Dan na Ambassagou

Number of Deaths

Number of Deaths

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Map data ©2026 Google
Map data ©2026 Google

SUMMARY

Dan na Ambassagou (Hunters who trust in God; sometimes Dan na Amba Sagou or Dan na Amassagou) was a coalition of ethnic Dogon militias, created in the context of the intrastate conflict in Mali. The Malian government had been challenged by islamist groups in the northern and eastern part of the country since 2012, and in 2015, violence also erupted in central Mali when the Fulani islamist group FLM emerged. As the group stepped up attacks and became increasingly vocal in its advocacy for the Fulani population, pre-existing tensions between the pastoralist Fulani and the agricultural Dogon and Bambara communities increased, eventually stoking ethnic violence. In the security vacuum that was central Mali, this, in turn, caused the different ethnic groups in the conflict-hit area to create self-defense militias, and Dan na Ambassagou became the largest of these.

Dan na Ambassagou was created sometime between October and December 2016, as a reaction to the killing of Théodore Soumbounou, a prominent Dogon hunter – or Dozo – who had worked as a scout for the Malian army in its fight against FLM. Before his death, Soumbounou had argued that the traditional hunting societies in central Mali should join forces to meet the jihadi threat, and this came to fruition shortly after his passing, as numerous such Dogon hunting societies together created Dan na Ambassagou, with the stated goal of protecting the Dogon population.

The group had a military and a political wing. The former was commanded by Youssouf Tolob, who had a background in the Ganda Koy and Ganda Iso militias, created in the context of the previous conflict between the Malian state and Tuareg separatists. The political wing was initially led by David Tembiné, but he was replaced by Mamadou Goudienkil in 2018 (more on this below). Dan na Ambassagou had a military-like hierarchy, with company commanders, battalion leaders, camp leaders, as well as team leaders, and appeared to be very well organized. At the onset, a majority of the fighters were initiated so-called Dozos, or hunters, who had been part of the previously mentioned hunting societies. Recruited only from the noble classes, they had been initiated into these societies, and followed a certain set of rules, upheld by the elders. However, as violence in central Mali escalated, the need for fighters grew and Dan na Ambassagou began recruiting more widely among the Dogon. As more and more of the fighters failed to adhere to the original principles of the hunting societies this caused a shift in the group, and after that, some observers came to view it as simply being made up “out of control young people” who saw this as “an opportunity to go after the Fulanis”.

Estimations of the size of the group vary over time and between sources. While most seem to agree that it contained “hundreds” of members at the outset, and that it grew over time, it is not clear how much it gained in size; some continue to set the size at hundreds, whereas the group itself claimed to have 5000 fighters in arms. A central Mali phenomenon in general, Dan na Ambassagou more specifically operated in areas colloquially referred to as the “Pays Dogon”, including the Koro, Bandiagara, Bankass, Douentza and part of the Mopti cercles (administrative region in Mali) in the central and eastern part of Mopti region. The group also had political offices in these cercles, as well as in the capital, Bamako.

While there have been frequent claims that Dan na Ambassagou was supported by the Malian state in various ways, no one has been able to substantiate these allegations and the situation was likely more complex. Especially Fulani leaders regularly pointed to the militia’s access to arms and ammunition as well as the fact that the group’s fighters were relatively well trained as an indication of state support. However, Dan na Ambassagou leaders denied all such allegations, explaining the group’s access to arms and ammunition with the capture of such items from armed Islamists. They also pointed to donations from Dogon individuals such as wealthy businessmen, enabling them to purchase arms. The closest Dan na Ambassagou came to admitting state support was to acknowledge contributions from individual security force members and government officials. As for military training, the group received that from retired members of the Malian army, as well as from Dogon who had fought with armed groups in northern Mali, or as mercenaries in the intrastate conflicts in Ivory Coast, Sierra Leone or Liberia.

There were signs of tensions within the group in late 2018, when it was involved in ceasefire negotiations. At the time, the political wing under David Tembiné appeared too willing to compromise for the military wing’s liking which eventually led to the latter’s ouster and replacement with Mamadou Goudienkil. In March the following year, a large-scale massacre was carried out in the Fulani village Ogossagou, in Bankass cercle, Mopti region, killing at least 145 civilians. Dan na Ambassagou was implicated and the following day, then-president Ibrahim Boubacar Keïta announced the dissolution of the militia. However, Dan na Ambassagou refused to disband and remained a potent force in central Mali.

No recorded fatalities for this entity.