SUMMARY
The Central Bolívar Bloc (BCB) was a paramilitary group that operated in Colombia between 1999 and 2006. It was initially part of the United Self-Defense Forces of Colombia (AUC), a confederation of right-wing paramilitary groups created to combat guerrilla insurgencies and protect powerful political and economic interests. However, the BCB later splintered from the AUC’s central command due to internal disagreements and operated as an increasingly independent structure. Founded between 1999 and 2000 by the Castaño brothers, founders of both the Peasant Self-Defense Forces of Córdoba and Urabá (ACCU) and the AUC, the BCB sought to expand influence into central Colombia. Its objectives included seizing territorial control from guerrilla forces, capturing revenues from drug trafficking, illegal mining, and smuggling, and dismantling grassroot organizations that opposed extractive economic projects. With backing from drug trafficking networks, large landowners, regional politicians, and local business elites, the BCB rapidly consolidated power. It became the largest paramilitary structure in Colombia in terms of the number of armed fronts and the volume of fighters who later entered the demobilization process under the 2006 peace framework.
Under the leadership of Carlos Mario Jiménez Naranjo, alias Macaco, the BCB developed into a business-oriented criminal organization sustained primarily by drug trafficking. This financial strength gave it considerable autonomy from the rest of the AUC. Beyond its military role, the BCB also pursued a political project by co-opting institutions and forging alliances with politicians at various levels. However, in 2002, deep tensions emerged within the AUC regarding how to achieve political influence. While Carlos Castaño advocated for a “purist” line focused on counterinsurgency and formal negotiations, Macaco’s position relied on maintaining control over drug trafficking revenues as the foundation for military and political power. This strategic disagreement led to an open rupture between the BCB and the AUC’s central leadership.
Structurally, the BCB was divided into three regional commands encompassing 22 armed fronts. These fronts operated with tactical autonomy but followed centralized directives focused on social control, political repression, and the extraction of revenues from illegal economies. The bloc’s expansion strategy relied on absorbing or eliminating smaller armed groups, enabling it to dominate large territories through a mix of military coercion and co-optation of government officials, particularly at the municipal and regional levels.
In 2006, the BCB demobilized as part of the peace process with the AUC, promoted by the government of Álvaro Uribe under the framework of the “Justice and Peace Law”. However, many of its structures were not fully dismantled. Following demobilization, several residual armed groups emerged, comprising former mid-level commanders and combatants. These included Los Rastrojos, and factions that were later absorbed by the EGC. These organizations inherited the BCB’s routes, contacts, and territorial control, sustaining patterns of violence and criminality in various regions of the country.
The BCB has been involved in the non-state and one-sided categories of UCDP organized violence.
