General information
Part of Conflict: Mali: Government
Date of first stated goals of incompatibility: 2011-12-10
Comment on date of first stated goal of incompatibility: MUJAO was created in late 2011 through a split in the Algerian rebel group AQIM (al-Qaeda Organization in the Islamic Maghreb). There are many theories regarding what caused the split. AQIM had since the early 2000s retreated to two strongholds, the Berber-inhabited Kabylia region in eastern Algeria and the Sahel region to the south, prompting a debate concerning the cohesion of the group. While by 2011 the Sahel-based AQIM faction had grown to include numerous fighters from other Sahel countries than Algeria, the leadership remained largely Algerian. This caused dissent within the group, and was one of the reasons given when MUJAO was launched. Another reason given was that AQIM had purportedly lost its devotion to jihad, instead focusing on its lucrative illicit business opportunities in the ineffectively controlled Sahel region. This reason appears doubtful, however, given that another version of the history behind the split was that it came about because of quarrels about sharing out the ransoms paid for the release of Western hostages. Another often cited possible explanation behind the split was that many of the non-Algerian fighters were dissatisfied that so much focus was placed on Algeria in terms of both strategic priority and military targeting; MUJAO instead propagated jihad in West Africa.
This last reason – the widening of the geographical focus of the group – is the one captured in UCDP data. On 10 December the group released a video in which they stated that “Today we are inaugurating jihad in West Africa”. They went on to say that they aimed to impose Sharia law throughout the whole region.
Date of first use of armed force: 2013-01-11
Comment on date of first use of armed force: In early January MUJAO’s allies, Ansar Dine, started moving south towards Bamako, seizing the important town of Konna on 10 January. While the Malian army subsequently received support from French troops, Ansar Dine was reinforced by both AQIM and MUJAO. On 11 January the government’s and France’s attempt to re-take the town commenced and fighting was fierce.
First Battle Related Death: 2013-01-11
Comment on First Battle Related Death: In early January MUJAO’s allies, Ansar Dine, started moving south towards Bamako, seizing the important town of Konna on 10 January. While the Malian army subsequently received support from French troops, Ansar Dine was reinforced by both AQIM and MUJAO. On 11 January the government’s and France’s attempt to re-take the town commenced and fighting was fierce. While most death tolls from the fighting in Konna cover events on 11 and 12 January, it is clear that at least some fatalities were incurred on the first day.
Date when dyad reached 25 battle releated deaths: 2013-01-12
Comment on date when dyad reached 25 battle related deaths: In early January MUJAO’s allies, Ansar Dine, started moving south towards Bamako, seizing the important town of Konna on 10 January. While the Malian army subsequently received support from French troops, Ansar Dine was reinforced by both AQIM and MUJAO. On 11 January the government’s and France’s attempt to re-take the town commenced and fighting was fierce. When the Islamists were eventually forced out on 12 January many people were dead and the death toll had crossed 25 for the first time.
Conflict issues
Conflict Goal Issues: Mouvement pour le Tawhîd et du Jihad en Afrique de l'Ouest, Movement for Unity and Jihad in West Africa, (MUJAO) was an Islamist rebel group fighting against the governments of Mali and Algeria. MUJAO emerged as a splinter group from AQIM in 2011, accusing AQIM of having lost its devotion to Jihad and, possibly, of having focused too much on Algeria. As MUJAO were active in both Algeria and Mali, the group’s statements were frequently coded as pertaining to both conflicts. During 2011, MUJAO stated two conflict goal issues, calling for the establishment of Sharia law “across the whole of west Africa”, and protecting the religious rights of west-African Muslims.
As the conflict progressed, protecting the religious rights of west-African Muslims was not explicitly reiterated as a conflict goal issue for MUJAO although it continuously emphasized its intentions to establish Sharia law in Mali. The group also began calling for the establishment of an Islamic state and for gender rights and freedom of expression to be restricted. In 2012, MUJAO also stated its intentions to oust the Malian government and accusing the government of Mali of corruption. Finally, in 2013, MUJAO expressed its opposition toward Malian national elections and stating that voting places would be targeted by Mujahideen attacks.
The main conflict goal issue of MUJAO was the establishment of Sharia law in west Africa and, particularly, in Mali. This issue was continuously stated throughout the conflict and heavily emphasized for all its active years.
Conflict Dynamics Issues: Whilst no conflict dynamics issues were pronounced by MUJAO in 2011, the group stated three issues in 2012. The group called for two prisoners connected to the movement to be released, implicitly accused the government of committing atrocities stating it needed to cease its unwarranted barbaric acts, and called for “jihadists all over the world to head to the Sahel region ‘to fight the international troops which are preparing to intervene in the region militarily’.” No issues were stated in following years, which is why no main conflict dynamics issue was attributed to MUJAO.
Conflict Resolution Issues: MUJAO stated no conflict resolution issues in the first year of conflict, but in 2012 the group stated its readiness to engage in negotiations with the government, although it stated it would rather negotiate with “Mali’s Higher Islamic Council (HIC) on behalf of the government.” Later in the year, however, MUJAO changed its position stating that “there is no negotiation to be had” as the group did not recognize the Malian government.
Type of conflict issues: Conflict Goal Issues: Change judicial system, Corruption, CPS: Islamic state, Opposition to elections, Oust full executive, Religious rights, Restriction of gender rights, Restrictions on freedom of expression
Conflict Dynamics Issues: Atrocities and abuses, DFI: Removal of foreign influence, IFI: Support from diasporas/foreign fighters, Release of prisoners
Conflict Resolution Issues: Call for negotiations, Opposition to negotiations, Structure of negotiations
Annual information
This section contains annual information systematically collected by the UCDP.
2011
| Estimated Fatalities | |
|---|---|
| High | 0 |
| Best | 0 |
| Low | 0 |
Secondary Warring Support:
Side A (Government of Mali): n/a
Side B (MUJAO): n/a
2012
| Estimated Fatalities | |
|---|---|
| High | 0 |
| Best | 0 |
| Low | 0 |
Secondary Warring Support:
Side A (Government of Mali): n/a
Side B (MUJAO): n/a
2013
| Estimated Fatalities | |
|---|---|
| High | 362 |
| Best | 333 |
| Low | 333 |
Secondary Warring Support:
Side A (Government of Mali): Government of Bangladesh, Government of Belgium, Government of Benin, Government of Burkina Faso, Government of Burundi, Government of Cambodia (Kampuchea), Government of Chad, Government of China, Government of Egypt, Government of Estonia, Government of Finland, Government of France, Government of Germany, Government of Ghana, Government of Guinea, Government of Guinea-Bissau, Government of Italy, Government of Ivory Coast, Government of Jordan, Government of Liberia, Government of Mauritania, Government of Nepal, Government of Niger, Government of Nigeria, Government of Norway, Government of Rwanda, Government of Senegal, Government of Sierra Leone, Government of Sweden, Government of Tajikistan, Government of Togo, Government of United Kingdom, Government of United States of America, Government of Yemen (North Yemen)
Side B (MUJAO): n/a
2014
| Estimated Fatalities | |
|---|---|
| High | 0 |
| Best | 0 |
| Low | 0 |
Secondary Warring Support:
Side A (Government of Mali): n/a
Side B (MUJAO): n/a
2015
| Estimated Fatalities | |
|---|---|
| High | 0 |
| Best | 0 |
| Low | 0 |
Secondary Warring Support:
Side A (Government of Mali): n/a
Side B (MUJAO): n/a
Dyad Archive
This section contains annual information no longer systematically collected by the UCDP.
2011 Dyad Archive
Terminated: NO
2012 Dyad Archive
Terminated: NO
2013 Dyad Archive
Comment on Active: In 2013 MUJAO became active in the Malian conflict over governmental power for the first time. The group did not participate in the 2012 fighting, when Ansar Dine and MNLA (Mouvement National pour la Libération de lAzawad, National Movement for the Liberation of Azawad) pushed government troops out of the northern part of the country. However, it fell in behind them as they moved south and subsequently – having outmaneuvered MNLA – went on to control the vast territory together with allied Islamist groups through the second half of the year. When Ansar Dine launched its southward attack on Konna on 9 January, MUJAO was right behind, together with AQIM joining their allies in the battle on 10 January. In the face of this imminent threat, the Malian government appealed to France for help in stopping the rebels advance. The French President Francois Hollande agreed to Bamakos request and on 11 January French troops launched Operation Serval, deploying helicopters and fighter jets, as well as ground troops right away. They were subsequently able to stop a column moving towards Mopti and by the night of 11 January the Malian army backed by French troops reported that they had succeeded in re-taking Konna.
Faced with a much stronger enemy, MUJAO and its allies were forced to retreat. With French airstrikes preceding the ground troops advance, the Islamists for the most part withdrew without a fight, although there were some skirmishes. In late January the French forces had reached and seized the big towns in the north: Timbuktu, Kidal and Gao. Gao had been MUJAO-controlled since June 2012 and the group put up fierce but brief resistance before withdrawing. While AQIM and Ansar Dine retreated to the remote Adrar des Ifoghas massif, MUJAO remained in the area around Gao. Protected by loyal residents in some villages in the region, many of the groups’ fighters were able to stay under the radar of the approaching forces.
MUJAO subsequently resorted to guerrilla-style tactics, planting landmines, conducting car bombings and commencing to launch suicide attacks targeting mainly military check point. The group’s fighters also managed to infiltrate Gao on a number of occasions, causing fierce street fighting. At one point they even briefly occupied the courthouse and the city hall and a MUJAO spokesman stated that "Our troops have been ordered to attack. If the enemy is stronger, well pull back only to return stronger, until we liberate Gao."
After Malian and French forces on 1 March destroyed a major MUJAO base in Imenas, 60 km east of Gao, leaving 47 Islamists dead, attacks appeared to decrease somewhat. However, the group was far from defeated and later in the month it carried out a suicide attack in Timbuktu, announcing that it had opened up a new front. Furthermore, MUJAO joined forces with Signed-in-Blood Battalion, catching international attention by launching an attack in neighbouring Niger; on 22 May the two groups together attacked a military barracks in Agadez town. At least 20 people were killed, most of them Nigerien soldiers, and the Islamists announced that it was retaliation for Niger’s participation in the Malian campaign (Niger contributed some 500 troops to the ECOWAS AFISMA force supporting the Malian government; see comment on dimension in the encyclopedia).
On 22 August MUJAO and Signed-in-Blood Battalion announced that they had merged, creating a new jihadist group, al-Murabitun. The name is an homage to the 11th-Century Almoravid Empire that at one point stretched from southern Spain south to Mauritania, and also included parts of what is now Algeria.
Negotiations: NO
Comment on Negotiations: There were no negotiations between the Malian government and MUJAO in 2013.
Victory: NO
Terminated: YES
Type of termination: Other
Date of termination: 2013-08-22
Comment on Termination: On 22 August MUJAO and Signed-in-Blood Battalion announced that they had merged, creating a new jihadist group, al-Murabitun. The name is an homage to the 11th-Century Almoravid Empire that at one point stretched from southern Spain south to Mauritania, and also included parts of what is now Algeria.
2014 Dyad Archive
Terminated: NO
2015 Dyad Archive
Terminated: NO