SUMMARY
Hay’at Tahrir al-Sham (HTS or the “Organization for the Liberation of the Levant”) was a Syrian rebel group which traces its rise to the beginning of the Syrian civil war and continued to be a important opposition force. HTS was led by Abu Muhammad al-Julani and consisted of 12,000 – 20,000 fighters. It was a relatively localized Syrian terrorist organization, which held a jihadist ideology despite its public split from al-Qaida in 2017.
Its former names are Jabhat al-Nusra and Jabhat Fatah al-Sham. Jabhat al-Nusra was formed in Syria in late 2011 as an al-Qaida affiliate within the opposition to the Assad regime. Its leader, al-Julani, established a capable group, which secured its own donors, collected revenue from taxation and asset seizures in the territories under its control, became capable of committing insurgent attacks, and attracted a growing amount of combatants.
In July 2016, al-Julani announced the dissolution of Jabhat al-Nusra and the establishment of a new group, Jabhat Fatah al-Sham. In late January 2017, Jabhat Fatah al- Sham re-branded itself again, as it merged with several hardline Syrian local rebel groups; Nour al-Din al-Zenki, Liwa al Haq, Jaish al Sunna and Jabhat Ansar al Din, establishing Hay’at Tahrir al Sham (HTS). This merger and shift towards local rebels drove some foreign Jihadi fighters and figures away from the HTS. The international “global caliphate” rhetoric adopted by Islamic State (IS) and al-Qaida is absent in HTS publications. Alternatively, the group’s focus was more local, with its main objective to establish an Islamic state in Syria. Despite HTS’s re-branding and local rhetoric, the U.S. government believed that a link between the two groups remained.
Similar to IS, HTS governed the territory it controlled through a sophisticated administrative structure, by establishing civil services, Sharia courts, and providing security. On the other hand, HTS imposed taxes and fines on citizens that lived in the territory it controlled. Those taxes included utility, service taxes, income and business taxes as well as renting out empty houses. Import tariffs on goods entering HTS’s territory was a vital and stable income source for the group. Unlike other rebel and Jihadi groups, HTS did not take cash, but a certain percentage of the tariffed goods instead.
Another crucial part of HTS’s income was spoils of war. This was the group’s main source of heavy weaponry such as tanks, IFVs, and APCs that helped it apply its unique tactics on the battlefield. In the battle of Idlib, HTS managed to take 33 tanks. Those tanks along with other heavy weapons were a deciding factor in the gains of the 2016 South Aleppo offensive despite heavy Russian airstrikes. Kidnappings of civilians and military personnel for ransom has been considered a significant source of income particularly between 2012 and 2015. Although ransom income was not a stable income, it remained a source of millions of dollars each year. Like most designated terrorist organizations, HTS enjoyed a stream of donations from around the world. Donations were sent through Hawala; a money transfer method that involves intermediaries and brokers to maintain plausible deniability. While much of the organization’s income and resources initially came from foreign donors, HTS increasingly relied on funding sources more typical of a government. Taxes, tariffs and fines are typically imposed by governments, but were key in HTS’s overall funding structure. Unlike most governments, HTS also relied heavily on spoils of war, hostage ransoms and smuggling to fund itself.
HTS’s strong footprint on the battlefield distinguished it from other rebel groups. Since establishment in late 2011 it proved to be a worthy adversary to regime forces. HTS along with IS introduced new tactics to the Syrian civil war and to civil wars in general. HTS used a crucial tactic they called the Inghimasi tactic. Inghimasi fighters were defined by the United States military Combating Terrorism Center as "suicide fighters (...) who submerse in enemy lines with no intent to come back alive". Inghimasi fighters are deployed after a wave of suicide bombers and before the main regular wave. That is, they may run behind or are sometimes transported by armored suicide cars and keep pushing through the frontlines until they become entirely surrounded by enemy forces. At this point, remaining troops with heavy armor are deployed to the battlefield. HTS also managed to utilize AT-missile systems in a unique way which became a determining factor for its success on the battlefield. HTS also added light drones into its arsenal, using them as its long arm to attack regime forces where its mortars can’t reach in addition to using drones for surveillance.
While HTS sustained military alliances with many rebel and Jihadi groups, Ahrar al-Sham was its closest ally. The two groups began coordinating attacks together in late 2012, and with the Islamic Front, an umbrella organization where Ahrar al-Sham was an influential member in 2014. The groups coordinated operations through Jaysh al-Fatah (Army of Conquest) umbrella organization, which HTS spearheaded a successful campaign to push the Syrian Army out of the Idlib governorate in 2015, and through the Fatah Halab control room. While HTS’s close military relationship with Ahrar al-Sham helped facilitate the former’s rise to power, the two groups have engaged each other in violent skirmishes over differences on how to govern the areas they jointly control.
HTS had a complicated relationship with the FSA, a loose affiliation of rebel groups with decentralized leadership. Coming from different ideologies, those groups coordinated with HTS, especially in a 2013 offensive against Government of Syria positions in Southern Syria, and in offensives against Syrian government and its allies' positions in 2014 and 2015. HTS also attacked those rebel groups throughout the course of war, more specifically during its attempt to consolidate power in Idlib province. In addition, HTS regularly targeted U.S.-backed opposition groups because it believed their alliance with the United States posed a threat to its operations.
Harakat Ahrar al-Sham al-Islamiyya or Ahrar al-Sham was formed in December 2011 as part of the civil war in Syria. The group has increasingly become one of the most prominent groups within the opposition.
Ahrar al-Sham was Sunni Salafist militant group that aimed at replacing the Assad Regime with an Islamic government.
Ahrar al-Sham was the largest group within the Islamic Front. The group has also been the main component of the Fatah Halab, Jaysh al-Fatah Idlib, Eastern Qalamoun, Eastern Ghouta Unified Military Command Operation Rooms. Ahrar al-Sham has also been fighting together with Jabhat al-Nusra. On 18 February 2018, Ahrar al-Sham created Syrian Liberation Front together with Nour al-Din Zenki. Syrian Liberation Front merged with National Front for Liberation in August 2018, which in turn joined the Turkish-backed rebel alliance SNA (Syria National Army) in October 2019.
Ahrar al-Sham consisted of 10 000 - 20 000 fighters. Qatar Supported Ahrar al-Sham with weapons and money in 2014, Saudi Arabia and Turkey joined the support in 2015 providing the group with weapons and money.
Ahrar al-Sham was led by Hassan Abboud until he was killed in clashes with IS on 9 September 2014. On 11 September 2014 Sheikh Hashim al-Sheikh became the interim leader of Ahrar al-Sham until September 2015 when he stepped down in favour of Abu Yahya al-Hamawi.
Ahrar al-Sham has been involved in the non-state category of UCDP organised violence. It is also considered part of the Syrian insurgents active in the intrastate and one-sided categories of UCDP organised violence.
Jaysh al-Islam (meaning the Army of Islam) was formed as Liwa al-Islam (Islam Brigade) by Zahran Alloush in September 2011 during the civil war in Syria with an aim of toppling Assad and replacing him with an Islamic government. The group was particularly active around Damascus, with Eastern Ghouta as its stronghold. Jaysh al-Islam was one of the main Syrian insurgent groups in Damascus and its countryside until 2018. On 29 September 2013, 50 small rebel factions from the area joined Liwa al-Islam and they changed their name to Jaysh al-Islam.
In 2014, Jaysh al-Islam was part of the Islamic Front. During 2015, it participated in several coalitions while remaining an independent actor. Most notably, on 26 April 2015 they established the Fatah Halab Operations room with other groups active in the Aleppo area. The group was also a leading member in the Eastern Ghouta Unified Military Command and the Eastern Qalamoun Operations Room, both active in fighting IS in Rif Dimashq. It continued fighting IS in several coalitions (2015, 2017, 2018) in Damascus countryside until it was driven out by the regime in mid-2018. In April 2018, Jaysh al-Islam joined the Turkish-backed rebel alliance SNA (Syria National Army)
Jaysh al-Islam consisted of between 17 000 and 25 000 fighters, and was for much of the uprising one of the strongest groups in Syria.
Jaysh al-Islam was led by Zahran Alloush until his death on 25 December 2015. Essam al-Buwaydhani then became the military leader of the group.
Jaysh al-Islam has been involved in the non-state category of UCDP organised violence. It is also considered part of the Syrian insurgents active in the intrastate and one-sided categories of UCDP organised violence.
When popular protests emerged in Syria, the Governments answer was harsh, including mass arrests, torture of detainees, and firing live ammunition into crowds of protesters. Many soldiers had difficulties with this, especially when realizing that they were facing unarmed civilians, rather than armed terrorists as the propaganda suggested. Added to this was an ethnic dimension. While most army officers were Alawite career soldiers, the lower ranks in the Syrian Army were generally composed of Sunni conscripts. Since a majority of the protestors were Sunni, this resulted in the lower rank soldiers having to shoot fellow Sunnis, leading to even more frustration. Thus, defections became increasingly frequent as of spring 2011.
29th July 2011, defected Colonel Riyad al-Asaad announced the creation of the FSA (Free Syrian Army), aiming to protect and support the protests and to overthrow the government. During the fall of 2011, the FSA succeeded in posing a considerable challenge to the government. The FSA applied a double strategy of holding on to a series of strongholds and using guerilla style hit-and-run tactics against military convoys.
Since then, the FSA has been an important opposition actor fighting the Syrian government as the protests became increasingly violent, reaching and by far exceeding the level of war (at least 1000 battle-related deaths in a calendar year) on the state-based side in 2012. (For more information about this, please refer to the information pertaining to the state-based conflict.)
Importantly, however, the FSA is not a unitary actor, but rather an umbrella organization, consisting of a number of factions who state their association with it.
FSA has suffered from this fragmentation and the lack of functioning co-operation and co-ordination between its component factions. Accordingly, attempts at unification have been made.
In September 2012, Brigadier Gereral Mithqal al-Bateesh formed the Joint Command for the Revolutions Military Council. However, the Joint Command struggled in its endeavor to actually control all factions. As militant Salafi Islamism became more common on the Syrian scene, further difficulties arose. The Islamist ideology clashed with its secular values, and the Joint Command thus tried to reduce those forces that had strong specific ideological ties to the margins. This approach led to problems on the ground concerning for instance how to administer those areas which had fallen under rebel control. Another very serious difficulty was related to funding and resources. Many individual units had sources of supplies and funds who conditioned these resources, making coordination of strategies difficult.
On 5th November 2012 another attempt at coordination and shared structures was made, as the Five Fronts Command was announced, as a way to "unite rebel forces based on the strategic alignment of certain areas into five fighting fronts." This structure existed in parallel with the Joint Command, but failed to secure loyalty from most Syrian groups. However, it did have many resources at its disposal, which meant that it was still able to exert a rather high degree of influence.
In December 2012 the Supreme Joint Military Command, known as the SMC (Supreme Military Command) for short, was created. It announced three overarching objectives:
1) The uniting of forces, 2) Sidelining external actors and ensuring that their influence over the Syrian population was minimized, and 3) Ensuring power-centers would not be captured by extremists.
The five fronts, the geographical division form the Five Front Command structure, lies as the basis for the geographical division of the command of this new structure. The new structure was endorsed by the Gulf countries, USA, Turkey and the EU as the rebellions legitimate leadership.
The SMC does not represent a new organization, but is rather a combination of the Five Fronts Command and the Joint Command. However, SMC is not wholly unified, since each individual brigade has kept its own command structure.
Importantly, as mentioned above, the FSA is by no means a unitary actor. While FSA was the name of Colonel Riyad al-Asaads group, as new groups emerged in Syria many of them claimed to be a part of the FSA, even though they frequently had no ties to it at all. This trend continued until mid-2012, when the number claiming to be parts of the FSA declined significantly.
In general, the FSA has been described as a brand name of the insurgency, rather than a de facto rebel group. Many make use of the term to separate themselves from the Salafi-segments of the rebellion. Further, a reference to FSA has frequently been used when speaking of the armed opposition against the regime of President Bashar al-Assad in general.
Thus, pinpointing the actual membership of the FSA becomes very difficult, since the use of the name has not been coupled with the creation of a corresponding organisational structure.
FSA has been involved in the non-state category of UCDP organised violence. It is also considered part of the "Syrian insurgents" active in the intrastate and one-sided categories of UCDP organised violence.
