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Uppsala Conflict Data Program

Department of Peace and Conflict Research

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CMA

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General information

Actor Chronology

Conflict issues

Annual information

2012 2013 2014 2015 2016 2019

Group Archive

2012 2014

General information

First Active Year: 2012

Current Name: CMA
Current Name full English: Coordination of Azawad Movements
Current Name full native language: Coordination des Mouvements de l’Azawad

Original Name: MNLA
Original Name full English: National Movement for the Liberation of Azawad
Original Name full native language: Mouvement national pour la libération de l'Azawad

Actor Chronology

This section contains information about (if applicable) group splinters, name changes, and alliances according to the UCDP definitions of these concepts.

Name Change: From MNLA to CMA
On: 2014-10-28

Joined Actor: FLA (Front de libération de l'Azawad)
On: 2023-08-04

Conflict issues

Government of Mali - CMA

Conflict Goal Issues: Coordination des Mouvements de l’Azawad, Coordination of Azawad Movements, (CMA), originally established as Mouvement national de libération de l'Azawad, National Movement for the Liberation of Azawad, (MNLA), was a Touareg secessionist rebel group fighting against the government of Mali to establish an independent state for the Touareg people in Northern Mali called Azawad. The group was established in 2011 as a coalition of returning Touareg people from Libya who had been trained under Gaddafi and remnants of earlier Malian groups such as the ATNMC and MLA. During the years of its establishment CMA, then MNLA, stated several conflict goal issues. The group stated its commitment to principles of democracy, sovereignty, and freedom of expression. CMA also called for independence from the Malian government for Azawad and the Sahara region but also stated that increased autonomy and self-rule would be “the least that we will now accept with the Malian Government.” The issue of independence was reemphasized as the conflict emerged in early 2012, and issues of civil and human rights, security, and corruption were also raised. In late 2012, the group implied its intentions to organize the Malian state structure as a confederation: “We are seeking cultural, political and economic independence but not secession”.

As the conflict progressed, the issue of autonomy began being emphasized again, emphasizing the right to self-governance and self-determination. This also came with allegations of government corruption and calls for executive power-sharing and the federalization of the Malian state to give more autonomy and power to regional governance structures. CMA also reemphasized its intentions to protect the civil and human rights of the people of Azawad and their access to public services and their own natural resources. In 2013, the group stated its intentions to liberate Azawad from poverty and to free it from the administration, which was interpreted as a call for ousting the government.

The main conflict goal issue of CMA was the issue of self-determination, independence, and autonomy. The group frequently varied in communications as to whether it fought for independence or only increased autonomy and self-rule throughout the conflict, which is why the main issue should only be considered increased regional autonomy for the people of Azawad.

Conflict Dynamics Issues: In 2011, CMA released statements calling upon the international community, especially the government of France, to use its influence to take its “full responsibility” and “to better guarantee peace and security as stipulated in international law.”, alluding to the responsibility to protect. In 2012, the group accused the Malian army of “abuse, torture, confiscation of property, perpetrated on the population” and called for the removal of foreign forces, influence, and civilians, stating that their presence “is a real threat and a source of insecurity for the people of Azawad”. The group also called for international investigations to be initiated into the Malian government and army for crimes against humanity.

As the conflict progressed, CMA continuously emphasized ethnically motivated atrocities and abuses against the people of Azawad by military and militia forces. Based on these abuses, the group also frequently called for international investigations, prosecutions, and monitoring missions to be initiated. CMA also began calling for foreign pressure to be applied onto the Malian government again, calling for it to “exercise its moral authority over Mali and uphold the basic principles of human rights in Azawad.” Towards the end of the conflict, CMA released statements calling for the release of political prisoners and prisoners of war detained by the Malian government, for humanitarian aid for the people of Azawad, and for the assistance from the international community, particularly ECOWAS, to assist in mediations with the government.

The main conflict dynamics issues of CMA were the continuously and frequently stated issue of abuses and atrocities against the civilian population in Azawad and the allegations that these were motivated by ethnicity. These issues were heavily emphasized throughout the entire duration of the coded conflict.

Conflict Resolution Issues: In 2011 and 2012, CMA called for negotiations with the government under supervision of the international community, called for the implementation of the Algiers agreement, a peace agreement which included the demilitarization of Azawad, and for recognition of wrongdoing as well as accountability for previous and current war crimes perpetrated by government forces.

As the conflict progressed, issues of accountability and prosecution, peace agreement implementation, calls for negotiations, and demands that negotiations be held under international supervision were continuously stated by CMA. In 2014, the group also called for truth and reconciliation processes to be implemented and for the Malian government to abide by an agreed upon ceasefire.

The main conflict resolution issues of CMA were calls for negotiations, statements pertaining to the structure of negotiations, and calls for the implementation of peace agreements. These issues were continuously and frequently mentioned with heavy emphasis throughout the entire conflict.

Type of conflict issues: The coded conflict issues for this group are: Conflict Goal Issues: Autonomy, Basic needs, Civil rights, Confederation/union, Corruption, Cultural rights, Electoral fraud, Executive power-sharing, Federalism, Freedom of expression, Freedom of movement, Human rights, Independence, Law and order, Oust full executive, Protection of natural resources/the environment, Public services, Rule of law

Conflict Dynamics Issues: Atrocities and abuses, Collective targeting: ethnic, DFI: Removal of foreign influence, DFI: Removal of foreigners, DFI: Withdrawal of military intervention/foreign forces, IFI: Foreign mediator, IFI: Humanitarian aid, IFI: International court/tribunal/investigation, IFI: International monitoring, IFI: Use of foreign influence, Military conduct, Release of prisoners, Return of refugees/IDPs

Conflict Resolution Issues: Accountability/prosecution/investigation, Call for implementation/abiding to ceasefire, Call for negotiations, Call for truth and reconciliation processes, Peace agreement implementation, Recognition of wrongdoing, Structure of negotiations

Annual information

This section contains annual information systematically collected by the UCDP.

2012


Actor Active in Dyad(s):

CMA - MUJAO, Signed-in-Blood Battalion

AQIM, JAS, MUJAO - CMA

Ganda Iso - CMA

Government of Mali - CMA

2013


Actor Active in Dyad(s):

MAA - CMA

2014


Actor Active in Dyad(s):

CMA - CM-FPR, GATIA, MAA

Government of Mali - CMA

2015


Actor Active in Dyad(s):

Ansar Dine - CMA

Government of Mali - CMA

2016


Actor Active in Dyad(s):

CMA - GATIA

2019


Actor Active in Dyad(s):

CMA - MSA

Group Archive

This section contains annual information no longer systematically collected by the UCDP.

2012 Group Archive


CMA - MUJAO, Signed-in-Blood Battalion

AQIM, JAS, MUJAO - CMA

Ganda Iso - CMA

Comment on Name: MNLA: Mouvement national de libération de l’Azawad, National Movement for the Liberation of Azawad

Government of Mali - CMA

Comment on Name: MNLA: Mouvement national de libération de l’Azawad, National Movement for the Liberation of Azawad
Troop Size: 400 - 3000
Comment on Troop Size: Estimates on the number of MNLA fighters vary greatly. Sources indicate that some 400 Tuareg fighters returning from Libya and joining MNLA. However, the newly formed MNLA also included remnants of ATNMC, the group fighting the Malian government between 2007 and 2009, but there is no information on how many they numbered, wherefore the 400 estimate at the start of the year is probably too low. The newly formed group grew as Tuaregs soldiers that had deserted the Mali army and young recruits from the region joined it. Credible estimates eventually put the number at around 3000.

It should be noted that MNLA itself claims to number 9000 – 10000 men.
Secondary Support: While the relationship between Ansar Dine and MNLA was always uneasy, the first three months of the year saw a number of joint operations, as the two groups carried out their lightning offensive and seized the northern part of the country. It is important to note that theirs was a tactical alliance, since they fought the same enemy, but for different ends. From April onwards, the relationship broke down and there were some instances of fighting between the two groups in April, June, July and November.

2014 Group Archive


CMA - CM-FPR, GATIA, MAA

Comment on Name: Mouvement National pour la Libération de lAzawad (National Movement for the Liberation of Azawad)

Government of Mali - CMA

Comment on Name: Mouvement National pour la Libération de lAzawad (National Movement for the Liberation of Azawad)
Troop Size: 400 - 3000
Comment on Troop Size: Estimates on the number of MNLA fighters vary greatly. Sources indicate that some 400 Tuareg fighters returning from Libya and joining MNLA. However, the newly formed MNLA also included remnants of ATNMC, the group fighting the Malian government between 2007 and 2009, but there is no information on how many they numbered, wherefore the 400 estimate at the start of the year is probably too low. The newly formed group grew as Tuaregs soldiers that had deserted the Mali army and young recruits from the region joined it. Credible estimates eventually put the number at between 3000.

It should be noted that MNLA itself claims to number 9000 – 10000 men.

Note that in the 2014 fighting, the MNLA was aided by HCUA and MAA, each contributing with fighters at least in the high hundreds.
Secondary Support: All of the battles recorded for 2014 were fought by MNLA in collaboration with HCUA and MAA. Throughout, however, MNLA assumed political leadership and provided, in all likelihood, most of the fighters, even as HCUA was described as better trained and equipped.

Note that after the 23 May ceasefire, MNLA, HCUA and a faction of the MAA joined forces in creating a single group, the Coordination of Movements in Azawad, first as a political platform, and by October, as a joined armed force

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