mentioned that Garang also met with representatives from both AU and EU, but it is unclear how involved in the peace process they were.
In addition to this Chad led negotiations between the government and SLM/A and JEM that led up to the ceasefire agreement on 8 April. The rebels were dissatisfied with Chad as a mediator since they considered Chad to be biased in favour of the government. The African Union initiated a peace process in May that continued throughout the year. They held four rounds of talks in Abuja.
A Ceasefire Commission was established on 28 May and included some 130 military observers that were stationed at five locations in Darfur and one in Chad. 80 of the observers came from AU countries, and the remainder were from Chad (which is also a member of AU), the US, the EU and the warring parties themselves. During a summit in early July, the AU decided to deploy a force of 308 soldiers to Darfur, with the mandate to protect both the monitors of the ceasefire and the civilian population. The government in Khartoum were critical to the inclusion of the protection of civilians in the mandate. In August there were 80 observers and 150 AU troops present, and in September there were 133 observers and 300 soldiers deployed in
Victory: NO
Terminated: NO
2005 Conflict Archive
Comment on Activity: Sudans government and SPLM/A signed a comprehensive peace agreement on 8 January 2005 that ended the conflict between those parties that had been fighting each other for 21 years. The ceasefire between SPLM/A and the Government held throughout the year and there was not a single reported case of battle-related deaths between SPLM/A and the Government. However, there were major clashes between Southern Sudanese and Northern Sudanese after the dead of SPLM/A leader John Garang in a helicopter crash 31 July. A lot of supporters to Garang accused the government for being behind the crash. However, the leadership of SPLM/A never said anything like that and the ceasefire survived also this.
However, the year was not a peaceful year in Sudan since the conflict in Darfur, western Sudan continued. However, the level of the fighting was lower than the previous year and in 2005 JEM did not carried out any attacks on their own. They participated in some joint attacks with SLM/A but since SLM/A is much bigger than JEM those battle related deaths are affiliated to SLM/A. This leads to that in 2005 there were just one active rebel groups in Sudan, SLM/A.
Comment on Yearly Battle Related Deaths: Armed conflict continued in Darfur, albeit at a significantly lower level than in late 2003 and 2004. The lower level of conflict is due to a number of factors, including the presence of AMIS (African Union Mission in Sudan) forces, the flight of most of the population from heavily contested areas to Internally Displaced Persons (IDP) and refugee camps, pressure by the international community, and consolidation of areas of control by the warring parties.
Another difference from previous years is that last year it was several statements from SLA that said that they killed hundreds of governmental troops. For 2005 there does not exists any statements of this nature. The reason for this is not clear one could be the higher presence of the international community in the region.
In 2005 there were no attacks performed by Just JEM it was either just SLA or mutual operations between SLA and JEM. The battle-related for the mutual operations has been put in the SLA category since SLA is the larger group and more likely to lead such operations.
During 2005 there were also 245 battle-related deaths where the rebel group was unclear and hence not taken into the figure above for 2005. These deaths were mostly from two bomb attacks on villages that presumably targeted both rebels and civilians but it is not clear which rebel group.
Finally, a splinter group from JEM the National Movement for Reform and Development (NMRD) conducted one big attack in November 2005 because they wanted to be part of the AU-brokered negotiations. The attack killed 37 government soldiers but since their incompatibility is not clearly stated they are not taken into account in the battle-related figure for 2005."
Negotiations: YES
Comment on Negotiation: The Government of Sudan and the main Darfur rebels signed a ceasefire agreement during 2004. However, this ceasefire was often violated and negotiations to bring peace to Darfur continued throughout 2005. The first meeting for the year was held in Chad in February supervised by Chadian President Idriss Deby and attended by international mediators and African Union (AU) Commission Chairman Alpha Oumar Konare.
The next round of meeting was held in the Nigerian Capital, Abuja and was brokered by the AU. After more then three weeks of negotiating a "Declaration of Principles" was signed in July. The declaration includes calls for refugees to be brought home and for new security arrangements, as well as more long-term principles such as respect for different ethnic and religious groups and equitable distribution of national wealth. While political leaders expressed hope that the agreement would lead to peace in the region, rebel commanders in the field painted a grim picture about the reality on the ground.
A sixth round of AU-sponsored talks began in September between the government and the two main Darfur rebel groups, the SLA and the JEM. But the negotiations have been plagued by rebel divisions and violence on the ground. The round of meeting lasted for a month and ended Oct. 20. The talks started with the rebels fighting among themselves and ended with little progress. Meanwhile, violence was reportedly increasing in Darfur.
In the end of November did the 7th round of talks start, also now in Nigerian Capital Abuja and brokered by AU. No results of the talks were concluded during 2005. So far, negotiations have stalled on power-sharing and security arrangements, with the rebels demanding the redrawing of Darfurs borders and a Vice-Presidency for Darfur in the new Government of National Unity.
The negotiations that lead to the signing of the Comprehensive Peace Agreement between the SPLM/A and the government of Sudan were held during 2004 and hence no negotiations took place within that dyad in 2005.
Third party involvement: YES
Third party involvement names: AU, UN
Comment on Third Party Involvement: The United Nations Mission in the Sudan (UNMIS) was established by the Security Council on 24 March 2005, by resolution 1590, after it had determined that the situation in the country continued to constitute a threat to international peace and security. Acting on the recommendation of the Secretary-General, the Council decided that the task of UNMIS would be: (a) to support implementation of the Comprehensive Peace Agreement signed by the parties; (b) to facilitate and coordinate, within its capabilities and in its areas of deployment, the voluntary return of refugees and internally displaced persons and humanitarian assistance; (c) to assist the parties in the mine action sector; (d) to contribute towards international efforts to protect and promote human rights in Sudan , as well as to coordinate international efforts towards the protection of civilians, with particular attention to vulnerable groups including internally displaced persons, returning refugees, and women and children, within UNMISs capabilities and in close cooperation with other United Nations agencies, related organizations, and non-governmental organizations. UNMIS should finally consist of 10,000 troops. The strength of UNMIS as of 30 November 2005 was 4,222 total uniformed personnel.
Peacekeepers from the African Union were present in Darfur throughout the year, under the AU Mission in Sudan (AMIS). The number of peacekeepers increased during the year from 1700 in January to 6964 in the end of the year. The peacekeepers were deployed in Darfur to monitor a shaky ceasefire in the region. Even though AMIS is often hailed by for example UN for its work many people see this operation as a failure. Experts says that like many of the peacekeeping operations that came before it, the Darfur mission has failed because the force is not big enough and the mandate is too limited. Darfur is a vast region with an area at the same size as France and hence hard to control.
Victory: NO
Terminated: NO
2006 Conflict Archive
Comment on Activity: In Darfur the year of 2006 was characterized by an increased level of violence, a worsening humanitarian situation, fragmentation among the rebels and a peace agreement that lead to a worsening of the situation on the ground. The level of violence during 2006 increased compared to 2005; a year that was less violent than 2003 and 2004. The fighting again reached the threshold off over 1000 reported battle-related deaths. Most of the fighting took place between the Government and an alliance formed in the beginning of July with the name of the National Redemption front. However, fighting with other rebel groups also took place at several occasions throughout the year. This higher level of violence led to a worsening of the humanitarian situation. Many NGO’s and aid workers were forced to leave large areas because the situation was too insecure to be able to stay; resulting in an enlargement of the people out of reach of humanitarian assistance.
Fragmentation among the rebels began at the end of 2005 but escalated heavily throughout 2006. On occasions alliances and groups shifted almost on a daily basis and it has been reported that the rebels now are organised in up to twelve different groups. Most of the fragmentation is different breakaway factions from the SLM/A but there have also been reported splits within JEM. The most important factor creating this crumbling on the rebel side was the Darfur Peace Agreement (DPA) that was signed by the Government of Sudan and the SLM/A faction lead by Minni Minawi. Many commanders from the Minawi group who disliked that he had signed the DPA left his faction and created new factions or joined other rebel groups. Despite these numerous splits on the rebel side the main incompatibility with the Government remained the same and the different groups also often cooperated against the Governments troop’s militarily. In addition to these clashes against the government several clashes between different rebel factions took place. The most severe of these involved SLA (MM) against other factions that had not signed the DPA. The amount of violence was not decreased at all after the signing of the DPA, and instead the second half of the year was much more violent than the five months of the year preceding the DPA.
The situation in Darfur also heavily influenced the situation in the bordering Chad. Militia attacks by the infamous Janjaweed against civilians increased both within Darfur and spread to a much higher extent than before to Chad. The situation became even more intricate following enlarged rebellion in Chad (supported by Sudan) and since the Government of Chad supported rebellion in Darfur. Another important issue discussed throughout the year was the deployment of a UN peacekeeping force or a hybrid AU/UN force. Even though there were some signs of government acceptance, no solution was made at the end of 2006. To sum up, 2006 was a lost year for Darfur with no solution to the crises within sight at the end of 2006.
Comment on Yearly Battle Related Deaths: A clear majority of the battle related deaths for 2006 was in fighting between the government and the NRF. The largest explanation for the difference between the best and the high are two major clashes between the government and the NRF with highly disputed casuality figures."
Negotiations: YES
Comment on Negotiation: There were negotiations within the conflict in Darfur in 2006. The negotiations took place between the government of Sudan and three different rebel groups, SLM/A, SLM/A (MM) and JEM. The AU was the chief mediator in these negotiations and during the seventh round of negotiations the Darfur Peace Agreement (DPA) was signed in Abuja, Nigeria. The seventh round began on 29 November 2005, alternated between different locations but finished in Abuja. However, JEM and SLM/A lead by Abdul Wahid refused to sign the agreement, leaving Minni Minawi as the sole signatory from the rebel side. During the rest of the year there were no negotiations between the government and the DPA non-signatories.
Third party involvement: YES
Third party involvement names: AMIS-The African Mission In sudan, UNMIS United Nation Mission in Sudan
Comment on Third Party Involvement: AMIS - the African Mission in Sudan is the name of the African Union (AU) operation in Darfur. Initially it was a Ceasefire Commission (CFC) established in April 2004 following the signing of the Humanitarian Ceasefire Agreement on 8 April by the government of Sudan and the two rebel groups SLM/A and JEM. In October 2004 the purpose of AMIS increased to also include assistance for confidence-building, protection of civilians and humanitarian operations. During 2005 the number of personal within the AMIS increased from 1 700 to almost 7 000. In 2006 the number of personnel increased slightly to around 7 200. The mandate of AMIS has been prolonged several times and the latest extension is for six months starting on 1 January 2007.
In the first half of 2006 the AU was heavily involved in the negotiations that lead up to the signing of DPA. Now AMIS sees supporting and implementing the DPA as there primary mission. Since a majority of the people in Darfur are not supportive of the DPA this has affected the perception of the AU in Darfur. Many people feel that AU is not neutral but are sympathising with the signatories of the DPA. A factor that is undermining the Darfurians view of AU is the organisation’s lack of ability to provide security in the region.
Many different actors within the international community have put pressure on the government of Sudan to accept a replacement of the AU force with a force lead by the UN. One reason for this is that the 7 000 peacekeeping forces that the AU has in Darfur too small a contingent to ensure the security of civilians in an area the size of France. Many actors also argue that the mandate for an international operation in Darfur also has to be strengthened so it can be of a more peace enforcing character. It has also been suggested that it should be a hybrid force of AU and UN peacekeepers. Despite some signals from the government to accept such a hybrid force there were no decisions made for such a change of the international presence in Darfur by the end of 2006.
The United Mission in Sudan (UNMIS) was active in Sudan during 2006. There main task was to oversee the CPA.
Victory: NO
Terminated: NO
2007 Conflict Archive
Comment on Activity: The conflict in Sudan was active in 2007 due to fighting in the western region of Darfur. 2007 was a year with many parallel processes going on in Darfur. The rebel movements fractionized further during the year and at some times it was reported that there were over 20 rebel movements in Darfur. However, the joint AU/UN negotiation team worked hard to unite the rebels. This process took place at different places as Chad and Eritrea during the year but real success in these negotiations did not happen until a unification process in Juba, Southern Sudan facilitated by the SPLM/A resulted in unification of some of the movements in Darfur.
Another important factor during the year was that some groups with an Arab identity that had been supporting the government felt neglected by the government and changed side started to support the rebels instead of the government.
Negotiations: YES
Comment on Negotiation: In the beginning of 2007 Jan Eliasson was appointed Special Envoy of the UN Secretary-General for Darfur. Since 2004 Salim Ahmed Salim has been the African Union Special Envoy to Darfur and since, the beginning of 2007 they have jointly worked towards getting a political solution to the crises in Darfur. In this context they have had a four-fold strategy. The first step was to be the only negotiators on the scene since parallel negotiations could create problems the second step was to get the neighbouring countries to work in a peace-enhancing way the third step was to unify the fragmentised rebels, the fourth was the actual negotiations. The first negotiations between the GoS and Darfurian rebels after this process started took place in Sirtre, Libya in the end of October 2007. However, several high-ranking rebel leaders boycotted the talks so the negotiations were postponed after just one day and no new negotiations between the Darfurian rebels and the Government of Sudan took place during the year.
Third party involvement: YES
Third party involvement names: African Union (AU) and United Nations (UN)
Comment on Third Party Involvement: The United Nations and African Union were both involved in the Sudanese conflict as third parties. One of their third-party roles were the AU/UN joint ongoing negotiations efforts that took place during the year. In addition to this AU was also involved in Darfur through the peacekeeping force African Union Mission in Sudan (AMIS) that had around 7, 000 soldiers deployed in Darfur during the year. This force was at the end of 2007 transformed to a hybrid-AU/UN force called United Nations African Union Mission in Darfur (UNAMID). The plan was that UNAMID should be deployed with 26, 000 troops at the end of 2008. However, due to resistance from the Government of Sudan as well as reluctance from other countries to deliver appropriate technical equipment have resulted in that the change between AMIS and UNAMID have not been that extensive this far.
Victory: NO
Terminated: NO
2008 Conflict Archive
Comment on Activity: In 2008 the conflict over government in Sudan was active for the 25th consecutive year and the current crisis in Darfur its fifth. The most high-profile incident during 2008 was the JEM attack on Omdurman (twin city to the capital, Khartoum) in May. This was the first time the civil war in Sudan took place in the surroundings of the capital. Except for this incident the fighting was located in Darfur. In 2008 there were three different rebel groups active in the fighting, the previously mentioned, JEM, SLM/A led by Abdul Wahid and SLM/A (Unity). Also, tension was high and serious incidents took place between the Sudanese government and SPLM/A, especially in the tinder-box Abyei on the border between Northern and Southern Sudan, but still both parties held on to the Comprehensive Peace Agreement (CPA) from 2005.
Negotiations: NO
Comment on Negotiation: In 2008 several negotiations initiatives were launched to deal with the situation in Darfur. In the beginning of the year they were foremost led by a joint UN/AU mediation effort. This negotiating team was headed by Jan Eliasson (UN) and Salim Salim (AU). In July these two persons resigned and were replaced by Djibrill Bossole, former foreign-minister of Burkina Faso. In addition to this Qatar made effort to get to negotiations. However, no real negotiations took place in 2008 as the warring parties did not meat each other.
Third party involvement: YES
Third party involvement names: UNAMID
Comment on Third Party Involvement: On 1 January 2008 the African Union Mission in Sudan (AMIS) was replaced by African Union/United Nations Hybrid operation in Darfur (UNAMID). This was done as AMIS was incapable of creating security for civilians in Darfur. The ambition was also that UNAMID should be much stronger and having much more personnel. However, due to problems created by the Sudanese government and unwillingness by many western countries to provide necessary technical material UNAMID was far from that capable force that many had hoped. UNAMID is mandated to have 25 000 troops but at the end of 2008 just 12 442 of these are deployed.
Victory: NO
Terminated: NO
2009 Conflict Archive
Comment on Activity: The conflict in Sudan was active in 2009 due to fighting in Darfur between the government and the two rebel groups JEM and SLM/A. The fighting with JEM was much more intense than the fighting with SLM/A which can be seen in the best estimated battle-related deaths: 304 for JEM and 49 for SLM/A. Most of the fighting in 2009 took place in February between JEM and the government near the town of Muharaya in south Darfur. In August 2009 the commander of the joint UN/AU peacekeeping stated that the situation in Darfur has descended into banditry with low intensity military campaign and "As of today, I would not say there is a war going on in Darfur." a statement rendered a lot of criticism from different NGO’s. The UCDP figures show that from a perspective of the whole year the fighting have been fairly low-intensity, but higher than both in 2005 and 2007. However, in the second half of the year the fighting was at a low-intensity level but this shifts in intensity during the year is normal for Darfur.
Comment on Yearly Battle Related Deaths: The clear majority of this years battle related deaths involved fighting between the government and JEM. The SLM/A and governent fighting was less intensive.
Negotiations: YES
Comment on Negotiation: In 2009 there were negotiations going on between the government of Sudan and various Darfur rebel groups. The negotiations were led by the UN/AU chief mediator from Burkina Farso Djibril Bassolé and took place in Doha the capital of Qatar. Abdul Wahid, the leader of SLM/A, refused to take part in any of these negotiations and instead stayed in his exile in Paris. However, JEM took part in these negotiations and on February the negotiations resulted in a trust-building agreement that should lead to more comprehensive negotiations. This agreement created high expectations among people concerned with the situation in Darfur but little came out from this agreement. For example the day after the agreement were signed JEM positions were bombed by the government. The Doha negotiations restarted in November and were ongoing at the end of 2009 but the prospects for a breakthrough to happen in the near future was bleak.
Third party involvement: YES
Third party involvement names: United Nations, African Union
Comment on Third Party Involvement: The United Nations and African Union were active as third parties in the Sudan conflict in 2009 both as mediator and as peacekeepers. The name of the peacekeeping operation is United Nations African Union Mission in Darfur (UNAMID) and they replaced African Union Mission in Sudan (AMIS) as of 1 January 2008. The deployment of the UNAMID has been met with many problems and has been severely delayed. However, as of end of November 2009 the UNAMID is deployed with 19 500 troops which is in accordance with the size mentioned in the 1769 Security Council resolution. Still there is a technical problems remaining for the UNAMID with extensive problems to get the technical equipment that they need, foremost helicopters. During its two years in place UNAMID have lost 48 personnel: 27 troops, 10 police, 1 military observer, 2 international civilians and 8 local civilians.
In addition to UNAMID there was a parallel UN peacekeeping operation going on in South Sudan. The name of this mission is UNMIS, United Nation Mission in Sudan. The main mandate for the UNMIS was to oversee the Comprehensive Peace Agreement from 2005 between the government of Sudan and SPLM/A, Sudan Peoples Liberation Movement/Army. In the end of November 2009 UNMIS had 9 955 uniformed personnel.
Victory: NO
Terminated: NO
2010 Conflict Archive
Comment on Activity: In 2010 the conflict in Sudan was active for the 28th consecutive year. As for the previous seven years the fighting took place in the westernmost region of Darfur. It was the two initial rebel groups of the Darfur conflict, JEM and SLM/A, that were active during the year. The fighting in 2010 was the most intensive since 2006 and the main reason for increased intensity was that the government of Sudan initiated several offensives against the Darfurian rebels throughout the year. In January 2011 South Sudan will hold a referendum about being independent or staying in a united Sudan. This constitute a potential war between North and South Sudan and for this reason Khartoum wanted to crush as much of the Darfurian rebel resistance as possible to not be caught in a challenging two-front war. Most of the fighting was between JEM and the government but also the fighting involving SLM/A caused many battle-related deaths. Another important political event in 2010 was election held in April. The elections were won by the government and President Omar el-Bashir but all international observers stated that they were neither free nor fair.
In addition to the fighting in Darfur a new rebel group emerged in South Sudan. In the election in 2010 George Athor was one of the candidate to become the governor in Jonglei, one of the states in South Sudan. When he lost the election he accused the government of South Sudan (GoSS) for fraud and demanded that the GoSS should be dissolved. Fighting broke out in the end of April and then was ongoing throughout May. The coming months were calmer but in December fighting again took place. The clashes between the Forces of George Athor and the GoSS were located in the border area between Jonglei and Upper Nile. Despite negotiations and the government of south Sudan pardoning George Athor and his men no solution to the conflict was seen in 2010. The fighting killed between 90 and 299 people.
Comment on Yearly Battle Related Deaths: In 2010 the fighting in Sudan was located in Darfur and all battle related deaths occurred in this region (except two who was killed in Kordofan a region that borders Darfur). The fighting involving SLM/A mainly took place in and around the Jebel Mara mountains whilst the fighting with JEM was more spread allover Darfur. The estimated number battle related deaths in 2010 is 638-920 for JEM and 203-590 for SLM/A.
Negotiations: YES
Comment on Negotiation: Throughout the year negotiations went on and off between different rebel factions and the government. In February negotiations between JEM and the government that had been stalled for several months restarted and on 20 February a framework agreement between the two parties was signed in the Chadian capital of N’Djamena. The deal had been negotiated by the Chadian government. The agreement called for a ceasefire, release of hundreds of JEM-fighters that were imprisoned and set out terms for future negotiations. This agreement was followed up by a more comprehensive deal signed 23 February in Doha. This deal stipulated that in a final peace agreement the JEM should have representation at all governmental level. However, the ceasefire did not hold and in late April intense fighting between JEM and the government broke out and because of this JEM left the ongoing negotiations 3 May but negotiations continued with other rebel groups. However, the SLM/A led by Abdul Wahid continued its firm resistance to any negotiations with the government before the security situation improved in Darfur.
In addition negotiations took place between the Government of South Sudan and the Forces of George Athor but no solution was reached during the year.
Third party involvement: YES
Third party involvement names: UNAMID, UNMIS, Chad
Comment on Third Party Involvement: The United Nations and African Union were active as third parties in the Sudan conflict in 2010 both as mediators and as peacekeepers. In Darfur the name of the peacekeeping operation was United Nations African Union Mission in Darfur (UNAMID) and they replaced African Union Mission in Sudan (AMIS) as of 1 January 2008. The deployment of the UNAMID was met by many problems and was severely delayed. However, as of the end of October 2010, the UNAMID was deployed with 22 061 troops which was in accordance with the size mentioned in the 1769 Security Council resolution. Still there was a technical problems remaining for the UNAMID with extensive problems to get the technical equipment that they need, foremost helicopters. During its three years in place UNAMID have lost 75 personnel: 48 troops, 12 police, 1 military observer, 3 international civilians 9 local civilians and 2 others.
In addition to UNAMID there was a parallel UN peacekeeping operation going on in South Sudan. The name of this mission was UNMIS, United Nation Mission in Sudan. The main mandate for the UNMIS was to oversee the Comprehensive Peace Agreement from 2005 between the government of Sudan and SPLM/A, Sudan Peoples Liberation Movement/Army. In the end of October 2010 UNMIS had 10 592 uniformed personnel.
Furthermore, Chad acted as a mediator for the agreement signed between JEM and the Government.
Victory: NO
Terminated: NO
2011 Conflict Archive
Comment on Activity: The year of 2011 was a historic year in Sudan as the country split into the Republic of Sudan and the Republic of South Sudan on 9 July. The year was also very violent and during the year five different rebel groups fought against the government of Sudan. In the westernmost region of Darfur the two rebel groups of JEM and SLM/A continued its struggle against the government albeit the fighting was less intensive than previous years. Two other dyads in South Sudan (SSDM/A and SSLM/A) fought against the government of South Sudan and before the independence of South Sudan come into effect this fighting is part of the conflict in Sudan. The UCDP definition of incompatibility over government state that the rebel groups should either want to remove the government or substantially change it. Up until 9 July 2011 South Sudan was part of Sudan and not an independent country. The stated goal of incompatibility by SSDM and SSLA was just directed against the Government of South Sudan (GoSS) but to remove it would be a substantial change of the government of the entire Sudan. Especially since SPLM/A (the absolute dominant party in GoSS) was also part of a Government of National Unity until independence. However, after the independence the fighting is part of the intrastate conflict in South Sudan.
In addition, fighting erupted between the government and a new rebel group called SPLM/A-North in the contested areas of South Kordofan and Blue Nile. Albeit located in the North large elements within the two states feel more Southern and large elements from these states fought on the side of South Sudan during the 22 years long war between SPLM/A and the government of Sudan. In the Comprehensive Peace Agreement from 2005 which ended this fighting the two states were given a ‘special status’. This special status meant that a ‘popular consultation’ about security arrangements should be dealt with before the end of the CPA-period 9 July. No such consultations were held. Instead an election over governorship was held in May 2011. The election was won by the NCP (party of President Omar el-Bashir) candidate and ICC indicted for crimes against humanity in Darfur Ahmed Haroun. The main opposition party SPLM/A-North (and most independent analysts) judge the election as neither free nor fair. In early June the Sudanese army tried to disarm elements of the SPLM/A who had been able to keep their weapons in accordance with the CPA. SPLM/A-North refused to hand over their weapons and fighting erupted in South Kordofan on 5 June. In September the fighting spread to the neighboring state of Blue Nile.
In November a new coalition group, SRF (Sudanese Revolutionary Front) was formed. The group fought to topple the government and consisted of four groups (JEM, SLM/A, SLM/A-MM and SPLM/A-North).
Comment on Yearly Battle Related Deaths: The year of 2011 was a historic year in Sudan as the country split into the Republic of Sudan and the Republic of South Sudan on 9 July. The year was also very violent and during the year five different rebel groups fought against the government of Sudan. In the westernmost region of Darfur the two rebel groups of JEM and SLM/A continued its struggle against the government albeit the fighting was less intensive than previous years. Two other dyads in South Sudan fought against the government of South Sudan and before the independence of South Sudan came into effect this fighting was part of the conflict in Sudan. However, after the independence the fighting was part of the intrastate conflict in South Sudan. In addition, fighting erupted between the government and a new rebel group called SPLM/A-North in the contested areas of South Kordofan and Blue Nile.
The battle-related deaths in 2011 were divided between the dyads as follows:
Darfur: JEM: 98-108 SLM/A: 130-197
South Kordofan/Blue Nile SPLM/A-North: 217-664
South Sudan SSDM/A: 492-602 SSLM/A: 312-598
The discrepancy between the best and high estimates was because it was very hard to find reliable information from some of the battle areas of Sudan in 2011. In particular the contested areas of South Kordofan and Blue Nile where the government refused to let any outside actors into the regions. Not even international aid organizations were allowed in, despite huge needs among civilians within the regions.
Negotiations: YES
Comment on Negotiation: In 2011 negotiations were ongoing in the Sudan conflict. The SPLM/A-North and the government were involved in negotiations led by AU in which Thabo Mbeki acted as the chairman. The parties also met in Khartoum for negotiations in which the Ethiopian Prime Minister Meles Zenawi acted as a mediator. In South Sudan the Episcopal Church of Sudan was involved in negotiations between SSDM and the government.
In Darfur, none of the rebel groups active in fighting against the government were involved in any negotiations. However, the LJM (Liberation and Justice Movement) was involved in negotiations led by the African Union and signed the Doha Document for Peace in Darfur on 28 June 2011. The LJM is an alliance of rebel splinter factions and have never really fought against the government and therefore these negotiations and the peace-agreement are not included in the UCDP coding.
Third party involvement: YES
Third party involvement names: UNAMID, AU, Ethiopia, Episcopal Church of Sudan
Comment on Third Party Involvement: In Darfur, the UNAMID peacekeeping mission continued and its current authorization is until 31 July 2012. UNAMID is the abbreviation of United Nations African Union Mission in Darfur which replaced African Union Mission in Sudan (AMIS) as of 1 January 2008. The deployment of the UNAMID was met by many problems and was severely delayed. Also, UNAMID faced severe technical problems as significant equipment such as helicopter was not delivered. However, in 2011 some helicopters were delivered by Ethiopia which improved the ability for UNAMID. As of the end of November 2011, the UNAMID was deployed with a total of 22,850 total uniformed personnel which was divided into 17,626 troops, 247 military observers, 4,977 police (including formed units),1,131 international civilian personnel, 2,916 local civilian staff, and 482 United Nations Volunteers. Up until the end of 2011 UNAMID had lost 104 of its personnel: 69 troops, 21 police, 1 military observer, 3 international civilian, 10 local civilian.
In the conflict in South Kordofan and Blue Nile African Union was involved as a negotiator. The chief negotiator for AU was Thabo Mbeki. Also, Ethiopia acted as a mediator in this conflict as its Prime Minister Meles Zenawi led talks between the government and SPLM/A-N.
In South Sudan the Episcopal Church of Sudan was involved in negotiations between SSDM/A and the government. The negotiations led to a cease-fire signed on 5 January but fighting broke out soon after it was signed.
Victory: NO
Terminated: NO
2012 Conflict Archive
Comment on Activity: In 2012 the intra-state conflict was active for the 30th consecutive year. The fighting stood between the Sudanese Revolutionary Front (SRF) and the government. Clashes between SRF and the government took place in the three areas of Darfur, South Kordofan and Blue Nile with South Kordofan witnessing the most intensive fighting. Fighting took place throughout the year and was intensive (intensity level of war according to the UCDP-criteria). The fighting between the SRF and the government has it foundation in grievances within the Darfur, Southern Kordofan and Blue Nile area. These areas are severely marginalized in comparison to the Khartoum area which utterly dominates the political and economic life of Sudan. The fighting, however, also has a clear international dimension as it is part of the Sudan-South Sudan proxy-war. The divorce between Sudan and South Sudan that took place in 2011 was far from happy and resulted in hostile relations between Juba and Khartoum. In addition to leading to an intrastate conflict between the two countries (see Sudan-South Sudan conflict) it also led to a situation of proxy-war in which Khartoum supported rebels in South Sudan and Juba supported the SRF rebels in Sudan.
Comment on Yearly Battle Related Deaths: The fighting took place in Darfur, South Kordofan and Blue Nile with Southern Kordofan witnessing the most intensive fighting.
Negotiations: YES
Comment on Negotiation: The SRF and the government were not involved in direct negotiations in 2012. Indirect negotiations, however, took place under auspices of the African Union’s High Level Implementation Panel. These negotiations led to the signing of on an agreement to allow humanitarian assistance in rebel-controlled areas of South Kordofan and Blue Nile on 4 August. The agreement, however, was not implemented as of the end of 2012.
Third party involvement: NO
Third party involvement names: UNAMID, African Union’s High Level Implementation Panel
Comment on Third Party Involvement: In Darfur, the UNAMID peacekeeping mission continued and its current authorization is until 31 July 2013. UNAMID is the abbreviation of United Nations African Union Mission in Darfur which replaced African Union Mission in Sudan (AMIS) as of 1 January 2008. The deployment of the UNAMID was met by many problems and was severely delayed. Also, UNAMID faced severe technical problems as significant equipment such as helicopter was not delivered. However, in 2011 some helicopters were delivered by Ethiopia which improved the ability for UNAMID. As of the end of November 2012, the UNAMID was deployed with a total of 21,350 total uniformed personnel which was divided into 15,978 troops, 306 military observers, 5,066 police (including formed units) as well as 1,087 international civilian personnel, 2,935 local civilian staff, and 446 United Nations Volunteers. Up until the end of 2012 UNAMID had lost 131 of its personnel: 90 troops, 29 police, 1 military observer, 3 international civilian, 11 local civilian. 1other.
The African Union’s High Level Implementation Panel led indirect negotiations between the SRF and the Sudanese government.
Victory: NO
Terminated: NO
2013 Conflict Archive
Comment on Activity: In 2013 the intra-state conflict over government was active for the 31th consecutive year. The fighting stood between the Sudanese Revolutionary Front (SRF) and the government. Clashes between SRF and the government primarily took place in: Darfur, South Kordofan and Blue Nile. Intensive fighting took place throughout the year. The areas where the fighting took place are located in places that are hard to access and therefore reliable information about the number of fatalities is hard to confirm. This is why the best estimate – 576 battle related deaths – is substantially lower than the high estimate – 3134 battle related deaths. The fighting between the SRF and the government has it foundation in grievances within the Darfur, Southern Kordofan and Blue Nile areas. These areas are severely marginalized in comparison to the Khartoum area which utterly dominates the political and economic life of Sudan.
Comment on Yearly Battle Related Deaths: The fighting between the Sudanese government and SRF took place in three states: Darfur, Blue Nile and South Kordofan. The prime reason behind the high discrepancy between the best and high figure is the difficulties to get reliable information from these areas.
Negotiations: YES
Comment on Negotiation: The government of Sudan and rebel representatives met for negotiations in Addis Ababa in May. The rebel side was represented by SPLM/A-north, which are a core part of the SRF. The negotiations were facilitated by the African Union’s High Level Implementation Panel led by Thabo Mbeki.
Third party involvement: YES
Third party involvement names: UNAMID, African Union’s High Level Implementation Panel
Comment on Third Party Involvement: In Darfur, the UNAMID peacekeeping mission continued and its current authorization is until 31 August 2014. UNAMID is the abbreviation of United Nations African Union Mission in Darfur which replaced African Union Mission in Sudan (AMIS) as of 1 January 2008. The deployment of the UNAMID was met by many problems and was severely delayed. Also, UNAMID faced severe technical problems as significant equipment such as helicopter was not delivered. However, in 2011 some helicopters were delivered by Ethiopia which improved the ability for UNAMID. As of the end of December 2013, the UNAMID was deployed with a total of 19,442 uniformed personnel which was divided into 14,443 troops, 325military observers, 4,674 police (including formed units) as well as 1,061 international civilian personnel, 2,955 local civilian staff, and 408 United Nations Volunteers. Up until the end of 2013 UNAMID had lost 188 of its personnel: 128 troops, 41 police, 1 military observer, 15 international civilian, 14 local civilian.
The African Union’s High Level Implementation Panel led negotiations between the SRF and the Sudanese government.
Victory: NO
Terminated: NO
2014 Conflict Archive
Comment on Activity: The intra-state conflict over government in Sudan was active in 2014 for the 32nd consecutive year. The major part of the fighting stood between the government and the Sudanese Revolutionary Front (SRF). However, during 2014 two new actors were involved in this conflict, the Darfur Joint Resistance Forces consisting of SLM/A (MM) and SLM/A (AW), which fought interchangeably with the SRF and in this coalition, and in cooperation with the smaller group SLMJ. The second new actor in 2014 was the Sudanese Awakening Revolutionary Council (SARC) led by the former Janjaweed leader Musa Hilal who defected from the government party in January. Clashes between the government and these three actors mainly took place in Darfur, South Kordofan and Blue Nile throughout the year.
Comment on Yearly Battle Related Deaths: The areas where the fighting took place are located in places hard to access, reliable information about the number of fatalities is therefore hard to confirm. This is the prime reason behind the discrepancy between the best and high figure for the battle-related deaths.
Negotiations: YES
Comment on Negotiation: There were negotiations between the Government of Sudan and SRF in 2014. President Bashir announced the government’s plan of initiating a National Dialogue in January 2014. A National Dialogue Committee was appointed by the governing National Congress Party (NCP), also called the Committee of 7+7. The opposition parties’ response to this initiative was manifold, and the intents of President Bashir were questioned in some quarters. The African Union’s High Level Implementation Panel (AUHIP) supported the initiative from the outset, and the chairman of AUHIP and former South African president Thabo Mbeki have been mediating a number of talks during the year.
Several of the different groups being part of the SRF have been involved in direct talks with the government through the National Dialogue as well as in separate negotiations. The Government of Sudan has been reluctant to recognise the SRF as a single entity, which have complicated the peace process. SPLM/A-N has been involved in the most extensive negotiations, the SLM/A (MM) and JEM have also negotiated with the government under the direction of AUHIP in Addis Ababa.
UNAMID’s Joint Chief Mediator, Mohamed Ibn Chambas, has led indirect peace talks between the SRF and the government, and have pressed for the need of direct negotiations. In coordination with the African Union’s High Level Implementation Panel, UNAMID have been encouraging the parties to join the National Dialogue.
One important development during 2014 has been the steps the opposition took in order to coordinate their political efforts. On the 8 August the SRF and the National Umma Party, an unarmed opposition party, signed the Paris Declaration which strengthened their cooperation. And in December they took additional steps when signing a document called the Sudan Call. The Paris Declaration led to that the SRF and the Umma Party mediated together in the National Dialogue with the government.
In early September negotiations in Addis Ababa led to a framework agreement between the government and the SRF. In the Agreement on the National Dialogue and Constitutional Process the parties agreed to a continued dialogue and a framework for that process. To reach a cessation of hostilities was listed as the most important priority, and one of SRF’s demands was met through the provision that a comprehensive political settlement was the ideal option to resolve Sudan’s problems. The government on the other hand have been promoting an approach with more fragmented characteristics. However, this agreement was far from addressing all of the outstanding issues in this conflict, but could be a step towards bringing a political solution to the conflict between the government and SRF.
Third party involvement: YES
Third party involvement names: UNAMID, African Unions High Level Implementation Panel (AUHIP), Ethiopia.
Comment on Third Party Involvement: The UNAMID peacekeeping mission continued in Darfur and its current authorization runs until 30 June 2015. UNAMID is the abbreviation of United Nations African Union Mission in Darfur which replaced the African Union Mission in Sudan (AMIS) as of 1 January 2008. In late August 2014 the Security Council decided to decrease the military and police components of the peacekeeping mission. As of the end of 2014, the UNAMID was deployed with a total of 15 863 uniformed personnel which was divided into 12 588 troops, 195 military observers, 3080 police (including formed units) as well as 970 international civilian personnel, 2869 local civilian staff, and 214 United Nations Volunteers. Up until the end of 2014 UNAMID had lost 212 of its personnel.
UNAMID’s Joint Chief Mediator, Mohamed Ibn Chambas, met with both the Sudanese government and the SRF in indirect negotiations.
The African Union’s High Level Implementation Panel led negotiations between the SRF and the Sudanese government in Addis Ababa.
Victory: NO
Terminated: NO
2015 Conflict Archive
Comment on Activity: The intra-state conflict over government in Sudan continued to be active in 2015, a conflict that has been active since the early 1980s. Following the pattern from the last years, the majority of the fighting stood between the government and the Sudanese Revolutionary Front (SRF). Clashes between the government and SRF intensified in 2015, due to an extensive operation against the rebel group during the first four months of the year. However, clashes continued throughout the year and was concentrated to the southern parts of the country, Darfur, South Kordofan and Blue Nile.
The Darfur Joint Resistance Forces, an alliance of rebel groups that emerged in 2014, clashed with the government in Central Darfur early January 2015. Following these heavy battles the alliance did not clash with the government during the remainder of the year.
Comment on Yearly Battle Related Deaths: The areas where most of the fighting took place are located in places that are hard to access, reliable information about the number of fatalities is therefore hard to confirm. This is the prime reason behind the discrepancy between the best and high figure for the battle-related deaths.
Negotiations: YES
Comment on Negotiation: There were negotiations between the Government of Sudan and SRF in 2015. The National Dialogue process that was initiated in 2014 made little progress during 2015. Talks were planned to be held on several occasions but had to be canceled when delegations from both the government and the SRF failed to show up. However, the chief negotiator of the African Union’s High Level Implementation Panel (AUHIP) and former South African president, Thabo Mbeki, continued his efforts to support the National Dialogue. Mbeki held separate negotiations with the government of Sudan and SRF several times during 2015.
Delegates from Khartoum and the SRF met in Addis Ababa, Ethiopia, in November 2015 for negotiations facilitated by AUHIP. It became clear that the outstanding issues from previous years remained. The Sudanese government continues to regard the conflict as two separate areas of interest, Darfur and the Two Areas (Kordofan and Blue Nile) and is therefore reluctant to negotiate with the SRF as a single entity. Something that the different rebel groups that the SRF coalition consists of insists upon.
This has put restraints on the cooperation within the SRF and a struggle for the leadership position has emerged within the rebel coalition during 2015. In sum, no progress was made to reach a peaceful settlement between the two parties.
Third party involvement: YES
Third party involvement names: UNAMID, African Union’s High Level Implementation Panel, Ethiopia.
Comment on Third Party Involvement: The UNAMID peacekeeping mission continued in Darfur and its current authorization is until 30 June 2016. UNAMID is the abbreviation of United Nations African Union Mission in Darfur which replaced the African Union Mission in Sudan (AMIS) as of 1 January 2008. As of March 2016, the UNAMID was deployed with a total of 17 402 uniformed personnel which was divided into 14 294 troops, 174 military observers, 2 934 police (including formed units) as well as 811 international civilian personnel, 2 601 local civilian staff, and 159 United Nations Volunteers.
The African Union’s High Level Implementation Panel led negotiations between the SRF and the Sudanese government in Addis Ababa.
Victory: NO
Terminated: NO
2016 Conflict Archive
Comment on Activity: The intra-state conflict in Sudan continued to be active in 2016, a conflict that has been active consecutively since the early 1980s.
The fighting stood between the government and the Sudanese Revolutionary Front (SRF) during the year, as well as between the government and the SPLM/A-North. Clashes took place in Darfur, Blue Nile and South Kordofan. Amnesty International accused the government of using chemical weapons in their military operations against the SRF during 2016, something that led to the death of as many as 250 people in the Jebel Marra area of Darfur.
Comment on Yearly Battle Related Deaths: The areas where most of the fighting took place are located in places that are hard to access, reliable information about the number of fatalities is therefore hard to confirm. This is the prime reason behind the discrepancy between the best and high figure for the battle-related deaths.
Negotiations: YES
Comment on Negotiation: There were several rounds of negotiations between the Government of Sudan and the SRF in 2016. The negotiations took place in Addis Ababa, Ethiopia, and were led by the chief negotiator of the African Union’s High Level Implementation Panel (AUHIP) and former South African president, Thabo Mbeki.
A road map peace agreement was drafted where the parties were to commit to taking part in the National Dialogue that the government had initiated in previous years, a process that has been considered to exclude important parts of the opposition by the SRF.
One of the stumbling blocks during the negotiations has been how access should be given to the affected areas, in order for humanitarian aid to reach the civilian population. Both the government and the SRF were suspicious of the other party to take advantage of the deliveries, either for smuggling weapons or in order to create leverage for themselves by blocking the access routes.
The government signed the road map agreement in March 2016, and some parts of the SRF, after refusing to do so initially, finally signed the same agreement in early August. However, the SLM/A continued to refuse to be part of the agreement, and only days later the negotiation process collapsed.
Informal talks between the government and SPLM-N took place in Germany in early 2016, however, no progress was made concerning the outstanding issues of the conflict.
Third party involvement: YES
Third party involvement names: UNAMID, African Union's High Level Implementation Panel, Ethiopia, Germany.
Comment on Third Party Involvement: The UNAMID peacekeeping mission continued in Darfur and its current authorization is until 30 June 2017. UNAMID is the abbreviation of the United Nations African Union Mission in Darfur which replaced the African Union Mission in Sudan (AMIS) as of 1 January 2008. As of April 2017, the UNAMID was deployed with a total of 17 036 uniformed personnel which was divided into 13 613 troops, 178 military observers, 3 245 police (including formed units) as well as 749 international civilian personnel, 2 148 civilian staff, and 120 United Nations Volunteers.
The African Union's High Level Implementation Panel led negotiations between Sudanese government and the SRF in Addis Ababa.
Victory: NO
Terminated: NO
2017 Conflict Archive
Comment on Activity: The intra-state conflict in Sudan continued to be active in 2017, a conflict that has been active consecutively since the early 1980s. The fighting stood between the government and the SRF during the year, and between the government and the SLM/A but violence levels dropped to their lowest in decades. Clashes between the government and the SPLM/A-North did not reach the UCDP criteria of 25 battle-related-deaths in 2017.
Negotiations: NO
Comment on Negotiation: The African Union’s High Level Implementation Panel (AUHIP) facilitated peace process remained frozen during 2017; nonetheless, most alliance members of the SRF and the Government of Sudan enforced unilateral ceasefires throughout the year.
Third party involvement: YES
Third party involvement names: UNAMID, African Union's High Level Implementation Panel,
Comment on Third Party Involvement: The UNAMID peacekeeping mission continued in Darfur and its current authorization is until 30 June 2018, during which a scale down in mission troop and police strength is planned. UNAMID is the abbreviation of the United Nations African Union Mission in Darfur, which replaced the African Union Mission in Sudan (AMIS) as of 1 January 2008.
Victory: NO
Terminated: NO
2018 Conflict Archive
Comment on Activity: The fighting between SLM/A and the government in Sudan continued in 2018 and the number of battle-related-deaths increased in comparison with the previous year. Sporadic and small scale clashes between the government and SRF took place in early 2018, but the number of deaths did not reach the UCDP criteria.
Negotiations: YES
Comment on Negotiation: Peace talks between the Government of Sudan and the main SPLM/A-N faction led by al-Hilu were held in Ethiopia in February 2019.
Third party involvement: YES
Third party involvement names: African Unions High Level Implementation Panel (AUHIP). UNAMID peacekeeping mission ,Ethiopia
Comment on Third Party Involvement: ECP
Victory: NO
Terminated: YES
Type of termination: No or Low Activity
Date of termination: 2018-12-31
Comment on Termination: The SLM/A was the only armed group that continued to fight the government in 2019, however, the fighting, mainly located in the Jebel Marra area of Darfur, did not reach the UCDP criteria of 25 battle-related-deaths. Consequently, the conflict was terminated by the end of 2018.
2019 Conflict Archive
Comment on Activity: Drastic changes took place in Sudan in 2019. The widespread protests against President al-Bashir that had started in December 2018, continued and gained momentum in 2019. al-Bashir was ousted on 11 April 2019 and was replaced by a Transitional Military Council, nevertheless, the protests continued against the military rule of the country. Protests were sometimes brutally put down by security forces, and clashes between the protesters and the security forces took place occasionally. The Transitional Military Council was dissolved in August 2019, and the civilian-led Sovereignty Council, with Abdalla Hamdok as Prime Minister, took over the transitional government.
For the first time since 1983 there was no active conflict over government in Sudan in 2019. The SLM/A was the only armed group that continued to fight the government in 2019, however, the fighting, mainly located in the Jebel Marra area of Darfur, did not reach the UCDP criteria of 25 battle-related-deaths.
Negotiations: YES
Comment on Negotiation: Peace talks between the Government of Sudan and the main SPLM/A-N faction led by al-Hilu were held in Ethiopia in February 2019.
The halting peace negotiations between the Sudanese government and the SRF, gained new momentum after the civilian-led Sovereignty Council, with Abdalla Hamdok as Prime Minister, took over the transitional government. The parties, including SPLM/A-North, no longer part of the rebel alliance, met for peace talks on several occasions during the fall of 2019 in Juba in neighboring South Sudan. Several peace agreements, including political roadmaps and cessation of hostilities agreements, were signed.
A first round of talks was held in Juba, South Sudan in September during which the parties signed ta peace process agreement "the Juba Declaration for Trust Building Measures and Pre-Negotiations Principles". During the second round in October 2019 "Political Declaration between the Government of the Republic of Sudan and the Sudan Revolutionary Front" was signed.
Third party involvement: YES
Third party involvement names: UNAMID, African Union High-Level Implementation Panel on Sudan (AUHIP), South Sudan,
Comment on Third Party Involvement: Hosted negotiations
Victory: NO
Terminated: NO
Type of termination: Not terminated
2020 Conflict Archive
Comment on Activity: Peace talks continued in 2020, and despite some delay due to the COVID-19 pandemic, several peace agreements were signed. A slight uptick in fighting between SLM/A and the government in Darfur once again led to an active conflict being registered in Sudan in 2020.
Third party involvement: YES
Third party involvement names: African Union High Level Panel on Sudan (AUHIP), Troika
(EEUU, United Kingdom, Norway), Germany, AU, UNAMID,
Ethiopia, South Sudan, Uganda
Terminated: NO
2021 Conflict Archive
Comment on Activity: The fighting between SLM/A and the government continued in Darfur in 2021, as both sides clashed sporadically throughout the year. The leader of SLM/A, Abdel Wahid al-Nur, condemned the 25 October coup and called his supporters to join the anti-coup protest movement.
Terminated: NO
2022 Conflict Archive
Comment on Activity: The conflict between the government and SLM/A continued in 2022 with a slight uptick in the intensity compared to the previous year. The clashes mainly occurred in the Jebel Marra area and the Rokoro district. The leader of SLM/A, Abdel Wahid al-Nur, refused the peace talks with the al-Burhan regime, which came to power through a military coup in October 2021.
Negotiations: NO
Third party involvement: NO
Victory: NO
Terminated: NO
2023 Conflict Archive
Terminated: NO
2024 Conflict Archive
Comment on Activity: The intensity of the conflict between the Sudanese Armed Forces (SAF) and the Rapid Support Forces (RSF) slightly decreased in 2024 compared to the previous year, with over 4500 fatalities. While heavy fighting continued in Khartoum, a major shift occurred with the RSF’s rapid expansion into Gezira state, following its capture of the regional capital, Wad Madani, in December 2023. This marked one of the RSF’s most significant gains, effectively extending its control eastward. The takeover accompanied by reports of targeted executions, as RSF forces sought to eliminate perceived SAF sympathizers.
In North Darfur, El Fasher emerged as a critical battleground. El Fasher held strategic importance both as a military stronghold and a humanitarian hub sheltering hundreds of thousands displaced civilians. In May 2024, the RSF launched a large-scale offensive to seize the city, triggering intense clashes. The SAF relied heavily on airstrikes to defend its positions, while RSF forces carried out ground assaults and imposed siege tactics, cutting off key access routes.
Negotiations: YES
Comment on Negotiation: Throughout 2024, multiple regional and international actors, including Saudi Arabia, the United States, the Intergovernmental Authority on Development (IGAD), and the African Union, sought to mediate between the Sudanese Armed Forces (SAF) and the Rapid Support Forces (RSF). Notably, ceasefire talks were held in Jeddah, Saudi Arabia, resuming in late 2023 and continuing sporadically into 2024. These efforts led to several short-term humanitarian truces; however, the agreements frequently collapsed due to violations by both parties.
While negotiations between the SAF and RSF did take place—primarily through indirect, internationally mediated channels—they were limited in scope, focusing mainly on humanitarian access and ceasefire arrangements rather than broader political or security settlements. The two sides remained deeply divided on key issues, particularly the structure of future security arrangements and the integration of forces. The lack of sustained dialogue and continued military escalation on the ground hindered progress toward a comprehensive ceasefire or political agreement.
Terminated: NO
2025 Conflict Archive
Comment on Activity: In 2025, the conflict over government in Sudan intensified significantly, resulting in over 12 000 fatalities compared to over 4 500 fatalities in 2024. The escalation was driven by military escalation and major shifts among armed actors. While the Government of Sudan, represented by the Sudanese Armed Forces (SAF), remained engaged in large-scale hostilities with the Rapid Support Forces (RSF), the formation of the Sudan Founding Alliance (SFA) in February, uniting RSF, SPLM/A-North, and allied factions, broadened the war both geographically and tactically. Fighting remained particularly intense across Darfur, Kordofan, and Khartoum, as the government forces pursued territorial recapture campaigns in central Sudan while SFA increasingly relied on drone strikes, artillery shelling, and siege tactics.
A major turning point occurred in late October when RSF, under the banner of SFA captured El Fasher, the capital of North Darfur and the last major SAF stronghold in Darfur region, after a prolonged siege. Its fall largely consolidated RSF control over most of Darfur, strengthening its territorial dominance in western Sudan, despite continued resistance from SAF-aligned forces. The capture also enhanced RSF supply lines and operational coordination across Darfur and neighboring Kordofan. Expanded drone warfare further marked a significant tactical shift, with RSF and allied forces increasingly targeting military installations, urban centers, and strategic infrastructure beyond traditional frontlines. Territorial shifts throughout the year significantly increased civilian vulnerability and further entrenched Sudan’s fragmentation.
Negotiations: YES
Comment on Negotiation: Throughout 2025, regional and international actors, including Saudi Arabia, the United States, The African Union, Intergovernmental Authority on Development (IGAD), Egypt and the United Nations, continued mediation efforts between the Government of Sudan and Sudan Founding Alliance (SFA) through the Jeddah Framework and parallel diplomatic initiatives focused on humanitarian access, temporary ceasefires, and de-escalation. However, the formation of the SFA in February further complicated negotiations by expanding the number of armed and political actors involved.
Negotiations remained limited to humanitarian corridors, prisoner exchanges, and short-term truce proposals, while repeated ceasefire violations, ongoing offensives in Darfur, Kordofan, and central Sudan, and deep divisions over governance, military integration, and territorial control prevented progress toward a comprehensive settlement. Despite sustained international engagement, peace efforts failed to secure a durable ceasefire or viable political agreement, as battlefield escalation continued to outpace diplomatic initiatives.
Third party involvement: YES
Third party involvement names: Saudi Arabia, the United States, The African Union, Intergovernmental Authority on Development (IGAD), Egypt and the United Nations
Victory: NO
Terminated: NO
