General information
Type of Incompatibility: Territory
Comment on Type of Incompatibility: The conflict is referred to as Burma/Myanmar (Karen), which differs from UCDP practice of naming the conflict after the contested territory. As Burma was preparing for independence, ethnic Karen organizations requested the formation of an independent Karenistan – the territory of the so-called Tenasserim Division and part of the Pegu district, but were also concerned with the rights of ethnic Karen throughout the country.
It is worth remembering that this suggested Karenistan would by no means be an exclusively Karen-populated area, or that all ethnic Karen were based in this territory, as the Karen population generally was intermixed with Burman and other minorities throughout the country. Indeed, the depiction of the Karen as a separate ethnic group has been suggested as a combination of the classification system of the Burma Court of Ava, and anthropological studies during British colonial rule. The 1931 Burma census identified 16 Karen sub-groups, dominated by the Sqaw, Pwo, and Pa-O. The KNU has been dominated by the Sqaw and Pwo sub-groups, which constituted together some 75% of the Karen in 1931. Some sub-groups, such as the Pa-O, Karenni, and Kayan have formed separate rebel groups concerned with specific incompatibilities.
After the first months of fighting, on 20 May 1949, the KNU/KNUP proclaimed the independent state of Kawthoolei for the territory it controlled. As the KNU has modified its demands from outright independence to autonomy within a federal state, the aim is still that such a territory should be called Kawthoolei rather than Karen state.
Territory: Karen
Date of first stated goal of incompatibility: 1948-02-03
Comment on date of first stated goals of incompatibility: The Karen National Union was at odds with the government already when Burma became independent on 4 January 1948, since the organization was created with the objective to establish an independent Karen state outside of the Union of Burma. The KNU had been formed by an All Karen Congress in Rangoon on 5 February 1947.
The KNU boycotted the elections to the first Constituent Assembly in Burma on 9 April 1947, and started organizing a paramilitary force under General Bo Mya. In July 1947, the KNDO (Karen National Defence Organisation) was established as the armed wing of the KNU. It should be noted that the KNDO was mainly created with the objective to defend Karen civilians from the increasing communal violence as the British colonial forces withdrew. Many members of the early leadership of the KNU had previously worked in the colonial administration.
No Karen leaders were present when the draft constitution creating the Union of Burma was adopted in September. On 3 February 1948, the KNU chairman Ba U Gyi wrote to the newly formed Burmese government and demanded the formation of an independent Karen state. The government were given one month to comply with these demands. The KNU also organised a day of protest on 11 February, when - according to Karen leaders - 400 000 people took to the streets.
Date of first use of armed force: 1948-07-20
Comment on first use of armed force: In the early months of 1948, talks were held between the KNU and the new Burmese government about the Karen situation, as communal violence increased. The Karen leadership was also in contact with other ethnic minorities and established co-operation with ethnic Mon leaders in the MUF (Mon United Front), who were in the process of creating a similar armed militia, the MNDO (Mon National Defence Organisation), in March 1948.
The KNU-KNDO had some access to weaponry through its members that previously had been part of the British Army, but the MUF-MNDO had almost any guns. The first use of armed force was when Karen police officers helped MUF-MNDO to take over the police station in Zarthabyin village on 20 July 1948 and capture three machine guns. At the same time, KNU-KNDO forces took over hundreds of district and village administrations in southern Burma in an attempt to stop the communal violence that often was supported by government officials. It is unclear to what extent, these incidents led to any fatalities, and also whether any fighting involved government troops or just independent Burman militias.
Date of first battle related death: 1948-12-01
Comment on first battle related death: In a series of meetings during August-October 1948, the leaderships of the Karen National Union and the Mon United Front agreed to a four memorandum that led to an alliance between the two independence movements. When the government heard of the Mon-Karen alliance it started arresting opposition figures and harassment of civilians. A two-day operation on 30-31 August 1948 led to the capture of the cities of Thaton and Moulmein by Mon-Karen forces without a shot being fired.
As the government troops encircled the occupied cities and talks were initiated, minor clashes were reported from surrounding villages. On 8 September 1948, the Mon-Karen forces were persuaded to withdraw. It has been reported that pro-government militias had launched attacks in the morning hours of the same day to re-capture the small nearby towns of Kyaikmaraw and Mudon, but had been fought off. It is likely that these clashes led to at least some fatalities as the Mon-Karen forces returned with a number of prisoners. No deaths have been confirmed, and it is unclear whether troops controlled by the government participated in the clashes.
Following the withdrawal of forces from Moulmein in September 1948, the KNU controlled substantial "liberated zones" as continued harassment of Karen civilians led to an influx of refugees into these areas.
Towards the end of the year, the Burmese prime minister started to form local paramilitary defence units called "Sitwundans", mainly composed of former PVO (see government conflict) rebels who accepted an amnesty in October 1948. These groups, acting as auxiliary police forces encouraged communal tension. On Christmas Eve 1948, such paramilitaries attacked and killed more than 80 Christian Karen worshippers in Mergui district.
In the ensuing days, clashes between KNDO and the ex-PVO forces erupted, with the latter claiming to represent the government.
Date of conflict reached 25 battle releated deaths: 1949-01-15
Comment on conflict reached 25 battle releated deaths: Pro-government PVO forces attacked a village in Taikkyi township, some 40 miles north of Rangoon. It is somewhat unclear exactly what occurred, but it was reported that in the bombardment some 20 houses were destoyed and a total of 150 Karen killed. Of these, 30 were reportedly executed by the government troops, suggesting that the incident also included fighting with KNDO units.
In an immediate response, KNDO raided the armoury at Insein and the treasure at Maubin. This provoced the 4th Burma Rifles of the Army to also get involved in skirmishes at Maubin.
On 30 January 1949, the political wing of the Karen independence movement, KNU, was declared illegal by the government and the Karen forces immediately captured Insein, north of Rangoon, the following day. The military capacity of KNU increased further when the three battalions referred to as the Karen Rifles of the Burmese army and one regiment of the Kachin Rifles deserted and joined the KNU. Their arrival led to the reorganisation of the KNU military wing into the KNLA (Karen National Liberation Army.)
Annual information
This section contains annual information systematically collected by the UCDP.
1975
Primary Parties: Government of Myanmar (Burma) - KNU, KNUP
Dimension: Internal
| Estimated Fatalities | |
|---|---|
| High | 50 |
| Best | 50 |
| Low | 0 |
Numbers include fatalities for all dyads both active and inactive for this year
1976
Primary Parties: Government of Myanmar (Burma) - KNU
Dimension: Internal
| Estimated Fatalities | |
|---|---|
| High | 25 |
| Best | 25 |
| Low | 0 |
Numbers include fatalities for all dyads both active and inactive for this year
1977
Primary Parties: Government of Myanmar (Burma) - KNU
Dimension: Internal
| Estimated Fatalities | |
|---|---|
| High | 25 |
| Best | 25 |
| Low | 0 |
Numbers include fatalities for all dyads both active and inactive for this year
1978
Primary Parties: Government of Myanmar (Burma) - KNU
Dimension: Internal
| Estimated Fatalities | |
|---|---|
| High | 25 |
| Best | 25 |
| Low | 0 |
Numbers include fatalities for all dyads both active and inactive for this year
1979
Primary Parties: Government of Myanmar (Burma) - KNU
Dimension: Internal
| Estimated Fatalities | |
|---|---|
| High | 25 |
| Best | 25 |
| Low | 0 |
Numbers include fatalities for all dyads both active and inactive for this year
1980
Primary Parties: Government of Myanmar (Burma) - KNU
Dimension: Internal
| Estimated Fatalities | |
|---|---|
| High | 25 |
| Best | 25 |
| Low | 0 |
Numbers include fatalities for all dyads both active and inactive for this year
1981
Primary Parties: Government of Myanmar (Burma) - KNU
Dimension: Internal
| Estimated Fatalities | |
|---|---|
| High | 25 |
| Best | 25 |
| Low | 0 |
Numbers include fatalities for all dyads both active and inactive for this year
1982
Primary Parties: Government of Myanmar (Burma) - KNU
Dimension: Internal
| Estimated Fatalities | |
|---|---|
| High | 25 |
| Best | 25 |
| Low | 0 |
Numbers include fatalities for all dyads both active and inactive for this year
1983
Primary Parties: Government of Myanmar (Burma) - KNU
Dimension: Internal
| Estimated Fatalities | |
|---|---|
| High | 1000 |
| Best | 1000 |
| Low | 0 |
Numbers include fatalities for all dyads both active and inactive for this year
1984
Primary Parties: Government of Myanmar (Burma) - KNU
Dimension: Internal
| Estimated Fatalities | |
|---|---|
| High | 1000 |
| Best | 1000 |
| Low | 0 |
Numbers include fatalities for all dyads both active and inactive for this year
1985
Primary Parties: Government of Myanmar (Burma) - KNU
Dimension: Internal
| Estimated Fatalities | |
|---|---|
| High | 25 |
| Best | 25 |
| Low | 0 |
Numbers include fatalities for all dyads both active and inactive for this year
1986
Primary Parties: Government of Myanmar (Burma) - KNU
Dimension: Internal
| Estimated Fatalities | |
|---|---|
| High | 25 |
| Best | 25 |
| Low | 0 |
Numbers include fatalities for all dyads both active and inactive for this year
1987
Primary Parties: Government of Myanmar (Burma) - KNU
Dimension: Internal
| Estimated Fatalities | |
|---|---|
| High | 25 |
| Best | 25 |
| Low | 0 |
Numbers include fatalities for all dyads both active and inactive for this year
1988
Primary Parties: Government of Myanmar (Burma) - KNU
Dimension: Internal
| Estimated Fatalities | |
|---|---|
| High | 25 |
| Best | 25 |
| Low | 0 |
Numbers include fatalities for all dyads both active and inactive for this year
1989
Primary Parties: Government of Myanmar (Burma) - KNU
Dimension: Internal
| Estimated Fatalities | |
|---|---|
| High | 1913 |
| Best | 1304 |
| Low | 538 |
Numbers include fatalities for all dyads both active and inactive for this year
1990
Primary Parties: Government of Myanmar (Burma) - KNU
Dimension: Internal
| Estimated Fatalities | |
|---|---|
| High | 428 |
| Best | 393 |
| Low | 393 |
Numbers include fatalities for all dyads both active and inactive for this year
1991
Primary Parties: Government of Myanmar (Burma) - KNU
Dimension: Internal
| Estimated Fatalities | |
|---|---|
| High | 672 |
| Best | 552 |
| Low | 497 |
Numbers include fatalities for all dyads both active and inactive for this year
1992
Primary Parties: Government of Myanmar (Burma) - KNU
Dimension: Internal
| Estimated Fatalities | |
|---|---|
| High | 1275 |
| Best | 1163 |
| Low | 1130 |
Numbers include fatalities for all dyads both active and inactive for this year
1993
Primary Parties: -
Dimension: Internal
| Estimated Fatalities | |
|---|---|
| High | 11 |
| Best | 11 |
| Low | 11 |
Numbers include fatalities for all dyads both active and inactive for this year
1994
Primary Parties: Government of Myanmar (Burma) - KNU
Dimension: Internal
| Estimated Fatalities | |
|---|---|
| High | 25 |
| Best | 25 |
| Low | 15 |
Numbers include fatalities for all dyads both active and inactive for this year
1995
Primary Parties: Government of Myanmar (Burma) - KNU
Dimension: Internal
| Estimated Fatalities | |
|---|---|
| High | 110 |
| Best | 110 |
| Low | 60 |
Numbers include fatalities for all dyads both active and inactive for this year
1997
Primary Parties: Government of Myanmar (Burma) - KNU
Dimension: Internal
| Estimated Fatalities | |
|---|---|
| High | 41 |
| Best | 41 |
| Low | 41 |
Numbers include fatalities for all dyads both active and inactive for this year
1998
Primary Parties: Government of Myanmar (Burma) - KNU
Dimension: Internal
| Estimated Fatalities | |
|---|---|
| High | 36 |
| Best | 36 |
| Low | 36 |
Numbers include fatalities for all dyads both active and inactive for this year
1999
Primary Parties: -
Dimension: Internal
| Estimated Fatalities | |
|---|---|
| High | 17 |
| Best | 14 |
| Low | 14 |
Numbers include fatalities for all dyads both active and inactive for this year
2000
Primary Parties: Government of Myanmar (Burma) - God's Army, KNU
Dimension: Internal
| Estimated Fatalities | |
|---|---|
| High | 114 |
| Best | 114 |
| Low | 112 |
Numbers include fatalities for all dyads both active and inactive for this year
2001
Primary Parties: Government of Myanmar (Burma) - KNU
Dimension: Internal
| Estimated Fatalities | |
|---|---|
| High | 39 |
| Best | 39 |
| Low | 39 |
Numbers include fatalities for all dyads both active and inactive for this year
2002
Primary Parties: Government of Myanmar (Burma) - KNU
Dimension: Internal
| Estimated Fatalities | |
|---|---|
| High | 121 |
| Best | 110 |
| Low | 108 |
Numbers include fatalities for all dyads both active and inactive for this year
2003
Primary Parties: Government of Myanmar (Burma) - KNU
Dimension: Internal
| Estimated Fatalities | |
|---|---|
| High | 44 |
| Best | 38 |
| Low | 38 |
Numbers include fatalities for all dyads both active and inactive for this year
2004
Primary Parties: Government of Myanmar (Burma) - KNU
Dimension: Internal
| Estimated Fatalities | |
|---|---|
| High | 28 |
| Best | 27 |
| Low | 25 |
Numbers include fatalities for all dyads both active and inactive for this year
2005
Primary Parties: Government of Myanmar (Burma) - KNU
Dimension: Internal
| Estimated Fatalities | |
|---|---|
| High | 46 |
| Best | 42 |
| Low | 38 |
Numbers include fatalities for all dyads both active and inactive for this year
2006
Primary Parties: Government of Myanmar (Burma) - KNU
Dimension: Internal
| Estimated Fatalities | |
|---|---|
| High | 105 |
| Best | 104 |
| Low | 79 |
Numbers include fatalities for all dyads both active and inactive for this year
2007
Primary Parties: Government of Myanmar (Burma) - KNU
Dimension: Internal
| Estimated Fatalities | |
|---|---|
| High | 106 |
| Best | 104 |
| Low | 104 |
Numbers include fatalities for all dyads both active and inactive for this year
2008
Primary Parties: Government of Myanmar (Burma) - KNU
Dimension: Internal
| Estimated Fatalities | |
|---|---|
| High | 36 |
| Best | 33 |
| Low | 33 |
Numbers include fatalities for all dyads both active and inactive for this year
2009
Primary Parties: Government of Myanmar (Burma) - KNU
Dimension: Internal
| Estimated Fatalities | |
|---|---|
| High | 79 |
| Best | 63 |
| Low | 43 |
Numbers include fatalities for all dyads both active and inactive for this year
2010
Primary Parties: Government of Myanmar (Burma) - DKBA 5, KNU
Dimension: Internal
| Estimated Fatalities | |
|---|---|
| High | 125 |
| Best | 121 |
| Low | 106 |
Numbers include fatalities for all dyads both active and inactive for this year
2011
Primary Parties: Government of Myanmar (Burma) - DKBA 5, KNU
Dimension: Internal
| Estimated Fatalities | |
|---|---|
| High | 1467 |
| Best | 334 |
| Low | 318 |
Numbers include fatalities for all dyads both active and inactive for this year
Peace agreements
Name of peace agreement: Kalo Htoo Baw (DKBA-5) Government Union Level peace agreement
Date when warring parties signed the agreement: 2011-12-11
Comment of peace agreement: Peace process agreement
This short, six point agreement between the Government of Myanmar and Kalo Htoo Baw states their intent to continue dialogue. The parties state that Karen State is part of the Republic of Myanmar and agree that Kayin State will not secede. The parties agree to "Non-disintegration of the Union, Non-disintegration of National Solidarity and Perpetuation of Sovereignty forever", and to continue dialogue "for establishing eternal peace". The agreement further commits parties to cooperate toward regional development.
Signatories: No signatures, but the agreement states the peace-making group to be led by Taungtha Township Pyithu Hluttaw Representative U Aung Thaung and its six-member delegation of Kalo Htoo Baw group led by U Saw Lah Pwe
Comment of signatories: Dyadic peace agreement signed in Hpa-an, Karen State, Myanmar on 11 December 2011.
Ended: True
Date agreement ended: 2014-10-13
Comment of Duration: DKBA threatended to void the ceasefire agreement unless the military stops launching offensive attacks against KIO on 27 December 2012. In October 2014 DKBA entered into an alliance with KNLA, KNDO and KNU/KNLA-PC called Kawthoolei Armed Forces (KAF). In its first statement KAF spelled out the Tatmadaw's failure to keep the ceasefire and declared to "carry on the struggle in cooperation with forces at home and abroad, until the emergence of lasting peace and a democratic federal union, and the achievement of victory."
In 2015 the group joined the NCA.
Full-text peace agreement
2012
Primary Parties: -
Dimension: Internal
| Estimated Fatalities | |
|---|---|
| High | 4 |
| Best | 4 |
| Low | 4 |
Numbers include fatalities for all dyads both active and inactive for this year
2013
Primary Parties: Government of Myanmar (Burma) - DKBA 5
Dimension: Internal
| Estimated Fatalities | |
|---|---|
| High | 41 |
| Best | 41 |
| Low | 41 |
Numbers include fatalities for all dyads both active and inactive for this year
2014
Primary Parties: -
Dimension: Internal
| Estimated Fatalities | |
|---|---|
| High | 15 |
| Best | 15 |
| Low | 15 |
Numbers include fatalities for all dyads both active and inactive for this year
2015
Primary Parties: -
Dimension: Internal
| Estimated Fatalities | |
|---|---|
| High | 23 |
| Best | 21 |
| Low | 21 |
Numbers include fatalities for all dyads both active and inactive for this year
Peace agreements
Name of peace agreement: Deed of Commitment for Peace and National Reconciliation
Date when warring parties signed the agreement: 2015-02-12
Comment of peace agreement: Peace process agreement
This short agreement signed between the government and four ethnic armed organizations states their commitment to the peace process. The parties agree to aim to conclude the National Ceasefire Agreement and state their goal of safeguarding sovereignty, unity, and territorial integrity and desire to advance a political dialogue to "ensure freedom, equality, justice and self-determination for all citizens." The objectives also include building a union based on federal principles.
Signatories: Government of Myanmar and 4 rebel groups;
Karen National Union; KNU Chairman General Saw Mutu Sae Poe, KNU Secretary P’doh Saw Kwe Htoo Win, Central Standing Committee Member General Saw Isaac Po, Political & Military Affairs Advisor to Chairman Col Saw Htoo Htoo Lay and Secretary to Chairman Office Saw Tamula
Democratic Karen Buddhist Army;
Karen National Liberation Army Peace Council;
Shan State Army (Restoration Council of Shan State)
Comment of signatories: Dyadic peace agreement signed in Naypyitaw, Myanmar on 12 February 2015.
Full-text peace agreement
Name of peace agreement: Nationwide Ceasefire Agreement (NCA)
Date when warring parties signed the agreement: 2015-10-15
Comment of peace agreement: Peace process agreement
The NCA peace process agreement was signed by the government and a large number of Ethnic Armed Organizations on 15 October 2015. The agreement set out a number of basic principles which the signatories agreed to follow in the implementation, including “Reach a negotiated settlement to end protracted armed conflict in the Republic of the Union of Myanmar, secure a nationwide ceasefire as a first step to end armed conflict and establish a new political culture of resolving political conflicts through political dialogue instead of force of arms.”
The agreement included a ceasefire, to cease troop movement for territorial control, reconnaissance, recruitment, armed attacks, laying of mines, acts of violence, destruction of property, and launching of military offensives.
Regarding the incompatibility the NCA provided the holding of a national political dialogue based on an inclusive principle. To establish a union based on the principles of democracy and federalism.
The agreement also provided for the forming of a Joint Ceasefire Monitoring Committee. The signatories agreed to collaborate on the IDP resettlement process. Provide for the protection of civilians and equal rights to all citizens who live in Myanmar.
Signatories: All Burma Students Democratic Front (ABSDF) Arakan Liberation Party (ALP) Chin National Front (CNF) Democratic Karen Benevolent Army (DKBA) Karen National Liberation Party-Peace Council (KNLA-PC) Karen National Union (KNU) Pa-O National Liberation Party (PNLA) Restoration Council of Shan State (RCSS, also commonly known as the Shan State Army-South, or SSA-S)
Government of Myanmar
Comment of signatories: Signing the ceasefire on behalf of the government in Naypyitaw were President Thein Sein and the Tatmadaw's Commander-in-Chief Senior General Min Aung Hlaing, Deputy Commander-in-Chief Senior General Soe Win, and the two Vice Presidents, Nyan Tun and Sai Mauk Kham.
Representatives of the United Nations, the European Union, China, India, Japan, and Thailand were official witnesses to the signing of the ceasefire agreement. Ambassador Derek Mitchell reportedly attended the event on behalf of the U.S. government, but was not an official witness.
Groups Not Signing the Agreement: Arakan Army (AA) Arakan National Council (ANC) Kachin Independence Organization (KIO) Karenni National Progressive Party (KNPP) Lahu Democratic Union (LDU) Myanmar National Democratic Alliance Army (MNDAA) National Democratic Alliance Army-Eastern Shan State (NDA-ESS) National Socialist Council of Nagaland-Khaplang (NSCN-K) New Mon State Party (NMSP) Shan State Progressive Party (SSPP) Ta'ang National Liberation Army (TNLA) United Wa State Army (UWSA) Wa National Organization (WNO)
On 13 February 2018 two more parties signed the agreement:
the New Mon State Party and the Lahu Democratic Union
Comment of third parties role in peace agreement: No third parties involved
Comment of Duration: On 1 February 2021 a coup d'état by the military of Myanmar succeeded in detaining President Win Myint and State Counsellor Aung San Suu Kyi, along with ministers, their deputies, and members of Parliament. The coup followed a general election in which Aung San Suu Kyi's NLD party had won. Min Aung Hlaing's assumed of the role of Chairman of the State Administration Council.
In response to the coup the Peace Process Steering Team (PSST), a group consisting of ethnic armed organizations (EAOs) that have signed the NCA released a statement condemning the coup but affirming their committment to the NCA. "We stand firm on the Nationwide Ceasefire Agreement (NCA) and act accordingly regarding the peace process."
In response to the coup KNU said on 15 October in a statement that the coup had "breached all the NCA’s principles and implementation” . The group outlined six calls for a resolution of the crisis including cessation of hostilities, end to abuses and provisions for humanitarian assistance. The RCSS similarly claimed that the situation had "become so bad that it is impossible to continue implementing the NCA and the Peace Process.” Still the groups did not state an end to the agreement.
Full-text peace agreement
2016
Primary Parties: -
Dimension: Internal
| Estimated Fatalities | |
|---|---|
| High | 0 |
| Best | 0 |
| Low | 0 |
Numbers include fatalities for all dyads both active and inactive for this year
2018
Primary Parties: -
Dimension: Internal
| Estimated Fatalities | |
|---|---|
| High | 5 |
| Best | 3 |
| Low | 3 |
Numbers include fatalities for all dyads both active and inactive for this year
2019
Primary Parties: -
Dimension: Internal
| Estimated Fatalities | |
|---|---|
| High | 1 |
| Best | 1 |
| Low | 1 |
Numbers include fatalities for all dyads both active and inactive for this year
2020
Primary Parties: -
Dimension: Internal
| Estimated Fatalities | |
|---|---|
| High | 32 |
| Best | 1 |
| Low | 1 |
Numbers include fatalities for all dyads both active and inactive for this year
Peace agreements
Name of peace agreement: Union Accord Part III
Date when warring parties signed the agreement: 2020-08-21
Comment of peace agreement: Partial peace agreement
The Union Accord Part III, was concluded after the 4th session of the Union Peace Conference -21st Century Panglong held in Nay Pyi Taw from 19 to 21 August 2020.
The agreement included three parts: A framework agreement on implementing the Nationwide Ceasefire Agreement, a stage-by-stage work programmes and step-by-step in the post-2020, and an agreement of fundamental principles to establish a Union based on democracy and federal system.
Establish a Union based on democracy and the federal system. Separate state and religion
Signatories: Representing the Government, Dr Tin Myo Win,
Hluttaw, Dr May Win Myint, Lt-Gen
Tatmadaw, Lt-Gen Tin Maung Win
EAOs, Dr Salai Lian Hmung Sakhong
political parties U Thu Wai
NCA-S
As witnesses
U Htone Phoo Dagon Ethnic Representative Government Group
U Kyaw Win Relevant Representative of the Government Group
Kya Sha Mwe Ethnic Representative Ethnic Armed Organizations Group
Daw Khin Ma Ma Myo Relevant Representative of the Ethnic Armed Organization Group
U Zein Khan Ram Ethnic Representative Political Parties Group
Nang Aye Aye Thwe Relevant Representative of the Political Parties Group
Comment of Duration: On 1 February 2021 a coup d'état by the military of Myanmar succeeded in detaining President Win Myint and State Counsellor Aung San Suu Kyi, along with ministers, their deputies, and members of Parliament. The coup followed a general election in which Aung San Suu Kyi's NLD party had won. Min Aung Hlaing's assumed of the role of Chairman of the State Administration Council.
Full-text peace agreement
2021
Primary Parties: Government of Myanmar (Burma) - KNU
Dimension: Internal
| Estimated Fatalities | |
|---|---|
| High | 911 |
| Best | 78 |
| Low | 72 |
Numbers include fatalities for all dyads both active and inactive for this year
2022
Primary Parties: Government of Myanmar (Burma) - KNU
Dimension: Internal
| Estimated Fatalities | |
|---|---|
| High | 2148 |
| Best | 241 |
| Low | 239 |
Numbers include fatalities for all dyads both active and inactive for this year
2023
Primary Parties: Government of Myanmar (Burma) - KNU
Dimension: Internal
| Estimated Fatalities | |
|---|---|
| High | 1191 |
| Best | 193 |
| Low | 193 |
Numbers include fatalities for all dyads both active and inactive for this year
2024
Primary Parties: Government of Myanmar (Burma) - KNU
Dimension: Internal
Comment on Dimension: The conflict between the government of Myanmar and the KNU remined internal throughout 2024.
| Estimated Fatalities | |
|---|---|
| High | 471 |
| Best | 177 |
| Low | 177 |
Numbers include fatalities for all dyads both active and inactive for this year
2025
Primary Parties: Government of Myanmar (Burma) - KNU
Dimension: Internal
Comment on Dimension: The conflict between the Government of Myanmar and KNU remined internal throughout 2025.
| Estimated Fatalities | |
|---|---|
| High | 320 |
| Best | 151 |
| Low | 151 |
Numbers include fatalities for all dyads both active and inactive for this year
Conflict Archive
This section contains annual information no longer systematically collected by the UCDP.
1975 Conflict Archive
Comment on Yearly Battle Related Deaths: "Of the conflicts in Burma, the Karen conflict is one of the better documented due to the geographical vicinity to the Thai border and the NGOs and journalists based there. That said, there remain many difficulties in obtaining reliable reports on the number of battle related deaths. Most of the fighting in the Karen conflict in 1975 involved the government offensive against KNUP, which ended in April the same year, where it can be assumed that at least some 500 battle related deaths occurred. In June 1975, it was reported that the army launched an offensive targeting border trade posts in Karen state, but few reports on the severity of the fighting is available.
There are several difficulties for estimating battle related deaths in the conflicts in Burma.
First, there is limited information available about events and the reports that can be accessed can rarely be independently confirmed. The estimates provided by UCDP are conservative and rely on available information from international and local news reporters, books, and official statements by the parties. When new information becomes available, these estimates are revised retrospectively.
Second, since 1968, the Burmese government has been using what it calls ""the Four Cuts strategy"" against opposition groups. This strategy aims at cutting off recruiting, intelligence, logistics, and financial resources for the rebel groups. In practice, this has primarily consisted of relocating the civilian population from rebel-controlled territory, often accompanied by severe human rights abuses. As deliberate attacks on civilians are coded by the UCDP as one-sided violence, these incidents are not included as battle related deaths in the conflict.
Third, the ceasefire agreements signed between the government and armed organizations has often included a provision that the ceasefire group is expected to fight against remaining rebels in its vicinity. Fighting between such entities, just like intra-rebel fighting, is coded by UCDP as non-state conflict, and thus not included as battle related deaths in the conflict."
Negotiations: NO
Third party involvement: NO
Victory: NO
Terminated: NO
1976 Conflict Archive
Comment on Yearly Battle Related Deaths: "Of the conflicts in Burma, the Karen conflict is one of the better documented due to the geographical vicinity to the Thai border and the NGOs and journalists based there. That said, there remain many difficulties in obtaining reliable reports on the number of battle related deaths. One of the few incidents reported in 1976 involved a KNU attacks on a government-operated ferry off the southern coast of the country where at least 45 people were killed. Other sources have suggested that the government offensives during late 1975 and early 1976 led to intense fighting.
There are several difficulties for estimating battle related deaths in the conflicts in Burma.
First, there is limited information available about events and the reports that can be accessed can rarely be independently confirmed. The estimates provided by UCDP are conservative and rely on available information from international and local news reporters, books, and official statements by the parties. When new information becomes available, these estimates are revised retrospectively.
Second, since 1968, the Burmese government has been using what it calls ""the Four Cuts strategy"" against opposition groups. This strategy aims at cutting off recruiting, intelligence, logistics, and financial resources for the rebel groups. In practice, this has primarily consisted of relocating the civilian population from rebel-controlled territory, often accompanied by severe human rights abuses. As deliberate attacks on civilians are coded by the UCDP as one-sided violence, these incidents are not included as battle related deaths in the conflict.
Third, the ceasefire agreements signed between the government and armed organizations has often included a provision that the ceasefire group is expected to fight against remaining rebels in its vicinity. Fighting between such entities, just like intra-rebel fighting, is coded by UCDP as non-state conflict, and thus not included as battle related deaths in the conflict."
Negotiations: NO
Third party involvement: NO
Victory: NO
Terminated: NO
1977 Conflict Archive
Comment on Yearly Battle Related Deaths: "Of the conflicts in Burma, the Karen conflict is one of the better documented due to the geographical vicinity to the Thai border and the NGOs and journalists based there. That said, there remain many difficulties in obtaining reliable reports on the number of battle related deaths. In 1977, it was reported that intense clashes took place between the KNU and the government in February-March. During these, the government shelling of KNU positions near the Thai border led to the death of some 50 people, supposedly civilians, in Thailand.
There are several difficulties for estimating battle related deaths in the conflicts in Burma.
First, there is limited information available about events and the reports that can be accessed can rarely be independently confirmed. The estimates provided by UCDP are conservative and rely on available information from international and local news reporters, books, and official statements by the parties. When new information becomes available, these estimates are revised retrospectively.
Second, since 1968, the Burmese government has been using what it calls ""the Four Cuts strategy"" against opposition groups. This strategy aims at cutting off recruiting, intelligence, logistics, and financial resources for the rebel groups. In practice, this has primarily consisted of relocating the civilian population from rebel-controlled territory, often accompanied by severe human rights abuses. As deliberate attacks on civilians are coded by the UCDP as one-sided violence, these incidents are not included as battle related deaths in the conflict.
Third, the ceasefire agreements signed between the government and armed organizations has often included a provision that the ceasefire group is expected to fight against remaining rebels in its vicinity. Fighting between such entities, just like intra-rebel fighting, is coded by UCDP as non-state conflict, and thus not included as battle related deaths in the conflict."
Negotiations: NO
Third party involvement: NO
Victory: NO
Terminated: NO
1978 Conflict Archive
Comment on Yearly Battle Related Deaths: "Of the conflicts in Burma, the Karen conflict is one of the better documented due to the geographical vicinity to the Thai border and the NGOs and journalists based there. That said, there remain many difficulties in obtaining reliable reports on the number of battle related deaths.
There are several difficulties for estimating battle related deaths in the conflicts in Burma.
First, there is limited information available about events and the reports that can be accessed can rarely be independently confirmed. The estimates provided by UCDP are conservative and rely on available information from international and local news reporters, books, and official statements by the parties. When new information becomes available, these estimates are revised retrospectively.
Second, since 1968, the Burmese government has been using what it calls ""the Four Cuts strategy"" against opposition groups. This strategy aims at cutting off recruiting, intelligence, logistics, and financial resources for the rebel groups. In practice, this has primarily consisted of relocating the civilian population from rebel-controlled territory, often accompanied by severe human rights abuses. As deliberate attacks on civilians are coded by the UCDP as one-sided violence, these incidents are not included as battle related deaths in the conflict.
Third, the ceasefire agreements signed between the government and armed organizations has often included a provision that the ceasefire group is expected to fight against remaining rebels in its vicinity. Fighting between such entities, just like intra-rebel fighting, is coded by UCDP as non-state conflict, and thus not included as battle related deaths in the conflict."
Negotiations: NO
Third party involvement: NO
Victory: NO
Terminated: NO
1979 Conflict Archive
Comment on Yearly Battle Related Deaths: "Of the conflicts in Burma, the Karen conflict is one of the better documented due to the geographical vicinity to the Thai border and the NGOs and journalists based there. That said, there remain many difficulties in obtaining reliable reports on the number of battle related deaths.
There are several difficulties for estimating battle related deaths in the conflicts in Burma.
First, there is limited information available about events and the reports that can be accessed can rarely be independently confirmed. The estimates provided by UCDP are conservative and rely on available information from international and local news reporters, books, and official statements by the parties. When new information becomes available, these estimates are revised retrospectively.
Second, since 1968, the Burmese government has been using what it calls ""the Four Cuts strategy"" against opposition groups. This strategy aims at cutting off recruiting, intelligence, logistics, and financial resources for the rebel groups. In practice, this has primarily consisted of relocating the civilian population from rebel-controlled territory, often accompanied by severe human rights abuses. As deliberate attacks on civilians are coded by the UCDP as one-sided violence, these incidents are not included as battle related deaths in the conflict.
Third, the ceasefire agreements signed between the government and armed organizations has often included a provision that the ceasefire group is expected to fight against remaining rebels in its vicinity. Fighting between such entities, just like intra-rebel fighting, is coded by UCDP as non-state conflict, and thus not included as battle related deaths in the conflict."
Negotiations: NO
Third party involvement: NO
Victory: NO
Terminated: NO
1980 Conflict Archive
Comment on Yearly Battle Related Deaths: "Of the conflicts in Burma, the Karen conflict is one of the better documented due to the geographical vicinity to the Thai border and the NGOs and journalists based there. That said, there remain many difficulties in obtaining reliable reports on the number of battle related deaths.
There are several difficulties for estimating battle related deaths in the conflicts in Burma.
First, there is limited information available about events and the reports that can be accessed can rarely be independently confirmed. The estimates provided by UCDP are conservative and rely on available information from international and local news reporters, books, and official statements by the parties. When new information becomes available, these estimates are revised retrospectively.
Second, since 1968, the Burmese government has been using what it calls ""the Four Cuts strategy"" against opposition groups. This strategy aims at cutting off recruiting, intelligence, logistics, and financial resources for the rebel groups. In practice, this has primarily consisted of relocating the civilian population from rebel-controlled territory, often accompanied by severe human rights abuses. As deliberate attacks on civilians are coded by the UCDP as one-sided violence, these incidents are not included as battle related deaths in the conflict.
Third, the ceasefire agreements signed between the government and armed organizations has often included a provision that the ceasefire group is expected to fight against remaining rebels in its vicinity. Fighting between such entities, just like intra-rebel fighting, is coded by UCDP as non-state conflict, and thus not included as battle related deaths in the conflict."
Negotiations: NO
Third party involvement: NO
Victory: NO
Terminated: NO
1981 Conflict Archive
Comment on Yearly Battle Related Deaths: "Of the conflicts in Burma, the Karen conflict is one of the better documented due to the geographical vicinity to the Thai border and the NGOs and journalists based there. That said, there remain many difficulties in obtaining reliable reports on the number of battle related deaths.
There are several difficulties for estimating battle related deaths in the conflicts in Burma.
First, there is limited information available about events and the reports that can be accessed can rarely be independently confirmed. The estimates provided by UCDP are conservative and rely on available information from international and local news reporters, books, and official statements by the parties. When new information becomes available, these estimates are revised retrospectively.
Second, since 1968, the Burmese government has been using what it calls ""the Four Cuts strategy"" against opposition groups. This strategy aims at cutting off recruiting, intelligence, logistics, and financial resources for the rebel groups. In practice, this has primarily consisted of relocating the civilian population from rebel-controlled territory, often accompanied by severe human rights abuses. As deliberate attacks on civilians are coded by the UCDP as one-sided violence, these incidents are not included as battle related deaths in the conflict.
Third, the ceasefire agreements signed between the government and armed organizations has often included a provision that the ceasefire group is expected to fight against remaining rebels in its vicinity. Fighting between such entities, just like intra-rebel fighting, is coded by UCDP as non-state conflict, and thus not included as battle related deaths in the conflict."
Negotiations: NO
Third party involvement: NO
Victory: NO
Terminated: NO
1982 Conflict Archive
Comment on Yearly Battle Related Deaths: "Of the conflicts in Burma, the Karen conflict is one of the better documented due to the geographical vicinity to the Thai border and the NGOs and journalists based there. That said, there remain many difficulties in obtaining reliable reports on the number of battle related deaths. In September 1982, a small team of KNU fighters attacked the government radio station in Rangoon.
There are several difficulties for estimating battle related deaths in the conflicts in Burma.
First, there is limited information available about events and the reports that can be accessed can rarely be independently confirmed. The estimates provided by UCDP are conservative and rely on available information from international and local news reporters, books, and official statements by the parties. When new information becomes available, these estimates are revised retrospectively.
Second, since 1968, the Burmese government has been using what it calls ""the Four Cuts strategy"" against opposition groups. This strategy aims at cutting off recruiting, intelligence, logistics, and financial resources for the rebel groups. In practice, this has primarily consisted of relocating the civilian population from rebel-controlled territory, often accompanied by severe human rights abuses. As deliberate attacks on civilians are coded by the UCDP as one-sided violence, these incidents are not included as battle related deaths in the conflict.
Third, the ceasefire agreements signed between the government and armed organizations has often included a provision that the ceasefire group is expected to fight against remaining rebels in its vicinity. Fighting between such entities, just like intra-rebel fighting, is coded by UCDP as non-state conflict, and thus not included as battle related deaths in the conflict."
Negotiations: NO
Third party involvement: NO
Victory: NO
Terminated: NO
1983 Conflict Archive
Comment on Yearly Battle Related Deaths: "Of the conflicts in Burma, the Karen conflict is one of the better documented due to the geographical vicinity to the Thai border and the NGOs and journalists based there. That said, there remain many difficulties in obtaining reliable reports on the number of battle related deaths. In January 1983, the government launched a large-scale offensive targeting KNU bases on the Thai border. An attempted counteroffensive in February by the KNU was unsuccessful, leading to some 200-300 deaths. Fighting escalated again in late 1983 after a brief lull during the rainy season. Government sources claimed that they had killed 2464 insurgents, and lost 528 soldiers in the offensive against KNU between 6 April 1983 and 23 March 1984. The ratio between government and rebel losses is not reliable, and it is likely that the government-claimed “insurgents†include civilians. The estimate does, however, give an indication on the severity of the fighting, and since most of the major battles occurred in early 1984, it can be assumed that 1/3 of the given casualties took place in 1983.
There are several difficulties for estimating battle related deaths in the conflicts in Burma.
First, there is limited information available about events and the reports that can be accessed can rarely be independently confirmed. The estimates provided by UCDP are conservative and rely on available information from international and local news reporters, books, and official statements by the parties. When new information becomes available, these estimates are revised retrospectively.
Second, since 1968, the Burmese government has been using what it calls ""the Four Cuts strategy"" against opposition groups. This strategy aims at cutting off recruiting, intelligence, logistics, and financial resources for the rebel groups. In practice, this has primarily consisted of relocating the civilian population from rebel-controlled territory, often accompanied by severe human rights abuses. As deliberate attacks on civilians are coded by the UCDP as one-sided violence, these incidents are not included as battle related deaths in the conflict.
Third, the ceasefire agreements signed between the government and armed organizations has often included a provision that the ceasefire group is expected to fight against remaining rebels in its vicinity. Fighting between such entities, just like intra-rebel fighting, is coded by UCDP as non-state conflict, and thus not included as battle related deaths in the conflict."
Negotiations: NO
Third party involvement: NO
Victory: NO
Terminated: NO
1984 Conflict Archive
Comment on Yearly Battle Related Deaths: "Of the conflicts in Burma, the Karen conflict is one of the better documented due to the geographical vicinity to the Thai border and the NGOs and journalists based there. That said, there remain many difficulties in obtaining reliable reports on the number of battle related deaths. Government offensives against Karen bases near the Thai border continued with some success in the beginning of the year. Government sources claimed that they had killed 2464 insurgents, and lost 528 soldiers in the offensive against KNU between 6 April 1983 and 23 March 1984. The ratio between government and rebel losses is not reliable, and it is likely that the government-claimed “insurgents†include civilians. The estimate does, however, give an indication on the severity of the fighting, and since most of the major battles occurred in early 1984, it can be assumed that 2/3 of the given casualties took place in 1984.
In August and September 1984, the KNU launched a counteroffensive and manage to recapture many of their previously lost bases. In late 1984, independent sources estimated that the government had lost between 1000-1800 deaths in the offensive during 1984. Government sources claimed that they had killed 1870 insurgents, and lost 566 soldiers in conflicts against separatists and communists (ie all ongoing conflicts) between 25 March 1984 and 20 March 1985. As this period include government offensives also in the Kachin, Shan and the government conflicts, this statement merely confirm that fighting led to more than 1000 battle related deaths in 1984. Most of the fighting did, however, register in the Karen and the Kachin conflicts and very few incidents were registered during the first months of 1985.
There are several difficulties for estimating battle related deaths in the conflicts in Burma.
First, there is limited information available about events and the reports that can be accessed can rarely be independently confirmed. The estimates provided by UCDP are conservative and rely on available information from international and local news reporters, books, and official statements by the parties. When new information becomes available, these estimates are revised retrospectively.
Second, since 1968, the Burmese government has been using what it calls ""the Four Cuts strategy"" against opposition groups. This strategy aims at cutting off recruiting, intelligence, logistics, and financial resources for the rebel groups. In practice, this has primarily consisted of relocating the civilian population from rebel-controlled territory, often accompanied by severe human rights abuses. As deliberate attacks on civilians are coded by the UCDP as one-sided violence, these incidents are not included as battle related deaths in the conflict.
Third, the ceasefire agreements signed between the government and armed organizations has often included a provision that the ceasefire group is expected to fight against remaining rebels in its vicinity. Fighting between such entities, just like intra-rebel fighting, is coded by UCDP as non-state conflict, and thus not included as battle related deaths in the conflict."
Negotiations: NO
Third party involvement: NO
Victory: NO
Terminated: NO
1985 Conflict Archive
Comment on Yearly Battle Related Deaths: "Of the conflicts in Burma, the Karen conflict is one of the better documented due to the geographical vicinity to the Thai border and the NGOs and journalists based there. That said, there remain many difficulties in obtaining reliable reports on the number of battle related deaths. Government sources claimed that they had killed 1870 insurgents, and lost 566 soldiers in conflicts against separatists and communists (ie all ongoing conflicts) between 25 March 1984 and 20 March 1985. There were very few reports of encounters during the first months of 1985, suggesting that most of those causalities refer to fighting in the previous year. During 1985, the reports of fighting almost exclusively refer to KNU attacks on government forces, with few details on casualties. Government sources claimed that they had killed 2538 insurgents, and lost 651 soldiers in conflicts against separatists and communists (ie all ongoing conflicts) between 22 March 1985 and 21 March 1986. As fighting escalated in late 1985 especially against the Karen and Kachin rebels, most of those casualties probably occurred in early 1986.
There are several difficulties for estimating battle related deaths in the conflicts in Burma.
First, there is limited information available about events and the reports that can be accessed can rarely be independently confirmed. The estimates provided by UCDP are conservative and rely on available information from international and local news reporters, books, and official statements by the parties. When new information becomes available, these estimates are revised retrospectively.
Second, since 1968, the Burmese government has been using what it calls ""the Four Cuts strategy"" against opposition groups. This strategy aims at cutting off recruiting, intelligence, logistics, and financial resources for the rebel groups. In practice, this has primarily consisted of relocating the civilian population from rebel-controlled territory, often accompanied by severe human rights abuses. As deliberate attacks on civilians are coded by the UCDP as one-sided violence, these incidents are not included as battle related deaths in the conflict.
Third, the ceasefire agreements signed between the government and armed organizations has often included a provision that the ceasefire group is expected to fight against remaining rebels in its vicinity. Fighting between such entities, just like intra-rebel fighting, is coded by UCDP as non-state conflict, and thus not included as battle related deaths in the conflict."
Negotiations: NO
Third party involvement: NO
Victory: NO
Terminated: NO
1986 Conflict Archive
Comment on Yearly Battle Related Deaths: "Of the conflicts in Burma, the Karen conflict is one of the better documented due to the geographical vicinity to the Thai border and the NGOs and journalists based there. That said, there remain many difficulties in obtaining reliable reports on the number of battle related deaths. Government sources claimed that they had killed 2538 insurgents, and lost 651 soldiers in conflicts against separatists and communists (ie all ongoing conflicts) between 22 March 1985 and 21 March 1986. As fighting escalated in late 1985 especially against the Karen and Kachin rebels, most of those casualties probably occurred in early 1986. The ratio between government and rebel losses is not reliable, and it is likely that the government-claimed “insurgents†include civilians. The estimate does, however, give an indication on the severity of the fighting, and the government-acknowledged losses can be used as a best estimate and the total as high. It is assumed that 3/4 of the government announced deaths occurred in 1986, and that it mainly include reports from the Karen, Kachin, and government conflicts where major offensives were launched.
There are several difficulties for estimating battle related deaths in the conflicts in Burma.
First, there is limited information available about events and the reports that can be accessed can rarely be independently confirmed. The estimates provided by UCDP are conservative and rely on available information from international and local news reporters, books, and official statements by the parties. When new information becomes available, these estimates are revised retrospectively.
Second, since 1968, the Burmese government has been using what it calls ""the Four Cuts strategy"" against opposition groups. This strategy aims at cutting off recruiting, intelligence, logistics, and financial resources for the rebel groups. In practice, this has primarily consisted of relocating the civilian population from rebel-controlled territory, often accompanied by severe human rights abuses. As deliberate attacks on civilians are coded by the UCDP as one-sided violence, these incidents are not included as battle related deaths in the conflict.
Third, the ceasefire agreements signed between the government and armed organizations has often included a provision that the ceasefire group is expected to fight against remaining rebels in its vicinity. Fighting between such entities, just like intra-rebel fighting, is coded by UCDP as non-state conflict, and thus not included as battle related deaths in the conflict."
Negotiations: NO
Third party involvement: NO
Victory: NO
Terminated: NO
1987 Conflict Archive
Comment on Yearly Battle Related Deaths: "Of the conflicts in Burma, the Karen conflict is one of the better documented due to the geographical vicinity to the Thai border and the NGOs and journalists based there. That said, there remain many difficulties in obtaining reliable reports on the number of battle related deaths. The government launched a new comprehensive offensive targeting the KNU headquarters at Manerplaw in February and March 1987, where at least 80 deaths occurred. Government sources claimed that they had killed 1688 insurgents, and lost 592 soldiers in conflicts against separatists and communists (ie all ongoing conflicts) between 22 March 1987 and 21 March 1988. As this period was dominated by heavy fighting against Kachin rebels and in Shan state, it is not assumed to capture many casualties from the Karen conflict.
There are several difficulties for estimating battle related deaths in the conflicts in Burma.
First, there is limited information available about events and the reports that can be accessed can rarely be independently confirmed. The estimates provided by UCDP are conservative and rely on available information from international and local news reporters, books, and official statements by the parties. When new information becomes available, these estimates are revised retrospectively.
Second, since 1968, the Burmese government has been using what it calls ""the Four Cuts strategy"" against opposition groups. This strategy aims at cutting off recruiting, intelligence, logistics, and financial resources for the rebel groups. In practice, this has primarily consisted of relocating the civilian population from rebel-controlled territory, often accompanied by severe human rights abuses. As deliberate attacks on civilians are coded by the UCDP as one-sided violence, these incidents are not included as battle related deaths in the conflict.
Third, the ceasefire agreements signed between the government and armed organizations has often included a provision that the ceasefire group is expected to fight against remaining rebels in its vicinity. Fighting between such entities, just like intra-rebel fighting, is coded by UCDP as non-state conflict, and thus not included as battle related deaths in the conflict."
Negotiations: NO
Third party involvement: NO
Victory: NO
Terminated: NO
1988 Conflict Archive
Comment on Activity: By mid-1988, NMSP and the KNU fought each other over revenue from the lucrative trading point at Three Pagodas Pass on the border with Thailand. The KNU consisted, at the time of nearly 8000 troops, which included KNDO (Karen National Defence Organization) local militiamen.
Comment on Yearly Battle Related Deaths: "Of the conflicts in Burma, the Karen conflict is one of the better documented due to the geographical vicinity to the Thai border and the NGOs and journalists based there. That said, there remain many difficulties in obtaining reliable reports on the number of battle related deaths. Government sources claimed that they had killed 1688 insurgents, and lost 592 soldiers in conflicts against separatists and communists (ie all ongoing conflicts) between 22 March 1987 and 21 March 1988. As this period was dominated by heavy fighting against Kachin rebels and in Shan state, it is not assumed to capture many casualties from the Karen conflict. In early October 1988, the KNU launched an offensive on the government who initially had to withdraw but eventually counterattacked leading to intense fighting during the last three months of the year. Government sources later claimed that these three months had led to the death of 242 government soldiers and some 400 Karen rebels. The ratio between government and rebel losses is not reliable, and it is likely that the government-claimed “insurgents†include civilians. The estimate does, however, give an indication on the severity of the fighting, and the government-acknowledged losses can be used as a best estimate and the total as high
There are several difficulties for estimating battle related deaths in the conflicts in Burma.
First, there is limited information available about events and the reports that can be accessed can rarely be independently confirmed. The estimates provided by UCDP are conservative and rely on available information from international and local news reporters, books, and official statements by the parties. When new information becomes available, these estimates are revised retrospectively.
Second, since 1968, the Burmese government has been using what it calls ""the Four Cuts strategy"" against opposition groups. This strategy aims at cutting off recruiting, intelligence, logistics, and financial resources for the rebel groups. In practice, this has primarily consisted of relocating the civilian population from rebel-controlled territory, often accompanied by severe human rights abuses. As deliberate attacks on civilians are coded by the UCDP as one-sided violence, these incidents are not included as battle related deaths in the conflict.
Third, the ceasefire agreements signed between the government and armed organizations has often included a provision that the ceasefire group is expected to fight against remaining rebels in its vicinity. Fighting between such entities, just like intra-rebel fighting, is coded by UCDP as non-state conflict, and thus not included as battle related deaths in the conflict."
Negotiations: NO
Third party involvement: NO
Victory: NO
Terminated: NO
1989 Conflict Archive
Negotiations: NO
Third party involvement: NO
Victory: NO
Terminated: NO
1990 Conflict Archive
Negotiations: NO
Third party involvement: NO
Victory: NO
Terminated: NO
1991 Conflict Archive
Negotiations: NO
Third party involvement: NO
Victory: NO
Terminated: NO
1992 Conflict Archive
Negotiations: NO
Comment on Negotiation: On 5 May, the Myanmarese government appealed, in an editorial of the state-run Working Peoples Daily, for all ethnic insurgent groups to lay down their arms and join the regime in a national reunification process. The government claimed it wanted to sign ceasefire agreements and end the conflicts in the country.
Third party involvement: NO
Comment on Third Party Involvement: In April, EEC called for a world-wide ban on arms sales to Myanmar with the intent of stopping the government from its attacks on Muslims and Karen separatists.
Victory: NO
Terminated: YES
Type of termination: Ceasefire
Date of termination: 1992-04-28
Comment on Termination: On 28 April, the government declared a unilateral ceasefire.
1993 Conflict Archive
Comment on Activity: An Amnesty International Report concluded that the government forces were guilty of severe human rights violation, including detention, forced labour, torture, and murder.
Negotiations: NO
Third party involvement: NO
Victory: NO
Terminated: NO
1994 Conflict Archive
Comment on Yearly Battle Related Deaths: Government offensive started in December, no confirmed casualty figures given. Possibly over 25 deaths.
Negotiations: YES
Comment on Negotiation: KNU foreign affairs spokesperson Dr. Marta, in January said that the Thai government were pressuring KNU into peace negotiations. It was claimed that Thailand was eager to secure business deals regarding Myanmars natural resources in the border areas. In February, KNU announced that they had decided to participate in peace talks, even though the Myanmarese government had not agreed to negotiate with all groups of the DAB (Democratic Alliance of Burma) together.
Third party involvement: NO
Victory: NO
Terminated: NO
1995 Conflict Archive
Comment on Activity: In early January, dissident members of KNU formed a new group called the DKBO/DKBA (Democratic Karen/Kayin Buddhist Organisation/Army). In March, it was reported that the government had changed the name of the Karen state to the Kayin State and declared that it belonged to the DKBO.
Around 300 of the founding DKBA members joined the Myanmarese military and led them to an attack on the KNU headquarters in Manerplaw. On 30 January, the KNU ordered a retreat and the group crossed the Moei River into Thailand. The Myanmarese army fired across the river at the fleeing Karens, creating an international incident leading to official protests from the Thai government.
The Myanmarese government offensive continued and basically all KNU bases were taken in the months to come, leading to a stream of refugees into Thailand. The DKBA was fighting side by side with the government forces.
In April, fighting spilled over into Thailand as the DKBA and government forces attacked a Karen refugee camp. The UNHCR then asked the Thai government to move the refugee camps further away from the border.
After another cross-border attack in the first week of May that killed three Thai policemen, Thailand launched a heavy attack on a DKBA camp. A few days later, the DKBA promised to cease its cross-border raids to avoid military confrontation with Thailand. However, in December more DKBA attacks on Thai territory was reported.
Negotiations: YES
Comment on Negotiation: In December, delegates from the KNU and the government met for top-secret talks in Moulmein. The KNU leadership was pessimistic about concluding ceasefire talks without "any real dialogue over the political future." The result of the talks was only that both sides agreed to continue further meetings.
Third party involvement: NO
Victory: NO
Terminated: YES
Type of termination: No or Low Activity
Date of termination: 1995-12-31
Comment on Termination: In 1996, the KNU kept clashing with DKBA forces, who allegedly received logistical support from the government.
1997 Conflict Archive
Negotiations: NO
Third party involvement: NO
Victory: NO
Terminated: NO
1998 Conflict Archive
Comment on Activity: International organisations have reported large-scale military activities against civilians from the Myanmarese government as well as the KNU. The Myanmarese government denied the reports but agreed that the KNU had carried out "terrorist attacks on civilians".
The KNU was involved in fighting not only the Myanmarese government but also the DKBA (Democratic Karen Buddhist Army). The DKBA was receiving support from the Myanmarese military in these clashes. It had signed an agreement with the government to keep its arms and territory in return for fighting KNU and other insurgent groups.
The conflict received a lot of international attention when DKBA troops attacked refugee camps across the border in Thailand in March.
Negotiations: NO
Third party involvement: NO
Victory: NO
Terminated: YES
Type of termination: No or Low Activity
Date of termination: 1998-12-31
Comment on Termination: The conflict did not reach the 25-fatalities threshold in the following year.
Comment on Termination Date: The conflict was inactive in the following year.
1999 Conflict Archive
Comment on Activity: KNU occasionally clashed with government troops, but there were not reports of 25 battle related deaths.
Most of the fighting took place in the non-state conflict against the DKBA (Democratic Kayin Buddhist Army), while there were also incidents of non-state fighting against UWSA (United Wa State Army).
Negotiations: NO
Third party involvement: NO
Victory: NO
Terminated: NO
2000 Conflict Archive
Comment on Activity: The KNU fought both the Myanmarese government and the DKBA (Democratic Karen Buddhist Army) during the year. The DKBA have received support from the Myanmarese military since the group signed a ceasefire agreement with the government. At a few occasions, the clashes between KNU and the DKBA spilled into Thai territory. Whenever DKBA forces were discovered by the Thai army, clashes between these two groups followed.
Negotiations: NO
Third party involvement: NO
Victory: NO
Comment on Victory: After losing their camp in January 2000, the remains of Gods Army kept hiding from the Myanmarese government throughout the year. In January 2001, the remaining 20 members including the twins leading the group surrendered to Thailand, applying for political asylum, after the group had run out of food.
Terminated: NO
2001 Conflict Archive
Comment on Activity: The Myanmar-affiliated group DKBA (Democratic Karen Buddhist Army) were also involved in clashes with the Thai military. In their fight with KNU (Karen National Union) the fighting spilled over into Thai territory, and Thai military responded to the intrusion by force. It is widely suggested that the KNU uses Thai territory for bases, some located within refugee camps.
Negotiations: NO
Third party involvement: NO
Victory: NO
Terminated: NO
2002 Conflict Archive
Negotiations: NO
Comment on Negotiation: Discussions about starting peace talks were held throughout the year. In May, Thai Prime Minister Thaksin Shinawatra offered to sponsor peace talks between Myanmars military government and ethnic rebels. However, the parties never met for formal discussions during 2002.
Third party involvement: NO
Third party involvement names: Thailand
Comment on Third Party Involvement: Trying to negotiate peace talks.
Victory: NO
Terminated: NO
2003 Conflict Archive
Comment on Activity: The Myanmarese government accused KNU of attacking civilians and public property. The KNU acknowledged that they had attacked a natural gas pipeline in April, but did not comment on the alleged attacks on civilians.
In December, a verbal ceasefire was agreed on between the government and the KNU, and negotiations about formalizing it begun in January 2004.
Negotiations: YES
Comment on Negotiation: On 24 February, the ethnic armies KNU (Karen), SSA/s (Shan), KNPP (Karenni), CNF (Chin), and ALP (Arakan) declared that they were willing to let Thailand mediate peace talks with the Myanmarese government. The insurgent organisations wanted the talks to be held in a third country.
In November, an official from the Myanmarese Defense ministry Col. San Pwint, travelled to northern Thailand for contacts with the KNU. In early December, a KNU delegation went to Yangon to continue the preparations for possible peace talks.
On 8 December, it was announced that the parties had verbally agreed to a ceasefire during the coming peace talks, the ceasefire starting on 10 December. It was also reported that there had been an agreement that the negotiations should be conducted on Myanmar territory, and that the National League for Democracy should be excluded. The Myanmarese government had agreed to the KNU demand that a ceasefire had to be negotiated before the surrender of any weapons.
Thai border guards reported that the ceasefire seemed to hold, and in late December, KNU gave hints that they might reconsider their refusal to participate in the National Convention on writing a new constitution. According to KNU leader Bo Mya, more talks would follow after the new year.
Third party involvement: NO
Victory: NO
Terminated: YES
Date of termination: 2003-12-10
Comment on Termination: There were two rounds of negotiations in early 2004, and the verbal ceasefire was generally upheld. There was, however, hundreds of "incidents" when KNU and government patrols exchanged fire in 2004 killing at least 20 people. The conflict did not reach the UCDP threshold of 25 battle-related deaths for 2004.
Comment on Termination Date: On 10 December 2003, a "gentlemans agreement" on a ceasefire was announced by the KNU and the government.
2004 Conflict Archive
Comment on Activity: The "gentlemans agreement" on ceasefire from December 2003 largely kept throughout the year, despite several hundred incidents when KNU and goverment patrols fired at each other. Some casualties was reported but less than 25.
Negotiations: YES
Comment on Negotiation: The KNU leadership met with the government for two rounds of negotiations in January and February. During the second round, it was rumoured that a permanent ceasefire would be signed but eventually the verbal agreement of December 2003 was generally respected.
According to KNU representatives, the issues discussed during the talks were conditions for a ceasefire, that the KNU would resume control over previously held territory, and the repatriation of the Karen refugees from Thailand.
A third round of talks in April was postponed due to government preparations for the hosting of the National Convention in May. Contacts resumed in August, and it was agreed that the third round of negotiations would start in mid-October.
The KNU delegates had begun their travel to the third round of negotiations when the prime minister was arrested. In the light of the reorganisation of the government on 19 October, negotiations were postponed indefinitely.
Third party involvement: NO
Victory: NO
Terminated: NO
2005 Conflict Archive
Comment on Activity: Occasional fighting between the government and the KNU continued throughout 2005. A KNU commander revealed that smaller skirmishes had occurred almost every other day despite the 2004 ceasefire, even though these had led to few casualties.
In mid-January 2005, the government launched a major offensive against a KNU stronghold around the celebrations of the Karen New Year. Otherwise, there were clashes of different severity taking place throughout the year.
Negotiations: NO
Comment on Negotiation: In January, the KNU requested a timeframe for the resumption of talks following the cancellation of the meeting in October 2004 due to the government reorganization. If this could not be provided, the KNU threatened to renege on the unofficial ceasefire in place for more than a year. The two parties met for exploratory talks in mid-March and early May but this did not lead to any formal ceasefire agreement.
After increased fighting between the two parties, the KNU officially accused the government for breaking the ceasefire in October 2005 and warned that it would be difficult to resume a peace process. However, at the KNU congress in December, the group published a statement that outlined an ambition to continue the dialogue “whenever circumstances permit” on the basis of the previous gentlemen’s agreement with the government.
Third party involvement: NO
Victory: NO
Terminated: NO
2006 Conflict Archive
Comment on Activity: Starting in February, the government launched its biggest offensive since 1997 against the KNU. This led to an upsurge in fighting even though each individual clash remained fairly limited due to the KNU use of hit-and-run guerrilla tactics. In response, the government often targeted the civilian population and it was estimated that over 20 000 people became displaced during the year.
Comment on Yearly Battle Related Deaths: Sources close to the KNU suggested that the group had killed and injured some 1150 soldiers of the government troops, but these figures could not be verified by any other sources. As part of the government offensive during the year, the army often attacked the civilian population in these areas, but these attacks are not included in the battle-deaths estimate."
Negotiations: YES
Comment on Negotiation: The KNU declared a willingness to negotiate throughout the year, while the government initially refused to participate in talks. Instead, the government tried to open talks with lower-level commanders of the KNU and there were some exploratory meetings with these held in June and July.
The two parties met for a week-long session in Yangon during the first week of October. The topic of the talks was the possibility of signing a ceasefire, but no agreement was made. The government also clarified that it did not consider the "gentlemans agreement" from 2004 valid, since it had been concluded with the former prime minister Khin Nyunt.
Third party involvement: NO
Victory: NO
Terminated: NO
2007 Conflict Archive
Comment on Activity: The comprehensive government offensives launched in 2006 continued throughout the year in 2007 even during the rainy season when fighting previously often have been limited. The government offensive rarely led to any significant battles with the KNU forces and included attacks on the civilian population and the forced relocation of several Karen villages.
The fighting included joint attacks from the government and the DKBA as well as increased casualties from the non-state conflict between DKBA and the KNU.
Negotiations: NO
Comment on Negotiation: There were reports that the KNU had sent a negotiating team to Yangon in January 2007 with the intention of resuming talks. It later became clear that the team had not been sanctioned by the KNU central committee and that the talks had taken place between the government and the breakaway faction the KNU (Peace Council).
There were no attempts of negotiations with the main part of KNU, even though the group reiterated its willingness to accept a negotiated settlement of the conflict.
Third party involvement: NO
Victory: NO
Terminated: NO
2008 Conflict Archive
Comment on Activity: The general secretary of KNU, Mahn Sha was killed by two gunmen in Mae Sot, Thailand in early February. The perpetrators were reported to have spoken Karen, so it is believed that the assassination was part of the ongoing rivalry between KNU and the DKBA (Democratic Kayin Buddhist Army)
Negotiations: NO
Third party involvement: NO
Victory: NO
Terminated: NO
2009 Conflict Archive
Negotiations: NO
Third party involvement: NO
Victory: NO
Terminated: NO
2010 Conflict Archive
Comment on Activity: Conflict activity continued throughout the year, primarily through rebel ambushes on government troops, while government attacks largely consisted of retaliation or operations that often targeted civilians.
During the last two months of the year, there was an increase in outright clashes between the belligerents. In particular following the brief capture by DKBA 5 of the border town Myawaddy on 7-9 November.
Comment on Yearly Battle Related Deaths: Relibable information on battle events and in particular fatalities of fighting is difficult to assess in Myanmar. The conflict areas are closed off for reporters and NGO workers, while the state-controlled media rarely reports on the fighting at all, and rebel-connected sources can be suspected of bias.
Negotiations: NO
Comment on Negotiation: No negotiations were held regarding the incompatibility of the conflict. After the first days of fighting in early November, members of the Thai army tried to mediate a ceasefire between DKBA 5 and the Myanmar government. The talks broke down almost immediately and DKBA 5 refused any further talks with the government later in the year.
Third party involvement: NO
Comment on Third Party Involvement: Following the outbreak of fighting in Myawaddy on the Thai border and the subsequent influx or refugees onto Thai soil, Thailand tried to mediate a ceasefire between the Myanmar government and DKBA 5. The attempt was shortlived as DKBA 5 cancelled the talks.
Victory: NO
Terminated: NO
2011 Conflict Archive
Comment on Activity: In 2011, the DKBA and KNU sometimes fought jointly against the government which means it may be difficult to separate the deaths into specific dyads. The events have been attributed to the group that was dominant in each specific joint engagement.
Comment on Yearly Battle Related Deaths: In 2011, the DKBA and KNU sometimes fought jointly against the government which means it may be difficult to separate the deaths into specific dyads. The events have been attributed to the group that was dominant in each specific joint engagement.
Negotiations: YES
Comment on Negotiation: Following talks starting on 26 October, the DKBA 5 and government announced a ceasefire on 7 November 2011.
After this agreement had been concluded, negotiations also took place with KNU but no ceasefire agreement was reached until early 2012.
Third party involvement: NO
Victory: NO
Terminated: YES
Type of termination: Ceasefire
Date of termination: 2011-12-31
Comment on Termination: The conflict over in Myanmar Karen was not active in 2012, therefore the conflict was considered terminated on 31 December 2011. The KNU signed a ceasefire agreement with the government on 12 January 2012. There was at least one incident in 2012 after the ceasefire agreement in which soldiers engaged in a firefight. However this was immediately followed by more talks between the parties on how to strengthen the agreement to prevent similar incidents in the future. There was also an agreement between the Karen National Liberation Army Peace Council and the Government of Myanmar on 7 February 2012.
Comment on Termination Date: KNU signed a ceasefire agreement with the government. The conflict was not active in 2012.
2012 Conflict Archive
Comment on Activity: A ceasefire was signed in January between the government and KNU (Karen National Union) and as a result fighting in 2012 did not result in 25 battle-related deaths.
Comment on Yearly Battle Related Deaths: A ceasefire went into effect in early January, 2012 and held for the year.
Negotiations: YES
Comment on Negotiation: A ceasefire was concluded between KNU and the Government on 12 January, and a larger pan-Karen ceasefire was signed on 7 February. Additional talks were held in April between the government and the KNU which discussed details on how to implement the ceasefire. The parties agreed to measures for transparently implementing the ceasefire-monitoring process and the establishment of liaison offices in mutually agreed locations.
Third party involvement: NO
Third party involvement names: .
Victory: NO
Terminated: NO
2013 Conflict Archive
Comment on Activity: The territorial conflict over Karen State became active again in 2013 after a year-long lull in the fighting. The conflict flared up in late April 2013 when the DKBA 5 clashed with government forces over territorial control of the proposed Hat Gyi dam. These clashes generated over 25 battle-related deaths.
Comment on Yearly Battle Related Deaths: Fighting in 2013 spiked after a lull in 2012, during which the conflict was inactive. Nearly all battle-related Deaths in 2013 resulted from a 4-day-engagement in late April between the Border Guard Force (BGF) and the DKBA 5. The Border Guard Force is an element of the Myanmar military, though the specific brigades involved in the clashes were primarily made up of former members of the DKBA 5s parent group, the DKBA. The fighting ceased in May, when representatives of the groups spoke with one another.
The clash between the the BGF and the DKBA 5 resulted from the groups desires to win territorial control of the Hat Gyi Dam site on the Salween River. The dam lies near Myaing Gyi Ngu Village in Karen States Hlaing Bwe Township.
Negotiations: YES
Comment on Negotiation: In mid-May, the DKBA 5 met with elements of the Border Guard Force (forces of the Government of Myanmar) in Sone Si Myaing Village, Myawaddy Township, near the Thai-Myanmar border. The Groups met to address recent fighting over territorial of the Hat Gyi Dam. No formal ceasefire agreement resulted from the talks.
Third party involvement: NO
Victory: NO
Terminated: YES
Type of termination: No or Low Activity
Date of termination: 2013-12-31
Comment on Termination: Despite a ceasefire agreement with the government fighting had briefly flared up in April 2013, when forces of the DKBA 5 clashed with Government forces over territorial control of the Hat Gyi Dam Project. Sporadic clashes continued in 2014 but the violence did not reach the level of 25 battle-related deaths. During 2015, a small number of clashes took place between the KNU and the government and a larger number between one part of the DKBA 5 and the government. During the year, both groups were involved in negotiations concerning the Nationwide Ceasefire Agreement (NCA) which they both signed in October 2015, together with several other armed groups. The part of the DKBA 5 that had been involved in the majority of the clashes splintered from the DKBA 5 in July, acting independently from that point.
2014 Conflict Archive
Comment on Activity: Sporadic clashes continued in 2014 but the violence did not reach the level of 25 battle-related deaths.
Terminated: NO
2015 Conflict Archive
Comment on Activity: During 2015, a small number of clashes took place between the KNU and the government and a larger number between one part of the DKBA 5 and the government. During the year, both groups were involved in negotiations concerning the Nationwide Ceasefire Agreement (NCA) which they both signed in October 2015, together with several other armed groups. The part of the DKBA 5 that had been involved in the majority of the clashes splintered from the DKBA 5 in July, acting independently from that point.
Comment on Yearly Battle Related Deaths: During 2015, a small number of clashes took place between the KNU and the government and a larger number between one part of the DKBA 5 and the government. During the year, both groups were involved in negotiations concerning the Nationwide Ceasefire Agreement (NCA) which they both signed in October 2015, together with several other armed groups. The part of the DKBA 5 that had been involved in the majority of the clashes splintered from the DKBA 5 in July, acting independently from that point.
Negotiations: YES
Comment on Negotiation: During the year, both the KNU and the the DKBA 5 were involved in negotiations concerning the Nationwide Ceasefire Agreement (NCA) which they both signed in October 2015, together with several other armed groups.
The process leading up to the Nationwide Ceasefire Agreement (NCA) had been ongoing since 2011, and by the 15 October 2015, eight groups signed the agreement. It should be noted that none of the groups coded as being in active conflict in Myanmar during 2015 signed the agreement (being the KIO, MNDAA, PSLF and SSPP).
A number of rounds of negotiation between the government and the ethnic armed groups and between ethnic armed groups took place during 2015. An agreement proposed and approved by the government was presented on 31 March, which was rejected by a collection of ethnic armed groups on 9 June. Amendments were proposed, and a decision reached that none of the groups would sign unless all did. This was followed by more negotiations during July and August, with the question of which groups were actually prepared to sign continuing to be unresolved.
As noted, a large portion of groups did not sign it, and it has been suggested that the military offensive against the SSPP in October was connected to the group’s refusal to sign. The military also stated that it refused to include the three groups fighting in northern Shan at the time, the Arakan Army, MNDAA and PSLF, in the NCA.
In February 2016, the United Nationalities Federal Council (UNFC - including the Kachin Independence Organization (KIO), Shan State Progressive Party (SSPP), New Mon State Party (NMSP), Karenni National Progressive Party (KNPP), Myanmar Nationalities Democratic Alliance Army (MNDAA), Palaung State Liberation Front (PSLF), Arakan National Council (ANC), Lahu Democratic Union (LDU) and Wa National Organization (WNO) - ) condemned the use of the NCA to divide and create conflict between the ethnic armed groups. Several observers also voiced similar concerns, as clashes between the Restoration Council of Shan States (RCSS) and the PSLF continued in Shan state.
Terminated: NO
2016 Conflict Archive
Terminated: NO
2018 Conflict Archive
Terminated: NO
2019 Conflict Archive
Terminated: NO
2020 Conflict Archive
Terminated: NO
2021 Conflict Archive
Comment on Activity: In 2021, the conflict between the government and KNU was reignited. Following the coup on 1 February 2021, armed violence spread across Myanmar, including territories claimed by KNU, thereby breaking the ceasefire that had been in place since 2015. KNU was one of the first ethnic armed organizations that opposed the coup and showed support for the anti-military regime movement, as well as provided shelter for fleeing protesters and trained anti-coup groups. On 27 March, KNU claimed to have captured a Tatmadaw outpost in Hpapun district, which initiated a series of air strikes in the district throughout April. These were the first air strikes on KNU territories in 25 years. The fighting between the government and KNU further escalated in December 2021 in Myawaddy township. Furthermore, KNU conducted joint attacks with the local PDFs against the Myanmar military forces.
Terminated: NO
2022 Conflict Archive
Comment on Activity: In 2022, the territorial conflict between the government and KNU significantly increased its intensity compared to the previous year. Both sides continued fighting, mainly in Kawkareik and Myawaddy districts in Kayin state and Thaton district in Mon state. KNU was one of the main ethnic armed groups that quickly opposed to the military regime after the February 2021 coup and joined forces with the PDF, armed wing of NUG. Throughout 2022, the KNU carried out joint operations with the local chapters of PDFs in the territories claimed by KNU. In May, KNU and allied resistance forces captured Thay Baw Boe camp in Myawaddy township, which is strategically located on the border with Thailand and had been under military control since the early 1990s.
Negotiations: NO
Third party involvement: NO
Victory: NO
Terminated: NO
2023 Conflict Archive
Comment on Activity: The conflict between the government of Myanmar and KNU decreased in intensity in 2023; however, both sides continued fighting in the territories claimed by the KNU. This decrease in intensity might be due to limited reporting of fatalities from the region. The military regime and KNU mainly clashed in Hpapun, Kawkareik, and Myawaddy districts of Kayin state, as well as Taungoo district of Bago region and Thaton district in Mon state.
Negotiations: NO
Third party involvement: NO
Victory: NO
Terminated: NO
2024 Conflict Archive
Comment on Activity: The intensity of the conflict between the government of Myanmar and the KNU slightly declined in 2024 compared to the previous year, though fighting remained highly active. The year was marked by territorial shifts across Kayin state, particularly in Hpapun, Hpa-an, and Myawaddy districts. In December, KNU forces recaptured Manerplaw – KNU’s former headquarters lost to the military in the 1990s – in a symbolic victory. This occurred as part of a broader campaign involving the KNU and allied local defense forces operating under the NUG, which launched coordinated offensives across southeastern Myanmar.
Negotiations: NO
Comment on Negotiation: The KNU did not engage in direct dialogue with the military government in 2024.
Third party involvement: NO
Victory: NO
Terminated: NO
2025 Conflict Archive
Comment on Activity: The conflict between the Government of Myanmar and Karen National Unio (KNU) slightly de-escalated in intensity in 2025 compared to the previous year. While fighting remained ongoing across parts of Kayin and Mon states as well as Bago region, the number of large-scale clashes decreased, reflecting both the KNU’s consolidation of control in certain rural areas and the Myanmar military’s diversion of resources to other active conflict areas, particularly in central Myanmar and northern Shan state. Despite this relative decline in ground fighting, the conflict remained active, with continued reports of skirmishes, raids, and intermittent artillery exchanges. The Myanmar military also maintained the use of airstrikes in contested areas.
Negotiations: NO
Comment on Negotiation: There were no formal talks between the Government of Myanmar and KNU in 2025
Third party involvement: NO
Terminated: NO
