General information
Current Name: Government of Iran
Current Name full English: Government of Iran
Current Name full native language: n/a
Original Name: Government of Iran
Original Name full English: Government of Iran
Original Name full native language: n/a
Actor Chronology
This section contains information about (if applicable) group splinters, name changes, and alliances according to the UCDP definitions of these concepts.
UCDP has not recorded any Chronology Activities involving this group.
Conflict issues
Government of Iran - KDPI
Conflict Goal Issues: The Kurdish Democratic Party of Iran (KDPI) was a Kurdish-nationalist rebel group that emerged in 1945 with a manifesto declaring its intent to establish an autonomous region for Kurdish people with self-rule and with a socialist economic system. In the KDPI’s manifesto the group expressed its intentions to establish an autonomous Kurdish region in Iran’s frontiers, for education reforms to be established to allow for more Kurdish language rights, for a democratic system to be put into place in the Kurdish region and for freedom of political action to be promoted in all of Iraq. The KDPI also called for improving its relations with Azerbaijani people and minority communities in Azerbaijan, to improve public services, and to establish economic reforms in order to preserve Kurdistan’s natural resources and economic abilities.
As the KDPI became involved in armed conflict with the government of Iran in 1989 and onwards, the group continued to release statements pertaining to several conflict goal issues. The group did not explicitly reaffirm their intent to establish reforms to the economic and education system, to improve foreign relations, nor to improve public services. They did, however, continuously call for the establishment of an autonomous and democratic Kurdistan in order to protect the civil rights of Kurdish people. The group also began emphasizing the cultural-, gender-, language-, and human rights of Kurdish people. The KDPI also called for the ousting of the government, stating that “In the Islamic Republic there is no freedom for the people.” Finally, as the KDPI reemerged in 2015, their intentions to oust the Iranian government were reaffirmed, as were calls for autonomy, democracy, and civil rights. The KDPI also began calling for the federalization of the Iranian state in the latter years of the coded conflict whereby all ethnicities in Iran would be given autonomous rule over their own regions.
The main conflict goal issues of the KDPI were the continuously emphasized desire to protect the civil rights of Kurdish people, the establishment of an autonomous Kurdish region within Iran, and the calls for establishing a democratic system, both within Kurdistan and in Iran as a whole. These issues were continuously mentioned and emphasized throughout the 70 years of the group’s coded existence.
Conflict Dynamics Issues: No statements from the KDPI pertaining to conflict dynamics issues were interpreted during the year of its emergence, although it would state several issues as the conflict emerged. In 1988, the group released several statements pertaining to conflict dynamics issues. The group stated that the Iranian government were intentionally targeting civilians based on their ethnicity: “The Iranian regime knows that 85 per cent of Kurds are against them, and that is why they imprison them, torture them and kill them.” These accusations of collective targeting and of abuses and atrocities against Kurdish civilians continued throughout the conflict. The KDPI also began calling for the support of the international community, on several occasions calling for other countries, specifically the U.S., to support the Kurdish cause and to oppose agreements with the Iranian government.
As the conflict dynamics issues of collective targeting, atrocities and abuses, and calls for political support for the Kurds were the only frequently mentioned issues, these are considered the main issues for the KDPI. All these issues were also continuously stated with heavy emphasis and were impactful to the group’s existence, which is why they are considered main issues.
Conflict Resolution Issues: Whilst no statements were made by the KDPI pertaining to conflict resolution issues during the year of its emergence, the group stated several issues as the conflict progressed. In the few instances the group did release statements pertaining to the resolution of the conflict, they stated their opposition to engaging in negotiations with the Iranian government on the grounds of them giving amnesty to perpetrators of abuses. These calls for investigation into and prosecution of human rights abuses were continuously mentioned in the years conflict resolution issues were coded.
The main conflict resolution issue for the KDPI was the continuously emphasized calls for accountability and prosecution of Iranian war criminals, as this was the only issue that was stated on several occasions, and it relates to the group’s other main issues.
Type of conflict issues: Conflict Goal Issues: Autonomy, Civil rights, CPS: Democracy, CPS: Secular state, Cultural rights, Economic reforms, Education system: culture, Federalism, Foreign policy reform, Gender rights, Human rights, Language rights, Opposition to elections, Oust full executive, Public services, Revenues from natural resources
Conflict Dynamics Issues: Atrocities and abuses, Collective targeting: ethnic, IFI: Humanitarian aid, IFI: International court/tribunal/investigation, IFI: Military support, IFI: Political support, IFI: Sanctions, IFI: Use of foreign influence, Military conduct, Revenge/vengeance
Conflict Resolution Issues:
Accountability/prosecution/investigation, Opposition to negotiations
Government of Iran - MEK
Conflict Goal Issues: [MEK] (/#/actor/308) (Mujahideen e Khalq Organization sometimes abbreviated as MKO, also referred to as the Peoples Mujahideen of Iran (PMOI) by international media) was a rebel group in Iran (/#/country/630) fighting against the [government of Iran] (/#/conflict/338). [MEK] (/#/actor/308) was committed to a radical, progressive interpretation of Islam’s Shi`i doctrine, and at the same time it was founded on both Marxist theories of class struggle and historical determinism, and neo-Marxist concepts of armed struggle, guerrilla warfare and revolutionary heroism. As a result, its ideology resulted from a combination of Muslim and Marxist themes. The group was formed in the 1960s and its first conflict goal issue was coded in 1963, when in an article entitled “Armed struggle is a Historical necessity” [MEK] (/#/actor/308) revealed not only the political awareness of the masses but also the fundamental bankruptcy of the old organizations that had tried to resist the regime and its imperial patrons through unarmed struggles: through street protests, labor strikes, and parliamentary reforms. [MEK] (/#/actor/308) conflict goals issues remained generally unchanged during the period analyzed, centered around the request to overthrow the executive. It is important to underline that in 1975 a [MEK’s] (/#/actor/308) part closer to Marxism ideology splinted from the group and founded the Marxist-Leninist branch of the People’s Mujahedin Organization in Iran, nevertheless the goals issues stated from the faction remaining in the [MEK] (/#/actor/308) were unaffected. Another important thing to underline is that the goal issue of fighting to establish democracy was coded for the first time in 1981 and then 1982, however, it became a central issue in [MEK’s] (/#/actor/308) statements from 1990s onwards. Further, the group claimed to develop a classless state where mosque was separated from state; and additionally, following the Marxist’s principles the group opposed imperialism and called for the nationalization of larger banks as well as factories owned by western corporations. In this framework [MEK] (/#/actor/308) stated that its ideal economic and social model was the one developed by the Nordic countries. Other conflict goals issues argued by the group were the request for more gender and civil rights. In the former case, the groups asked for equality between men and women which, according to them, had been worsened by the government of Iran’s policies. Additionally, in 1993 [MEK] (/#/actor/308) designated Maryam Rajavi – i.e., Maussad Rajavi’s (leader of MEK) wife – as interim president once the group had reached the executive. Regarding the latter case, it wanted to eliminate all the discriminatory practices against minorities, while asking for political rights and freedom of activity for different social categories. [MEK’s] (/#/actor/308) main conflict goals issues were the ousting of the executive, democracy, gender rights and civil rights. Indeed, the goal of overthrowing the government of Iran was central in most of the statements found from the beginning of the group’s activities and was coded in all the years addressed, except for 1997. Democracy became a central claim in the 1990s, nevertheless, it was particularly emphasized and frequently demanded in the group’s statements. The goal of gender rights was also particularly emphasized and recurrent in [MEK’s] (/#/actor/308) as were civil rights.
Conflict Dynamics Issues: The first conflict dynamic issue raised by [MEK’s] (/#/actor/308) was in 1972, when it accused the government of Iran of torturing and killing Mujahidin and stated: “You have tortured us, convicted us in your kangaroo courts, and now you are about to sign our death warrants. Have you ever stopped to think why so many young intellectuals like us are willing to join the armed struggle, spend their whole lives in prison, and if necessary, shed their blood? Have you ever asked yourself why so many of us are willing to make the supreme sacrifice?”. Similar to MEK’s continuous conflict goal of ousting the executive, the group’s conflict dynamics issues remained largely the same over time. In general, the group denounced the torture, abuses, violence, human rights violation, and oppressive and discriminative policies operated by the government of Iran against Iranian people, as well as mujaheddin and mujahedin prisoners. Additionally, the group appealed for decreases in foreign involvement in the conflict through calling for a decrease in foreign influence, financial and military support as well as political and religious support. However, these claims were related to the relation between foreign countries and the government of Iran, as a matter of fact, MEK’s did ask for foreign involvement in term of humanitarian aid, political or religious support to boycott the Khomeini regime and to transfer Iran's seat at the United Nations to the National Council of Resistance of Iran (the self-proclaimed Iranian parliament in exile under the guidance of Massaud Rajavi). Most importantly, from the end of the 1980s the group started to constantly ask the international community to send commissions to investigate the government of Iran’s continuous breaches of international law and human rights violations. Along the lines of this request, MEK’s asked for sanctions against the government of Ian. MEK’s main conflict dynamics issues were atrocities and abuses, collective targeting: political, and international investigation/court/tribunal.
Conflict Resolution Issues: [MEK’s] (/#/actor/308) first resolution issue was also the only one the project was able to find. It was raised in 1989 when the group’s leader Massoud Rajavi, issued a statement calling the amnesty move asked by the government of Iran “ridiculous maneuvering by a deadlocked regime following the massacre of political prisoners.”
[MEK’s] (/#/actor/308) conflict resolution issue remained the same over time. Indeed, the group demanded that the government of Iran be prosecuted, investigated, and held responsible for the violation of international law – in 2001 the group explicitly argued that the UN Security Council and Secretary General condemned the government of Iran for the violation of UNSC resolution 598 – continuous killings and torture of political prisoners, rights abuses, and export of terrorism.
As a result, the main conflict resolution issue was accountability/prosecution/investigation.
Type of conflict issues: Conflict Goal Issues: Basic needs, Change economic system, Civil rights, Constitutional issues, Corruption, CPS: Democracy, CPS: Islamic state, CPS: Other/undefined system, Cultural rights, Decentralization, Economic reforms, Electoral fraud, Electoral reform, Foreign policy reform, Freedom of association, Freedom of expression, Gender rights, Hold elections, Human rights, Labor rights, Land reforms, Law and order, Opposition to elections, Oust full executive, Public services, Referendum, Reform judicial system, Religious rights, Restructure military forces, Revenues from natural resources, Rule of law
Conflict Dynamics Issues: Atrocities and abuses, Collective targeting: other group, Collective targeting: political, DFI: Removal of foreign influence, DFI: Withdrawal of financial support, DFI: Withdrawal of military support, DFI: Withdrawal of political support, DFI: Withdrawal of sanctions, IFI: Financial support, IFI: Humanitarian aid, IFI: International court/tribunal/investigation, IFI: Political support, IFI: Sanctions, IFI: Use of foreign influence, Revenge/vengeance
Conflict Resolution Issues: Accountability/prosecution/investigation
Government of Iran - PJAK
Conflict Goal Issues: [PJAK] (/#/actor/309) (Partî Jiyanî Azadî Kurdistan: Free Life Party of Kurdistan, also known as the East Kurdistan Defense Forces and YRK) was a rebel group in Iran (/#/country/630) fighting against the [government of Iran] (/#/conflict/338). [PJAK] (/#/actor/309) was a leftist-nationalist group which originated as an Iranian branch of the Turkish-Kurdish group PKK to represent the Kurdish people in eastern Kurdistan and aimed to achieve democracy in Iran as well as equality for all nationalities, particularly for Kurdish people. As a result, it focused on the Kurdish area in north-western Iran. [PJAK] (/#/actor/309) was established the 25thApril 2004 when it stated its first conflict goal issues. The firsts conflict goals issues pronounced by the group were a call for democracy, autonomy and overthrowing of the executive. As stated in the group’s words: “Changing of the regime to a democratic system in which all citizens; Iranians, Kurds, Azers, Beluchs, Turkomans and Arabs and all other ethnic groups within the framework of the democratic system, can govern themselves”.
The conflict goal issues have generally remained the same over time, centered around the group’s goal of establishing a democratic confederation in Iran. Alongside these goals [PJAK] (/#/actor/309) steadily claimed more political rights, as well as cultural and human rights. Additionally, the group opposed what it perceived as a patriarchal society and demanded more freedom and rights for women. Indeed, [PJAK] (/#/actor/309) had a women's armed wing called the Defense Forces (HPJ). Moreover, the other goal issue raised in multiple years was a call to reform the judiciary system.
[PJAK] (/#/actor/309) main conflict goals issues were democracy, confederation, civil rights, cultural rights and reforms of the judicial system, demonstrated by the emphasis the groups put on them. Indeed, [PJAK] (/#/actor/309) frequently expressed their will to both create a confederation in a more democratic Iran and to achieve more political and cultural rights for the Kurds living in Iran. It is in this framework that [PJAK] (/#/actor/309) was searching to reform the Iranian judicial system.
Conflict Dynamics Issues: Similar to PJAK’s continuous conflict goal of democracy, the group’s conflict dynamics issues remained largely the same over time. In general, the group denounced the torture, abuses, violence, human rights violation, and oppressive and discriminatory policies operated by the Iranian government against different categories – e.g., prisoners, women, political activists, Kurdish people in general and those who have different sets of beliefs. Additionally, PJAK appealed for increased foreign involvement in the conflict through calling for political support, the use of international influence, and humanitarian aid. Furthermore, it asked for a release of prisoners in both 2008 and 2010. The main conflict dynamics issues for PJAK were atrocities and abuses, and collective targeting: ethnic. Further, the group particularly emphasized the atrocities suffered by Kurdish people together with death sentences and torture. Indeed, as stated by the group: “the Iranian authorities ill-treatment of prisoners, torture, death sentences given to Kurdish activists, summary execution, human rights violations, continues oppressive and discrimination policies against women, Kurds and other ethnic and religious minorities.”
Conflict Resolution Issues: The first conflict resolution issue raised by PJAK was in 2009, when they expressed the group’s preferred negotiation structure for the Arbil conference. The group stated: “[…] However, if the aim of the conference is to achieve the goals of Erdogan and Turkey, that is, if they come and achieve easily in Arbil what they failed to achieve with army forces, we do not support it and we will stand against it. To my mind a conference requires a plan prepared beforehand so that it will be clear for everyone where the roads emanate from and where they lead to”. The project was able to find some conflict resolutions issues only towards the last years of PJAK’s activity for the period analyzed (i.e., 2009-2011). In 2010 and 2011 the group called for a ceasefire, and in 2010 also for a negotiation, the group argued that it was because some “friendly individuals” asked it to stop fighting and due to the fact that the group believed in democratic and peaceful solution to the Kurdish issue. PJAK’s main conflict resolution issue was call for ceasefire. It was called both in 2010 and 2011 and as they stated, “To prepare the ground for dialogue, negotiation and a political solution, a peaceful environment devoid of any violence where the politics can play its role, is needed; therefore, the immediate cessation of the military operation is required.”
Type of conflict issues: Conflict Goal Issues: Autonomy, Change judicial system, Civil rights, Confederation/union, CPS: Democracy, Cultural rights, Decentralization, Economic reforms, Freedom of association, Gender rights, Human rights, Language rights, Opposition to elections, Oust full executive, Protection of natural resources/the environment, Recognition as a political party, Reform executive structure, Reform judicial system, Religious rights
Conflict Dynamics Issues: Atrocities and abuses, Collective targeting: ethnic, Collective targeting: political, IFI: Humanitarian aid, IFI: Political support, Military conduct
Conflict Resolution Issues: Call for ceasefire, Structure of negotiations
Government of Iran - Jondullah
Conflict Goal Issues: [Jondullah] (/#/actor/310) (also spelled Jondollah or Jundallah or Soldiers (Army) of God) was a rebel group in Iran fighting the government of Iran (/#/conflict/338). The group stressed Baloch identity, culture, and religion as distinct from that of Iran, which the group claimed occupied their country. Furthermore, it wanted to preserve the national identity and dignity of Baloch people as well as establish a democratic system in Iran in which all people of different races, creeds, religions, and beliefs have equal rights in managing the affairs of their country. Abdolmalek Rigi was the group’s leader from its creation in 2003 up until his arrest and death in 2012. The first conflict goals issues were found in a statement from 2006, when the group called for more cultural, religious, and civil rights. In the group’s words: “In the past we resorted to many means to protect the national and religious rights of the Baluchis and Sunnis in Baluchistan province. As you know, everybody in Baluchistan is a Sunni and a Baluch. But since this revolution, some 27 years ago, till today the Sunnis have remained the most impoverished group in the country with lots of serious issues. [...] What I am saying is that before us, there were many who wanted to engage in political activities, but the government denied this to them. That is when we started our activities with the aim of defending our rights. And then we realized that there is no other way than to take up arms and begin an armed struggle. This is our last means.” The conflict goal issues have generally remained the same over time, centered around the group’s goals of achieving more cultural, civil, and religious rights. Indeed, the group claimed that the Baloch people should have the same rights as Iranian people. In particular, it asked for the possibility to preach the Baloch faith, and to recognize Baloch nationality and identity. It has expressed wishes for more human rights and freedom of expression, since according to [Jondullah] (/#/actor/310) whenever a Sunni Muslim says something different he/she will end up in prison. The main conflict goals issues claimed by Jondullah were cultural, civil, and religious rights. All the three were recurrent and particularly emphasized by the group in many of its statements. According to Jondullah “The only thing we ask of the Iranian government is to be citizens. We want to have the same rights as the Iranian Shiite people. That's it. We do not want discrimination between Sunnis and Shiites in this country.”
Conflict Dynamics Issues: The first conflict dynamics issue raised by [Jondullah] (/#/actor/310) was when the group denounced a form of collective targeting by the Iranian government against the Sunni Baloch people because of both their ethnic and religious differences from the majority Iranian Shiites. As stated by the group “They have committed genocide in our province. They kill people simply because they are Baluchis or Sunnis.” Similar to Jondullah’s continuous conflict goal of independence, the group’s conflict dynamics issues remained largely the same over time. In general, the group condemned the government of Iran for the excessive use of torture and execution of Balochi people, as well as killing of religious leaders and youth. The group referred to it as genocide of the Sunni Balochi people. Furthermore, in 2006 Jondullah appealed for the presence of an international organization in case of peace talks, since the group wanted to hold peace talk but did not trust the government. The group also asked for the support of the whole world to preserve their people from humiliation, as well as an international investigation conducted by the UN to find out about the massacre that the government of Iran organized against the Balochi people. In several years, the group claimed to organize attack against the government of Iran to avenge the attacks, violence and atrocities committed by the government of Iran against the Balochi people and some Jondullah’s. The main conflict dynamics issues stated by Jondullah were collective targeting: ethnic and religious, and atrocities and abuses. Accordingly, the groups frequently referred to the gross violation and torture committed by the government of Iran against the Balochi Sunni people; and these statements were also more emphasized by the group compared to others. As stated by the group “Despotic religious rule like fascism, like Nazism, has been imposed upon the Iranians, upon the people, and particularly against ethnic minorities like the Baloch, Kurd, Arab, Azeri, Turk and religious minorities like Sunni, Jews and the Christians”.
Conflict Resolution Issues: The first conflict resolution issues were raised by the group in 2006, when Jondullah asked for negotiations but only in the presence of a foreign mediator, and by doing it the group set out a structure of how the negotiations should proceed. Accordingly, “We want to hold talks with them in the presence of formal international organizations. Talks in the desert or in a house are useless. We do not trust them because they have revoked on their earlier promises they made to us”. The group’s conflict resolution issue was the call for negotiations, which the group claimed in 2006, 2008 and 2010. Jondullah stated that it was prepared to hold talks and that issues should be resolved through dialogue. Additionally in 2006 the group set out how it wanted to hold talks. Accordingly, the main conflict resolution issue was call for negotiations, based on the recurrency with which the group claimed for and the number of years it was asked. Indeed, the project was able to code for call for negotiations in three years.
Type of conflict issues: Conflict Goal Issues: Autonomy, Citizenship reforms, Civil rights, Corruption, CPS: Democracy, Cultural rights, Economic reforms, Federalism, Foreign policy reform, Freedom of expression, Human rights, Law and order, Oust full executive, Protection of cultural heritage, Public services, Religious rights
Conflict Dynamics Issues: Atrocities and abuses, Collective targeting: ethnic, Collective targeting: religious, IFI: Foreign mediator, IFI: International court/tribunal/investigation, IFI: Political support, Release of prisoners
Conflict Resolution Issues: Call for negotiations
Government of Iran - IS
Conflict Goal Issues: Islamic State, al-Dawla al-Islamiya, (IS) was a Salafist-Sunni Islamist global rebel group that emerged in Iraq and Syria in 2004. The group originally emerged with the goals of toppling the Iraqi regime and replacing the government with an Islamic state with Sharia law as well as ousting the occupying forces currently residing in the country, but its goals drastically shifted as it grew in size to wish to establish a global Islamic caliphate governed by Sharia law. Whilst the group was international for the majority of its existence, IS is considered a rebel group involved in several dyads as the group fought against, and attempted to overthrow, several individual governments as part of its international aims, and has been coded as such. However, many IS statements were not pertaining to specific countries, and the project has, hence, chosen to code them as pertaining to all countries with significant IS presence. Finally, whilst various groups have claimed allyship and adherence to IS, only statements from official IS groups have been coded by the project as legitimate sources for interpreting conflict issues. The Iran-IS dyad was initiated in 2016 following an Iranian attack on IS targets, although no statements pertaining to conflict goal issues were interpreted by the group during this year. Instead, when the conflict became active in 2017, IS pronounced several issues. During this year, they called for the ousting of the government and the Iranian leadership, accusing the government of spreading Shia influence and of blasphemy, and of influencing IS conflicts with Iraq and Syria. They also called for Sunni Muslims to “engage in violent jihad to put an end to what he described as their ‘subjugation’ at the hands of the Shia authorities.” Finally, they declared its intent to extend the planned Islamic caliphate into Iran, and establish an Islamic state governed by Sharia law.
Conflict Dynamics Issues: During 2017, IS stated conflict dynamics issues against the Iranian state, when they called for the collective targeting of Shia Muslim as a way of revenge for their “repression” of Sunnis.
Conflict Resolution Issues: The project coded no statements from IS in Iran pertaining to conflict resolution issues.
Type of conflict issues: The coded conflict issues for this group are: Conflict Goal Issues: Blasphemy, Change judicial system, CPS: Islamic state, Foreign policy reform, Oust full executive, Oust head of the executive, Religious rights, Restrictions on religious rights
Conflict Dynamics Issues: Call for collective targeting: religious, Revenge/vengeance
Conflict Resolution Issues:
Government of Afghanistan - UIFSA
Conflict Goal Issues: United Islamic Front for the Salvation of Afghanistan, originally called Supreme Council for the Defence of Afghanistan (SCDA), (UIFSA) was an Islamist rebel group fighting against the government of Afghanistan to remove the Taleban government that had recently seized power. The group was established in 1996 through the merger of approximately 13 rebel groups opposed to Taleban control of the government and operated mostly in North-Western Afghanistan. As UIFSA emerged as a coalition consisting of several different rebel groups, the only main characteristic attributed to the group was its shared ideals of unifying and all-inclusive Islamism including both Shi’ite and Sunni Muslims, as opposed to the Sunni Muslim characteristic of the Taleban. During the year of its emergence, UIFSA stated four conflict goal issues, calling for the ousting of the Taleban government followed by the establishment of interim executive power-sharing through the facilitating of an extensive national forum inviting all facets of Afghanistan society. UIFSA also stated its intentions to protect the cultural and religious rights of Shia Muslims which were under threat following the Taleban’s seizing of power.
As the conflict progressed, UIFSA continuously called for the ousting of the Taleban government, although the proposed interim power-sharing stated in 1996 was instead replaced with calls for the establishment of permanent executive power-sharing. Cultural rights were reemphasized on two occasions, although not explicitly pertaining to Shia Muslims but rather to all Afghani civilians. Protection of religious rights was also restated on one occasion, calling for the protection of religious minorities from massacres from the government. UIFSA also raised several new conflict goal issues throughout the conflict, occasionally calling for the establishment of an Islamic state, executive-, parliamentary-, and judicial reform, security sector power-sharing and restructuring of the military forces, and protection of civil-, human-, and gender rights of the Afghan people. UIFSA also called for the establishment of law and order in Afghanistan continuously throughout the conflict, emphasizing regional security and terrorism which plagued the country.
The main conflict goal issues of UIFSA were the ousting of the Taleban government, the establishment of executive power-sharing, and the protection of the Afghan people through establishing law and order. These issues were continuously stated and heavily emphasized throughout the conflict, indicating their centrality to the group.
Conflict Dynamics Issues: UIFSA stated two conflict dynamics issues during 1996, calling for the removal of foreign influence over the Afghan government and calling for the demilitarization of Kabul as a precondition for signing a ceasefire agreement with the government, indicating calls regarding military conduct.
As the conflict progressed, calls for removal of foreign influence over the Taleban government, although which specific countries or actors that were influencing Afghanistan was never explicitly stated, were continuously interpreted from UIFSA. Issues of military conduct were stated in 1997 as well, but not reemphasized after that. On two instances in the first half of the conflict UIFSA called for prisoners of war to be released, although such statements were not coded after 1998. On two instances, UIFSA accused the Taleban government of conducting attacks on civilians through massacres and terrorism. Towards the end of the conflict, UIFSA began significantly increasing statements toward the international community calling for the withdrawal of financial and military support from the government and for the withdrawal of foreign military forces in 2001. The group also began calling for international assistance through political support, humanitarian aid, and sanctions against the government. Furthermore, UIFSA continuously called for assistance through a foreign third-party mediator and international pressure on the Afghan government to engage in negotiations to resolve the conflict toward the latter half of the conflict.
The main conflict resolution issues of UIFSA were the calls for removal of foreign influence, calls for the assistance of a foreign mediator and calls for foreign influence to assist in resolving the conflict. These issues were heavily emphasized, particularly toward the end of the conflict, and related to the other main conflict issues of UIFSA.
Conflict Resolution Issues: In 1996, UIFSA stated two conflict resolution issues, calling for negotiations with the government and for “all groups and individuals who have some influence on the issue of Afghanistan” to “meet and discuss the issues.”, calling for the facilitation of national dialogue.
Whilst calls for national dialogue were not explicitly restated following 1996, calls for negotiations were interpreted in every active conflict year of UIFSA. The group also began continuously calling for ceasefires to be implemented for most active years of the conflict, indicating intentions to resolve the conflict through mediation and negotiations. On singular occasions UIFSA did state its opposition to negotiations with the government, motivated by recent aggression by the Taleban and perceived futility of negotiations. The group also called for international presence and oversight of negotiations on two occasions toward the end of the conflict.
The main conflict resolution issues stated by UIFSA were the calls for ceasefires and calls for negotiations. Both issues were stated continuously and frequently throughout the entire conflict and indicated the group’s intentions to resolve the conflict peacefully.
Type of conflict issues: Conflict Goal Issues: Basic needs, Civil rights, CPS: Islamic state, Cultural rights, Economic reforms, Executive power-sharing, Executive power-sharing: interim, Foreign policy reform, Gender rights, Human rights, Law and order, Opposition to share power in the executive, Oust full executive, Protection of natural resources/the environment, Referendum, Reform executive structure, Reform judicial system, Reform parliament, Religious rights, Restructure military forces, Security sector power-sharing
Conflict Dynamics Issues: Atrocities and abuses, DFI: Removal of foreign influence, DFI: Withdrawal of financial support, DFI: Withdrawal of military intervention/foreign forces, DFI: Withdrawal of military support, IFI: Foreign mediator, IFI: Humanitarian aid, IFI: Political support, IFI: Sanctions, IFI: Use of foreign influence, Military conduct, Release of prisoners
Conflict Resolution Issues:
Call for ceasefire, Call for negotiations, National dialogue, Opposition to negotiations, Structure of negotiations
Government of Syria - Syrian insurgents
Conflict Goal Issues: Syrian insurgents is an umbrella term employed by the UCDP to cover all rebel groups active in Syria, as distinguishing between actions and statements of individual groups is next to impossible. The umbrella term is coded as a rebel group by the project as it is considered a cohesive actor with a stated incompatibility with a government. As Syrian insurgents encompass upwards of 1200 individual rebel groups, no unifying characteristic apart from a desire to remove the Syrian government can be stated for the groups, seeing as ideological convictions, religious beliefs, and ethnic adherences vary widely. Syrian insurgents began emerging in 2011 during the Syrian civil war, during which several conflict goal issues were stated by groups belonging to the umbrella term. Syrian insurgent groups called for the establishment of democracy in Syria through the ousting of the Syrian government, calling for elections to be held. Groups also expressed intentions to restructure military and national police forces to reestablish rule of law in Syria, for human rights to be protected and for the basic needs of the Syrian people to be ensured.
As the civil war progressed, Syrian insurgent groups continuously reemphasized their intentions to oust the Syrian government. Groups also made occasional remarks toward providing the basic needs of the Syrian people and establishing law and order. The other issues raised during 2011 were not explicitly reemphasized, however. Whilst various groups raised several issues in singular instances, noteworthy issues that were raised with continuity and heavy emphasis were the establishment of an Islamic state in Syria, which emerged in 2012 and remained continuous throughout the conflict and the establishment of Sharia law which followed a similar trend. Insurgent groups initially raised issues of civil and human rights, but such emphasis was dropped as the conflict progressed, and on two instances groups called for the religious rights of non-Muslims to be restricted, instead.
The main conflict goal issues of the Syrian insurgents were the ousting of the Syrian government, the establishment of an Islamic state and the introduction of Sharia law. The overthrowing of the government was continuously mentioned throughout the entire conflict and stated with heavy emphasis. Issues of establishing an Islamic state governed by Sharia law, whilst continuously and frequently stated by insurgent groups, should not be inferred to all Syrian rebel groups, as many Syrian insurgent groups were not Islamist or even Muslim. Despite this, their frequent and continuous mentioning makes these issues main issues for certain Syrian insurgent groups.
Conflict Dynamics Issues: During the first year of conflict, Syrian insurgent groups stated five conflict dynamics issues, accusing the Syrian government of conducting massacres against civilians, indirectly accusing the “irresponsible military machine that protects the regime” of indiscriminatory attacks, calling upon the international community to provide “international ‘military assistance’” to the rebel groups whilst also expressing their opposition to foreign forces currently residing in the country. Finally, Syrian insurgent groups also called for the targeting of “the security forces that kill civilians and besiege cities”, indicating calls for collective targeting of Syrian security forces.
As the conflict progressed, calls for the removal of foreign forces were continuously made, relating to American, Iranian, Russian, and other external interference that supported the Syrian government. The group also frequently accused government forces of further atrocities, although military misconduct, specifically, was not restated. During the first few years of the conflict, Syrian insurgent groups also called for military support and a military intervention, although these calls were dropped after 2014. During the middle of the conflict, Syrian insurgent groups continuously accused the government of intentional collective targeting of Muslim civilians in Syria, whilst also beginning to call for collective targeting of non-Muslim civilians and, on one occasion, of political opponents. Finally, Syrian insurgent groups called upon the international community to withdraw its military and political support from the Syrian government.
The main conflict dynamics issues of Syrian insurgent groups were the removal of foreign influence, withdrawal of military forces, military support, and political support that enabled the Syrian government, and accusations of abuses committed by the government. These issues were all continuously stated throughout the conflict with heavy emphasis and were central to the aims of many of the Syrian rebel groups.
Conflict Resolution Issues: During the first year of conflict, Syrian insurgent groups stated two conflict resolution issues, calling for the establishment of a “military court for the revolution” to be established to investigate and hold accountable members of the Syrian government who ordered and carried out killings and assaults on Syrian citizens. Parts of Syrian insurgent groups also called for a general amnesty to be granted to its members.
As the conflict progressed and intensified, no further mention was made of amnesties, although issues of accountability and investigations were stated on two further occasions in the first half of the conflict. From 2013 and onwards, Syrian insurgent groups continuously stated their opposition to negotiations with the government. On singular instances, the groups also called for a ceasefire to be implemented, stated issues with proposed DDR programs, and stated their opposition to negotiated peace agreements.
The main conflict resolution issues of Syrian insurgent groups were their opposition to negotiations with the Syrian government and calls for investigations into human rights abuses committed by the government and military and accountability of perpetrators. These issues were heavily emphasized through different stages of the conflict, and were integral to the group’s position toward the government, which is why they are considered main issues.
Type of conflict issues: Conflict Goal Issues: Basic needs, Blasphemy, Bureaucratic setup, Change judicial system, Change of administrative divisions, Citizenship reforms, Civil rights, Corruption, CPS: Democracy, CPS: Islamic state, CPS: Other/undefined system, Destruction of cultural heritage, Hold elections, Human rights, Law and order, Oust full executive, Oust local executive, Protection of cultural heritage, Public services, Restrictions on religious rights, Restructure military forces, Restructure police forces, Revenues from natural resources, Rule of law, Water resources
Conflict Dynamics Issues: Atrocities and abuses, Call for collective targeting: other group, Call for collective targeting: political, Call for collective targeting: religious, Collective targeting: religious, DFI: Removal of foreign influence, DFI: Removal of foreign mediator, DFI: Withdrawal of international monitoring, DFI: Withdrawal of military intervention/foreign forces, DFI: Withdrawal of military support, DFI: Withdrawal of political support, IFI: Financial support, IFI: Humanitarian aid, IFI: International court/tribunal/investigation, IFI: Military intervention/foreign forces, IFI: Military support, IFI: Political support, IFI: Use of foreign influence, Military conduct, Release of prisoners, Return of refugees/IDPs, Revenge/vengeance
Conflict Resolution Issues:
Accountability/prosecution/investigation, Amnesties, Call for implementation/abiding to ceasefire, DDR issues, Opposition to negotiations, Opposition to peace agreement
Government of Syria - IS
Conflict Goal Issues: Islamic State, al-Dawla al-Islamiya, (IS) was a Salafist-Sunni Islamist global rebel group that emerged in Iraq and Syria in 2004. The group originally emerged with the goals of toppling the Iraqi regime and replacing the government with an Islamic state with Sharia law as well as ousting the occupying forces currently residing in the country, but its goals drastically shifted as it grew in size to wish to establish a global Islamic caliphate governed by Sharia law. Whilst the group was international for the majority of its existence, IS is considered a rebel group involved in several dyads as the group fought against, and attempted to overthrow, several individual governments as part of its international aims, and has been coded as such. However, many IS statements were not pertaining to specific countries, and the project has, hence, chosen to code them as pertaining to all countries with significant IS presence. Finally, whilst various groups have claimed allyship and adherence to IS, only statements from official IS groups have been coded by the project as legitimate sources for interpreting conflict issues. IS officially emerged in Syria following an expansion from Iraq in 2013, although earlier communications from the group that were made during its emergence in Iraq were interpreted as pertaining to both the Syrian and Iraqi government. During the year of its original emergence, the group pronounced several conflict goal issues. They called for the oppression of Sunni Muslims by “hateful rejectionists and the occupying crusaders” (non-believers, Shiites, and the occupying forces) to be ended and for their religious rights to be restored and respected. IS also stated its intent in changing the political and judicial system through the establishment of an Islamic State governed by Sharia law.
As the conflict progressed, the IS continuously reaffirmed its intent in protecting religious rights and changing the political and judicial system in Iraq. Furthermore, many new issues were pronounced by the group and related international IS groups, which is why only issues that were mentioned continuously will be discussed in this narrative. In the beginning of the conflict, as a part of its plan to establish an Islamic State, the group began calling for the ousting of the Iraqi government with accusations of governmental corruption. The group also called attention to blasphemous acts perpetrated by Iraqi soldiers whilst also calling for the restriction of non-Sunni and non-Muslim religious rights. The group also indicated for cultural rights of Muslims to be protected, although this was not as frequently mentioned throughout the conflict as the other issues. In 2007, the group was pushed back significantly by coalition forces, and was, thus, far less communicative until 2009. In 2009, these issues were reemphasized, and also joined with calls for law and order to be protected and for economic reform, which are two issues the IS would continuously call for toward the latter stages of the coded conflict. During 2014 IS initiated a clear shift in policy, goal, and aims toward the establishment of an international Islamic caliphate, which came shortly after IS emergence into Syria. This also had an effect on the pronounced conflict goal issues as the group became more communicative and more focused on becoming positively regarded by international Muslims. Likely for this reason, IS began calling for the civil rights and basic needs of Muslims to be protected and respected, whilst also calling for gender-, civil-, and religious rights to be restricted for non-Muslims. The group also began calling for and implementing changes to infrastructure to ensure the availability of public services in their controlled areas. Finally, they also began calling for increased religious, particularly Sunni-Muslim, teachings in schools.
Throughout the conflict, IS continuously pronounced several conflict goal issues as important to the group. Preventing blasphemy, changing the judicial system, establishing an Islamic State, ousting the government, protecting Muslim rights, and restricting religious rights of non-believers were all frequently mentioned throughout the conflict. The most heavily emphasized issues were, however, the establishment of an Islamic state, the establishment of Sharia law, and the protection of Muslim rights, as these were frequently stated with heavy emphasis and became foundational pillars for the Islamic State as a group, which is why they are considered its main issues.
Conflict Dynamics Issues: During the first year of the group’s existence, IS stated several conflict dynamics issues. They called attention to collective targeting and structural oppression of Sunni Muslims based on their faith, whilst also calling for the collective targeting of non-Muslims in Iraq. The group also heavily emphasized the removal of foreign forces and foreign influence from Iraqi soil: ‘lift the injustice suffered by the Sunnis overpowered by the hateful rejectionists and the occupying crusaders, and to assist the oppressed, and restore his rights to him’. They also called for the release of prisoners.
As the conflict progressed, the IS began calling attention to alleged atrocities against Muslim civilians based on their religious beliefs, which would become a commonly stated issue for the group. They also continued to emphasize the removal of foreign forces and influence throughout the entire coded conflict. The group also continued its emphasis on collective targeting of non-Muslims, specifically calling for the targeting of ‘Kuffar’ (non-believers). IS also began calling for vengeance against atrocities committed against Muslims and called for the international Muslim diaspora to assist the group’s cause financially and militarily. These two issues would become heavily emphasized after 2014 as well. Throughout the conflict, IS released sparse statements pertaining to collective targeting of political supporters of the government and non-commissioned members of the military and for international financial support from non-Muslims, although these were not continuously stated.
The main conflict dynamics issues of the IS were the calls for removal of foreign forces, calls for collective targeting of non-Muslims, specifically relating to international terrorism toward the later stages of conflict, and the accusations of atrocities perpetrated by state militaries in the area against Muslims based on their Islamic faith. These issues were continuously mentioned, but also especially emphasized throughout the entire conflict.
Conflict Resolution Issues: IS made few remarks regarding conflict resolution issues, and the resolution of conflict does not seem to have been a high priority for the group. Throughout the conflict, they stated its support of Islamism, its opposition to peace agreements, and a call for compensation of Muslim civilians who had been targeted by government violence on singular instances. These were the only stated conflict resolution issues interpreted by the IS.
Type of conflict issues: Conflict Goal Issues: Basic needs, Blasphemy, Change economic system, Change judicial system, Change of administrative divisions, Civil rights, Corruption, CPS: Islamic state, Destruction of cultural heritage, Economic reforms, Education system: culture, Education system: increase religion, Gender rights, Labor rights, Law and order, Oust full executive, Protection of cultural heritage, Public services, Reform executive structure, Religious rights, Restriction of gender rights, Restrictions on civil rights, Restrictions on religious rights, Restructure military forces, Restructure police forces, Revenues from natural resources, Rule of law, Security sector power-sharing, State structures, Unification of states, Water resources
Conflict Dynamics Issues: Atrocities and abuses, Call for collective targeting: other group, Call for collective targeting: political, Call for collective targeting: religious, Collective targeting: ethnic, Collective targeting: religious, DFI: Removal of foreign influence, DFI: Withdrawal of military intervention/foreign forces, IFI: Financial support, IFI: Support from diasporas/foreign fighters, Release of prisoners, Revenge/vengeance
Conflict Resolution Issues:
Compensation/restoration, Islamism, Opposition to peace agreement
Government of Mali - JNIM
Conflict Goal Issues: Jamaat Nusrat al-Islam wal-Muslimin, Group for the Support of Islam and Muslims (JNIM) emerged as an Islamist rebel group following a merger of several jihadist groups. The rebel group was created in 2017, during which it stated one conflict goal issue. The group declared its intent to alter the judicial system as it considered the Mauritian government to not “rule according [to] Islamic Sharia law and it supported ‘Christian’ France against the mujahidin in Mali.” Essentially, the group’s first announced conflict goal was to establish Sharia law in Mali and declared opposition to those who resisted it.
During 2018, JNIM reaffirmed its intent to establish Sharia law in Mali but also expressed its opposition to the Malian elections, stating that the only solution to French occupation was jihad.
The main conflict goal issue of JNIM was the establishment of Sharia law in Mali.
Conflict Dynamics Issues: During its first year, JNIM accused the combined forces of France and Mali of conducting operations which resulted in the killing, arrest, and displacement of innocent Muslims. Based on this, JNIM called upon the French military to withdraw their military, and threatened revenge upon the French military and its allies for “killing its [JNIM’s] militants”.
In the following year, JNIM accused the French military to have conducted massacres against Muslims in Mali. This, once again, caused the group to call for withdrawal of French troops, stating that “war between us will not end until the last soldier from the soldiers of Crusader France evacuate the Muslim land of Mali”. During the second year the JNIM also called upon its diaspora community to assist their cause.
The main conflict dynamics issue of JNIM was the issue of atrocities against civilians and the withdrawal of foreign forces from Mali.
Conflict Resolution Issues: The project coded no statements from JNIM pertaining to conflict resolution issues.
Type of conflict issues: Conflict Goal Issues: Change judicial system, Opposition to elections
Conflict Dynamics Issues: Atrocities and abuses, DFI: Withdrawal of military intervention/foreign forces, IFI: Support from diasporas/foreign fighters, Revenge/vengeance
Conflict Resolution Issues:
Government of Mali - IS
Conflict Goal Issues: Islamic State, al-Dawla al-Islamiya, (IS) was a Salafist-Sunni Islamist global rebel group that emerged in Iraq and Syria in 2004. The group originally emerged with the goals of toppling the Iraqi regime and replacing the government with an Islamic state with Sharia law as well as ousting the occupying forces currently residing in the country, but its goals drastically shifted as it grew in size to wish to establish a global Islamic caliphate governed by Sharia law. Whilst the group was international for the majority of its existence, IS is considered a rebel group involved in several dyads as the group fought against, and attempted to overthrow, several individual governments as part of its international aims, and has been coded as such. However, many IS statements were not pertaining to specific countries, and the project has, hence, chosen to code them as pertaining to all countries with significant IS presence. Finally, whilst various groups have claimed allyship and adherence to IS, only statements from official IS groups have been coded by the project as legitimate sources for interpreting conflict issues. IS officially emerged in Mali in 2016, following the recognition of the Islamic State Greater Sahara (ISGS) as a legitimate faction of the group. During this year, the group made one statement pertaining to conflict goals when it stated its allegiance to the IS and their intentions to establish an Islamic state in Mali, aiming to incorporate it into the greater Islamic Caliphate.
Conflict Dynamics Issues: In the year prior to its recognition, when the group was created in 2015 the ISGS released a statement calling upon “all the jihadi groups to pledge allegiance to the Caliph, to unify the word of the Muslims and align the ranks in front of the enemies of religion”. This was the only statement interpreted by IS in Mali regarding conflict dynamics issues.
Conflict Resolution Issues: The project coded no statements from IS in Mali pertaining to conflict resolution issues.
Type of conflict issues: The coded conflict issues for this group are: Conflict Goal Issues: CPS: Islamic state
Conflict Dynamics Issues: IFI: Support from diasporas/foreign fighters
Conflict Resolution Issues:
Annual information
This section contains annual information systematically collected by the UCDP.
1979
Actor Active in Dyad(s):
Government of Iran - KDPI
Government of Iran - MEK
Government of Iran - APCO
1980
Actor Active in Dyad(s):
Government of Iran - KDPI
Government of Iran - Government of Iraq
Government of Iran - MEK
Government of Iran - APCO
1981
Actor Active in Dyad(s):
Government of Iran - KDPI
Government of Iran - Government of Iraq
Government of Iran - MEK
1982
Actor Active in Dyad(s):
Government of Iran - KDPI
Government of Iran - Government of Iraq
Government of Iran - MEK
1983
Actor Active in Dyad(s):
Government of Iran - KDPI
Government of Iran - Government of Iraq
1984
Actor Active in Dyad(s):
Government of Iran - KDPI
Government of Iran - Government of Iraq
1985
Actor Active in Dyad(s):
Government of Iran - KDPI
Government of Iran - Government of Iraq
1986
Actor Active in Dyad(s):
Government of Iran - KDPI
Government of Iran - Government of Iraq
Government of Iran - MEK
1987
Actor Active in Dyad(s):
Government of Iran - KDPI
Government of Iran - Government of Iraq
Government of Iran - MEK
1988
Actor Active in Dyad(s):
Government of Iran - KDPI
Government of Iran - Government of Iraq
Government of Iran - MEK
1990
Actor Active in Dyad(s):
Government of Iran - KDPI
1991
Actor Active in Dyad(s):
Government of Iran - MEK
1993
Actor Active in Dyad(s):
Government of Iran - KDPI
Government of Iran - MEK
1996
Actor Active in Dyad(s):
Government of Iran - KDPI
1997
Actor Active in Dyad(s):
Government of Iran - MEK
1999
Actor Active in Dyad(s):
Government of Iran - MEK
2000
Actor Active in Dyad(s):
Government of Iran - MEK
2001
Actor Active in Dyad(s):
Government of Iran - MEK
2005
Actor Active in Dyad(s):
Government of Iran - PJAK
Government of Iran - Civilians
2006
Actor Active in Dyad(s):
Government of Iran - PJAK
Government of Iran - Jondullah
2007
Actor Active in Dyad(s):
Government of Iran - PJAK
Government of Iran - Jondullah
2008
Actor Active in Dyad(s):
Government of Iran - PJAK
Government of Iran - Jondullah
2009
Actor Active in Dyad(s):
Government of Iran - PJAK
Government of Iran - Jondullah
Government of Iran - Civilians
2010
Actor Active in Dyad(s):
Government of Iran - Jondullah
2011
Actor Active in Dyad(s):
Government of Iran - PJAK
2017
Actor Active in Dyad(s):
Government of Iran - IS
2018
Actor Active in Dyad(s):
Government of Iran - PJAK
2019
Actor Active in Dyad(s):
Government of Iran - Civilians
Government of Iran - Opponents of Khamenei
2020
Actor Active in Dyad(s):
Government of Iran - PJAK
Government of Iran - Civilians
Government of Iran - Government of Israel
2021
Actor Active in Dyad(s):
Government of Iran - PJAK
Government of Iran - Civilians
Government of Iran - Government of Israel
2022
Actor Active in Dyad(s):
Government of Iran - Civilians
Government of Iran - Opponents of Khamenei
Government of Iran - Government of Israel
2023
Actor Active in Dyad(s):
Government of Iran - Jaish al-Adl
Government of Iran - Government of Israel
2024
Actor Active in Dyad(s):
Government of Iran - Jaish al-Adl
Government of Iran - Government of Israel
2025
Actor Active in Dyad(s):
Government of Iran - Jaish al-Adl
Government of Iran - Government of Israel
Group Archive
This section contains annual information no longer systematically collected by the UCDP.
1979 Group Archive
Government of Iran - KDPI
Government of Iran - MEK
Government of Iran - APCO
Troop Size: 415 000
1980 Group Archive
Government of Iran - KDPI
Troop Size: 305 000
Government of Iran - Government of Iraq
Troop Size: 246 000 - 305 000
Government of Iran - MEK
Government of Iran - APCO
Troop Size: 305 000
1981 Group Archive
Government of Iran - KDPI
Troop Size: 260 000
Government of Iran - Government of Iraq
Troop Size: 260 000
Secondary Support: Both Syria and Libya provided Soviet-made weaponry to Iran. Logistics were provided for such transfers to occur, in many cases quite complicated.
Government of Iran - MEK
Troop Size: 260 000
1982 Group Archive
Government of Iran - KDPI
Troop Size: 240 000
Secondary Support: The KDP of Iraq assisted the Iranian army in removing the KDPI from certain strategic positions close to Turkey.
Government of Iran - Government of Iraq
Troop Size: 240 000
Secondary Support: Both Syria and Libya provided Soviet-made weaponry to Iran. Logistics were provided for such transfers to occur, in many cases quite complicated. Syria participated in Irans attack of the Walid Airforce Base.
Government of Iran - MEK
Troop Size: 240 000
1983 Group Archive
Government of Iran - KDPI
Troop Size: 240 000
Government of Iran - Government of Iraq
Troop Size: 240 000
Secondary Support: Both Syria and Libya provided Soviet-made weaponry to Iran. Logistics were provided for such transfers to occur, in many cases quite complicated.
1984 Group Archive
Government of Iran - KDPI
Troop Size: 335 000
Government of Iran - Government of Iraq
Troop Size: 335 000
Secondary Support: Syria and Libya supported Iran politically through various statements against Saddam as well as by putting themselves at odds with other Arab states. They further sold weapons to Iran, especially SCUD missiles, throughout 1986 and 1987.
1985 Group Archive
Government of Iran - KDPI
Troop Size: 345 000
Government of Iran - Government of Iraq
Troop Size: 345 000
Secondary Support: Syria and Libya supported Iran politically through various statements against Saddam as well as by putting themselves at odds with other Arab states. They further sold weapons to Iran, especially SCUD missiles, throughout 1986 and 1987.
1986 Group Archive
Government of Iran - KDPI
Troop Size: 345 000
Government of Iran - Government of Iraq
Troop Size: 345 000
Secondary Support: Syria and Libya supported Iran politically through various statements against Saddam as well as by putting themselves at odds with other Arab states. They further sold weapons to Iran, especially SCUD missiles, throughout 1986 and 1987.
Government of Iran - MEK
Troop Size: 345 000
1987 Group Archive
Government of Iran - KDPI
Troop Size: 350 000
Government of Iran - Government of Iraq
Troop Size: 350 000
Secondary Support: Syria and Libya supported Iran politically through various statements against Saddam as well as by putting themselves at odds with other Arab states. They further sold weapons to Iran, especially SCUD missiles, throughout 1986 and 1987.
Government of Iran - MEK
Troop Size: 350 000
1988 Group Archive
Government of Iran - KDPI
Troop Size: 654 000
Government of Iran - Government of Iraq
Troop Size: 644 800 - 654 000
Government of Iran - MEK
Troop Size: 654 000
1990 Group Archive
Government of Iran - KDPI
Troop Size: 504 000
Comment on Troop Size: The total number of armed forces active during 1990.
1991 Group Archive
Government of Iran - MEK
Troop Size: 528 000
Comment on Troop Size: The total number of armed forces active during 1991.
1993 Group Archive
Government of Iran - KDPI
Troop Size: 200 000 - 473 000
Comment on Troop Size: The higher figure is Irans total armed forces active. The lower figure is reportedly the number of Iranian troops that controlled Kurdish areas during 1993.
Government of Iran - MEK
Troop Size: 473 000
Comment on Troop Size: The total number of armed forces active during 1993.
1996 Group Archive
Government of Iran - KDPI
Troop Size: 513 000
Comment on Troop Size: The total number of armed forces active during 1996.
1997 Group Archive
Government of Iran - MEK
Troop Size: 518 000
Comment on Troop Size: The total number of armed forces active during 1997.
1999 Group Archive
Government of Iran - MEK
Troop Size: 545 600
Comment on Troop Size: The total number of armed forces active during 1999.
2000 Group Archive
Government of Iran - MEK
Troop Size: 513 000
Comment on Troop Size: The total number of armed forces active during 2000.
2001 Group Archive
Government of Iran - MEK
Troop Size: 513 000
Comment on Troop Size: The total number of armed forces active during 2001.
2005 Group Archive
Government of Iran - PJAK
Troop Size: 420 000
Comment on Troop Size: The Iranian army have 420 000 (Army 350 000 Navy 18 000 Air 52 000) active soldiers, 350 000 in the reserve that consists of ex-service volunteers. Additionally they have 40 000 paramilitary troops. There is no information about how many of these that is placed in the North-western part of the country.
2006 Group Archive
Government of Iran - PJAK
Government of Iran - Jondullah
Troop Size: 545 000
Comment on Troop Size: In total Iran had 545 000 troops in 2006. Thes troops were made up of (Army 350 000, Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corps 125 000, Navy 18 000 in addition to this they also had 40 000 paramilitaries.
The figures above are for the whole country and exactly how many troops they had in the Kurd respectively Baluch area could not be found. However, according to Jondollah leader Abdol-Malek Rigi the Iranian government increased the number of security officers in Baluchistan with 22 000 due to the increased activities by his group.
2007 Group Archive
Government of Iran - PJAK
Government of Iran - Jondullah
Troop Size: 545 000
Comment on Troop Size: In 2007 the Iranian army consisted of 545 000 men. Of these were 350 000 in the army, 125 000 in the Islamic Revolutionary Guard, 18 000 in the Navy and 52 000 in the Air Force. In addition to this they also had 40 000 paramilitary forces.
2008 Group Archive
Government of Iran - PJAK
Government of Iran - Jondullah
Troop Size: 523 000
Comment on Troop Size: In 2008 Iran had 523 000 active troops. 350 000 in the Army, 125 000 in the Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corps, 18 000 in the Navy and 30 000 in the Air-force. In addition to this there were 40 000 paramilitary troops.
2009 Group Archive
Government of Iran - PJAK
Government of Iran - Jondullah
Troop Size: 523 000
Comment on Troop Size: In 2009 Iran had 523 000 active troops. Out of these 350 000 were army soldiers, 125 000 were Revolutionary Guards, 18 000 were navy, and 30 000 were airforce. In addition there were 40 000 paramilitary troops.
2010 Group Archive
Government of Iran - Jondullah
Troop Size: 523 000
Comment on Troop Size: In 2010, Iran had 523 000 active troops. Of these, 350 000 were deployed in the army, 125 000 with the Revolutionary Guards, 18 000 with the Navy and 30 000 with the Air forces. Additionally, Iran had 40 000 paramilitaries.
2011 Group Archive
Government of Iran - PJAK
Comment on Active: In July 2011, the Iranaian Revolutionary Guard Corps (IRGC) launched a major offensive aimed at driving PJAK out of Iran, succeeding with this goal towards the end of September.
Troop Size: 523 000
Comment on Troop Size: In 2011, Iran had 523 000 active troops. Of these, 350 000 were deployed in the army, 125 000 with the Revolutionary Guards, 18 000 with the Navy and 30 000 with the Air forces. Additionally, Iran had 40 000 paramilitaries.