General information
First Active Year: 1989
Current Name: Government of Afghanistan
Current Name full English: Government of Afghanistan
Current Name full native language: n/a
Original Name: Government of Afghanistan
Original Name full English: Government of Afghanistan
Original Name full native language: n/a
Actor Chronology
This section contains information about (if applicable) group splinters, name changes, and alliances according to the UCDP definitions of these concepts.
UCDP has not recorded any Chronology Activities involving this group.
Conflict issues
Government of Afghanistan - Jam'iyyat-i Islami-yi Afghanistan
Conflict Goal Issues: Jam'iyyat-i Islami-yi Afghanistan, sometimes referred to as the Islamic Society of Afghanistan (ISA), was a Sunni Islamist rebel group fighting against the government of Afghanistan. The group was included within the Mujahideen movement and was largely comprised of ethnically Tajik people. Jam'iyyat-i Islami-yi Afghanistan emerged in 1979, during which the group stated several conflict goal issues. The group called for the establishment of Sharia law, for the state to be governed by Islamic principles, and for economic reform to prevent inequality and oppression. The group also called attention to government corruption and stated its intentions to protect the language- and cultural rights of minorities, provide the basic needs of the Afghan people, and increase religious teachings in schools. Finally, the group also called for the cultural rights of non-Islamic people to be restricted.
As the conflict progressed, the establishment of an Islamic state was continuously stated and heavily emphasized, but most other issues raised during the first year were not explicitly reemphasized throughout the conflict. In 1989, the group began calling for the ousting of the Afghan government and declaring its opposition to any sort of power-sharing agreement which would allow the sitting government to maintain executive power. In 1992, the Mujahideen successfully overthrew the Afghan government and Jam'iyyat-i Islami-yi Afghanistan gained control over large parts of the executive government before being ousted by the Taleban in 1996, during which the group once again expressed calls to oust the, now Taleban-controlled, government.
The main conflict goal issues of Jam'iyyat-i Islami-yi Afghanistan were the toppling of the Afghan government and its replacement with an Islamic state structure. These issues were the most central to the group, being continuously stated and heavily emphasized throughout the conflict.
Conflict Dynamics Issues: In 1979, Jam'iyyat-i Islami-yi Afghanistan called for the removal of foreign control over the Islamic world and for the Islamic world to establish itself as independence from “imperialism of the East and West”.
The issue of removing foreign influence over Afghanistan and other states that were considered Islamic was continuously reemphasized throughout the conflict. Jam'iyyat-i Islami-yi Afghanistan also occasionally accused the Afghan government of perpetrating atrocities and massacres against civilians, called for the removal of military and political support to the Afghan government, and called for support from the international Muslim diaspora and of central Asian republics to the Mujahideen against the Afghan government. In 1990, the group also called for refugees to be allowed to return to their homes.
The main conflict dynamics issue of Jam'iyyat-i Islami-yi Afghanistan was the expulsion of foreign influence and imperialism which was frequently stated throughout the conflict and heavily emphasized as a central issue for the group’s existence.
Conflict Resolution Issues: The first interpreted conflict resolution issues of Jam'iyyat-i Islami-yi Afghanistan were stated in 1989. During 1989 and 1990 the group stated its willingness to negotiate to end the conflict, although they remained adamant that negotiations would not be held with the Afghan government but rather with the Soviet government who were currently engaged in the Soviet-Afghan war. In 1996, following their ousting from power, Jam'iyyat-i Islami-yi Afghanistan stated their willingness to negotiate with the Taleban government to avoid further hostilities. The issue of negotiations is, therefore, considered the main conflict resolution issue of Jam'iyyat-i Islami-yi Afghanistan.
Type of conflict issues: Conflict Goal Issues: Basic needs, Change economic system, Change judicial system, Civil rights, Corruption, CPS: Islamic state, CPS: Other/undefined system, Cultural rights, Education system: increase religion, Executive power-sharing, Foreign policy reform, Gender rights, Geographical status quo, Hold elections, Land reforms, Language rights, Law and order, Opposition to share power in the executive, Oust full executive, Public services, Religious rights, Restrictions on cultural rights, Restrictions on freedom of expression, Restrictions on religious rights, Restructure military forces
Conflict Dynamics Issues: Atrocities and abuses, DFI: Removal of foreign influence, DFI: Withdrawal of military intervention/foreign forces, DFI: Withdrawal of military support, DFI: Withdrawal of political support, IFI: Political support, IFI: Support from diasporas/foreign fighters, Return of refugees/IDPs
Conflict Resolution Issues:
Call for negotiations, Structure of negotiations
Government of Afghanistan - Hizb-i Islami-yi Afghanistan
Conflict Goal Issues: Hizb-i Islami-yi Afghanistan was a mainly Pashtun Islamist group in [Afghanistan] (#Conflict/333). It adhered to a takfiri ideology and first stated in 1977 its goal of ousting the regime and establishing an Islamic government. During the first years, the conflict goals were not particularly elaborate, solely revolving around the establishment of an Islamic state. As the Soviet occupation neared its end, the group elaborated on a number of new goals, notably through a manifesto published in 1989. The manifesto for example called for reform of the economy, the judicial system as well as the parliament. During the civil war period the conflict goals of Hizb-I Islami revolved solely around seizing power and security sector reforms. In an interesting development, the demands towards the government and other mujahideen groups grew increasingly conciliatory. In 1994, the group intended to oust the executive, nonetheless it agreed to a power-sharing agreement two years later. This compromise coincides and is likely a response to the increasingly powerful Taliban. After being inactive during the Taliban rule, Hizb-I Islami reemerged. Similarly to the Soviet occupation period, the group demanded the establishment of an Islamic state and ousting the government. The group also regularly called for elections to be held. Throughout its existence, the main goal of Hizb-I Islami was to oust the successive governments and replace it with an Islamic state in Afghanistan. Although the project did not capture this issue as often, one of the corollary issues is the one of religious rights. This can be seen as a main conflict goal too.
Conflict Dynamics Issues: The project coded the first conflict dynamics issue for the year 1980 when Hizb-I Islami criticized western influence. Throughout the group’s lifetime, the conflict dynamics issues remained consistent. Hizb-I Islami regularly criticized various forms of foreign influence. This included military forces, humanitarian personnel as well as vaguer statements regarding foreign interference. The main issue was without a doubt the consistent demand that foreign forces should leave Afghanistan. In the early years this injunction was directed at the Soviet Union, following 2001, this targeted the US and its allies.
Conflict Resolution Issues: #Conflict Resolution Issues
The first conflict resolution issue was coded for the year 1988. Towards the end of the conflict with the Soviet Union, Hizb demanded that the Soviet Union pay compensation for the lives lost during the conflict.
No issue was coded throughout the 1990s. It was only from 2007 onwards that Hizb-I Islami opened the door to negotiations. It however required that the government of Kabul be granted full negotiating power by the US. At times, Hekmatyar was also quoted as opposing negotiations with the government, contradicting earlier statements. Eventually Hizb-I Islami became inactive and signed a peace agreement in 2016.
Type of conflict issues: Conflict Goal Issues: Civil rights, Constitutional issues, CPS: Islamic state, CPS: Other/undefined system, Cultural rights, Economic reforms, Electoral reform, Executive power-sharing, Foreign policy reform, Hold elections, Labor rights, Opposition to elections, Oust full executive, Oust head of the executive, Public services, Reform executive structure, Reform judicial system, Reform parliament, Restriction of gender rights, Restrictions on civil rights, Restrictions on religious rights, Restructure military forces, Security sector power-sharing
Conflict Dynamics Issues Atrocities and abuses, DFI: Removal of foreign influence, DFI: Removal of foreigners, DFI: Withdrawal of financial support, DFI: Withdrawal of humanitarian aid, DFI: Withdrawal of military intervention/foreign forces, DFI: Withdrawal of military support, DFI: Withdrawal of political support, Release of prisoners
Conflict Resolution Issues Accountability/prosecution/investigation, Call for ceasefire, Call for negotiations, Compensation/restoration, Opposition to negotiations, Structure of negotiations
Government of Afghanistan - Hizb-i Islami-yi Afghanistan - Khalis faction
Conflict Goal Issues: Hizb-i Islami-yi Afghanistan - Khalis faction was a Sunni-Islamist rebel group fighting against the government of Afghanistan to oust foreign influence from the country and establish an Islamic state in Afghanistan. The group emerged as a splinter group from Hizb-i Islami-yi Afghanistan, led by Gulbuddin Hekmatyar, following allegations by the group’s leader Mawlawi Yunus Khalis of the original group’s hesitancy of engaging in combat. The group emerged in 1979, during which it called for the establishment of an Islamic state in Afghanistan governed by Sharia law and the adoption of the Koran as the official Afghan constitution.
As the conflict emerged in 1989, calls for establishing an Islamic state were reemphasized, stating that it would be done through the ousting of the Afghan government. The group also began calling for the restriction of civil rights of women and non-Sunnis, specifically Shiites, and stated its opposition to Afghan elections as “they allowed both good and bad people to vote.”
The main conflict goal issue of Hizb-i Islami-yi Afghanistan - Khalis faction was the establishment of an Islamic state in Afghanistan, as this issue was continuously stated with heavy emphasis throughout the group’s existence.
Conflict Dynamics Issues: The project coded no statements from Hizb-i Islami-yi Afghanistan - Khalis faction pertaining to conflict dynamics issues.
Conflict Resolution Issues: Hizb-i Islami-yi Afghanistan - Khalis faction were interpreted as pronouncing only one conflict resolution issue, when the group in 1989 stated its opposition to negotiations with the Soviet ambassador to Afghanistan Yuli Vorontsov.
Type of conflict issues: The coded conflict issues for this group are: Conflict Goal Issues: Change judicial system, Constitutional issues, CPS: Islamic state, Opposition to elections, Oust full executive, Restrictions on civil rights
Conflict Dynamics Issues:
Conflict Resolution Issues:
Opposition to negotiations
Government of Afghanistan - Mahaz-i Milli-yi Islami-yi Afghanistan
Conflict Goal Issues: Mahaz-i Milli-yi Islami-yi Afghanistan, also known as National Islamic Front of Afghanistan (NIFA), was a Pashtun rebel group fighting against the government of Afghanistan as part of the Mujahideen. The group emerged in 1980, although future leaders of the group stated several conflict goal issues in 1979 as well. In 1979, the group called for the establishment of democracy in Afghanistan. Mahaz-i Milli-yi also called for foreign policy reform, particularly to improve relations with non-Islamic and Western countries, which also included the establishment of a mixed economy, rather than the Soviet-controlled Socialist economic system. The group also emphasized the protection of civil rights of the Afghan people.
As the conflict progressed, calls for establishing democracy in Afghanistan were continuously reemphasized, but no other issues raised in 1979 were explicitly stated again. Instead, Mahaz-i- Milli-yi began calling for the protection of civil and cultural rights, the holding of elections before which interim executive power-sharing would be established, and the formation of a new Afghan constitution. Mahaz-i- Milli-yi also called for executive reform in 1989 for the reestablishment of the Afghan monarchy to unify the country. In 1990, this was changed to parliamentary reform to make the Afghan government more representative of its people.
The main conflict goal issue of Mahaz-i- Milli-yi was the establishment of a democratic state structure in Afghanistan. This issue was continuously stated and heavily emphasized throughout the conflict and was central to many other stated issues of the group.
Conflict Dynamics Issues: In 1979, Mahaz-i- Milli-yi stated several conflict dynamics issues, all of which were directed toward the international community. The group called for the removal of foreign financial, political, and military support from the government of Afghanistan and for the withdrawal of foreign influence over the Afghan government. Mahaz-i- Milli-yi also called for the political support of the international community, particularly towards the West.
In 1989, the removal of foreign influence over the Afghan state was reemphasized, as the group called for the removal of Soviet control over the government. During 1990, Mahaz-i- Milli-yi also called upon the UN to establish a mission to “monitor polls in guerrilla-held areas.” Hence, the main conflict dynamics issues of Mahaz-i- Milli-yi was the removal of foreign influence over the Afghan government.
Conflict Resolution Issues: The only interpreted conflict resolution issue was stated in 1990, when Mahaz-i- Milli-yi called for criminals who had been active in the war to be punished and prosecuted, whilst stating that no revenge killings would be carried out.
Type of conflict issues: Conflict Goal Issues: Change economic system, Civil rights, Constitutional issues, CPS: Democracy, Cultural rights, Executive power-sharing: interim, Foreign policy reform, Hold elections, Reform executive structure, Reform parliament, Religious rights
Conflict Dynamics Issues: DFI: Removal of foreign influence, DFI: Withdrawal of financial support, DFI: Withdrawal of military support, DFI: Withdrawal of political support, IFI: International monitoring, IFI: Political support
Conflict Resolution Issues:
Accountability/prosecution/investigation
Government of Afghanistan - Hizb-i Wahdat
Conflict Goal Issues: Hizb-i Wahdat, Unity Party, was a Shiite Islamist rebel group mainly stemming from the Hazara ethnic group fighting against the government of Afghanistan. The group emerged in 1989 following Iranian pressure for smaller Shiite groups in Afghanistan to unite against the Sunni mujahideen. During the year of its emergence, Hizib-i Wahdat stated several conflict goal issues. The group stated its intentions to “install an Islamic government based on the rules of the Koran and the Sunna.”, called for the protection of the cultural-, civil-, and religious rights of the Hazara people and of Shiite Muslims in Afghanistan, and called for a restructuring of the executive structure which would grant Shiite Muslims increased representation in executive branches of the government.
As the conflict progressed, Hizb-i Wahdat did not explicitly restate its desires of establishing an Islamic state or changing the Judicial system, although emphasis on executive reform entailing executive power-sharing and political representation for Shiite groups, their members, and their constituents. Issues of cultural and religious rights were also not restated directly. The group also stated several new issues over the duration of the conflict, calling for the ousting of the government and Hizb-i Wahdat spokesman Mohammed Karim Khalili continuously called for the government to step down throughout the latter stages of the conflict. Towards the end of Hizb-i Wahdat’s existence, they also stated its intentions to hold elections to establish an interim government and prepare for future elections to establish a new government in Afghanistan.
The main conflict goal issue for Hizb-i Wahdat was the increase in Shiite representation in the Afghani government. This issue was heavily emphasized during the first year of conflict and remained a central issue for the group throughout its existence, largely shaping its desire to oust the government and to establish executive power-sharing, which were other frequently stated goal issues.
Conflict Dynamics Issues: Whilst no conflict dynamics issues were interpreted during Hizb-i Wahdat’s first year of existence, the group stated several issues throughout the conflict. In 1990, the group called for the removal of foreign influence in the country, specifically stating its opposition to Russian control over the government caused by the recently ended Soviet-Afghan war. They also called for the holding of a referendum and asked for the implementation of a UN monitoring mission to oversee these referendums. As the conflict progressed further, calls for removal of international influence were not explicitly stated again, although calls for international monitoring of peace agreements, elections, and negotiations were continuously made. Hizb-i Wahdat also accused the Afghani government of military misconduct and of unlawful massacring of a peaceful delegation from the group. The group also called for a prisoner exchange on one occasion. In 1995, the final year where conflict issues were interpreted, the group stated its appreciation for Iranian third-party mediation.
Whilst statements pertaining to the issue of international monitoring was continuously released by Hizb-i Wahdat throughout the conflict, the statements were generally not heavily emphasized nor similar enough for this to be considered a coherent main conflict dynamics issue. Therefore, no main issue pertaining to conflict dynamics was interpreted for the group.
Conflict Resolution Issues: No conflict resolution issues were pronounced during 1989, but in 1990 they stated their opposition toward direct negotiation with the Afghani government whilst also calling for negotiations to be held with the Soviet Union “provided that Moscow stops ferrying aid to Kabul”. As the conflict progressed, the group would occasionally state its opposition to negotiations or make conditions, such as Afghani President Burhanuddin Rabbani stepping down, for negotiations to be held. The group did, however, call for a ceasefire on several occasions, and in 1995 Hizb-i Wahdat called for negotiations to be held, following which a significant drop in conflict casualties occurred.
The main conflict resolution issue for Hizb-i Wahdat was the group’s position to negotiations as, whilst changing over the course of the conflict, the group continuously and frequently emphasized different aspects of negotiations throughout the conflict.
Type of conflict issues: The coded conflict issues for this group are: Conflict Goal Issues: Change judicial system, Civil rights, CPS: Islamic state, Cultural rights, Executive power-sharing, Hold elections, Law and order, Opposition to elections, Oust full executive, Oust head of the executive, Public services, Reform executive structure, Religious rights
Conflict Dynamics Issues: Atrocities and abuses, DFI: Removal of foreign influence, IFI: Foreign mediator, IFI: International monitoring, Military conduct, Release of prisoners
Conflict Resolution Issues:
Call for ceasefire, Call for negotiations, Opposition to negotiations, Structure of negotiations
Government of Afghanistan - Military faction (forces of Shahnawaz Tanay)
Conflict Goal Issues: The forces of Shanawaz Tanay were members of the Kalq faction of the PDPA. Tanay, a Pashtun, attempted to overthrow the regime of Najibullah. Due to the short-lived nature of this group, both the first and last issues were coded in 1990 when Tanay stated, “the struggle against the regime is continuing”. The project could not find statements beside demands for ousting (the head of) the executive.
Conflict Dynamics Issues: The project has not been able to find any statements from this group concerning conflict dynamics issues
Conflict Resolution Issues: The project has not been able to find any statements from this group concerning conflict dynamics issues
Type of conflict issues: Conflict Goal Issues:
Oust full executive, Oust head of executive
Conflict Dynamics Issues: None
Conflict Resolution Issues: None
Government of Afghanistan - Junbish-i Milli-yi Islami
Conflict Goal Issues: Junbish-i Milli-yi Islami, also known as the National Islamic Movement of Afghanistan, was a mainly Uzbek, but also partially Isma’ili and Turkoman, rebel group fighting against the government of Afghanistan. The group was also characterized by Islamic faith but was explicitly non-Islamist: “We wish to see an Islamic government but not a fundamentalist one”, “This is a nationalist movement based on the rights of all sections of society”. Junbish-i Milli-yi Islami was established in 1992, following Afghan militia groups overthrowing the Northern government of Afghanistan and creating the group. During its first year of existence, the group stated several conflict goal issues. The group called for Afghanistan to incorporate a federal structure, calling for it to incorporate a structure similar too Pakistan “with a central government, provincial governments and provincial assemblies”. This would also include economic reform to grant more economic freedom to provinces and would include increased civil rights for marginalized communities. The group also called for interim executive power-sharing, stating its demand that its leader General Abdul Rashid Dostum be granted a seat on the Leadership Council. The group also stated its intentions of establishing an Islamic government.
As the conflict progressed, the establishment of federalism, interim executive power-sharing, and an Islamic state was not reemphasized, although executive decentralization was stated occasionally. Instead, statements shifted to emphasize long-term executive-power sharing and for the ousting of Afghan President Burhanuddin Rabbani. The group also called for a general election to be held and particularly emphasized the rights and representation of marginalized groups in Afghanistan. The issue of civil rights was continuously stated throughout the conflict.
The main conflict goal issues of Junbish-i Milli-yi Islami were the issues of executive power-sharing and civil rights of the marginalized Afghan people. These issues encompassed the group’s intentions of granting themselves increased power over the executive government of Afghanistan whilst also protecting the rights of the citizens of Afghanistan, as both issues were frequently stated throughout the conflict with heavy emphasis.
Conflict Dynamics Issues: During 1992, Junbish-i Milli-yi Islami were interpreted as calling for the removal of international monitoring as its only stated conflict dynamics issue. This occurred when the group called for former President Mohammad Najibullah to be put on trial and complained about U.N. forces sheltering him.
As the conflict progressed, two more issues were interpreted as the group stated its willingness to cooperate with a U.N. international monitoring mission in 1994 and called for the withdrawal of Indian and Ukrainian military support to the Afghan government in 1996. As no issues were stated with continuity, no main conflict dynamics issues were attributed for the group.
Conflict Resolution Issues: In the year of Junbish-i Milli-yi Islami’s emergence, the group stated two conflict resolution issues, calling for negotiations with the Afghan government “to save the capital from a bloodbath.”, and for accountability for former Afghan President Mohammad Najibullah.
Throughout the conflict, no further explicit calls for accountability were made, although the group continuously called for negotiations with the government. Junbish-i Milli-yi Islami also stated its intentions to facilitate national dialogue with sectors of the Afghan society, mainly Jihadi and political groups. The group also called for a ceasefire to be implemented on one occasion.
The main conflict resolution issue of Junbish-i Milli-yi Islami was the initiation and continuation of negotiations with the Afghan government to resolve the conflict. This issue was stated throughout the entire conflict and was frequently heavily emphasized.
Type of conflict issues: Conflict Goal Issues: Basic needs, Bureaucratic setup, Civil rights, Constitutional issues, CPS: Islamic state, CPS: Other/undefined system, Decentralization, Economic reforms, Executive power-sharing, Executive power-sharing: interim, Federalism, Geographical status quo, Hold elections, Oust head of the executive, Recognition as a political party, Restructure military forces
Conflict Dynamics Issues: DFI: Withdrawal of international monitoring, DFI: Withdrawal of military support, IFI: International monitoring
Conflict Resolution Issues:
Accountability/prosecution/investigation, Call for ceasefire, Call for negotiations, National dialogue, Opposition to negotiations
Government of Afghanistan - Taleban
Conflict Goal Issues: The Taleban is a Sunni-Muslim Islamist group that emerged in 1994 with the aim to overthrow the government of Afghanistan and establish Sharia law in the country. Their first stated goal of incompatibility was to ensure security on a highway passing through the region of Kandahar, but their aims quickly grew with the release of a leaflet declaring their intentions and beliefs to citizens of villages after consolidating power in the southern regions of Afghanistan. The project coded the content of these leaflets, combined with other communication in 1994, to pertain to several conflict goal issues. Their most emphasized goal issue was to change the political and judicial system to become an Islamic state with Sharia law as a basis for the judicial system: “The law of the state is based on the Sharia law and the teachings of the early Khalivs.” This also entailed an emphasis on establishing law and order from religious police in the country, which would restructure both the military and the police to act in accordance with Sharia law. Furthermore, the Taliban proposed changes to the school system, whereby children would be taught in local languages rather than in Arabic and called for the government to respect the cultural and religious rights of Muslims. They also proposed significant changes to the executive structure, whereby all political parties would be granted increased power, themselves included, and security and intelligence apparatuses of the government would become more powerful than other institutions. Finally, the Taliban stated its intentions to impose restrictions on the people’s rights pertaining to gender, culture, freedom of expression, religion, and civil rights. Women would be forced to cover their heads, people would be forced to “pay respect to the Afghani diverse society – as Quran say “Muslims are brothers””, people would be prohibited from engaging in “bad and immoral acts”, such as “drugs, alcohol, and displaying and distributing graphics that provoke sexual instinct”, people would be forced to adhere to Muslim (Islamist) customs, and more.
As the conflict progressed, certain goal issues of the Taleban would receive continued emphasis, whereas others would cease to be stated. Only restrictions on freedom of speech and of religious- and gender rights were continuously stated, whereas cultural- and civil rights were not mentioned further. The ideas of executive power-sharing, the initial plan to increase the Taleban’s political influence, were dropped. However, all goal issues related to the creation of an Islamic state and the establishment of Sharia law remained emphasized and were continuously mentioned throughout the duration of the conflict. As the conflict continued, the Taleban began emphasizing the basic needs of the people, releasing statements that they would lift the people out of poverty, and grant them civil rights, as well as protect the rights of children, in line with Sharia law. Throughout the conflict they also began calling for a removal of the Afghani government, and opposing the electoral process, alleging that both were illegitimate, particularly as they insisted the government had been corrupted with Western ideals and become a Western puppet. The Taliban also expressed resistance to socialism and democracy which they perceived to shape government policy.
The main conflict goal issues of the Taleban were the intention of establishing an Islamic state, which entailed a change of the political system, governance structure, and sitting government, as well as the implementation of Sharia law, for which the judicial system, structures, and cultural laws would be altered. These issues were the most frequently and continuously stated, as well as heavily emphasized for almost every year they were coded. Another potential main issue for the Taleban is the restriction of people’s rights, particularly gender and religion but also culture. These were not as frequently stated, although it could be the result of the Taleban formulating many of their statements which were interpreted as restricting rights of some people, to instead enable the cultural rights of Muslims or Taleban supporters.
Conflict Dynamics Issues: The Taleban pronounced no issues pertaining to conflict dynamics during the year of its emergence. In 1995 and 1996 the Taleban accused the sitting government of conducting atrocities against civilians in Afghanistan: “These people had committed atrocities against the Afghan nation and therefore it was important to bring them to justice and punish them in front of the Afghan nation so that justice was seen being done […]”. The Taleban also stated that these were motivated on a religious basis, implying collective targeting of Muslims for their faith. Furthermore, the Taleban called for the removal of foreign influence, specifically of Russian and other foreign countries.
From 2003 and onwards, similar mentions of atrocities and abuses were stated, and continued emphasis was placed on the removal of foreign influence. Accusations of collective targeting based on religion were also raised occasionally. Significant emphasis was also placed on the removal of foreign troops, specifically the American military following the invasion of Afghanistan. The same timeframe also saw a continued mentioning of removing foreign influence, particularly Russian and American. The Taleban also began calling for the assistance of the international community, asking for the establishment of international criminal investigation into the conduct of US, British, UN, and Afghan military forces. Calls for political support and recognition from the international community were also made, continuously calling for public resistance against the acts of American soldiers and the illegal US invasion. “The Islamic Emirate of Afghanistan expresses its utter disbelief and regret over the UNAMA report and over the fact that the UN with all the neutrally slogans, plays a major role as a propaganda organization for the American imperialism and keeps covering up the blatant crimes of the Pentagon which is similar to betrayal by UN against the bloodshed and the massacre of the Afghan nation.”
In terms of continuity, the allegations of atrocities, calls for withdrawal of foreign forces, and calls for removing foreign influence were all frequently occurring. These were also heavily emphasized for many years of the Taleban’s existence and are to be considered the group’s main issues. In particular, calls for US military withdrawal based on atrocities committed by the American military were the most frequently coded conflict dynamics issue.
Conflict Resolution Issues: Whilst no statements regarding conflict resolution from the Taleban in 1994, two issues were stated in 1995, when the group called for negotiations to be held with the Afghan government: “The Islamic movement of the Taliban on the other hand has always remained positive about peace talks and has welcomed all efforts in this regard.” They also called for investigation into, and prosecution of atrocities committed by the Afghans.
From 2003 and onwards, Taleban frequently expressed its resistance to negotiations, although calls for negotiations also occurred at times, specifically towards the later stages of the coded conflict. This opposition to negotiations was often based in statements saying that no talks or negotiations would be held until US forces had withdrawn from Afghanistan. Calls for prosecution and accountability of perpetrators of abuses were also made at several points of the conflict.
The main conflict resolution issues of the Taleban were the general issue of negotiations and the calls for accountability of the US and Afghan military for abuses. The topic of negotiations was frequently stated and continuously heavily emphasized in statements, both in terms of the Taleban calling for participation in negotiations or refusing talks until US forces left the country. Calls for accountability remained frequent throughout the conflict and was an emphasized point when discussing the withdrawal of foreign military forces, which makes it a main issue.
Type of conflict issues: Conflict Goal Issues: Basic needs, Blasphemy, Bureaucratic setup, Revenues from natural resources, Change judicial system, Childrens rights, Civil rights, Constitutional issues, Corruption, CPS: Islamic state, CPS: Opposition to democracy, CPS: Opposition to socialist state, Cultural rights, Destruction of cultural heritage, Disband para-military forces, Economic reforms, Education system: increase religion, Electoral fraud, Executive power-sharing, Foreign policy reform, Freedom of expression, Gender rights, Geographical status quo, Human rights, Labor rights, Land reforms, Language rights, Law and order, Opposition to elections, Oust full executive, Protection of cultural heritage, Protection of natural resources/the environment, Public services, Referendum, Reform executive structure, Reform judicial system, Religious rights, Restriction of gender rights, Restrictions on civil rights, Restrictions on cultural rights, Restrictions on freedom of expression, Restrictions on religious rights, Restructure military forces, Restructure police forces
Conflict Dynamics Issues: Atrocities and abuses, Collective targeting: religious, DFI: Removal of foreign influence, DFI: Withdrawal of financial support, DFI: Withdrawal of humanitarian aid, DFI: Withdrawal of military intervention/foreign forces, DFI: Withdrawal of sanctions, IFI: Financial support, IFI: Humanitarian aid, IFI: International court/tribunal/investigation, IFI: Political support, IFI: Recognition, IFI: Use of foreign influence, Military conduct, Release of prisoners, Revenge/vengeance
Conflict Resolution Issues:
Accountability/prosecution/investigation, Structure of negotiations, Call for negotiations, Opposition to negotiations
Government of Afghanistan - UIFSA
Conflict Goal Issues: United Islamic Front for the Salvation of Afghanistan, originally called Supreme Council for the Defence of Afghanistan (SCDA), (UIFSA) was an Islamist rebel group fighting against the government of Afghanistan to remove the Taleban government that had recently seized power. The group was established in 1996 through the merger of approximately 13 rebel groups opposed to Taleban control of the government and operated mostly in North-Western Afghanistan. As UIFSA emerged as a coalition consisting of several different rebel groups, the only main characteristic attributed to the group was its shared ideals of unifying and all-inclusive Islamism including both Shi’ite and Sunni Muslims, as opposed to the Sunni Muslim characteristic of the Taleban. During the year of its emergence, UIFSA stated four conflict goal issues, calling for the ousting of the Taleban government followed by the establishment of interim executive power-sharing through the facilitating of an extensive national forum inviting all facets of Afghanistan society. UIFSA also stated its intentions to protect the cultural and religious rights of Shia Muslims which were under threat following the Taleban’s seizing of power.
As the conflict progressed, UIFSA continuously called for the ousting of the Taleban government, although the proposed interim power-sharing stated in 1996 was instead replaced with calls for the establishment of permanent executive power-sharing. Cultural rights were reemphasized on two occasions, although not explicitly pertaining to Shia Muslims but rather to all Afghani civilians. Protection of religious rights was also restated on one occasion, calling for the protection of religious minorities from massacres from the government. UIFSA also raised several new conflict goal issues throughout the conflict, occasionally calling for the establishment of an Islamic state, executive-, parliamentary-, and judicial reform, security sector power-sharing and restructuring of the military forces, and protection of civil-, human-, and gender rights of the Afghan people. UIFSA also called for the establishment of law and order in Afghanistan continuously throughout the conflict, emphasizing regional security and terrorism which plagued the country.
The main conflict goal issues of UIFSA were the ousting of the Taleban government, the establishment of executive power-sharing, and the protection of the Afghan people through establishing law and order. These issues were continuously stated and heavily emphasized throughout the conflict, indicating their centrality to the group.
Conflict Dynamics Issues: UIFSA stated two conflict dynamics issues during 1996, calling for the removal of foreign influence over the Afghan government and calling for the demilitarization of Kabul as a precondition for signing a ceasefire agreement with the government, indicating calls regarding military conduct.
As the conflict progressed, calls for removal of foreign influence over the Taleban government, although which specific countries or actors that were influencing Afghanistan was never explicitly stated, were continuously interpreted from UIFSA. Issues of military conduct were stated in 1997 as well, but not reemphasized after that. On two instances in the first half of the conflict UIFSA called for prisoners of war to be released, although such statements were not coded after 1998. On two instances, UIFSA accused the Taleban government of conducting attacks on civilians through massacres and terrorism. Towards the end of the conflict, UIFSA began significantly increasing statements toward the international community calling for the withdrawal of financial and military support from the government and for the withdrawal of foreign military forces in 2001. The group also began calling for international assistance through political support, humanitarian aid, and sanctions against the government. Furthermore, UIFSA continuously called for assistance through a foreign third-party mediator and international pressure on the Afghan government to engage in negotiations to resolve the conflict toward the latter half of the conflict.
The main conflict resolution issues of UIFSA were the calls for removal of foreign influence, calls for the assistance of a foreign mediator and calls for foreign influence to assist in resolving the conflict. These issues were heavily emphasized, particularly toward the end of the conflict, and related to the other main conflict issues of UIFSA.
Conflict Resolution Issues: In 1996, UIFSA stated two conflict resolution issues, calling for negotiations with the government and for “all groups and individuals who have some influence on the issue of Afghanistan” to “meet and discuss the issues.”, calling for the facilitation of national dialogue.
Whilst calls for national dialogue were not explicitly restated following 1996, calls for negotiations were interpreted in every active conflict year of UIFSA. The group also began continuously calling for ceasefires to be implemented for most active years of the conflict, indicating intentions to resolve the conflict through mediation and negotiations. On singular occasions UIFSA did state its opposition to negotiations with the government, motivated by recent aggression by the Taleban and perceived futility of negotiations. The group also called for international presence and oversight of negotiations on two occasions toward the end of the conflict.
The main conflict resolution issues stated by UIFSA were the calls for ceasefires and calls for negotiations. Both issues were stated continuously and frequently throughout the entire conflict and indicated the group’s intentions to resolve the conflict peacefully.
Type of conflict issues: Conflict Goal Issues: Basic needs, Civil rights, CPS: Islamic state, Cultural rights, Economic reforms, Executive power-sharing, Executive power-sharing: interim, Foreign policy reform, Gender rights, Human rights, Law and order, Opposition to share power in the executive, Oust full executive, Protection of natural resources/the environment, Referendum, Reform executive structure, Reform judicial system, Reform parliament, Religious rights, Restructure military forces, Security sector power-sharing
Conflict Dynamics Issues: Atrocities and abuses, DFI: Removal of foreign influence, DFI: Withdrawal of financial support, DFI: Withdrawal of military intervention/foreign forces, DFI: Withdrawal of military support, IFI: Foreign mediator, IFI: Humanitarian aid, IFI: Political support, IFI: Sanctions, IFI: Use of foreign influence, Military conduct, Release of prisoners
Conflict Resolution Issues:
Call for ceasefire, Call for negotiations, National dialogue, Opposition to negotiations, Structure of negotiations
Government of Afghanistan - IS
Conflict Goal Issues: Islamic State, al-Dawla al-Islamiya, (IS) was a Salafist-Sunni Islamist global rebel group that emerged in Iraq and Syria in 2004. The group originally emerged with the goals of toppling the Iraqi regime and replacing the government with an Islamic state with Sharia law as well as ousting the occupying forces currently residing in the country, but its goals drastically shifted as it grew in size to wish to establish a global Islamic caliphate governed by Sharia law. Whilst the group was international for the majority of its existence, IS is considered a rebel group involved in several dyads as the group fought against, and attempted to overthrow, several individual governments as part of its international aims, and has been coded as such. However, many IS statements were not pertaining to specific countries, and the project has, hence, chosen to code them as pertaining to all countries with significant IS presence. Finally, whilst various groups have claimed allyship and adherence to IS, only statements from official IS groups have been coded by the project as legitimate sources for interpreting conflict issues. The Afghanistan-IS dyad became active in 2015, following its declaration of intent to establish a global caliphate, and the group pronounced several conflict goal issues during its first active year. During this year, they stated its intent in reclaiming ‘the land of Khorasan’ (an area encompassing parts of Iran, Turkmenistan, Uzbekistan, Tajikistan, Pakistan, and Afghanistan) calling for the establishment of jihad and the Shariah. Apart from changing the political and judicial system in Afghanistan, and Khorasan as a whole, the group also called for the restriction of non-Muslim religious rights: "Know that the Islamic Caliphate is not limited to a particular country. These young men will fight against every disbeliever, whether in the west, east, south, or north."
As the conflict progressed, IS would continuously emphasize its intent to establish an Islamic State in Afghanistan and Khorasan and frequently mentioned its discontent with ‘apostates’ (Muslims who do not adhere to Islamic faith) calling for the religious rights of non-Muslims to be restricted. In 2017, the last coded year of conflict, the group also called for Muslim religious rights to be respected and for the ousting of, among others, the Afghan government. Apart from its first year of existence, IS were not interpreted as reemphasizing its intent to establish Sharia law, although this does not imply intentions to not do so, as Sharia law was continuously emphasized as a vital part of the establishment of an Islamic State by IS in other countries.
Throughout the coded conflict, IS continuously noted its intentions to establish an Islamic State in Afghanistan and Khorasan and called for the restriction of religious rights of non-believers and apostates. These are to be considered the main conflict goal issues of the group, as they were also continuously stated with heavy emphasis.
Conflict Dynamics Issues: During the first year of conflict, IS released one statement pertaining to conflict dynamics issues against the Afghan state. They called for the removal of foreign influence from Khorasan, particularly mentioning "the crusaders, the Jews and tyrants." This also indicates calls for collective targeting of Jewish people and of occupiers in Afghanistan.
These issues were stated once more each as the conflict progressed. The group also called for the collective targeting of people who supported the Afghan government. Finally, IS called for the withdrawal of foreign military intervention as it stated its plan to "clear the sacred land of Khorasan of apostate hirelings of CIA, ISI and KGB intelligence networks."
Whilst certain issues were pronounced continuously through the conflict, no main conflict dynamics issue was interpreted for IS in this particular dyad as no issue was particularly emphasized in communications.
Conflict Resolution Issues: The project coded no statements from IS in Afghanistan pertaining to conflict resolution issues.
Type of conflict issues: Conflict Goal Issues: Change judicial system, CPS: Islamic state, Oust full executive, Religious rights, Restrictions on religious rights
Conflict Dynamics Issues: Call for collective targeting: political, Call for collective targeting: religious, DFI: Removal of foreign influence, DFI: Withdrawal of military intervention/foreign forces
Conflict Resolution Issues:
Government of Pakistan - TTP
Conflict Goal Issues: The Taleban Movement of Pakistan (TTP) refers to the loosely united Taleban-supporting and related rebel groups, most notably Tehrik-i-Taliban Pakistan, fighting against the government of Pakistan to establish an Islamic State with Sharia law in Pakistan. TTP is characterized by its Muslim faith and Islamist ideology, sharing similar characteristics of the Taleban in Afghanistan. The group emerged in 2007, although TTP did not release any statements interpreted as pertaining to conflict goal issues during this year.
As the conflict progressed, TTP began releasing several statements, although many of these were only mentioned in singular instances and are, hence, not included in this narrative. Some frequently and continuously stated issues raised by TTP were their intentions to oust the government of Pakistan and replace it with an Islamic state structure governed by Sharia law as its political system. The group continuously accused the Pakistani government of corruption and accused it of failing to protect the religious rights of Pakistani Muslims. Furthermore, TTP pronounced its intentions to restrict the civil-, gender-, and religious rights of women and non-Muslims, as well as impose restrictions on freedom of expression, throughout the conflict.
The main conflict goal issues of TTP were the ousting of the Pakistani government, the establishment of an Islamic state and Sharia law. These issues were continuously stated throughout the conflict and were central to the group’s existence. Whilst religious rights and allegations of corruption were stated with similar continuity and frequency, these issues were far less emphasized than TTP’s main issues, which is why they are not attributed as main issues to the group.
Conflict Dynamics Issues: TTP stated two conflict dynamics issues during the year of its emergence, calling for the release of Imam Abdul Aziz who had been imprisoned by the government and demanding the abolishment of military operations and military checkpoints in regions of Pakistan.
As the conflict progressed, calls for release of political and military prisoners as well as demands on the conduct of the Pakistani military were continuously reemphasized. TTP also introduced several new conflict dynamics issues, accusing the Pakistani government of conducting atrocities and massacres against Pakistani civilian, which were often alleged to be motivated by collective targeting against Muslims based on their religious beliefs. TTP also frequently began calling for the removal of foreign influence on Pakistan, specifically from American influence and international investors, heavily emphasizing Pakistani independence from Western and non-Muslim influence.
The main conflict dynamics issues raised by TTP were the accusations of atrocities perpetrated against civilians by the Pakistani government, the removal of foreign influence, particularly U.S. influence, and the release of members of the group that had been detained by the government. These issues were heavily emphasized by TTP throughout the conflict and were often mentioned.
Conflict Resolution Issues: In 2007, TTP released one statement pertaining to conflict resolution issues, stating its opposition to negotiations with the Pakistani government. This position was changed in 2008, when TTP instead stated its support for negotiations with the government, although the group reverted to its original position and restated its opposition to negotiations in 2013. In 2009, TTP also called upon the Pakistani government to compensate members and associates of the group who had gotten their houses destroyed.
Whilst the issue of negotiations could be considered a main issue of TTP, as it was the only continuously stated conflict resolution issue interpreted, it was comparatively rarely raised in relation to the other main conflict issues, only being stated on three instances, which is why it is not considered a main issue of TTP.
Type of conflict issues: The coded conflict issues for this group are: Conflict Goal Issues: Basic needs, Blasphemy, Change judicial system, Corruption, CPS: Islamic state, CPS: Opposition to democracy, Economic reforms, Education system: increase religion, Foreign policy reform, Law and order, Opposition to elections, Oust full executive, Oust local executive, Protection of cultural heritage, Protection of natural resources/the environment, Public services, Religious rights, Restriction of gender rights, Restrictions on civil rights, Restrictions on freedom of expression, Restrictions on religious rights, Revenues from natural resources
Conflict Dynamics Issues: Atrocities and abuses, Call for collective targeting: other group, Call for collective targeting: political, Collective targeting: ethnic, Collective targeting: religious, DFI: Removal of foreign influence, DFI: Removal of foreigners, DFI: Withdrawal of military support, Military conduct, Release of prisoners, Return of refugees/IDPs
Conflict Resolution Issues:
Call for negotiations, Compensation/restoration, Opposition to negotiations
Government of United States of America - al-Qaida
Conflict Goal Issues: Al-Qaida was an Islamist anti-Western rebel group that emerged in 1988 but was first coded in 1998. The group aimed to expel Western ideals from the Islamic world and establish Sharia law. During its first year of conflict with the U.S., 1998, the group released statements pertaining to two conflict goal issues. Al-Qaida announced its intent to establish Sharia law on “the land of God” and protect cultural heritage by virtue of liberating them from Jews and Christians: “it is a religious obligation for every Muslim to support the Mujahidin fighting for freedom of sacred places”.
Throughout the extensive conflict, these issues were continuously and frequently emphasized by al-Qaida, but several new issues would also be raised, most coming from official statements from the group’s leader Usama Bin Ladin. Apart from the establishment of Sharia law and the protection of cultural heritage, the most frequently coded issues raised by al-Qaida were the creation of an Islamic State, foreign policy reform, which largely consisted of intentions of resisting Western values, calls for cessation of support to Israel, resistance to foreign influence, and resistance towards the U.S., the protection of religious rights of Muslims, restrictions of religious rights of non-Muslims, and revenues from natural resources, which mainly pertained to exploitation of natural resources in Arab nations by Western countries.
Whilst many conflict goal issues were continuously raised by al-Qaida, the most frequently and, especially, most heavily emphasized issues were the establishment of Sharia law, the creation of an Islamic state, and resisting foreign influence through protecting cultural heritage and natural resources as well as through foreign policy reform characterized by anti-Western ideas: “I say to the Islamic nation: we lost the Caliphate and it was dismantled. It fell under Crusader occupation approximately a century ago, and since that time the Crusaders have stood between us and the reconstitution of the Caliphate, or even the establishment of any Islamic nation.” Whilst religious rights were a commonly raised topic, the focus of statements regarding it was generally anti-occupation and anti-imperialism, rather than religious rights being the main focus.
Conflict Dynamics Issues: During the first year of existence, al-Qaida released several statements pertaining to the dynamics of the conflict. These were calls towards the Muslim community to continue its struggle despite being victims of collective targeting and to financially support al-Qaida with financial support. Furthermore, the group stated that the “occupation of non-Muslims” would cease and called upon the U.S. to withdraw its military forces from the Arab peninsula.
As the conflict progressed allegations of collective targeting became more specific in that targeting of civilians was based on their religion. Calls for removal of foreigners would also cease, although calls for removal of foreign influence and, especially military forces would become increasingly frequent and heavily emphasized throughout the entire conflict. Calls for financial support from the international community would also become sparse throughout the conflict and would instead shift towards calls for international funding from diaspora communities which came in tandem with calls towards international Muslims to join the fighting for al-Qaida’s cause. Accusations of U.S. soldiers committing human rights violations, atrocities, and massacres also became a continuously coded issue for al-Qaida, as did calls for collective targeting “against the infidels, the Americans and the Jews”. al-Qaida also repeatedly called for the international community to withdraw political and military support from the U.S., although this was most prevalent in the earlier stages of the coded conflict. Calls for vengeance were also frequently coded in the middle stages of the conflict.
The most frequently coded issues raised by the al-Qaida were allegations of atrocities by U.S. forces, calls for targeting infidels, allegations of U.S. collective targeting against Muslims, calls for removal of foreign influence, calls for withdrawal of military forces, and calls to the Muslim diaspora to assist the al-Qaida with funds and fighters. All of these were also continuously stated throughout the entire duration of the conflict, and received heavy emphasis most times it was coded. Therefore, the project coded all these issues as main conflict dynamics issues of al-Qaida.
Conflict Resolution Issues: Whilst no conflict resolution issues were stated by al-Qaida in its first year of existence, the group stated several issues as the conflict progressed. Throughout the conflict, al-Qaida would occasionally release statements, particularly during the middle part of the coded conflict as no statements were coded prior to 2004 or following 2010. The most frequently coded issue was al-Qaida’s opposition to negotiations, continuously stating that no negotiations would be held with the occupiers. They also called for the U.S. to be held accountable and to admit to wrongdoing. In one instance, al-Qaida also called for a ceasefire.
The main conflict resolution issue was coded as al-Qaida’s opposition to negotiations. For the few years resolution issues were coded, opposition to negotiations were frequently stated, and it was the most emphasized resolution issue pronounced by al-Qaida.
Type of conflict issues: Conflict Goal Issues: Basic needs, Blasphemy, Change economic system, Change judicial system, Civil rights, Climate change, Constitutional issues, Corruption, CPS: Islamic state, CPS: Opposition to democracy, Cultural rights, Destruction of cultural heritage, Economic reforms, Education system: increase religion, Foreign policy reform, Freedom of expression, Gender rights, Human rights, Language rights, Law and order, Opposition to elections, Protection of cultural heritage, Protection of natural resources/the environment, Public services, Reform executive structure, Reform parliament, Religious rights, Restriction of gender rights, Restrictions on freedom of expression, Restrictions on religious rights, Restructure military forces, Revenues from natural resources, Rule of law, Unification of states
Conflict Dynamics Issues: Atrocities and abuses, Call for collective targeting: ethnic, Call for collective targeting: other group, Call for collective targeting: religious, Collective targeting: other group, Collective targeting: religious, DFI: Removal of foreign influence, DFI: Removal of foreigners, DFI: Withdrawal of financial support, DFI: Withdrawal of military intervention/foreign forces, DFI: Withdrawal of military support, DFI: Withdrawal of political support, DFI: Withdrawal of sanctions, IFI: Financial support, IFI: Military support, IFI: Political support, IFI: Support from diasporas/foreign fighters, IFI: Use of foreign influence, Military conduct, Release of prisoners, Revenge/vengeance
Conflict Resolution Issues: Accountability/prosecution/investigation, Call for ceasefire, Opposition to negotiations, Recognition of wrongdoing
Annual information
This section contains annual information systematically collected by the UCDP.
1978
Actor Active in Dyad(s):
Government of Afghanistan - PDPA
1979
Actor Active in Dyad(s):
Government of Afghanistan - Jam'iyyat-i Islami-yi Afghanistan
Government of Afghanistan - Government of Russia (Soviet Union)
1980
Actor Active in Dyad(s):
Government of Afghanistan - Jam'iyyat-i Islami-yi Afghanistan
Government of Afghanistan - Harakat-i Inqilab-i Islami-yi Afghanistan
Government of Afghanistan - Hizb-i Islami-yi Afghanistan
Government of Afghanistan - Hizb-i Islami-yi Afghanistan - Khalis faction
Government of Afghanistan - Jabha-yi Nijat-i Milli-yi Afghanistan
Government of Afghanistan - Mahaz-i Milli-yi Islami-yi Afghanistan
1981
Actor Active in Dyad(s):
Government of Afghanistan - Jam'iyyat-i Islami-yi Afghanistan
Government of Afghanistan - Harakat-i Inqilab-i Islami-yi Afghanistan
Government of Afghanistan - Hizb-i Islami-yi Afghanistan
Government of Afghanistan - Hizb-i Islami-yi Afghanistan - Khalis faction
Government of Afghanistan - Jabha-yi Nijat-i Milli-yi Afghanistan
Government of Afghanistan - Mahaz-i Milli-yi Islami-yi Afghanistan
Government of Afghanistan - Ittihad-i Islami Bara-yi Azadi-yi Afghanistan
1982
Actor Active in Dyad(s):
Government of Afghanistan - Jam'iyyat-i Islami-yi Afghanistan
Government of Afghanistan - Harakat-i Inqilab-i Islami-yi Afghanistan
Government of Afghanistan - Hizb-i Islami-yi Afghanistan
Government of Afghanistan - Hizb-i Islami-yi Afghanistan - Khalis faction
Government of Afghanistan - Jabha-yi Nijat-i Milli-yi Afghanistan
Government of Afghanistan - Mahaz-i Milli-yi Islami-yi Afghanistan
Government of Afghanistan - Ittihad-i Islami Bara-yi Azadi-yi Afghanistan
1983
Actor Active in Dyad(s):
Government of Afghanistan - Jam'iyyat-i Islami-yi Afghanistan
Government of Afghanistan - Harakat-i Inqilab-i Islami-yi Afghanistan
Government of Afghanistan - Hizb-i Islami-yi Afghanistan
Government of Afghanistan - Hizb-i Islami-yi Afghanistan - Khalis faction
Government of Afghanistan - Jabha-yi Nijat-i Milli-yi Afghanistan
Government of Afghanistan - Mahaz-i Milli-yi Islami-yi Afghanistan
Government of Afghanistan - Ittihad-i Islami Bara-yi Azadi-yi Afghanistan
1984
Actor Active in Dyad(s):
Government of Afghanistan - Jam'iyyat-i Islami-yi Afghanistan
Government of Afghanistan - Harakat-i Inqilab-i Islami-yi Afghanistan
Government of Afghanistan - Hizb-i Islami-yi Afghanistan
Government of Afghanistan - Hizb-i Islami-yi Afghanistan - Khalis faction
Government of Afghanistan - Jabha-yi Nijat-i Milli-yi Afghanistan
Government of Afghanistan - Mahaz-i Milli-yi Islami-yi Afghanistan
Government of Afghanistan - Ittihad-i Islami Bara-yi Azadi-yi Afghanistan
Government of Afghanistan - Harakat-i Islami-yi Afghanistan
1985
Actor Active in Dyad(s):
Government of Afghanistan - Jam'iyyat-i Islami-yi Afghanistan
Government of Afghanistan - Harakat-i Inqilab-i Islami-yi Afghanistan
Government of Afghanistan - Hizb-i Islami-yi Afghanistan
Government of Afghanistan - Hizb-i Islami-yi Afghanistan - Khalis faction
Government of Afghanistan - Jabha-yi Nijat-i Milli-yi Afghanistan
Government of Afghanistan - Mahaz-i Milli-yi Islami-yi Afghanistan
Government of Afghanistan - Ittihad-i Islami Bara-yi Azadi-yi Afghanistan
1986
Actor Active in Dyad(s):
Government of Afghanistan - Jam'iyyat-i Islami-yi Afghanistan
Government of Afghanistan - Harakat-i Inqilab-i Islami-yi Afghanistan
Government of Afghanistan - Hizb-i Islami-yi Afghanistan
Government of Afghanistan - Hizb-i Islami-yi Afghanistan - Khalis faction
Government of Afghanistan - Jabha-yi Nijat-i Milli-yi Afghanistan
Government of Afghanistan - Mahaz-i Milli-yi Islami-yi Afghanistan
Government of Afghanistan - Ittihad-i Islami Bara-yi Azadi-yi Afghanistan
1987
Actor Active in Dyad(s):
Government of Afghanistan - Jam'iyyat-i Islami-yi Afghanistan
Government of Afghanistan - Harakat-i Inqilab-i Islami-yi Afghanistan
Government of Afghanistan - Hizb-i Islami-yi Afghanistan
Government of Afghanistan - Hizb-i Islami-yi Afghanistan - Khalis faction
Government of Afghanistan - Jabha-yi Nijat-i Milli-yi Afghanistan
Government of Afghanistan - Mahaz-i Milli-yi Islami-yi Afghanistan
Government of Afghanistan - Ittihad-i Islami Bara-yi Azadi-yi Afghanistan
1988
Actor Active in Dyad(s):
Government of Afghanistan - Jam'iyyat-i Islami-yi Afghanistan
Government of Afghanistan - Harakat-i Inqilab-i Islami-yi Afghanistan
Government of Afghanistan - Hizb-i Islami-yi Afghanistan
Government of Afghanistan - Hizb-i Islami-yi Afghanistan - Khalis faction
Government of Afghanistan - Jabha-yi Nijat-i Milli-yi Afghanistan
Government of Afghanistan - Mahaz-i Milli-yi Islami-yi Afghanistan
Government of Afghanistan - Ittihad-i Islami Bara-yi Azadi-yi Afghanistan
1989
Actor Active in Dyad(s):
Government of Afghanistan - Jam'iyyat-i Islami-yi Afghanistan
Government of Afghanistan - Hizb-i Islami-yi Afghanistan
Government of Afghanistan - Hizb-i Islami-yi Afghanistan - Khalis faction
Government of Afghanistan - Mahaz-i Milli-yi Islami-yi Afghanistan
Government of Afghanistan - Hizb-i Wahdat
1990
Actor Active in Dyad(s):
Government of Afghanistan - Jam'iyyat-i Islami-yi Afghanistan
Government of Afghanistan - Hizb-i Islami-yi Afghanistan
Government of Afghanistan - Hizb-i Islami-yi Afghanistan - Khalis faction
Government of Afghanistan - Hizb-i Wahdat
Government of Afghanistan - Military faction (forces of Shahnawaz Tanay)
1991
Actor Active in Dyad(s):
Government of Afghanistan - Jam'iyyat-i Islami-yi Afghanistan
Government of Afghanistan - Hizb-i Islami-yi Afghanistan
Government of Afghanistan - Hizb-i Islami-yi Afghanistan - Khalis faction
Government of Afghanistan - Hizb-i Wahdat
1992
Actor Active in Dyad(s):
Government of Afghanistan - Jam'iyyat-i Islami-yi Afghanistan
Government of Afghanistan - Hizb-i Islami-yi Afghanistan
Government of Afghanistan - Hizb-i Wahdat
1993
Actor Active in Dyad(s):
Government of Afghanistan - Hizb-i Islami-yi Afghanistan
Government of Afghanistan - Hizb-i Wahdat
Government of Afghanistan - Junbish-i Milli-yi Islami
Government of Afghanistan - Civilians
1994
Actor Active in Dyad(s):
Government of Afghanistan - Hizb-i Islami-yi Afghanistan
Government of Afghanistan - Hizb-i Wahdat
Government of Afghanistan - Junbish-i Milli-yi Islami
1995
Actor Active in Dyad(s):
Government of Afghanistan - Hizb-i Islami-yi Afghanistan
Government of Afghanistan - Hizb-i Wahdat
Government of Afghanistan - Junbish-i Milli-yi Islami
Government of Afghanistan - Taleban
1996
Actor Active in Dyad(s):
Government of Afghanistan - Jam'iyyat-i Islami-yi Afghanistan
Government of Afghanistan - Taleban
Government of Afghanistan - UIFSA
1997
Actor Active in Dyad(s):
Government of Afghanistan - UIFSA
Government of Afghanistan - Civilians
1998
Actor Active in Dyad(s):
Government of Afghanistan - UIFSA
Government of Afghanistan - Civilians
1999
Actor Active in Dyad(s):
Government of Afghanistan - UIFSA
Government of Afghanistan - Civilians
2000
Actor Active in Dyad(s):
Government of Afghanistan - UIFSA
Government of Afghanistan - Civilians
2001
Actor Active in Dyad(s):
Government of Afghanistan - UIFSA
Government of Afghanistan - Civilians
Government of Afghanistan - Government of United Kingdom, Government of United States of America
2002
Actor Active in Dyad(s):
Government of Afghanistan - Hizb-i Islami-yi Afghanistan
2003
Actor Active in Dyad(s):
Government of Afghanistan - Hizb-i Islami-yi Afghanistan
Government of Afghanistan - Taleban
2004
Actor Active in Dyad(s):
Government of Afghanistan - Taleban
2005
Actor Active in Dyad(s):
Government of Afghanistan - Taleban
2006
Actor Active in Dyad(s):
Government of Afghanistan - Hizb-i Islami-yi Afghanistan
Government of Afghanistan - Taleban
2007
Actor Active in Dyad(s):
Government of Afghanistan - Taleban
2008
Actor Active in Dyad(s):
Government of Afghanistan - Hizb-i Islami-yi Afghanistan
Government of Afghanistan - Taleban
2009
Actor Active in Dyad(s):
Government of Afghanistan - Hizb-i Islami-yi Afghanistan
Government of Afghanistan - Taleban
2010
Actor Active in Dyad(s):
Government of Afghanistan - Hizb-i Islami-yi Afghanistan
Government of Afghanistan - Taleban
2011
Actor Active in Dyad(s):
Government of Afghanistan - Hizb-i Islami-yi Afghanistan
Government of Afghanistan - Taleban
2012
Actor Active in Dyad(s):
Government of Afghanistan - Taleban
2013
Actor Active in Dyad(s):
Government of Afghanistan - Hizb-i Islami-yi Afghanistan
Government of Afghanistan - Taleban
2014
Actor Active in Dyad(s):
Government of Afghanistan - Taleban
2015
Actor Active in Dyad(s):
Government of Afghanistan - Taleban
Government of Afghanistan - IS
2016
Actor Active in Dyad(s):
Government of Afghanistan - Taleban
Government of Afghanistan - IS
2017
Actor Active in Dyad(s):
Government of Afghanistan - Taleban
Government of Afghanistan - IS
2018
Actor Active in Dyad(s):
Government of Afghanistan - Taleban
Government of Afghanistan - IS
2019
Actor Active in Dyad(s):
Government of Afghanistan - Taleban
Government of Afghanistan - Civilians
Government of Afghanistan - IS
2020
Actor Active in Dyad(s):
Government of Afghanistan - Taleban
Government of Afghanistan - IS
Government of Afghanistan - High Council of Afghanistan Islamic Emirate
2021
Actor Active in Dyad(s):
Government of Afghanistan - Taleban
Government of Afghanistan - Civilians
Government of Afghanistan - IS
Government of Afghanistan - NRF
2022
Actor Active in Dyad(s):
Government of Afghanistan - Civilians
Government of Afghanistan - IS
Government of Afghanistan - NRF
Government of Afghanistan - AFF
2023
Actor Active in Dyad(s):
Government of Afghanistan - Civilians
Government of Afghanistan - IS
Government of Afghanistan - NRF
Government of Afghanistan - AFF
2024
Actor Active in Dyad(s):
Government of Afghanistan - Civilians
Government of Afghanistan - Government of Pakistan
Government of Afghanistan - IS
Government of Afghanistan - NRF
2025
Actor Active in Dyad(s):
Government of Afghanistan - Civilians
Government of Afghanistan - Government of Pakistan
Government of Afghanistan - IS
Government of Afghanistan - NRF
Group Archive
This section contains annual information no longer systematically collected by the UCDP.
1978 Group Archive
Government of Afghanistan - PDPA
Comment on Active: President Mohammed Daud Khan was overthrown in a coup on 27 April. Nur Muhammad Taraki from the PDPA (Hizb-i Demokrati-i Khalq-i Afghanistan, People’s Democratic Party of Afghanistan) was installed as the country’s new Prime Minister and the Democratic Republic of Afghanistan was proclaimed.
Troop Size: 1800
Comment on Troop Size: It is unclear how many of the Afghan troops that were loyal to the Daud government. The Presidential Palace was, during the time of the coup, defended by the 1800 strong Republican Guard Brigade.
Secondary Support: Since 1965 the Soviet Union had been giving major military assistance to Afghanistan in form of weapons, vehicles and training. The air force was entirely equipped with planes from the Soviet Union and the pilots had received military training there. At the time of the coup there were 350 Soviet military advisers in Afghanistan. After the Saur revolution in 1978, the military cooperation between the countries expanded and in December they signed the Soviet-Afghan Treaty of Friendship, resulting in an even closer relationship.
1979 Group Archive
Government of Afghanistan - Jam'iyyat-i Islami-yi Afghanistan
Comment on Active: The Revolutionary Council of Afghanistan decided on 27 March to appoint Hafizullah Amin as Prime Minister. Nur Mohammad Taraki had, since the Saur revolution in 1978, held both the Presidential and the Prime Minister posts. After 27 March 1979, Taraki was the President of Afghanistan while Amin was the Prime Minister. In late March, the government also set up a Supreme Council for the Defence of the Country in order to "foil the conspiracies of internal and external enemies, to eliminate traitors and to protect the glorious April revolution".
Growing tensions between Taraki and Amin in the fall of 1979 caused Taraki to seek Soviet support for a disposal of Amin. A meeting at the Presidential Palace in September turned in to a shoot-out and it was later announced that Taraki was stepping down due to health issues. Amin, who was a more hard-line communist than Taraki, became the new President.
Amin was never popular in among the Soviet leaders in Moscow; ha had been educated at US universities and the Soviet Union suspected him of being secretly pro-Western. Already in late September, increased activity was registered among Soviet units north of the Afghan-Soviet border, and in late December Soviet forces finally intervened in Afghanistan, overthrew Amin on 27 December and installed Babrak Karmal as the new leader. On 28 December Karmal’s cabinet was announced.
Troop Size: 120 000
Secondary Support: Although there were many allegations that Soviet troops were supporting the Taraki- and Amin governments, both Afghan and Soviet authorities denied this during 1979. However, the Soviet Union was clearly supplying the government with arms and equipment. Many Afghan militaries were trained in the Soviet Union; in August it was reported that 1500 Afghan militaries travelled to the Soviet Union for education. There were also numerous Soviet advisers in Afghanistan during the year. Amin stated on 19 August that there were between 1000 and 1500 Soviet military advisers in Afghanistan and that the Soviet Union provided Afghanistan with extensive financial support and military aid.It has later been revealed that warplanes manned by Soviet troops helped Amins forces in fighting against rebels in Badakhshan during late November and early December 1979. According to some reports, Soviet aircraft was used in combat as early as in March, during the Herat uprising. In late December, Soviet troops overthrew Amin and Babrak Karmal became the new president. After that, Soviet troops were clearly fighting alongside government troops against Moslem rebels.
Government of Afghanistan - Government of Russia (Soviet Union)
Comment on Active: The Revolutionary Council of Afghanistan decided on 27 March to appoint Hafizullah Amin as Prime Minister. Nur Mohammad Taraki had, since the Saur revolution in 1978, held both the President and the Prime Minister posts. After 27 March 1979, Taraki was the President of Afghanistan while Amin was the Prime Minister. In late March, the government also set up a Supreme Council for the Defence of the Country in order to "foil the conspiracies of internal and external enemies, to eliminate traitors and to protect the glorious April revolution".
Growing tensions between Taraki and Amin in the fall of 1979 casued Taraki to seek Soviet support for a disposal of Amin. A meeting at the Presidential Palace in September turned in to a shoot-out and it was later announced that Taraki was stepping down due to health issues. Amin, who was a more hard-line communist than Taraki, became the new President.
Amin was never popular in among the Soviet leaders in Moscow; ha had been educated at US universities and the Soviet Union suspected him of being secretly pro-Western. Already in late September, increased activity was registrered among Soviet units north of the Afghan-Soviet border, and in late December Soviet forces finally intervened in Afghanistan, overthrew Amin on 27 December and installed Babrak Karmal as the new leader. On 28 December Karmal’s cabinet was announced.
Troop Size: 120 000
1980 Group Archive
Government of Afghanistan - Jam'iyyat-i Islami-yi Afghanistan
Government of Afghanistan - Harakat-i Inqilab-i Islami-yi Afghanistan
Government of Afghanistan - Hizb-i Islami-yi Afghanistan
Government of Afghanistan - Hizb-i Islami-yi Afghanistan - Khalis faction
Government of Afghanistan - Jabha-yi Nijat-i Milli-yi Afghanistan
Government of Afghanistan - Mahaz-i Milli-yi Islami-yi Afghanistan
Comment on Active: Babrak Karmal, who was installed as the President of Afghanistan after the Soviet invasion in December 1979, belonged to the Parchami section of the PDPA. His cabinet was a coalition of both Khalq and Parcham, although in contrast to previous President Taraki’s cabinet, Parcham had the majority. The new cabinet was made up of four parts Parcham to three parts Khalq, with one deputy prime minister from each group. Khalq and Parcham had for a long time had difficulties ruling together, and the new Parchami majority in the cabinet augmented their problems. During the Taraki-Amin period, hundreds, maybe thousands of government officials, belonging to the Parchami section, had been executed. Khalq now occupied all important government posts, and feared for their lives when Karmal from the Parchami faction, became the new President. Another problem was the fact that Khalq was particularly strong in the army. In 1980, Khalq outnumbered Parcham by a factor of three to one in the military forces, and when the government tried to expel Khalqi commanders, the soldiers often revolted. Thousands of troops deserted and by the end of 1980, army divisions from the Khalq faction were actually fighting alongside the Mujahideen.
Troop Size: 30 000
Comment on Troop Size: Due to the fact that a large number of men deserted and sometimes joined the rebels, the strength of the Afghan army was reduced from about 100 000 to around 30000 during 1980. Of these, only 10 000-15 000 could be used as effective fighting troops.
Secondary Support: In the first week of January 1980 there were approximately 50 000 Soviet troops in Afghanistan, three months later that number had increased to around 85 000. The Soviet troops brought with them all kinds of equipment and weapons, including several squadrons of fighter aircraft and air defence. Their aim was to first establish control over larger cities and major roads, thereafter to deploy troops to the border areas to limit incursion from Pakistan and Iran, and finally to disarm unreliable elements of the Afghan army. In mid-1980 the Soviets started to remove some of the troops and tanks from Afghanistan. From a total of 1000 tanks in the beginning of the year, the number was down to around 300 in the end of 1980 and the troops were reduced by 5000 men in June 1980. The reduction in troops was compensated by an increase in the number of fighter helicopters and other types of aircraft. At the end of the year there were about 130 Soviet jet fighters in Afghanistan. The Soviet Union also spent a lot of money improving the military infrastructure in Afghanistan, for instance by constructing permanent logistics- and communications facilities and by improving airfields.
1981 Group Archive
Government of Afghanistan - Jam'iyyat-i Islami-yi Afghanistan
Government of Afghanistan - Harakat-i Inqilab-i Islami-yi Afghanistan
Government of Afghanistan - Hizb-i Islami-yi Afghanistan
Government of Afghanistan - Hizb-i Islami-yi Afghanistan - Khalis faction
Government of Afghanistan - Jabha-yi Nijat-i Milli-yi Afghanistan
Government of Afghanistan - Mahaz-i Milli-yi Islami-yi Afghanistan
Government of Afghanistan - Ittihad-i Islami Bara-yi Azadi-yi Afghanistan
Troop Size: 25 000-30 000
Comment on Troop Size: The Afghan military forces were severely weakened during 1981 due to desertions.
Secondary Support: The Soviet Army was doing practically all of the fighting against the Mujahideen during 1981 as the Afghan Army was severely weakened. In December, an additional 5000 troops arrived in the country, increasing the total number from 85 000 to 90 000. An increasing number of Afghans received military training in the USSR, and in 1981 the US government estimated that 5500 Afghans received training in the Soviet Union and Eastern Europe. There are no reliable figures of how much money the Soviet Union spent on Afghanistan. China estimated the daily cost at between $3 and $4 million in 1981, while another estimate was $10 to $12 million a day. In 1989, Soviet Premier Nikolai Ryzhkov estimated that the intervention cost the Soviet Union about $5 billion per year. The Afghan Prime Minister, Sultan Ali Keshtmand, in a speech in 1981 said that we obtain all vital materials and means for the defense of the revolution - that is, food, arms, equipment, oil and other material goods - from the USSR.
1982 Group Archive
Government of Afghanistan - Jam'iyyat-i Islami-yi Afghanistan
Government of Afghanistan - Harakat-i Inqilab-i Islami-yi Afghanistan
Government of Afghanistan - Hizb-i Islami-yi Afghanistan
Government of Afghanistan - Hizb-i Islami-yi Afghanistan - Khalis faction
Government of Afghanistan - Jabha-yi Nijat-i Milli-yi Afghanistan
Government of Afghanistan - Mahaz-i Milli-yi Islami-yi Afghanistan
Government of Afghanistan - Ittihad-i Islami Bara-yi Azadi-yi Afghanistan
Comment on Active: The ruling party PDPA increased its membership during the year, and in March a national conference was held. The conference, the first one since 1966, resulted in an updated party programme.
Troop Size: 35 000
Comment on Troop Size: The manpower problems in the Afghan army continued, but during the year the number of desertions seemed to decrease. The number of troops increased somewhat during the year as a result of press-ganging and a decision to extend the age for military service from 35 to 39.
Secondary Support: The Soviet Army was doing practically all of the fighting against the Mujahideen during 1982 as the Afghan Army was severely weakened. During 1982, an additional 15 000 Soviet troops arrived in the country, increasing the total number from 90 000 to 105 000. An increasing number of Afghans received military training in the USSR, and in 1982 the US government estimated that 18 000 Afghans received training in the Soviet Union and Eastern Europe. There are no reliable figures of how much money the Soviet Union spent on Afghanistan. China estimated the daily cost at between $3 and $4 million in 1981, while another estimate was $10 to $12 million a day. In 1989, Soviet Premier Nikolai Ryzhkov estimated that the intervention cost the Soviet Union about $5 billion per year. The Afghan Prime Minister, Sultan Ali Keshtmand, in a speech in 1981 said that we obtain all vital materials and means for the defense of the revolution - that is, food, arms, equipment, oil and other material goods - from the USSR.
1983 Group Archive
Government of Afghanistan - Jam'iyyat-i Islami-yi Afghanistan
Government of Afghanistan - Harakat-i Inqilab-i Islami-yi Afghanistan
Government of Afghanistan - Hizb-i Islami-yi Afghanistan
Government of Afghanistan - Hizb-i Islami-yi Afghanistan - Khalis faction
Government of Afghanistan - Jabha-yi Nijat-i Milli-yi Afghanistan
Government of Afghanistan - Mahaz-i Milli-yi Islami-yi Afghanistan
Government of Afghanistan - Ittihad-i Islami Bara-yi Azadi-yi Afghanistan
Comment on Active: The Afghan Army played an increasingly important role in 1983, and in some provinces it was responsible for almost all the operations.
Troop Size: 35 000-40 000
Comment on Troop Size: In 1983 the Afghan Army increased to 35 000 – 40 000 men.
Secondary Support: The Soviet Army continued to do a lot of the fighting in 1983, as the Afghan Army had persisting manpower problems. Soviet troops were estimated to number around 110 000 in mid-1983. An increasing number of Afghans received military training in the USSR. There is no information for 1983, but in 1982 the US government estimated that 18 000 Afghans received training in the Soviet Union. British sources estimated in 1983 that the Soviets had 500 to 600 helicopters in Afghanistan, and in December 1982 Financial Times reported that the Soviets were deploying 1,420 tanks and 1,685 pieces of artillery to Afghanistan. There are no reliable figures of how much money the Soviet Union spent on Afghanistan. China estimated the daily cost at between $3 and $4 million in 1981, while another estimate was $10 to $12 million a day. In 1989, Soviet Premier Nikolai Ryzhkov estimated that the intervention cost the Soviet Union about $5 billion per year.
1984 Group Archive
Government of Afghanistan - Jam'iyyat-i Islami-yi Afghanistan
Government of Afghanistan - Harakat-i Inqilab-i Islami-yi Afghanistan
Government of Afghanistan - Hizb-i Islami-yi Afghanistan
Government of Afghanistan - Hizb-i Islami-yi Afghanistan - Khalis faction
Government of Afghanistan - Jabha-yi Nijat-i Milli-yi Afghanistan
Government of Afghanistan - Mahaz-i Milli-yi Islami-yi Afghanistan
Government of Afghanistan - Ittihad-i Islami Bara-yi Azadi-yi Afghanistan
Government of Afghanistan - Harakat-i Islami-yi Afghanistan
Troop Size: 35 000-40 000
Secondary Support: The Soviet Army continued to do a lot of the fighting in 1984, as the Afghan Army had persisting manpower problems. Soviet troops were estimated to number around 115 000 in 1984 and another 50 000 was in November deployed just north of the Soviet-Afghan border. These troops were airborne and could be flown in to Afghanistan when needed. A large number of Afghans, around 10 000 in 1984, received military training in the USSR. There are no reliable figures of how much money the Soviet Union spent on Afghanistan. China estimated the daily cost at between $3 and $4 million in 1981, while another estimate was $10 to $12 million a day. In 1989, Soviet Premier Nikolai Ryzhkov estimated that the intervention cost the Soviet Union about $5 billion per year.
1985 Group Archive
Government of Afghanistan - Jam'iyyat-i Islami-yi Afghanistan
Government of Afghanistan - Harakat-i Inqilab-i Islami-yi Afghanistan
Government of Afghanistan - Hizb-i Islami-yi Afghanistan
Government of Afghanistan - Hizb-i Islami-yi Afghanistan - Khalis faction
Government of Afghanistan - Jabha-yi Nijat-i Milli-yi Afghanistan
Government of Afghanistan - Mahaz-i Milli-yi Islami-yi Afghanistan
Government of Afghanistan - Ittihad-i Islami Bara-yi Azadi-yi Afghanistan
Troop Size: 35 000-40 000
Secondary Support: The Soviet Army continued to do a lot of the fighting in 1985, as the Afghan Army had persisting manpower problems. Soviet troops were estimated to number around 115 000 in 1985. A large number of Afghans, around 10 000 in 1985, received military training in the USSR. There are no reliable figures of how much money the Soviet Union spent on Afghanistan. China estimated the daily cost at between $3 and $4 million in 1981, while another estimate was $10 to $12 million a day. In 1989, Soviet Premier Nikolai Ryzhkov estimated that the intervention cost the Soviet Union about $5 billion per year.
1986 Group Archive
Government of Afghanistan - Jam'iyyat-i Islami-yi Afghanistan
Government of Afghanistan - Harakat-i Inqilab-i Islami-yi Afghanistan
Government of Afghanistan - Hizb-i Islami-yi Afghanistan
Government of Afghanistan - Hizb-i Islami-yi Afghanistan - Khalis faction
Government of Afghanistan - Jabha-yi Nijat-i Milli-yi Afghanistan
Government of Afghanistan - Mahaz-i Milli-yi Islami-yi Afghanistan
Government of Afghanistan - Ittihad-i Islami Bara-yi Azadi-yi Afghanistan
Comment on Active: In the spring of 1986, President Babrak Karmal’s position was uncertain. His health was suffering and when he didn’t attend the 27 April celebrations marking the anniversary of the Communist coup of 1978, speculation about his whereabouts began. Karmal returned to Afghanistan on 3 May, announcing that he had undergone medical treatment in the Soviet Union. The following day Karmal resigned from the post as general secretary of the Afghan Communist Party, and the former chief of the secret police, Mohammad Najibullah, was elected as the new leader of Afghanistan. Karmal kept the ceremonial Presidential post until November when he was replaced by Acting President Haji Chamkani.
Troop Size: 35 000-40 000
Secondary Support: The Soviet Army continued to do a lot of the fighting in 1986. Soviet troops were estimated to number around 118 000 in 1986. On 28 July, Soviet leader Mikhail Gorbachev announced a limited withdrawal of troops from Afghanistan in order to stimulate talks to end the conflict in Afghanistan. On 15 October, 8000 of the estimated 118 000 Soviet troops in Afghanistan left the country. The Soviets made it clear though, that further reduction of forces in Afghanistan would depend on a political solution for the country. A large number of Afghans received military training in the USSR. There are no reliable figures of how much money the Soviet Union spent on Afghanistan. China estimated the daily cost at between $3 and $4 million in 1981, while another estimate was $10 to $12 million a day. In 1989, Soviet Premier Nikolai Ryzhkov estimated that the intervention cost the Soviet Union about $5 billion per year.
1987 Group Archive
Government of Afghanistan - Jam'iyyat-i Islami-yi Afghanistan
Government of Afghanistan - Harakat-i Inqilab-i Islami-yi Afghanistan
Government of Afghanistan - Hizb-i Islami-yi Afghanistan
Government of Afghanistan - Hizb-i Islami-yi Afghanistan - Khalis faction
Government of Afghanistan - Jabha-yi Nijat-i Milli-yi Afghanistan
Government of Afghanistan - Mahaz-i Milli-yi Islami-yi Afghanistan
Government of Afghanistan - Ittihad-i Islami Bara-yi Azadi-yi Afghanistan
Comment on Active: Mohammad Najibullah, who had been elected general secretary of the Afghan Communist Party in 1986, strengthened his position further in1987 when he was elected president of Afghanistan and replaced the Acting President Haji Chamkani.
Troop Size: 35 000-40 000
Secondary Support: In 1987, the Soviets were getting closer to a withdrawal of troops from Afghanistan, and launched fewer offensives than in previous years. Furthermore, the delivery of advanced anti-aircraft missiles to the Mujahideen made Soviet air support less effective, which resulted in difficulties for large-scale operations against rebel strongholds. Nevertheless, the Soviet Army continued to do a lot of the fighting during the year. Soviet troops were estimated to number around 110 000 in 1987. A large number of Afghans received military training in the USSR. There are no reliable figures of how much money the Soviet Union spent on Afghanistan. China estimated the daily cost at between $3 and $4 million in 1981, while another estimate was $10 to $12 million a day. In 1989, Soviet Premier Nikolai Ryzhkov estimated that the intervention cost the Soviet Union about $5 billion per year.
1988 Group Archive
Government of Afghanistan - Jam'iyyat-i Islami-yi Afghanistan
Government of Afghanistan - Harakat-i Inqilab-i Islami-yi Afghanistan
Government of Afghanistan - Hizb-i Islami-yi Afghanistan
Government of Afghanistan - Hizb-i Islami-yi Afghanistan - Khalis faction
Government of Afghanistan - Jabha-yi Nijat-i Milli-yi Afghanistan
Government of Afghanistan - Mahaz-i Milli-yi Islami-yi Afghanistan
Government of Afghanistan - Ittihad-i Islami Bara-yi Azadi-yi Afghanistan
Comment on Active: In May, Ali Kishtmand was replaced by Mohammad Hassan Sharq as the Prime Minister of Afghanistan
Troop Size: 35 000-40 000
Secondary Support: In 1988, the Soviets started to withdraw their around 110 000 troops from Afghanistan, in line with the Geneva accords signed on 14 April that year. By August half of the troops had left the country and in February 1989, the last Soviet troops left Afghanistan. There are no reliable figures of how much money the Soviet Union spent on Afghanistan. China estimated the daily cost at between $3 and $4 million in 1981, while another estimate was $10 to $12 million a day. In 1989, Soviet Premier Nikolai Ryzhkov estimated that the intervention cost the Soviet Union about $5 billion per year.
1989 Group Archive
Government of Afghanistan - Jam'iyyat-i Islami-yi Afghanistan
Government of Afghanistan - Hizb-i Islami-yi Afghanistan
Government of Afghanistan - Hizb-i Islami-yi Afghanistan - Khalis faction
Government of Afghanistan - Mahaz-i Milli-yi Islami-yi Afghanistan
Government of Afghanistan - Hizb-i Wahdat
Comment on Name: The government was headed by Najibullah.
Troop Size: 55 000
Secondary Support: In February 1989, the last Soviet troops left Afghanistan. Soviet continued to support the Najibullah regime with military advisers, armaments and materiel.
1990 Group Archive
Government of Afghanistan - Jam'iyyat-i Islami-yi Afghanistan
Government of Afghanistan - Hizb-i Islami-yi Afghanistan
Government of Afghanistan - Hizb-i Islami-yi Afghanistan - Khalis faction
Government of Afghanistan - Hizb-i Wahdat
Government of Afghanistan - Military faction (forces of Shahnawaz Tanay)
Troop Size: 58 000
Secondary Support: The secondary support from the Soviet Union to the Najibullah government was estimated at $ 3.000.000.000 per year. The support included fuel and military equipment moved from Eastern Europe, as well as military expertise and food.
1991 Group Archive
Government of Afghanistan - Jam'iyyat-i Islami-yi Afghanistan
Government of Afghanistan - Hizb-i Islami-yi Afghanistan
Government of Afghanistan - Hizb-i Islami-yi Afghanistan - Khalis faction
Government of Afghanistan - Hizb-i Wahdat
Troop Size: 200 000
Comment on Troop Size: The army of Afghanistan is made up of about 200 000 regular and para-military troops under central command. These are backed by an estimated 80 000 local militia, largely recruited by the government among former Mujahideen groups. The loyalty of the latter is suspect as it depends on the government being able to regularly pay their salary.
Secondary Support: Financial aid and military supplies. Low estimate US$ 300.000.000 per year.
On 13 September the USA and Soviet Union agreed to cut off all military aid to Afghan warring parties from 1 January 1992, and not step up military aid through the rest of the year.
1992 Group Archive
Government of Afghanistan - Jam'iyyat-i Islami-yi Afghanistan
Government of Afghanistan - Hizb-i Islami-yi Afghanistan
Government of Afghanistan - Hizb-i Wahdat
Troop Size: 45 000
1993 Group Archive
Government of Afghanistan - Hizb-i Islami-yi Afghanistan
Government of Afghanistan - Hizb-i Wahdat
Government of Afghanistan - Junbish-i Milli-yi Islami
Comment on Active: Already in January plans were underway to establish an Islamic army, with soldiers mostly drawn from Mujahideen groups. The decision was made by a special assembly of 1335 delegates elected from across Afghanistan. This was the same assembly that elected Rabbani as President for a two year period. Pakistan offered training and assistance to the new army.
The Islamabad accord signed on 7 March between all the primary warring parties encompassed power-sharing arrangements that made Hekmatyar Prime Minister under Rabbani president rule. Fighting between the parties continued, however, unabated. Nominal prime minister Hekmatyar thus was in control over the Hizb-i-Islami-yi Afghanistan forces battering Kabul with artillery and rockets. General Massoud, ousted as defence minister by the new prime minister and stripped of all titles, remained, however, in virtual control over the governments armed forces.
Troop Size: 45 000 - 105 000
Comment on Troop Size: The low estimate is the official number of the armed forces given in 1993, building on the organisation at the time of the fall of Najibullah. No new structure for the armed forces had been established since the change of government in April 1992. It is unclear how much of the army is now loyal to the new regime and which Mujahideen forces are considered armed forces of the state. The high estimate is the troop-size of Jamiyyat-i Islami-yi Afghanistan added to the total number of troops in the armed forces.
Secondary Support: Saudi Arabia provided $150 million to the Afghan government between 1993 and 1994. They also supported the government with fuel. In 1993, Iran started to support the non-Pashtun groups in Afghanistan, including the Rabbani government and Dostums Junbish-i Milli, in order to prevent the Pashtuns of Hizb-i Islami to gain power.
1994 Group Archive
Government of Afghanistan - Hizb-i Islami-yi Afghanistan
Government of Afghanistan - Hizb-i Wahdat
Government of Afghanistan - Junbish-i Milli-yi Islami
Comment on Active: According to the Islamabad accord, signed in March between the warring parties, Rabbani’s Presidential term expired in late June. On 28 June the Sureme Court decided to extend Rabbanis Presidential term for six more months. Hekmatyar did not get a similar extension of office. The rule thus no longer had the legal foundation of the agreement between the parties.
Troop Size: > 60 000
Secondary Support: Saudi Arabia continued to back Rabbanis government financially and with fuel. Hekmatyar claimed that the Indian government were providing arms, cash, technical and logistical assistance to the Afghan President. The allegations were rejected both by President Rabbani and the Indian Government.
1995 Group Archive
Government of Afghanistan - Hizb-i Islami-yi Afghanistan
Government of Afghanistan - Hizb-i Wahdat
Government of Afghanistan - Junbish-i Milli-yi Islami
Government of Afghanistan - Taleban
Troop Size: Missing
Comment on Troop Size: It is becoming increasingly difficult to differentiate between the troops of the different military outfits in the Afghan civil war, as who belongs to the government forces, following a number of reports of defections and re-defections.
Secondary Support: Foreign diplomats and Afghan leaders reported that India provided money, ammunition, spare parts and technicians to the Rabbani government in order to improve its air force.
1996 Group Archive
Government of Afghanistan - Jam'iyyat-i Islami-yi Afghanistan
Government of Afghanistan - Taleban
Government of Afghanistan - UIFSA
Troop Size: 60 000
Comment on Troop Size: It is becoming increasingly difficult to differentiate between the different sides and groups in the Afghan civil war and to distinguish who represents the government. Note that from the signing of the peace accord on 24 May 1996 and to Taleban seizure of power on 28 September the forces of Hizb-i-Islami-yi Afghanistan are integrated with the government troops. The total troop size in this period should thus be put at 110 000.
Secondary Support: Saudi Arabia supported the Taleban government with funds and materiel. Pakistan, who had supported the Taleban before they took control over Kabul, was accused of continuing to do so when Taleban formed the new Afghan government.
1997 Group Archive
Government of Afghanistan - UIFSA
Comment on Active: In areas under their control the Taliban continued to enforce their version of Islamic law: prohibiting women from working outside the home in activities other than health care; requiring corporal punishment for those convicted for certain crimes; prohibiting women attending universities; and closing several girls schools in the country. A strict dress code for women was also enforced.
Troop Size: 25 000
Secondary Support: General Dostam accused the government of Turkmenistan of allowing Taleban soldiers and transport munitions to pass through their territory. Turkmenistan also supplied the Taleban government with ammunition and fuel. The Pakistani government was also widely accused of supporting the Taleban government, among other things through arming and training reinforcements. Saudi Arabia provided funds to the Taleban.
1998 Group Archive
Government of Afghanistan - UIFSA
Troop Size: 25 000
Secondary Support: Pakistan deployed military advisers to assist in planning. Saudi Arabia provided funds and vehicles. In the autumn of 1998, the Saudi Prince visited Afghanistan in an attempt to persuade the Taleban to hand over Usama bin Laden. When the Taleban refused, relations between the two countries detoriated and Saudi Arabia ceased all aid to the Taleban government.
1999 Group Archive
Government of Afghanistan - UIFSA
Troop Size: 200 000
Comment on Troop Size: According to military analysts the attack on Kabul showed that the Taleban had at their disposal more than 200 000 troops. Official estimates of Taleban strength has been much lower.
Secondary Support: Pakistan supported the Taleban regime with armaments, funds and technical expertise
2000 Group Archive
Government of Afghanistan - UIFSA
Comment on Active: Fighting in Talebans north-eastern frontline were student from Pakistan, Arabs loyal to Usama bin Laden, Uzbek rebels, Bangladeshis, Chechen, Kashmiris and Uighurs from China. It was estimated that about a fifth to a quarter of total Taleban combat strength is constituted by the foreign legion.
In March it was reported that a hard-line faction of Taliban military leaders loyal to Afghan-based Usama bin Laden had effectively seized control of the Taliban military. The faction, led by Defence Minister Mullah Fazal Akhund, had secured the support of Taliban leader Omar in discussions over the future of bin Laden, who had been indicted in the USA for his alleged involvement in the 1998 bombing of US embassies in east Africa.
Troop Size: 200 000
Comment on Troop Size: According to military analysts the attack on Kabul showed that the Taleban had at their disposal more than 200 000 troops. Official estimates of Taleban strength has been much lower.
Secondary Support: Pakistan supported the Taleban regime with armaments and funds.
2001 Group Archive
Government of Afghanistan - UIFSA
Comment on Active: The incorporation of foreign fighters in Talebans combat force continued: Arabs, Chechens, Central Asians. It was estimated that the foreign legion constituted between a fifth and a quarter of Taleban troops.
Troop Size: 20 000 - 200 000
Secondary Support: Although Pakistan denied it, aid was still flowing from Pakistan to the Taleban government according to a UN monitoring team. After the attacks on 11 September 2001 Pakistan officially suspended military supplies to the Taleban.
2003 Group Archive
Government of Afghanistan - Taleban
Troop Size: 6000
Comment on Troop Size: The government of Afghanistan currently has about 6000 troops, and it plans on recruiting and training an additional 60 000-70 000 troops. In addition, it plans on demobilizing and retraining the personal armies of various Northern Alliance leaders and integrating them into the Afghan National Army.
Secondary Support: Canada: leadership and maritime interdiction operations (prevention of al-Qaida and Taliban members from escaping the area of operations), humanitarian interventions, long-range patrol detachment (surveillance, reconnaissance, etc.). Hungary: provided a base to US forces, equipped three Afghan National Army battalions with armaments and supplies.. Korea: transportation of material and equipment, medical detachment to the Afghan National Army (ANA). Slovakia: overflight and basing rights, an engineering unit deployed in Afghanistan. Slovenia: 90 tons of military equipment to the ANA. bases), Egypt, Kuwait, Kazakhstan, Kyrgyzstan, Lithuania, Spain, Uzbekistan: overflight permission.
Comment on secondary support:
Some of the Multinational Coalition members have contributed troops to assist the US and Afghanistan; they are listed as secondary warring parties. Those countries in the Multinational Coalition which did not provide troops are listed here as secondary supporting parties. Because the Coalition does not clearly announce which countries provide which kind of support, it is possible that some countries listed only as secondary supporting parties, could actually contribute troops (thus making them secondary warring parties).
2004 Group Archive
Government of Afghanistan - Taleban
Troop Size: 13 000
Secondary Support: ALBANIA: In 20 July 2004 Albanian Armed Forces filled two billets in CFC-A, one Lieutenant Colonel and one NCO (billet = lodging for soldiers)
AUSTRALIA: AP-3C Orion aircraft from the Royal Australian Air Forces Maritime Patrol Group were in the area of operations, conducting maritime patrol tasks in the Persian Gulf as part of the multinational interception force. Australian specific Defence contributions in Afghanistan also included: one ADF member contributing to de-mining activities with the Coalition Joint Task Force.AZERBAIJAN: contributed one peacekeeping infantry platoon (23 personnel) (this probably refers to ISAF)CZECH REPUBLIC: The Czech Republic provided basing and overflight permission for all coalition and U.S. forces. There were 251 personnel deployed to Camp Doha, Kuwait to perform AOR-wide consequence Management (CM) support as well as local training. The Czech Republic has donated 1000 military uniforms to support the Afghan National Army (ANA). The air force provided one TU-154 aircraft with a mission to support NATO Airborne Early Warning (AEW). The aircraft has transported 1055 persons and 16 tons of cargoDENMARK: Denmark contributed with a staff officer to HQ CFC-A and 5 obs teamsETHIOPIA: information exchange and readiness to contribute tactical unitsFINLAND: CIMIC-teams (Civil/Military Cooperation) in Kabul area, Contribution to PRTs (Provisional Reconstruction Team) of Maimana and Mazar e-SharifGREECE: Souda Air Base, provided support to Allied Aircraft, Greece availed one (1) C-130 to transport Humanitarian Assistance and equipment for the Afghan National ArmyHUNGARY: Hungary has equipped three Afghan National Army battalions with armament, supplies (medical, clothing etc.)JAPAN: Provided fleet refueling capability, placing two refueling/replenishment ships and three support/protection destroyers in the Indian Ocean.KYRGYZSTAN: Has provided basing and overflight rights for U.S. and coalition personnel, approx. 205 engineering and medical staff deployedLITHUANIA: Lithuania was contributing to the antiterrorist operation in Central Asia with real capabilities. Also, authorization was issued for the US Governmental and military aircraft to use the Lithuanian air space and land in the Lithuanian airports until the antiterrorist action is terminatedNETHERLANDS: 1 military personnel in Afghanistan NEW ZEALAND: The Royal New Zealand Navy Frigate HMNZS Te Mana was part of the international campaign against terrorism conducting Maritime Interdiction Operations in the region. In 2004, the Royal New Zealand Air Force provided maritime surveillance support to the Maritime Interdiction Operations.NORWAY: Norwegian SOF, Mine Clearers, EOD-teams, C-130 for Tactical Airlift, MOVCON, F-16s for Close Air Support, CIMIC-teams and a Surgical Unit have over the past years completed missions in and around Afghanistan in either Operation Enduring Freedom or in ISAF. Norway deployed troops to the British PRT in MeymanehREPUBLIC OF KOREA: A Republic of Korea naval vessel LST transported more than 1600 tons of material and equipment through Indian and Pacific Ocean, also she accomplished B1 search operations with US Navy in the northern sea of Diego Garcia to support OEFSLOVENIA: Slovenia donated 90 tons of military equipment to the Afghan National Army, Slovenia had also police expert in AfghanistanSWEDEN: Sweden was providing a large Civil-Military Cooperation (CIMIC) unit in Kabul. The unit consisted of 34 officersTHAILAND: When it was clear that airfield reconstruction in Bagram was vital to the maintenance of security for peace operations in the country, Thailand provided a construction Engineering Unit of 130 personnel to the Coalition HeadquartersTURKEY: Supported nations at the airbase for their rotation plansInformation on secondary warring and supporting parties comes in large part from the Operation Enduring Freedoms website, which appears to be somewhat out of date. Thus, the accuracy of this information from year to year is questionable. Moreover, Operation Enduring Freedom (which concerns the larger war on terrorism) is composed of additional countries which are not listed here, as there is no indication that they have been involved specifically in assisting Afghanistan.
2005 Group Archive
Government of Afghanistan - Taleban
Troop Size: 25 000 - 27 000
Comment on Troop Size: The Afghan National Army comprises beteen 25 000 - 27 000 troops.
Secondary Support: Information on secondary warring and supporting parties comes in large part from the Operation Enduring Freedoms website, which appears to be somewhat out of date. Thus, the accuracy of this information from year to year is questionable. Moreover, Operation Enduring Freedom (which concerns the larger war on terrorism) is composed of additional countries which are not listed here, as there is no indication that they have been involved specifically in assisting Afghanistan.
2006 Group Archive
Government of Afghanistan - Taleban
Troop Size: 36 000
Secondary Support: South Korea deployed medical and engineering units in 2002. They pulled out in 2007.
2007 Group Archive
Government of Afghanistan - Taleban
Comment on Active: During 2007 there were approximately 45,000 international troops stationed in Afghanistan to assist the government of Afghanistan in its fight against the Taleban. Roughly 32,000 of these troops served under the NATO-led and UN-mandated International Security Assistance Force (ISAF), whilst 10,000 – 15,000 served in a US-led coalition under Operation Enduring Freedom (OEF). Whilst ISAF was responsible for both security and reconstruction and development the OEF mission largely focused on fighting Al-Qaeda and other militants, in addition to responsibilities of training the Afghan army.
Every nation in these two operations that committed troops to the country in 2007 are viewed as being secondary warring parties on the side of the government of Afghanistan. Note that the troop sizes given have fluctuated during the year and are based mainly on ISAF information as of 5 December 2007 and the Military Balance as of February 2007.
In addition to troops some nations also assisted the government in other ways, and these countries are viewed as being secondary supporting actors only.
Troop Size: 50 000
Comment on Troop Size: During 2007 the number of active military troops in Afghanistan reached approximately 50,000
Secondary Support: Apart from receiving military troops from a large number of states the government of Afghanistan also received secondary support from many countries. It is however hard to know exactly what countries gave what type of support during 2007.The US, the UK, France, Croatia, Germany, Romania, Denmark, Norway, Hungary, Italy, New Zeeland, the Netherlands, Slovakia, Spain, Sweden, and Turkey committed military and/or logistical support to the government, assisting with various tasks such as military training, police training and the supply of armaments and logistics. One of ISAFs primary tasks in Afghanistan is to assist the government of Afghanistan in the sphere of security and it is therefore likely that all states participating in ISAF gave secondary support (short of warring support) to the government.Neighbouring countries such as Kazakhstan, Kyrgyzstan and Uzbekistan also granted over-flight permission for international forces in Afghanistan.
2008 Group Archive
Government of Afghanistan - Hizb-i Islami-yi Afghanistan
Government of Afghanistan - Taleban
Comment on Active: During 2008 there were approximately 63 000 international troops stationed in Afghanistan to assist the government of Afghanistan in its fight against the Taleban. Roughly 51 000 of these troops served under the NATO-led and UN-mandated International Security Assistance Force (ISAF), whilst 12 000 served in a US-led coalition under Operation Enduring Freedom (OEF). Whilst ISAF was responsible for both security and reconstruction and development the OEF mission largely focused on fighting Al-Qaeda and other militants, in addition to responsibilities of training the Afghan army.
Every nation in these two operations that committed troops to the country in 2008 are viewed as being secondary warring parties on the side of the government of Afghanistan. Note that the troop sizes given have fluctuated during the year and are based mainly on ISAF information as of 1 December 2008 and the Military Balance as of February 2008.
In addition to troops some nations also assisted the government in other ways, and these countries are viewed as being secondary supporting actors only.
Troop Size: 70 000
Comment on Troop Size: Active combat troops. Also approximately 79 000 police, that also engage the Taleban in battle at times.
Secondary Support: Apart from receiving military troops from a large number of states (see secondary warring parties) the government of Afghanistan also received secondary support from many countries. It is, however, hard to know exactly what countries gave what type of support during 2008, so the list of countries should be used with caution. Note also that countries that are recorded as secondary warring parties do not count as also being secondary supporters.The US, Germany, Sweden, Canada, Croatia, Denmark, France, Italy, Latvia, New Zealand, Portugal, Romania, Spain, the UK and Turkey (at the least) committed military and/or logistical support to the government, assisting with various tasks such as military training, police training and the supply of armaments and logistics. One of ISAFs primary tasks in Afghanistan is to assist the government of Afghanistan in the sphere of security and it is therefore likely that all states participating in ISAF gave secondary support (short of warring support) to the government.Neighbouring countries such as Kazakhstan, Kyrgyzstan and Uzbekistan also granted over-flight permission for international forces in Afghanistan.
2009 Group Archive
Government of Afghanistan - Hizb-i Islami-yi Afghanistan
Government of Afghanistan - Taleban
Comment on Active: In 2009 a total of 43 countries contributed to the International Security Assistance Force (ISAF), with approximately 38 stationing troops in Afghanistan. The figures and countries given here correspond to information given by ISAF itself and is valid from 22 October 2009.
As of 22 October 2009 ISAF was composed of approximately 84 150 troops, up from approximately 51 000 around the same time in 2008. The vast bulk of the troop increase was comprised of US soldiers. In addition to these ISAF troops the US also has approximately 11 000 troops stationed in Afghanistan as part of Operation Enduring Freedom; troops engaged in hunting both al-Qaeda and Taleban operatives.
Every nation in these two operations that committed troops to the country in 2009 are viewed as being secondary warring parties on the side of the government of Afghanistan. Note that the troop sizes given have fluctuated during the year and are based mainly on ISAF information as of 22 December 2009 and the Military Balance as of February 2009.
In addition to troops some nations also assisted the government in other ways, and these countries are viewed as being secondary supporting actors only.
Troop Size: 100 000
Comment on Troop Size: As of 22 December 2009 the approximate troop size of the Afghan National Army (ANA) reached 100 000.
Secondary Support: Neighbouring countries such as Kazakhstan, Kyrgyzstan and Uzbekistan granted over-flight permission for international forces in Afghanistan, as well as supply routes for logistical supplies.Apart from receiving military troops from a large number of states (see secondary warring parties) the government of Afghanistan also received secondary support from many countries. It is, however, hard to know exactly what countries gave what type of support during 2009, so the list of countries should be used with caution. Also, the UCDP does not code secondary support given by secondary warring parties. The information below is thus only provided for reasons of clarity, and is not coded as secondary support.The US, France, Bulgaria, Canada, Estonia, Germany, Hungary, Latvia Netherlands, New Zealand, Romania, Spain, Sweden, Turkey and the UK (at the least) committed military and/or logistical support to the government, assisting with various tasks such as military training, police training and the supply of armaments and logistics. One of ISAFs primary tasks in Afghanistan is to assist the government of Afghanistan in the sphere of security and it is therefore likely that all states participating in ISAF gave secondary support (short of warring support) to the government.
2010 Group Archive
Government of Afghanistan - Hizb-i Islami-yi Afghanistan
Government of Afghanistan - Taleban
Troop Size: 93 800
Comment on Troop Size: The Afghan Army had around 93 800 troops in 2010.
Secondary Support: Apart from receiving military troops from a large number of states the government of Afghanistan also received secondary non-warring support from many countries. It is, however, hard to know exactly what countries gave what type of support during 2010, so the list of countries should be used with caution. The US, France, Bulgaria, Canada, Estonia, Germany, Hungary, Latvia, Netherlands, New Zealand, Romania, Spain, Sweden, Turkey, Azerbaijan, Bulgaria, Czech Republic, Denmark, Finland, Georgia, Greece, Hungary, Italy, Lithuania, Luxembourg, Montenegro, Norway, Poland, Slovenia and the UK (at the least) committed military and/or logistical support to the government, assisting with various tasks such as military training, police training and the supply of armaments and logistics. One of ISAFs primary tasks in Afghanistan is to assist the government of Afghanistan in the sphere of security and it is therefore likely that all states participating in ISAF gave secondary support (short of warring support) to the government.
2011 Group Archive
Government of Afghanistan - Hizb-i Islami-yi Afghanistan
Government of Afghanistan - Taleban
Troop Size: 170700
Comment on Troop Size: The Afghan Army had around 170 700 troops in 2011.
Secondary Support: Apart from receiving military troops from a large number of states the government of Afghanistan also received secondary non-warring support from many countries. It is, however, hard to know exactly what countries gave what type of support during 2011, so the list of countries should be used with caution. Azerbaijan, Belgium, Bulgaria, Canada, Czech Republic, Denmark, El Salvador, Estonia, Finland, France, Georgia, Germany, Hungary, Italy, Lithuania, Macedonia (Former Yugoslav Republic of), Netherlands, New Zealand, Norway, Poland, Romania, Singapore, Slovakia, Slovenia, South Korea, Spain, Sweden, Turkey, United Arab Emirates, the US and the UK (at the least) committed military and/or logistical support to the government, assisting with various tasks such as military training, police training and the supply of armaments and logistics. One of ISAFs primary tasks in Afghanistan is to assist the government of Afghanistan in the sphere of security and it is therefore likely that all states participating in ISAF gave secondary support (short of warring support) to the government.
2012 Group Archive
Government of Afghanistan - Taleban
Troop Size: 360000
Comment on Troop Size: The Afghan Army (ANA) had around 194000 troops in 2012, the Afghan police force (ANP) around 150000 members, and the Afghan Local Police (ALP) was made up of more than 16000 men in 2012.
Secondary Support: Apart from receiving military troops from a large number of states the government of Afghanistan also received secondary non-warring support from many countries. It is, however, hard to know exactly what countries gave what type of support during 2012. Many countries committed military and/or logistical support to the government, assisting with various tasks such as military training, police training and the supply of armaments and logistics. One of ISAFs primary tasks in Afghanistan is to assist the government of Afghanistan in the sphere of security and it is therefore likely that all states participating in ISAF gave secondary support (short of warring support) to the government.
2013 Group Archive
Government of Afghanistan - Hizb-i Islami-yi Afghanistan
Government of Afghanistan - Taleban
Troop Size: 360000
Comment on Troop Size: The Afghan National Army (ANA) included at least 185,800 troops in 2013, the Afghan National Police (ANP) around 152,350 members and the Afghan Local Police (ALP) was made up of around 20000 members in 2013.
Secondary Support: Apart from receiving military troops from a large number of states the government of Afghanistan also received secondary non-warring support from many countries. It is, however, hard to know exactly what countries gave what type of support during 2013. Many countries committed military and/or logistical support to the government, assisting with various tasks such as military training, police training and the supply of armaments and logistics. One of ISAFs primary tasks in Afghanistan is to assist the government of Afghanistan in the sphere of security and it is therefore likely that all states participating in ISAF gave secondary support (short of warring support) to the government.
In April 2013, the Guardian reported that the British intelligence service had made cash payments to the Afghan presidential office in order to pressure the Afghan government to sign the security agreement with USA.
2014 Group Archive
Government of Afghanistan - Taleban
Troop Size: 357650
Comment on Troop Size: The Afghan National Army (ANA) included at least 172000 troops in 2014, the Afghan National Police (ANP) around 152,150 members and the Afghan Local Police (ALP) was made up of around 27000 members in 2014.
Secondary Support: Apart from receiving military troops from a large number of states the government of Afghanistan also received secondary non-warring support from many countries. It is, however, hard to know exactly what countries gave what type of support during 2014. Many countries committed military and/or logistical support to the government, assisting with various tasks such as military training, police training and the supply of armaments and logistics. One of ISAFs primary tasks in Afghanistan is to assist the government of Afghanistan in the sphere of security and it is therefore likely that all states participating in ISAF gave secondary support (short of warring support) to the government.
2021 Group Archive
Government of Afghanistan - Taleban
Troop Size: 350,000
Government of Afghanistan - IS
Troop Size: 60,000 - 350,000
Comment on Troop Size: Before the Taleban takeover on 15 August 2021, the government troops were estimated at 300,000-350,000. The Taleban regime controls 60,000-80,000 troops.
Secondary Support: Before 15 August 2021, the government of Afghanistan received training, weapons, material, funds, and intelligence from the troop contributing countries in the NATO mission Resolute Support. It also received troops as secondary warring party from United States of America.
After the Taleban takeover, there are allegations that the government of Afghanistan received assistance from Pakistan,
Government of Afghanistan - NRF
Troop Size: 60,000-80,000
Comment on Troop Size: The Taleban regime is believed to have 60,000-80,000 troops.
