General information
Type of Incompatibility: Territory
Territory: Islamic State
Date of first stated goal of incompatibility: 2015-03-12
Comment on date of first stated goals of incompatibility: In July 2014, the Islamic State (IS) – a Salafi jihadist militant group with its origins in Iraq – announced that it had established a caliphate in parts of Syrian and Iraq. Furthermore, it demanded the allegiance of all devout Muslims worldwide, and declared that it would continue to seize land to expand its territory across the globe. When the caliphate was proclaimed, IS stated: "The legality of all emirates, groups, states and organisations becomes null by the expansion of the khilafah's [caliphate's] authority and arrival of its troops to their areas.”
On 7 March 2015, Jama’atu Ahlis Sunna Lidda’awati wal-Jihad (commonly called Boko Haram) declared its allegiance to IS, after a nearly one-year-long “courtship process” (term as used by Jacob Zenn in his article Wilayat West Africa Reboots for the Caliphate, in CTC Sentinel on 21 August 2915). Five days later, on 12 March, the pledged was accepted by IS-leader Abu Bakr al-Baghdadi, who also re-named the group Wilayat West Africa, i.e. IS’ West Africa province. With that, what had previously been Boko Haram became integrated into the Islamic State and the former group was rendered obsolete. The merger furthermore meant that what had earlier been Boko Haram switched its goals to the more far-reaching one stated by al-Bhahdadi: the creation of a global Islamic State. Having declared, back in 2014 that it considered the legality of those states to which its troops had arrived to be null, IS’ West Africa wing thus found itself in conflict with several states in the region, one of them being Cameroon. The conflict between IS (and more precisely its West African wing) and the Cameroonian government subsequently focused on IS’ aim of integrating Cameroon into its Islamic State.
Date of first use of armed force: 2015-03-19
Comment on first use of armed force: On 19 March 2015, IS fighters attacked communities near the Cameroonian town of Fotokol. Cameroonian troops responded and at least three Islamists died in the ensuing fighting.
Date of first battle related death: 2015-03-19
Comment on first battle related death: On 19 March 2015, IS fighters attacked communities near the Cameroonian town of Fotokol. Cameroonian troops responded and at least three Islamists died in the ensuing fighting.
Date of conflict reached 25 battle releated deaths: 2015-08-11
Comment on conflict reached 25 battle releated deaths: On 11 August 2015, IS launched a cross-border attack from Nigeria, targeting the village Achigachia in Cameroon’s Far North region. During the battle, some 20 Islamists were killed, as was a chief sergeant in the Cameroonian army. With this, the 25 fatality threshold was crossed for the first time.
Annual information
This section contains annual information systematically collected by the UCDP.
2015
Primary Parties: Government of Cameroon - IS
Secondary Warring Parties Side A: Government of Chad
Dimension: Internationalized intrastate
Comment on Dimension: The conflict between Cameroon and IS was internationalized from the outset, as Chad had deployed troops to the northern part of the country already in January, in order to support the Yaondé government against IS’ predecessor Boko Haram.
In November, amid increased IS attacks in Chad, resulting in a state of emergency being declared, there were unconfirmed reports that N’Djamena was withdrawing all its soldiers from Cameroon.
| Estimated Fatalities | |
|---|---|
| High | 315 |
| Best | 283 |
| Low | 283 |
Numbers include fatalities for all dyads both active and inactive for this year
2016
Primary Parties: Government of Cameroon - IS
Dimension: Internal
Comment on Dimension: The conflict between IS and the Cameroonian government, which had been internationalized in 2015, did not see any external involvement in 2016. This was despite the fact that the Lake Chad Basin countries’ establishment of an expanded Multinational Joint Task Force (MNJTF) to combat Boko Haram (meaning both Jamaatu Ahlis Sunna Liddaawati wal-Jihad and IS’ West Africa wing) continued during the year. Facing many political, technical and financial obstacles, the force nevertheless appeared to make some progress. Four sectors of operation were defined: sector 1 with the command located in Mora, Cameroon; sector 2 in Baga-Sola, Chad; sector 3 in Baga, Nigeria; and sector 4 located in Diffa, Niger. The contingents from the four contributing countries are based on their own territory, but are allowed cross-border access on a bilateral basis.
Since all countries active militarily in the MNJTF were involved in their own conflicts with IS, a coding rule was created. Under that rule, fighting carried out on a country’s own soil was recorded as part of that particular conflict, whereas fighting carried across the border, in a neighboring country, was recorded as an action assisting the government of that country in its conflict with IS. Since there was no report of troops from any of the other participating countries fighting on Cameroonian soil in 2016, the conflict was not recorded as internationalized.
| Estimated Fatalities | |
|---|---|
| High | 206 |
| Best | 189 |
| Low | 189 |
Numbers include fatalities for all dyads both active and inactive for this year
2017
Primary Parties: -
Dimension: Internal
| Estimated Fatalities | |
|---|---|
| High | 23 |
| Best | 23 |
| Low | 23 |
Numbers include fatalities for all dyads both active and inactive for this year
2018
Primary Parties: -
Dimension: Internal
| Estimated Fatalities | |
|---|---|
| High | 24 |
| Best | 24 |
| Low | 24 |
Numbers include fatalities for all dyads both active and inactive for this year
2019
Primary Parties: Government of Cameroon - IS
Secondary Warring Parties Side A: Government of Chad
Dimension: Internationalized intrastate
Comment on Dimension: In 2019, the conflict was once more internationalized.
The Lake Chad Basin countries’ establishment of an expanded Multinational Joint Task Force (MNJTF) to combat Boko Haram (meaning both Jamaatu Ahlis Sunna Liddaawati wal-Jihad and IS’ West Africa wing) continued during the year. The contingents from the four contributing countries were based on their own territory, but allowed cross-border access on a bilateral basis. Since all countries active militarily in the MNJTF were involved in their own conflicts with IS, a coding rule was created. Under that rule, fighting carried out on a country’s own soil was recorded as part of that particular conflict, whereas fighting carried across the border, in a neighboring country, was recorded as an action assisting the government of that country in its conflict with IS.
In February 2019, Chadian soldiers crossed into Cameroon near Kousseri and are thus recorded as secondary warring parties, supporting the Cameroonian government.
| Estimated Fatalities | |
|---|---|
| High | 153 |
| Best | 135 |
| Low | 129 |
Numbers include fatalities for all dyads both active and inactive for this year
2020
Primary Parties: -
Dimension: Internal
Comment on Dimension: The conflict between IS and the Cameroonian government, which had been internationalized in 2019, did not see any external involvement in 2020. This was despite the fact that the Lake Chad Basin countries’ establishment of an expanded Multinational Joint Task Force (MNJTF) to combat Boko Haram (meaning both Jamaatu Ahlis Sunna Liddaawati wal-Jihad and IS’ West Africa wing) continued during the year. Facing many political, technical and financial obstacles, the force nevertheless appeared to make some progress. Four sectors of operation were defined: sector 1 with the command located in Mora, Cameroon; sector 2 in Baga-Sola, Chad; sector 3 in Baga, Nigeria; and sector 4 located in Diffa, Niger. The contingents from the four contributing countries are based on their own territory, but are allowed cross-border access on a bilateral basis.
Since all countries active militarily in the MNJTF were involved in their own conflicts with IS, a coding rule was created. Under that rule, fighting carried out on a country’s own soil was recorded as part of that particular conflict, whereas fighting carried across the border, in a neighboring country, was recorded as an action assisting the government of that country in its conflict with IS. Since there was no report of troops from any of the other participating countries fighting on Cameroonian soil in 2020, the conflict was not recorded as internationalized.
| Estimated Fatalities | |
|---|---|
| High | 19 |
| Best | 11 |
| Low | 11 |
Numbers include fatalities for all dyads both active and inactive for this year
2021
Primary Parties: Government of Cameroon - IS
Secondary Warring Parties Side A: Government of Nigeria
Dimension: Internationalized intrastate
Comment on Dimension: In 2021, the conflict was once more internationalized.
The Lake Chad Basin countries’ establishment of an expanded Multinational Joint Task Force (MNJTF) to combat Boko Haram (meaning both Jamaatu Ahlis Sunna Liddaawati wal-Jihad and IS’ West Africa wing) continued during the year. The contingents from the four contributing countries were based on their own territory, but allowed cross-border access on a bilateral basis. Since all countries active militarily in the MNJTF were involved in their own conflicts with IS, a coding rule was created. Under that rule, fighting carried out on a country’s own soil was recorded as part of that particular conflict, whereas fighting carried across the border, in a neighboring country, was recorded as an action assisting the government of that country in its conflict with IS.
In 2021, Nigerian soldiers were present on Cameroonian soil, fighting against IS fighters in the Logone-et-Chari department, and are thus recorded as secondary warring parties, supporting the Cameroonian government.
| Estimated Fatalities | |
|---|---|
| High | 134 |
| Best | 62 |
| Low | 56 |
Numbers include fatalities for all dyads both active and inactive for this year
2022
Primary Parties: -
Dimension: Internationalized intrastate
Comment on Dimension: The Lake Chad countries' Multinational Joint Task Force (MNJTF), aimed to combat Boko Haram (meaning both Jamaatu Ahlis Sunna Liddaawati wal-Jihad and IS’ West Africa wing), continued their operations during the year. The contingents from the four contributing countries were based on their own territory, but allowed cross-border access on a bilateral basis. Since all countries active militarily in the MNJTF were involved in their own conflicts with IS, a coding rule was created. Under that rule, fighting carried out on a country’s own soil was recorded as part of that particular conflict, whereas fighting carried across the border, in a neighboring country, was recorded as an action assisting the government of that country in its conflict with IS.
In 2022, Chadian soldiers were present on Cameroonian soil, fighting against IS fighters in the Logone-et-Chari department, and are thus recorded as secondary warring parties, supporting the Cameroonian government.
| Estimated Fatalities | |
|---|---|
| High | 12 |
| Best | 9 |
| Low | 7 |
Numbers include fatalities for all dyads both active and inactive for this year
2023
Primary Parties: Government of Cameroon - IS
Dimension: Internal
| Estimated Fatalities | |
|---|---|
| High | 67 |
| Best | 53 |
| Low | 33 |
Numbers include fatalities for all dyads both active and inactive for this year
2024
Primary Parties: -
Dimension: Internal
Comment on Dimension: The conflict between IS and the Cameroonian government, which previously had been internationalized, did not see any external involvement in 2024. This was despite the fact that the Lake Chad Basin countries’ establishment of an expanded Multinational Joint Task Force (MNJTF) to combat Boko Haram (meaning both Jamaatu Ahlis Sunna Liddaawati wal-Jihad and IS’ West Africa wing) continued during the year. Facing many political, technical and financial obstacles, the force nevertheless appeared to make some progress. Four sectors of operation were defined: sector 1 with the command located in Mora, Cameroon; sector 2 in Baga-Sola, Chad; sector 3 in Baga, Nigeria; and sector 4 located in Diffa, Niger. The contingents from the four contributing countries are based on their own territory, but are allowed cross-border access on a bilateral basis.
Since all countries active militarily in the MNJTF were involved in their own conflicts with IS, a coding rule was created. Under that rule, fighting carried out on a country’s own soil was recorded as part of that particular conflict, whereas fighting carried across the border, in a neighboring country, was recorded as an action assisting the government of that country in its conflict with IS. Since there was no report of troops from any of the other participating countries fighting on Cameroonian soil in 2024, the conflict was not recorded as internationalized.
| Estimated Fatalities | |
|---|---|
| High | 27 |
| Best | 23 |
| Low | 19 |
Numbers include fatalities for all dyads both active and inactive for this year
2025
Primary Parties: Government of Cameroon - IS
Secondary Warring Parties Side A: Government of Nigeria
Dimension: Internationalized intrastate
Comment on Dimension: The Lake Chad countries' Multinational Joint Task Force (MNJTF), aimed to combat Boko Haram (meaning both Jamaatu Ahlis Sunna Liddaawati wal-Jihad and IS’ West Africa wing), continued their operations during the year. The contingents from the four contributing countries were based on their own territory, but allowed cross-border access on a bilateral basis. Since all countries active militarily in the MNJTF were involved in their own conflicts with IS, a coding rule was created. Under that rule, fighting carried out on a country’s own soil was recorded as part of that particular conflict, whereas fighting carried across the border, in a neighboring country, was recorded as an action assisting the government of that country in its conflict with IS.
In 2025, Nigerian soldiers were present on Cameroonian soil, fighting against IS fighters in the Logone-et-Chari department, and are thus recorded as a secondary warring party, supporting the Cameroonian government.
| Estimated Fatalities | |
|---|---|
| High | 77 |
| Best | 62 |
| Low | 62 |
Numbers include fatalities for all dyads both active and inactive for this year
Conflict Archive
This section contains annual information no longer systematically collected by the UCDP.
2015 Conflict Archive
Negotiations: NO
Third party involvement: NO
Victory: NO
Terminated: NO
2016 Conflict Archive
Negotiations: NO
Comment on Negotiation: There were no negotiations in 2016.
Third party involvement: NO
Comment on Third Party Involvement: There was no third party involvement in 2016.
Victory: NO
Terminated: YES
Type of termination: No or Low Activity
Date of termination: 2016-12-31
Comment on Termination: While there continued to be sporadic outbursts of fighting in 2017, the conflict de-escalated and fell below the 25 battle-related deaths threshold.
Comment on Termination Date: While there continued to be sporadic outbursts of fighting in 2017, the conflict de-escalated and fell below the 25 battle-related deaths threshold.
2017 Conflict Archive
Negotiations: NO
Third party involvement: NO
Victory: NO
Terminated: NO
2018 Conflict Archive
Negotiations: NO
Third party involvement: NO
Victory: NO
Terminated: NO
2019 Conflict Archive
Comment on Activity: After two years of less violence, the conflict escalated once more in 2019 and was registered as active in UCDP data. During the year, IS carried out a number of attacks on military positions, and there were intermittent clashes between the group and the military, especially on the Lake Chad islands of Logone-et-Chari department in the far north of Cameroon.
Negotiations: NO
Comment on Negotiation: There were no negotiations in 2019.
Third party involvement: NO
Comment on Third Party Involvement: There was no third party involvement in 2019.
Victory: NO
Terminated: YES
Type of termination: No or Low Activity
Date of termination: 2019-12-31
Comment on Termination: While there continued to be sporadic outbursts of fighting in 2020, the conflict de-escalated and fell below the 25 battle-related deaths threshold.
Comment on Termination Date: While there continued to be sporadic outbursts of fighting in 2020, the conflict de-escalated and fell below the 25 battle-related deaths threshold.
2020 Conflict Archive
Comment on Activity: After a spike in violence in 2019, the conflict de-escalated once again. As a result it fell below the threshold of 25 battle-related deaths and was no longer coded as active.
Negotiations: NO
Comment on Negotiation: There were no negotiations in 2020.
Third party involvement: NO
Comment on Third Party Involvement: There was no third party involvement in 2020.
Victory: NO
Terminated: NO
2021 Conflict Archive
Comment on Activity: After a year of less violence, the conflict escalated once more in 2021 and was registered as active in UCDP data. During the year, IS mostly carried out attacks in the Logone-et-Chari department of the Far North region, but also claimed attacks in both Mayo-Sava and Mayo-Tsanaga departments.
Negotiations: NO
Comment on Negotiation: There were no negotiations in 2021.
Third party involvement: NO
Third party involvement names: There was no third party involvement in 2021.
Victory: NO
Terminated: YES
Type of termination: No or Low Activity
Date of termination: 2021-12-31
Comment on Termination: While there continued to be sporadic outbursts of fighting in 2022, the conflict de-escalated and fell below the 25 battle-related deaths threshold.
Comment on Termination Date: While there continued to be sporadic outbursts of fighting in 2022, the conflict de-escalated and fell below the 25 battle-related deaths threshold.
2022 Conflict Archive
Comment on Activity: In 2022, ISWAP remained in the Far North region but the conflict was inactive.
Negotiations: NO
Comment on Negotiation: There were no negotiations in 2022.
Third party involvement: NO
Victory: NO
Terminated: NO
2023 Conflict Archive
Comment on Activity: After a year of less violence, the conflict escalated once more in 2023 and was registered as active in UCDP data.
Terminated: YES
Type of termination: No or Low Activity
Date of termination: 2023-12-31
Comment on Termination: While there continued to be sporadic outbursts of fighting in 2024, the conflict de-escalated and fell below the 25 battle-related deaths threshold.
Comment on Termination Date: While there continued to be sporadic outbursts of fighting in 2024, the conflict de-escalated and fell below the 25 battle-related deaths threshold.
2024 Conflict Archive
Comment on Activity: After a spike in violence in 2023, the conflict de-escalated once again. As a result it fell just below the threshold of 25 battle-related deaths and was no longer coded as active.
Comment on Negotiation: There were no negotiations in 2024.
Third party involvement: NO
Comment on Third Party Involvement: There was no third party involvement in 2024.
Victory: NO
Terminated: NO
2025 Conflict Archive
Comment on Activity: After a year of less violence, the conflict escalated once more in 2025 and became active again. During the year, ISWAP escalated its attacks against Cameroonian military posts in the Logone-et-Chari department in the Far North region and made frequent use of Improvised Explosive Devices (IEDs).
Negotiations: NO
Third party involvement: NO
Victory: NO
Terminated: NO
