SUMMARY
Forces of Khalifa al-Ghawil is a label used by UCDP to refer to a variety of groups that fought for Khalifa al-Ghawil, a former Prime Minister of Libya. Al-Ghawil had led the Islamist-dominated “National Salvation Government” (NSG), which had controlled the Libyan government from August 2014 to the end of March 2016 (for more on the NSG, please consult the Government of Libya actor page). The groups included under this UCDP label were generally referred to as “supporters” of al-Ghawil and/or the NSG, or by the names of the individual militias. The Forces of Khalifa al-Ghawil was opposed to the Libyan (“Skhirat”) Political Agreement signed in December 2015, and thus rejected the legitimacy of the Presidency Council and its “Government of National Accord” (GNA) that assumed government power in March 2016. The goal of the group was to overthrow the Government of Libya and restore al-Ghawil to power. The group accused the Government of Libya of undermining national unity, and claimed that al-Ghawil and the former NSG were the sole legitimate political entity in Libya.
Forces of Khalifa al-Ghawil emerged in 2016 as a direct consequence of the attempts to create a unified Libyan government, and thus to reconcile the Tripoli-based Government of Libya and its rival House of Representatives-led government based in the eastern towns of Bayda and Tobruk. In 2014, elements of the former General National Congress (GNC) government and its affiliated Libya Dawn militias had forced the House of Representatives to flee from Tripoli. Members of the former GNC then established the Islamist-oriented National Salvation Government (NSG), which eventually came under the leadership of Prime Minister Khalifa al-Ghawil (for more detailed information about this, see the Government of Libya page). On 17 December 2015, the NSG-led Government of Libya and the House of Representatives signed the Libyan Political Agreement, which contained a series of power-sharing arrangements. Among these arrangements, it was agreed that the NSG should be disbanded and replaced with a new executive body, the Presidency Council, and a “Government of National Accord” (GNA). Prime Minister al-Ghawil did not support the dissolution of the NSG, as such a move would effectively force him from power. Nevertheless, al-Ghawil eventually stepped down on 5 April 2016 and recognized the authority of the Presidency Council. However, not long after this, al-Ghawil denied that he had ever accepted the Presidency Council’s legitimacy. Then, on 14 October 2016, al-Ghawil and some other former NSG officials, backed by armed militias, reemerged in Tripoli and declared themselves in power. It was thus after this date that the “Forces of Khalifa al-Ghawil” emerged in the UCDP data to encompass the various armed groups that supported the efforts of al-Gheweil and the former NSG to retake government power in Libya.
During the 2010s, major political actors in Libya, including al-Ghawil and the defunct NSG, were highly reliant on their ability to draw support from powerful militia groups in order to solidify their political relevance. In October 2016, al-Ghawil relied on fighters that had defected from the Presidential Guard, a force set up by the Government of Libya just a few months before. By February 2017, al-Ghawil had procured the support from a wide range of militias and “brigades” (a term often adopted by armed groups in Libya at the time), which allowed him to establish the “Libyan National Guards” (LNG). This LNG force was comprised mainly of armed groups from the town Misrata, one of Libya’s most powerful politico-military actors in the post-Gaddafi era. The Misratans had been key supporters of the NSG-led Government of Libya, which in part explained the decision by some of its commanders to side with al-Ghawil. Some Misratan forces had also been disgruntled by the new Presidency Council’s decision to favor Tripoli-based militias and brigades. The most prominent of the Misratan groups to support al-Ghawil was the Jabhat al-Samud (“Steadfastness Front”) militia, led by ex-Libya Dawn commander Salah Badi. It should however be noted that not all Misratan groups decided to side with al-Ghawil, and many of them remained loyal to the Government of Libya. Other prominent contingents within the Forces of Khalifa al-Ghawil were the “Mobile Forces” from the Amazigh tribe, Barki Brigade, Kaniyat (or Kani Brigade), as well as former members of the defunct Libya Islamic Fighting Group (LIFG). Reflecting the fluid nature of Libya’s “militia politics", Kaniyat appeared to have defected to the GNA-led Government of Libya at some point in October 2017.
As suggested above, the overall political leader of the group was Khalifa al-Ghawil. However, al-Ghawil does not appear to have exercised any direct military command, as such functions were filled by the individual militia commanders. For example, the top commander of LNG was Colonel Mahmud Al-Zaghel. Other prominent military commanders were Saleh Badi, the commander of Jabhat al-Samud, and Mohammed Issa, both hailing from Misrata, and Ali Ramali, who had been the commander of the NSG’s Presidential Guard. Unlike most other major armed factions in Libya at the time, the forces of Khalifa al-Ghawil did not control any large swaths of territory. From October 2016 to May 2017, the group was able to control several neighborhoods in Tripoli, before it was driven out by government forces. The group also appears to have exerted at least some control over a few minor towns around Tripoli. It was not possible to establish how many fighters the Forces of Khalifa al-Ghawil included.
As of 2017, it was not known whether the Forces of Khalifa al-Ghawil had any connections to other government or major non-state actors. In October 2016, al-Ghawil reached out to the Tobruk-based House of Representatives and suggested that the two should form a unity government; there were however no indication that the Tobruk government accepted this invitation.
