General information
Type of Incompatibility: Territory
Territory: Islamic State
Date of first stated goal of incompatibility: 2016-10-30
Comment on date of first stated goals of incompatibility: The process leading up to the conflict between the Burkinabe government and the Greater Sahara section of the Islamic State is a complex one, played out on two continents.
In July 2014, the Islamic State (IS) – a Salafi jihadist militant group with its origins in Iraq – announced that it had established a caliphate in parts of Syrian and Iraq. Furthermore, it demanded the allegiance of all devout Muslims worldwide, and declared that it would continue to seize land to expand its territory across the globe. When the caliphate was proclaimed, IS stated: "The legality of all emirates, groups, states and organisations becomes null by the expansion of the khilafah's [caliphate's] authority and arrival of its troops to their areas.” In the Sahel, a little less than a year later, the islamist rebel group al-Murabitun fell apart when its senior spokesman and self-proclaimed emir Adnan Abu Waleed al-Sarhawi pledged allegiance to the Islamic State. While stating that the pledge was on behalf of al-Murabitun in its entirety, it soon became clear that al-Sahrawi was solely speaking for himself and MUJAO, one of al-Murabitun’s constituent groups. The other part making up al-Murabitun – Mokhtar Belmokhtar and his Signed- in-Blood Battalion - quickly announced that it remained a staunch ally of al-Qaida.
While al-Sarhawi began calling his group the Islamic State in the Greater Sahara (ISGS) soon after this, the core IS leadership failed to acknowledge the pledge for more than a year. It was not until 30 October 2016, when ISGS had conducted a series of attacks in Burkina Faso and Niger, and IS core was under pressure in Iraq and Syria, that the group officially recognized the pledge via its Amaq news agency, hailing the integration of al-Sahrawi’s faction of al-Murabitun into the “Islamic Caliphate.” With that, what had previously been ISGS became integrated into IS. Having declared, back in 2014 that it considered the legality of those states to which its troops had arrived to be null, IS’ Greater Sahara faction thus found itself in conflict with several states in the region, one of them being Burkina Faso.
The conflict between IS (and more precisely its Greater Sahara faction) and the Burkinabe government subsequently focused on IS’ aim of integrating Burkina Faso into its Islamic State.
Date of first use of armed force: 2017-10-23
Comment on first use of armed force: The group carried out a couple of attacks on Burkinabe targets during the two months leading up to IS core’s recognition of its pledge. Since al- Sarhawi and his men were not yet part of IS at this time, these attacks cannot be recorded as their first use of armed force. After the group officially became part of IS there was a lull in attacks on Burkinabe soil and over the following years, it failed to claim any attacks in the country. However, analysts agree that IS retained a presence specifically in Oudalan province of Sahel region and that violence carried out there were most likely the work of said group. Thus, due to the location of the attack, the event recorded here – the killing of a soldier in Gorom-Gorom, Oudalan on 23 October 2017 - is regarded as the first use of armed force in the conflict.
Date of first battle related death: 2017-10-23
Comment on first battle related death: The group carried out a couple of attacks on Burkinabe targets during the two months leading up to IS core’s recognition of its pledge. Since al-Sarhawi and his men were not yet part of IS proper at this time, these attacks cannot be recorded as the first battle-related death in the conflict. After the group officially became part of IS there was a lull in attacks on Burkinabe soil and over the following year, it failed to claim any attacks in the country. However, analysts agree that IS retained a presence specifically in Oudalan province of Sahel region and that violence carried out there were most likely the work of said group. Thus, due to the location of the attack, the event recorded here – the killing of a soldier in Gorom-Gorom, Oudalan on 23 October 2017 - is regarded as the first battle-related death in the conflict.
Date of conflict reached 25 battle releated deaths: 2019-08-19
Comment on conflict reached 25 battle releated deaths: The conflict between the Burkinabe government and IS crossed the 25 battle-related deaths threshold for the first time om 19 August 2019. On that date, the group carried out the most devastating attack on Burkinabe troops to date, striking a military base in the department of Kotogou, and killing 24 Burkinabe soldiers, which pushed that year’s total death toll over 25.
Annual information
This section contains annual information systematically collected by the UCDP.
2016
Primary Parties: -
Dimension: Internal
| Estimated Fatalities | |
|---|---|
| High | 0 |
| Best | 0 |
| Low | 0 |
Numbers include fatalities for all dyads both active and inactive for this year
2017
Primary Parties: -
Dimension: Internal
| Estimated Fatalities | |
|---|---|
| High | 2 |
| Best | 2 |
| Low | 0 |
Numbers include fatalities for all dyads both active and inactive for this year
2018
Primary Parties: -
Dimension: Internal
| Estimated Fatalities | |
|---|---|
| High | 19 |
| Best | 19 |
| Low | 1 |
Numbers include fatalities for all dyads both active and inactive for this year
2019
Primary Parties: Government of Burkina Faso - IS
Secondary Warring Parties Side A: Government of France
Dimension: Internationalized intrastate
Comment on Dimension: In 2019, the conflict between the Burkinabe government and IS was internationalized, with France supporting the government with troops via its counter-terrorism Operation Barkhane.
| Estimated Fatalities | |
|---|---|
| High | 137 |
| Best | 78 |
| Low | 73 |
Numbers include fatalities for all dyads both active and inactive for this year
2020
Primary Parties: Government of Burkina Faso - IS
Secondary Warring Parties Side A: Government of France
Dimension: Internationalized intrastate
Comment on Dimension: In 2020, the conflict between the Burkinabe government and IS was internationalized, with France supporting the government with troops via its counter-terrorism Operation Barkhane.
| Estimated Fatalities | |
|---|---|
| High | 182 |
| Best | 160 |
| Low | 131 |
Numbers include fatalities for all dyads both active and inactive for this year
2021
Primary Parties: Government of Burkina Faso - IS
Secondary Warring Parties Side A: Government of Chad, Government of France, Government of Mali, Government of Niger
Dimension: Internationalized intrastate
Comment on Dimension: In 2021, the conflict between Burkina Faso’s government and IS was internationalized, as the former received support from France, Chad, Mali and Niger.
France’s support came via the French-led counter-terrorism Operation Barkhane, which had succeeded Operation Serval in 2015. The French air force conducted airstrikes against IS targets several times during the year.
The G5 Sahel joint force (FC-G5S) was another multinational operation active in Burkina Faso in 2021. The force was set up by the Sahel's five countries - Burkina Faso, Chad, Niger, Mali and Mauritania - in February 2017, as a means of settling the armed conflicts in the region. More specifically, the joint force's mandate - which is one of peace enforcement rather than peacekeeping - includes fighting terrorism and restoring state authority. However, the force struggles with funding deficiencies as well as a lack of troops, and cooperation and coordination between the contributing countries remain problematic. Furthermore, the G5 countries have largely chosen to continue operating as singular units, instead of working together, operating in their own country, in a strip of 50 kilometers on their side of the border, with a right of pursuit. Since also JNIM is a target for the G5 force, and since several of the countries participating have their own incompatibilities against these groups, a coding rule was created so as to be able to determine which events should be coded to which dyad. Under this rule, fighting carried out on a country’s own soil was recorded as part of that particular conflict, whereas fighting carried across the border, in a neighboring country, was recorded as an action assisting the government of that country. Since Chad deployed troops for operations in the tri-border Liptako-Gourma area, which straddles Burkina Faso, Niger and Mali, they are recorded as secondary warring parties to all these governments. It should be noted, that the Chadian troops were recalled after only six months in the field. Malian and Nigerien soldiers also belonged to an FC-G5S group that operated across borders in the area.
| Estimated Fatalities | |
|---|---|
| High | 176 |
| Best | 170 |
| Low | 152 |
Numbers include fatalities for all dyads both active and inactive for this year
2022
Primary Parties: Government of Burkina Faso - IS
Secondary Warring Parties Side A: Government of France, Government of Niger
Dimension: Internationalized intrastate
Comment on Dimension: In 2022, the conflict between Burkina Faso’s government and IS was internationalized, as the former received support from France and Niger.
France’s support came both via the French-led counter-terrorism Operation Barkhane and Operation Sabre. On a number of occasions during the year, Barkhane conducted airstrikes against IS targets. Operation Sabre is a task force of 300-400 special operations forces based in Kamboinsin, on the outskirts of Ouagadougou, with a mandate to conduct counter-terrorism operations. However, relations between the Burkinabe government and France deteriorated during the year, as anti-French sentiments among the population grew, and in early 2023, the ruling junta requested that France withdraw all its troops from its territory.
Neighboring Niger is suffering from armed conflicts against the same Islamist groups actively fighting the Burkinabe government, and the two countries has both coordinated and carried out a number of joint operations in the border area.
| Estimated Fatalities | |
|---|---|
| High | 422 |
| Best | 402 |
| Low | 252 |
Numbers include fatalities for all dyads both active and inactive for this year
2023
Primary Parties: Government of Burkina Faso - IS
Dimension: Internal
Comment on Dimension: 2023 was the first year that the conflict between the Burkinabe government and IS was not internationalized. The government had previously been supported by troops from France and Chad, as well as by neighboring Niger and Mali.
France's support had come via both via the French-led counter-terrorism Operation Barkhane and Operation Sabre. However, with the coups placing military juntas in power in Ouagadougou, the relationship between the two countries deteriorated and the French forces were withdrawn by request from the Burkinabe regime.
In contrast, Burkina Faso's relationship with neighboring Niger and Mali - also governed by military regimes - grew increasingly close and in September, the three countries created a defense alliance, the “Alliance of Sahel States”. This was followed by joint operations in a number of other conflicts (e.g. Burkina Faso - JNIM), but none was recorded in the conflict against IS.
| Estimated Fatalities | |
|---|---|
| High | 925 |
| Best | 817 |
| Low | 572 |
Numbers include fatalities for all dyads both active and inactive for this year
2024
Primary Parties: Government of Burkina Faso - IS
Secondary Warring Parties Side A: Government of Niger
Dimension: Internationalized intrastate
Comment on Dimension: In 2024, the conflict between the Burkinabe government and ISSP was internationalized, with neighboring Niger once more supporting the government militarily.
Burkina Faso's relationship with neighboring Niger and Mali - also governed by military regimes – continued to strengthen. In September 2023, the three countries had created a mutual defense alliance, the “Alliance of Sahel States” (AES) and in July 2024, this pact was turned into a confederation. One of the main objectives of the new confederation was to increase coordination in the fight against both IS and JNIM. A joint military force was also announced, but its deployment in the field was unclear in 2024. Some sources announced that it was already in existence, but in early 2025, Niger’s defense chief stated that the 5000 strong force would “soon” deploy. Regardless, in Burkina Faso, the year saw Joint operations take place with Niger.
A note is also warranted on Burkina Faso’s relationship with Russia. Just like fellow AES states, Burkina Faso cut its ties with France after the 2022 coup, instead turning to Russia for military assistance. At the start of 2024, the new Russian force “Africa Corps”, succeeding the Wagner Group, deployed 100 men to the country. In contrast to Wagner Group, Africa Corps is directly subordinate to Russia's Defence Ministry. However, Russia is not coded as a secondary warring party, since the Russian troops were mandated to train Burkinabe soldiers, and not to take part in fighting. In late August the Russian troops were withdrawn from Burkina Faso and deployed to Ukraine.
| Estimated Fatalities | |
|---|---|
| High | 67 |
| Best | 63 |
| Low | 53 |
Numbers include fatalities for all dyads both active and inactive for this year
2025
Primary Parties: Government of Burkina Faso - IS
Secondary Warring Parties Side A: Government of Mali, Government of Niger
Dimension: Internationalized intrastate
Comment on Dimension: The conflict between the Burkinabe government and ISPP remained internationalized in 2025, with, Niger and Mali supporting the former militarily.
AES, the mutual defense alliance turned confederation, created by Mali, Burkina Faso and Niger in 2024, continued to deepen, at least on paper. Much focus was places on joint security cooperation and at the December summit, a joint battalion for counter-terrorism operations across borders was announced. Prior to this, the unified force of the AES carried out at least one operation; a large patrol in the tri-border area, including both ground forces and the air force.
| Estimated Fatalities | |
|---|---|
| High | 124 |
| Best | 92 |
| Low | 92 |
Numbers include fatalities for all dyads both active and inactive for this year
Conflict Archive
This section contains annual information no longer systematically collected by the UCDP.
2016 Conflict Archive
Terminated: NO
2017 Conflict Archive
Terminated: NO
2018 Conflict Archive
Terminated: NO
2019 Conflict Archive
Comment on Activity: In 2019, the conflict between the Burkinabe government and the Greater Sahara faction of IS became active for the first time. The group had increased its presence in the country already the year prior, when a successful offensive against them in neighboring Mali had driven many fighters to cross the border. The group’s main area of operation was Oudalan province in northern Sahel region, but during 2019 it also moved into neighboring Soum province. It was in Soum that the group carried out its most devastating attack to date, when it struck a military base in the department of Kotogou, killing 24 Burkinabe soldiers. The attack was well coordinated and IS used heavy weapons, including rockets.
Another development in 2019 was that an organizational restructuring incorporated ISGS into IS West Africa Province (ISWAP) in March. This modification probably indicated an increase in communication between what was previously two distinct groupings within the IS umbrella, and analysts have argued that what was earlier ISGS has received increasing technical support from ISWAP. However, there are few signs of close cooperation between the two, and their areas of operation remained far apart, with ISWAP proper focusing its actions on north-eastern Nigeria, south-eastern Niger, northern Cameroon and The Lake Chad area of Chad.
Negotiations: NO
Comment on Negotiation: There were no negotiations between the government and IS in 2019.
Third party involvement: NO
Comment on Third Party Involvement: There was no third party involvement in 2019.
Victory: NO
Terminated: NO
Type of termination: Not terminated
2020 Conflict Archive
Comment on Activity: In 2020, the conflict escalated in terms of fatalities. This was due both to more persistent deadly raids on military targets carried out by IS, and to a number of French attacks on IS (France being a secondary warring party to the Burkinabe government via its counter-terrorism Operation Barkhane).
Negotiations: NO
Comment on Negotiation: There were no negotiations between the government and IS in 2020.
Third party involvement: NO
Comment on Third Party Involvement: There was no third party involvement in 2020.
Victory: NO
Terminated: NO
Type of termination: Not terminated
2021 Conflict Archive
Comment on Activity: After a marked escalation in 2020, conflict activity remained on roughly the same level in 2021. However, the group was on the back foot, after suffering a number of defeats. For one, its involvement in a non-state conflict with fellow jihadist group JNIM the year prior had been costly. Second, the group had been the main target of both the regional force G5 Sahel and the French Operation Barkhane, and as such, it found itself pushed back from many of its previous areas of operation, more or less confined to the eastern part of Oudalan province and to Seno, further south. The group suffered yet another setback in Mali in August, when France succeeded in killing Abu Walid Al-Saharaoui, the head of the ISGS. Despite this, it was far from defeated, and was able to carry out a number of deadly attacks on Burkinabe forces during the year. The army’s largest setback against ISGS in 2021 came in early August. Having received information of attacks on some villages near the border with Niger, the military detachment of the near-by town Markoye set off to assist, but was ambushed by IS and lost some 19 soldiers.
Negotiations: NO
Comment on Negotiation: Officially, the government for a long time advocated for a purely military approach to the jihadist groups operating in the country, frequently announcing its refusal on principal to “negotiate with terrorists”. While there were signs of a change in this stance in February 2021, when Prime Minister Christophe Dabire implied that the government could be open to dialogue, this did not amount to the initiation of substantial talks with the groups in question. Rather, it soon became clear that the government continued to oppose talks with the leaders of both IS and JNIM, be it national or regional ones, instead aiming to target individual fighters from Burkina Faso. The idea, then, was to attempt to separate moderate fighters from their mother group, and subsequently reintegrate them into society. These types of initiates appear to have sprung up in several parts of the country, but since they did not aim to involve the leadership of the group, and since they did not revolve around the incompatibility, they are not recorded as negotiations by UCDP.
Third party involvement: NO
Comment on Third Party Involvement: There was no third party involvement in 2021.
Victory: NO
Terminated: NO
2022 Conflict Archive
Comment on Activity: Levels of violence escalated markedly in 2022, with the number of fatalities more than doubling from below 200 in 2021, to over 400. Despite the escalation of the conflict, the area affected remained roughly the same as the year prior. The number of violent events in that area increased, however, as the year saw numerous mine incidents and complex ambushes carried out by IS, as well as government airstrikes and offensives.
The continued failure of the military to contain the jihadist threat and the subsequent deterioration of the security situation, led to two military coups on 2022. Spawned by escalating violence in both the conflict against JNIM, and against the Sahel branch of IS at the end of 2021, the first coup d’état was carried out on 23-24 January, when democratically elected President Roch Marc Christian Kaboré was ousted from power by a group of soldiers. Calling themselves the Patriotic Movement for Safeguarding and Restoration, the junta gave the president’s inability to contain the Islamist conflicts and as the reason for the coup. A few days later, the junta restored the constitution and appointed Paul-Henri Sandaogo Damiba as interim president. Only eight months later, on 30 September, Damiba was ousted in a new coup, and Captain Ibrahim Traoré seized power. It is widely believed that a JNIM ambush on the convoy heading to Djibo served as a trigger for the second coup.
Negotiations: NO
Comment on Negotiation: There were no negotiations, as defined by UCDP, between the parties in 2022, but steps were taken indicating a willingness to engage in dialogue on the side of the government. After the January coup, the new regime’s stance on negotiations softened, and it was reported that Junta leader Paul-Henri Sandaogo Damiba aimed to launch a new strategy blending military operations with dialogue. However, it remained unclear if this would mean a national dialogue, involving the government, or that was a way to show its approval of the ongoing local initiatives. Indicating the latter option, the government in April stated that it would provide logistical support and formal mandates to local communities engaged in talks, and that it would offer livelihood opportunities for fighters who agreed to disarm.
Third party involvement: NO
Comment on Third Party Involvement: There was no third party involvement in 2022.
Victory: NO
Terminated: NO
Type of termination: Not terminated
2023 Conflict Archive
Comment on Activity: In 2023, the conflict escalated for the sixth consecutive year, going from a little over 400 fatalities in 2022, to more than 800. The main battleground continued to be Seno and Oudalan provinces of Sahel region, but there were also a number of clashes and attacks in Yagha, just south of Seno. While the government made frequent use of drone strikes against Islamist fighters (albeit clearly hitting civilian targets on multiple occasions), IS launched numerous attacks on especially the positions of the Volunteers for the Defence of the Homeland (VDPs), an auxiliary unit to the armed forces that had been created in 2020. The most noteworthy attack of the year took place in February, when IS scored a big victory, ambushing a military convoy between Oursi and Deou in Oudalan and killing more than 50 soldiers.
Negotiations: NO
Comment on Negotiation: There were no negotiations in 2023.
Third party involvement: NO
Comment on Third Party Involvement: There was no third party involvement in 2023.
Victory: NO
Terminated: NO
Type of termination: Not terminated
2024 Conflict Archive
Comment on Activity: In 2024, the conflict de-escalated sharply and caused well below 100 fatalities. In stark contrast to the big battles and devastating death tolls of 2023, the fighting was more small-scale and intermittent. The group continued to be confined to the Oudalan and Seno provinces, remote and peripheral parts of the country. As such, ISSP does not constitute as big of a threat to the regime as JNIM, at the moment, wherefore the junta appears to have focused more of its drone strikes and operations on the latter during the year.
Negotiations: NO
Comment on Negotiation: In 2024, the conflict between the Burkinabe government and ISSP was internationalized, with neighboring Niger once more supporting the government militarily.
Burkina Faso's relationship with neighboring Niger and Mali - also governed by military regimes – continued to strengthen. In September 2023, the three countries had created a mutual defense alliance, the “Alliance of Sahel States” (AES) and in July 2024, this pact was turned into a confederation. One of the main objectives of the new confederation was to increase coordination in the fight against both IS and JNIM. A joint military force was also announced, but its deployment in the field was unclear in 2024. Some sources announced that it was already in existence, but in early 2025, Niger’s defense chief stated that the 5000 strong force would “soon” deploy. Regardless, in Burkina Faso, the year saw Joint operations take place with Niger.
A note is also warranted on Burkina Faso’s relationship with Russia. Just like fellow AES states, Burkina Faso cut its ties with France after the 2022 coup, instead turning to Russia for military assistance. At the start of 2024, the new Russian force “Africa Corps”, succeeding the Wagner Group, deployed 100 men to the country. In contrast to Wagner Group, Africa Corps is directly subordinate to Russia's Defence Ministry. However, Russia is not coded as a secondary warring party, since the Russian troops were mandated to train Burkinabe soldiers, and not to take part in fighting. In late August the Russian troops were withdrawn from Burkina Faso and deployed to Ukraine.
Third party involvement: NO
Victory: NO
Terminated: NO
Type of termination: Not terminated
2025 Conflict Archive
Comment on Activity: Since 2024, IS had focused its attacks on supply convoys and escort units, suggesting a strategy aimed at economic strangulation and siege warfare. This was evident in 2025, as the two most lethal attacks were of this kind. In January, a civilian convoy escorted by the military was attacked between Dori and Seytenga in Seno province. IS launched rocket launchers against the army vehicles that were in the lead, causing panic among the civilians. When the smoke had cleared, the human toll stood at at least 18 gendarmes and soldiers, as well as three civilians. Some months later, in late July, the group launched yet another bloody ambush on a supply convoy, this time moving between Dori and Gorom-Gorom in Oudalan Province. The convoy, again under military escort, was hit about two-thirds of the way through the journey. IS fighters were positioned on a hill with machine guns as well as in the fields, appearing as farmers, and they targeted the soldiers first, followed by fleeing civilians. While different fatality figures were reported, a trustworthy source from the region estimated that at least 40 soldiers were killed, making this the deadliest attack of the year.
Negotiations: NO
Comment on Negotiation: There were no negotiations between the parties in 2025.
Third party involvement: NO
Comment on Third Party Involvement: There was no third party involvement in 2025.
Victory: NO
Terminated: NO
Type of termination: Not terminated
