SUMMARY
Hay’at Tahrir al-Sham (HTS or the “Organization for the Liberation of the Levant”) was a Syrian rebel group which traces its rise to the beginning of the Syrian civil war and continued to be a important opposition force. HTS was led by Abu Muhammad al-Julani and consisted of 12,000 – 20,000 fighters. It was a relatively localized Syrian terrorist organization, which held a jihadist ideology despite its public split from al-Qaida in 2017.
Its former names are Jabhat al-Nusra and Jabhat Fatah al-Sham. Jabhat al-Nusra was formed in Syria in late 2011 as an al-Qaida affiliate within the opposition to the Assad regime. Its leader, al-Julani, established a capable group, which secured its own donors, collected revenue from taxation and asset seizures in the territories under its control, became capable of committing insurgent attacks, and attracted a growing amount of combatants.
In July 2016, al-Julani announced the dissolution of Jabhat al-Nusra and the establishment of a new group, Jabhat Fatah al-Sham. In late January 2017, Jabhat Fatah al- Sham re-branded itself again, as it merged with several hardline Syrian local rebel groups; Nour al-Din al-Zenki, Liwa al Haq, Jaish al Sunna and Jabhat Ansar al Din, establishing Hay’at Tahrir al Sham (HTS). This merger and shift towards local rebels drove some foreign Jihadi fighters and figures away from the HTS. The international “global caliphate” rhetoric adopted by Islamic State (IS) and al-Qaida is absent in HTS publications. Alternatively, the group’s focus was more local, with its main objective to establish an Islamic state in Syria. Despite HTS’s re-branding and local rhetoric, the U.S. government believed that a link between the two groups remained.
Similar to IS, HTS governed the territory it controlled through a sophisticated administrative structure, by establishing civil services, Sharia courts, and providing security. On the other hand, HTS imposed taxes and fines on citizens that lived in the territory it controlled. Those taxes included utility, service taxes, income and business taxes as well as renting out empty houses. Import tariffs on goods entering HTS’s territory was a vital and stable income source for the group. Unlike other rebel and Jihadi groups, HTS did not take cash, but a certain percentage of the tariffed goods instead.
Another crucial part of HTS’s income was spoils of war. This was the group’s main source of heavy weaponry such as tanks, IFVs, and APCs that helped it apply its unique tactics on the battlefield. In the battle of Idlib, HTS managed to take 33 tanks. Those tanks along with other heavy weapons were a deciding factor in the gains of the 2016 South Aleppo offensive despite heavy Russian airstrikes. Kidnappings of civilians and military personnel for ransom has been considered a significant source of income particularly between 2012 and 2015. Although ransom income was not a stable income, it remained a source of millions of dollars each year. Like most designated terrorist organizations, HTS enjoyed a stream of donations from around the world. Donations were sent through Hawala; a money transfer method that involves intermediaries and brokers to maintain plausible deniability. While much of the organization’s income and resources initially came from foreign donors, HTS increasingly relied on funding sources more typical of a government. Taxes, tariffs and fines are typically imposed by governments, but were key in HTS’s overall funding structure. Unlike most governments, HTS also relied heavily on spoils of war, hostage ransoms and smuggling to fund itself.
HTS’s strong footprint on the battlefield distinguished it from other rebel groups. Since establishment in late 2011 it proved to be a worthy adversary to regime forces. HTS along with IS introduced new tactics to the Syrian civil war and to civil wars in general. HTS used a crucial tactic they called the Inghimasi tactic. Inghimasi fighters were defined by the United States military Combating Terrorism Center as "suicide fighters (...) who submerse in enemy lines with no intent to come back alive". Inghimasi fighters are deployed after a wave of suicide bombers and before the main regular wave. That is, they may run behind or are sometimes transported by armored suicide cars and keep pushing through the frontlines until they become entirely surrounded by enemy forces. At this point, remaining troops with heavy armor are deployed to the battlefield. HTS also managed to utilize AT-missile systems in a unique way which became a determining factor for its success on the battlefield. HTS also added light drones into its arsenal, using them as its long arm to attack regime forces where its mortars can’t reach in addition to using drones for surveillance.
While HTS sustained military alliances with many rebel and Jihadi groups, Ahrar al-Sham was its closest ally. The two groups began coordinating attacks together in late 2012, and with the Islamic Front, an umbrella organization where Ahrar al-Sham was an influential member in 2014. The groups coordinated operations through Jaysh al-Fatah (Army of Conquest) umbrella organization, which HTS spearheaded a successful campaign to push the Syrian Army out of the Idlib governorate in 2015, and through the Fatah Halab control room. While HTS’s close military relationship with Ahrar al-Sham helped facilitate the former’s rise to power, the two groups have engaged each other in violent skirmishes over differences on how to govern the areas they jointly control.
HTS had a complicated relationship with the FSA, a loose affiliation of rebel groups with decentralized leadership. Coming from different ideologies, those groups coordinated with HTS, especially in a 2013 offensive against Government of Syria positions in Southern Syria, and in offensives against Syrian government and its allies' positions in 2014 and 2015. HTS also attacked those rebel groups throughout the course of war, more specifically during its attempt to consolidate power in Idlib province. In addition, HTS regularly targeted U.S.-backed opposition groups because it believed their alliance with the United States posed a threat to its operations.
Jaysh al-Islam (meaning the Army of Islam) was formed as Liwa al-Islam (Islam Brigade) by Zahran Alloush in September 2011 during the civil war in Syria with an aim of toppling Assad and replacing him with an Islamic government. The group was particularly active around Damascus, with Eastern Ghouta as its stronghold. Jaysh al-Islam was one of the main Syrian insurgent groups in Damascus and its countryside until 2018. On 29 September 2013, 50 small rebel factions from the area joined Liwa al-Islam and they changed their name to Jaysh al-Islam.
In 2014, Jaysh al-Islam was part of the Islamic Front. During 2015, it participated in several coalitions while remaining an independent actor. Most notably, on 26 April 2015 they established the Fatah Halab Operations room with other groups active in the Aleppo area. The group was also a leading member in the Eastern Ghouta Unified Military Command and the Eastern Qalamoun Operations Room, both active in fighting IS in Rif Dimashq. It continued fighting IS in several coalitions (2015, 2017, 2018) in Damascus countryside until it was driven out by the regime in mid-2018. In April 2018, Jaysh al-Islam joined the Turkish-backed rebel alliance SNA (Syria National Army)
Jaysh al-Islam consisted of between 17 000 and 25 000 fighters, and was for much of the uprising one of the strongest groups in Syria.
Jaysh al-Islam was led by Zahran Alloush until his death on 25 December 2015. Essam al-Buwaydhani then became the military leader of the group.
Jaysh al-Islam has been involved in the non-state category of UCDP organised violence. It is also considered part of the Syrian insurgents active in the intrastate and one-sided categories of UCDP organised violence.
