UCDP

LRA - Civilians

General information

Part of Conflict: n/a

First Battle Related Death: 1989-04-03

Date when dyad reached 25 battle releated deaths: 1989-04-14
Comment on date when dyad reached 25 battle related deaths: LRA first became active as a one-sided actor in UCDP data in 1989 when the one-sided violence resulted in over 25 civilian deaths. The threshold was reached on 14 April that year when the group shot dead 6 civilians in Layibi village.

Conflict issues

Annual information

This section contains annual information systematically collected by the UCDP.

1989

Estimated Fatalities
High	36
Best	26
Low	26

Secondary Warring Support:

Side A (LRA): n/a

Side B (Civilians): n/a

1990

Estimated Fatalities
High	63
Best	63
Low	63

Secondary Warring Support:

Side A (LRA): n/a

Side B (Civilians): n/a

1991

Estimated Fatalities
High	102
Best	102
Low	102

Secondary Warring Support:

Side A (LRA): n/a

Side B (Civilians): n/a

1993

Estimated Fatalities
High	0
Best	0
Low	0

Secondary Warring Support:

Side A (LRA): n/a

Side B (Civilians): n/a

1994

Estimated Fatalities
High	13
Best	10
Low	10

Secondary Warring Support:

Side A (LRA): n/a

Side B (Civilians): n/a

1995

Estimated Fatalities
High	285
Best	275
Low	275

Secondary Warring Support:

Side A (LRA): n/a

Side B (Civilians): n/a

1996

Estimated Fatalities
High	666
Best	586
Low	586

Secondary Warring Support:

Side A (LRA): n/a

Side B (Civilians): n/a

1997

Estimated Fatalities
High	452
Best	452
Low	452

Secondary Warring Support:

Side A (LRA): n/a

Side B (Civilians): n/a

1998

Estimated Fatalities
High	103
Best	103
Low	103

Secondary Warring Support:

Side A (LRA): n/a

Side B (Civilians): n/a

1999

Estimated Fatalities
High	56
Best	33
Low	33

Secondary Warring Support:

Side A (LRA): n/a

Side B (Civilians): n/a

2000

Estimated Fatalities
High	101
Best	91
Low	91

Secondary Warring Support:

Side A (LRA): n/a

Side B (Civilians): n/a

2001

Estimated Fatalities
High	69
Best	60
Low	60

Secondary Warring Support:

Side A (LRA): n/a

Side B (Civilians): n/a

2002

Estimated Fatalities
High	1079
Best	1051
Low	1051

Secondary Warring Support:

Side A (LRA): n/a

Side B (Civilians): n/a

2003

Estimated Fatalities
High	924
Best	637
Low	637

Secondary Warring Support:

Side A (LRA): n/a

Side B (Civilians): n/a

2004

Estimated Fatalities
High	1045
Best	952
Low	911

Secondary Warring Support:

Side A (LRA): n/a

Side B (Civilians): n/a

2005

Estimated Fatalities
High	308
Best	304
Low	304

Secondary Warring Support:

Side A (LRA): n/a

Side B (Civilians): n/a

2006

Estimated Fatalities
High	62
Best	47
Low	47

Secondary Warring Support:

Side A (LRA): n/a

Side B (Civilians): n/a

2007

Estimated Fatalities
High	62
Best	62
Low	62

Secondary Warring Support:

Side A (LRA): n/a

Side B (Civilians): n/a

2008

Estimated Fatalities
High	1067
Best	734
Low	734

Secondary Warring Support:

Side A (LRA): n/a

Side B (Civilians): n/a

2009

Estimated Fatalities
High	1464
Best	1394
Low	1358

Secondary Warring Support:

Side A (LRA): n/a

Side B (Civilians): n/a

2010

Estimated Fatalities
High	493
Best	464
Low	454

Secondary Warring Support:

Side A (LRA): n/a

Side B (Civilians): n/a

2011

Estimated Fatalities
High	211
Best	211
Low	211

Secondary Warring Support:

Side A (LRA): n/a

Side B (Civilians): n/a

2012

Estimated Fatalities
High	66
Best	65
Low	65

Secondary Warring Support:

Side A (LRA): n/a

Side B (Civilians): n/a

2013

Estimated Fatalities
High	52
Best	48
Low	47

Secondary Warring Support:

Side A (LRA): n/a

Side B (Civilians): n/a

2014

Estimated Fatalities
High	38
Best	37
Low	37

Secondary Warring Support:

Side A (LRA): n/a

Side B (Civilians): n/a

2015

Estimated Fatalities
High	50
Best	32
Low	32

Secondary Warring Support:

Side A (LRA): n/a

Side B (Civilians): n/a

2016

Estimated Fatalities
High	15
Best	15
Low	15

Secondary Warring Support:

Side A (LRA): n/a

Side B (Civilians): n/a

2017

Estimated Fatalities
High	28
Best	26
Low	26

Secondary Warring Support:

Side A (LRA): n/a

Side B (Civilians): n/a

2018

Estimated Fatalities
High	7
Best	7
Low	7

Secondary Warring Support:

Side A (LRA): n/a

Side B (Civilians): n/a

2019

Estimated Fatalities
High	29
Best	29
Low	11

Secondary Warring Support:

Side A (LRA): n/a

Side B (Civilians): n/a

2020

Estimated Fatalities
High	4
Best	4
Low	4

Secondary Warring Support:

Side A (LRA): n/a

Side B (Civilians): n/a

Dyad Archive

This section contains annual information no longer systematically collected by the UCDP.

1989 Dyad Archive

Comment on Active: Only a small number of one-sided attacks were reported in 1989, the biggest of which took place in April, when LRA attacked a village in Gulu district and killed some 20 villagers.

Terminated: NO

1990 Dyad Archive

Comment on Active: The single biggest attack in 1990 was carried out on 11 April, when the rebels attacked Alwi village near Kitgum town and hacked and burned to death 43 civilians.

Terminated: NO

1991 Dyad Archive

Comment on Active: On 31 March the government launched "Operation North", a major counter-insurgency operation against the rebels, and for the coming five months the northern districts of Apac, Lira and Kitgum were completely sealed off with a media blackout imposed. The knowledge of what actually happened during this period is thus limited. However, NGO reports indicate that both the government and the rebels carried out large-scale human rights violations in the context of the armed conflict.

Local government officials during the year urged the civilian population to mobilize into local defence units, armed with bows and arrows. These were supposed to protect the villages from UCDA attacks and resist the rebels until the NRA had a chance to arrive. Local Defence Units became a common phenomenon, signalling the civilian populations gradual disenchantment with the rebellion. LRA, feeling abandoned by the population, subsequently stepped up their abuses against the civilian population.

Terminated: NO

1993 Dyad Archive

Terminated: NO

1994 Dyad Archive

Terminated: NO

1995 Dyad Archive

Comment on Active: In 1995 the scale of violence and child abduction by the LRA increased dramatically. Some attacks on civilian targets involved large-scale loss of life. The massacre in Atiak in northern Gulu district was the largest carnage to date when it took place, on 20 April. LRA attacked the trading centre and herded several hundred people out into the bush. According to survivors, the rebel commander in charge, Joselph Kony’s second in command, Vincent Otti, then chastened the people them for siding with the government and told them that they were undermining their power. He went on to say that the people of Atiak had been saying that LRA guns had rusted and that they had come to show the people that their guns were still functioning. Over 200 people were subsequently shot to death.

Terminated: NO

1996 Dyad Archive

Comment on Active: The year 1996 started out rather quiet, as LRA fighters had retreated to their bases in southern Sudan in late 1995. However, in February new LRA units crossed into Uganda. They issued an edict banning settlement within three kilometres of roads and prohibiting the use of bicycles. Through the rest of the year, small spread-out LRA groups enforced the edict by attacking villages and trading centres and murdering villagers using roads. Oftentimes the bodies of those killed were laid on the roads to further enforce the ban. The largest massacre of the year took place in Acholpii refugee camp, housing refugees from southern Sudan. In mid-July LRA rebels attacked the camp, killing over 100 refugees. As a consequence of the increase in attacks, the government’s policy of moving the population to so-called protected villages was introduced.

Terminated: NO

1997 Dyad Archive

Comment on Active: As an increasing number of so-called protected villages were created, they immediately became a target for the rebels. The year saw numerous raids on protected villages, many resulting in deaths and others also in abductions. The single largest attack on civilians was carried out between 8 and 12 January in and around the subcounties of Lokung and Palabek in northwest Kitgum. According to survivors LRA rebels expressed anger that some Kitgum abductees had revealed to the army the location of hidden arms caches in the area. They also complained that Kitgum abductees escaped in greater proportion than those from Gulu. During the four days, LRA units subsequently gathered up and methodically hacked and clubbed to death a total of 412 men, women and children.

Terminated: NO

1998 Dyad Archive

Comment on Active: In 1998 it appeared as if many of the one-sided attacks were aimed to force the population back to their farms. During raids mounted on camps in April and May, rebels told the villagers to leave the camps. This was probably partly due to a lack of food for the rebels, who relied on plunder. Thus, in the first half of 1998 the rebels moved east to Lira district. In 1998 many of the attacks carried out on protected villages resulted solely in abductions and not in deaths.

Terminated: NO

1999 Dyad Archive

Terminated: NO

2000 Dyad Archive

Comment on Active: In 2000 LRA carried out some one-sided violence, but relatively speaking the level of violence was low compared to the years in the mid-1990s. By October 2000 most of the rebels had retreated to southern Sudan, probably as a result of an Ebola outbreak in Gulu district.

Terminated: NO

2001 Dyad Archive

Comment on Active: The relative calm that had prevailed in northern Uganda since October 2000 remained through the March 2001 elections. However, soon thereafter small groups of LRA fighters crossed back into Uganda from southern Sudan and launched occasional attacks on the civilian population.

Terminated: NO

2002 Dyad Archive

Comment on Active: In March 2002, with the permission of the Sudan government, the UPDF launched a major offensive against the LRA in southern Sudan, called "Operation Iron Fist". The initial plan had been to completely defeat the rebel group, but after just a few months it became clear that this would fail. Instead, LRA crossed back to northern Uganda and from April the country saw attacks and brutality not witnessed since 1995 and 1996.

Terminated: NO

2003 Dyad Archive

Comment on Active: After having been flushed out of their safe havens in southern Sudan in 2002, LRA rebels continued to wreak havoc on northern Uganda in 2003. By mid-year the rebels moved the conflict eastwards to the Teso region carrying out simultaneous attacks in Lira, Apac and Katakwi districts. Furthermore, three days later LRA attacked Adjumani district in Lango region for the first time in 14 years. There were different explanations given for the move, with some citing the lack of food in Gulu, Pader and Kitgum. With almost the entire population in camps, most of the land lies in fallow. Another explanation was that the rebels wanted to punish the Iteso for supporting the government. Survivors of attacks told of rebels saying that the Iteso were the strongest supporters of the Movement (i.e. the government) in the north and, so they must be punished for it. Yet others say that LRA moved east to attempt to find new supporters. However, when the population began to resist the rebels reacted with brutality.

Terminated: NO

2004 Dyad Archive

Comment on Active: As the government continued its operations in southern Sudan in 2004, LRA carried out persistent one-sided attacks, in southern Sudan as well as in northern Uganda. As in 2003 LRA operated in a wide-stretched area. The single largest attack on civilians was the group’s 21 February raid on Barlonyo camp near Lira in eastern Uganda, which resulted in up to 337 deaths.

Terminated: NO

2005 Dyad Archive

Comment on Active: By 2005 the rebels no longer had a fixed headquarter in southern Sudan due to the onslaught the Ugandan national armed forces. However, small, highly mobile groups of rebels continued to wreck havoc in both northern Uganda and in southern Sudan.

Terminated: NO

2006 Dyad Archive

Comment on Active: All one-sided violence took place during the first eight months of the year. On 26 August a Cessation of Hostilities Agreement was signed by both the government and LRA and through the rest of the year the ceasefire was largely respected. From October there was a string of road ambushes along the Torit-Juba and Nimule-Juba roads in southern Sudan and fingers were pointed at LRA, as the modus operandi resembled theirs: people were hacked and clubbed to death. However, the team monitoring the ceasefire established that the attacks were the work of a militia allied to the Khartoum government, the EDF (Equatorial Defence Force).

Terminated: NO

2007 Dyad Archive

Comment on Active: While LRA’s attacks on civilians had abated through the last few months of 2006, the first five months of 2007 saw them increasing again. As in the previous year, the developments seemed to be tied to events in the peace process. The negotiations got off to a rocky start when the rebel delegation walked out in January and the situation continued to be deadlocked until April. During this impasse the security situation deteriorated in Southern Sudan, as LRA rebels resumed their practice of attacking villages and conducting ambushes along the roads. When the peace process resumed and gained momentum the attacks declined rapidly.

Terminated: NO

2008 Dyad Archive

Comment on Active: After a relatively calm first couple of months, 2008 saw a rapid deterioration in security for civilians living in LRA-affected areas, and a veritable explosion of violence during the last week of the year. These developments were tied to events in the negotiation process, and the eventual resumption of fighting in mid-December (see the section on armed conflict).

As the peace process came to a halt in April when LRA leader Joseph Kony repeatedly failed to sign the final peace agreement, attacks began to increase in southern Sudan. The attacks on civilians escalated further when they spread to the northeastern part of DRC in September. LRA, which had been based in the areas since 2006, had previously refrained from attacking Congolese civilians, but in September the same pattern of one-sided attacks that could be seen in northern Uganda and southern Sudan through the 1990s and early 2000s spread to neighbouring DRC. Most analysts argue that the reason for this was that local communities had helped LRA defectors escape, a practice that the rebels felt had to be punished.

On 14 December the armed forces of Uganda (UPDF), DRC (FARDC) and Southern Sudan (SPLA) launched Operation Lightning Thunder, beginning with a surprise air strike against Camp Swahili, LRAs main camp in Garamba national park, northeastern DRC. Due to poor coordination, bad weather and the dense forests in the region, the ground troops arrived late, wherefore the rebels had ample time to disperse in the jungle. In response to the offensive LRA on 24 December initiated a wave of massacres throughout the area. According to Human Rights Watch, in order to be able to kill as many people as possible during a short period of time, the rebels waited for the holiday season, when many people gathered in the villages. While the worst killings of the so-called “Christmas Massacres” happened during the first two days, one-sided attacks continued through the rest of the year.

Terminated: NO

2009 Dyad Archive

Comment on Yearly Battle Related Deaths: A vast majority of the killings occurred in north-eastern Democratic Republic of Congo, followed by Southern Sudan and the Central African Republic.
Comment on Active: After the so-called Christmas massacres in north-eastern Democratic Republic of Congo (DRC) in December 2008, LRA continued to carry out large-scale violence against the civilian population of Congo during 2009. Most analysts concluded that the unabated LRA attacks were best seen as the rebels’ retaliation for the continued military offensive against them (see the section on the armed conflict).

Despite the intention of the armed forces of Uganda, DRC, Southern Sudan and the Central African Republic (CAR) to confine the rebels to an ever-decreasing area in north-eastern DRC, the LRA fighters were able to avoid the soldiers and split into even smaller groupings. Small bands of LRA fighters subsequently dispersed over a large geographical area; some crossing the border into CAR and Southern Sudan and others remaining in north-eastern DRC. Irrespective of location, the violence against civilians continued, with almost daily reports of attacks on remote villages in all three countries.

At least one large-scale massacre was carried out by the rebels in December 2009, almost a year to the day after the Christmas massacres of 2008. Between 14 and 19 December the rebels moved through Makombo area in DRC’s Haut Uele district, killing more than 300 people and abducting some 250 civilians, most probably to reinforce their ranks.

Terminated: NO

2010 Dyad Archive

Comment on Yearly Battle Related Deaths: Due to the remoteness of the region in which LRA operate, there is limiter reporting available. Subsequently, the figures reported here make up a conservative estimate of the number of people killed.

There was a substantial decline in the number of fatalities as compared to the previous years. This is by and large explained by the fact that there were no large massacres on the scale of the 2008 and 2009 December killings in 2010.
Comment on Active: LRA remained a regional threat during 2010 with its forces scattered over CAR, DRC and Southern Sudan. The government forces pursuing them had great difficulties in tracking them down, and there was a decrease in military engagements during the year. However, LRA fighters continued to launch attacks on the civilian population of the three countries where they were based, causing massive displacement and bloodshed.

During the year the section of the rebels based in DRC appeared to establish a new base area. Previously concentrated in Haut Uele, groups of LRA fighters in 2010 moved west to Bas Uele and started attacking civilians. Bas Uele, and more specifically Ango territory in the northern-most part of the district, is deemed to be a strategically sound area for the group to establish themselves in, according to analysts. It is a vast area, sparsely populated and with very limited military presence. To the south the river Ule serves as a natural barrier to movements from the south and the border with CAR, and the large Zemongo forest, is to the north. To the west Ango territory is bordered by Equateur Province, a violent region which is a hotbed of Congolese rebel activities. Troops in pursuit of LRA would need to come from the east, along a route that is easy to monitor. During 2010 LRA fighters launched a strategy of attempting to empty Ango territory of civilians. Wanting total control of the area to ensure safe passage to CAR, rebels were reported to explicitly tell the civilian population that their land now belonged to the LRA and that they should leave for CAR. Those that did not obey were killed. The emptied land was then cultivated by LRA abductees.

Terminated: NO

2011 Dyad Archive

Comment on Active: As during previous years, LRA remained a regional threat during 2011, with its forces scattered over CAR, DRC and Southern Sudan. Suffering from logistical problems, cooperation problems with its allies as well as from down-sizing, the Ugandan government forces pursuing them had great difficulties in tracking them down, and the military engagements continued on a relatively low level (for more information on this, see the armed conflict section of the database).

While LRA fighters continued to launch attacks on the civilian population of the three countries where they were based, causing displacement and bloodshed, the level of violence decreased markedly compared to the previous year. This led to a debate among analysts and policymakers, with some arguing that the reason for this decrease was that the rebels had been substantially weakened and that this was a sign that they were on their last leg. Others warned that the decline was an intentional tactics – one used many times before – under which the group waits out military incursions, reorganizing and laying low, only to re-appear and launch attacks, stronger than before.

Terminated: NO

2012 Dyad Archive

Comment on Active: LRA remained a regional threat during 2012 with its forces scattered over CAR, DRC and South Sudan. The government forces pursuing them had great difficulties in tracking them down, and for the first time since 2007 the conflict between the government and LRA was not active. While not fighting the government, LRA fighters continued to launch attacks on the civilian population of the three countries where they were based, albeit on a less deadly scale than previous years. However, analysts have noted that the number of attacks did not decrease, but instead of killing civilians, the main intention of most attacks seemed to have been to raid food and abducting civilians to transport looted goods. According to Human Rights Watch former abductees had reported to them that the LRA leadership had given instructions to the rebels to avoid large-scale killing in order to keep their locations hidden from the armed forces pursuing them.

Terminated: NO

2013 Dyad Archive

Terminated: NO

2014 Dyad Archive

Terminated: NO

2015 Dyad Archive

Terminated: NO

2016 Dyad Archive

Terminated: NO

2017 Dyad Archive

Terminated: NO

2018 Dyad Archive

Terminated: NO

2019 Dyad Archive

Terminated: NO

2020 Dyad Archive

Terminated: NO