SUMMARY
FLM (Front de Libération du Macina), or in English MLF (Macina Liberation Front), was an islamist rebel group, that fought an intrastate armed conflict against the Malian government in Central Mali. The group’s members rarely used this name, however, more commonly referring to it as Katiba Macina, and to themselves as ”bushmen”, or “yimbe ladde” in Fula, the language of the Fulani people who made up the bulk of the group’s membership.
The emergence of the group in 2015 was closely linked to local, structural factors in central Mali. The region, in general, was a fertile environment for extremist mobilization, since it had long seen economic decline, growing unemployment and low education rates. Furthermore, among the nomadic Fulani community in particular, there was long-seated sentiments of marginalization due to – among other things – the decline in their socio-economic status, caused in turn by state-led policies that had prioritized agriculture over pastoralism. This was coupled with a chain of events set off in 2012, when a largely Tuareg uprising launched by MNLA (later CMA) drove the Malian army from the northern part of the country, and was then highjacked by a number of Islamist groups, Ansar Dine, AQIM and MUJAO. Central Mali, which separated the rebel-held north and the government-controlled south, was also affected by the conflict; the central Mopti region’s eastern-most cercles (administrative divisions), Douentza and Youwarou, were occupied by first MNLA, and later MUJAO, and the rest of the center saw increasing insecurity due to both rebel raids and other forms of violence. State officials fled and the only remaining state presence was a few military posts. This caused a security vacuum, leaving communities forced to fend for themselves by e.g. creating self-defense militias or joining MUJAO. In 2013, France helped oust the islamists from both the center and the north, and with the return of the state, human rights abuses increased as especially the Fulani were viewed as being in collusion with the islamist groups. Thus, an already present antipathy against the state gained in strength, as many Fulani became more radicalized and ripe for mobilization, and subsequently FLM was formed.
The group was established by Hamadoun Kouffa, a radical preacher who also went by the name Mohamed Alhassane Ahmadoun Barry and was known for his critical views against the state. A member of the Tabligh Jama’at, a preaching movement born in Pakistan and known locally as Dawa, Kouffa had joined Ansar Dine in 2012 and received military training. He also participated in the above-mentioned 2013 offensive south, declaring himself the Sultan of Konna” after seizing the central Mali town.
Initially, there was little official communication from FLM, but by and by, it became possible to puzzle together its aims and goals. Its fighters verbally passed on their message during attacks, and cassettes with sermons by Kouffa began to circulate, and it eventually stood clear that FLM was drawing on narratives of reviving the 19th century Fulani-led Macina Empire, a theocratic caliphate that encompassed a large territory comprising Ségou, Mopti, and Timbuktu regions in present-day Mali. This was confirmed some month later, when the group released a statement saying that its goal was to establish and rule an independent Macina Empire, where sharia law would be implemented.
At the outset, there was debate as to whether the group actually existed or not. Some argued that the violence that beset the region was in fact tied to actors from northern Mali, and not to a new group with local roots. Others maintained that FLM may not exist as one unitary actor but that it was a label attributed to the activities of multiple armed groups operating in the same region. However, while it might have started out in an uncoordinated manner, it became increasingly clear that Kouffa was indeed in command of a group calling itself Katiba Macina, and that he also exerted a certain degree of control over a network of relatively autonomous sub-groups, or katibas. The sub-groups were made up of between 30 and 50 men, including both fighters and scouts. They, in turn, were divided into groups of 10, with a chief under the authority of the head of the katiba. The actual size of the group is difficult to determine, with estimates ranging from a few hundred up to 4 000 fighters. As previously mentioned, a majority were local Fulanis, but over time, there were rumors of the group attempting to widen its support base by portraying itself as defenders of the region’s all Muslims, regardless of ethnicity. Whether this succeeded or not remains unclear, however. Nevertheless, FLM was mainly successful in recruiting from the Fulani pastoral nomad community, appealing mainly to the most marginalized in society. The group also recruited from Koranic schools. An unclear number of FLM’s fighters had previously fought with MUJAO.
The group’s main area of operation was in Central Mali’s Mopti and Segou regions, specifically in the former’s Ténenkou, Youwarou and Douentza cercles, where they had a strong presence. Other areas where they had a significant influence were Koro and Bankass cercles, near the Burkina Faso border. While not militarily occupying the cities and villages, the group nevertheless exercised significant control and was able to impose its laws and de facto replace the authorities.
As indicated earlier, Mali as a whole was in the midst of a very turbulent period at the time of FLM’s birth, and the group co-existed with numerous other armed challengers to the government, albeit with different aims and goals. While some of these groups functioned as catalysts to the emergence of FLM, such as the Tuareg MNLA (later CMA), whose actions was one of the factors that caused the Fulani population to mobilize, others served as allies. FLM’s closest ally was Ansar Dine, which most likely played a part in the groups formation. Kouffa and Ansar Dine’s leader Iyad ag Ghali had a long history together, having fought together in 2012-13, and being members of the Dawa, and analysts agree that the latter served as a mentor to the former. The close ties between the two even led some to argue that Katiba Macina was a mere southern katiba of Ansar Dine. Nevertheless, the two groups coordinated their operations in central Mali, and FLM received both financial support and weapons from Ansar Dine. A second group that appeared to be allied to FLM was fellow jihadist group al-Murabitun; the two organizations claimed joint responsibility for some attacks.
On 19 May 2016, a little over a year after its creation, FLM pledged allegiance to Ansar Dine, and thus became the southern branch of the latter. However, eight month later, in January 2017, Kouffa and his group backtracked and severed this link, allegedly as a result of differing objectives as well as ethnic tensions, with Kouffa opposing the perceived use of his Fulani fighters as cannon fodder by the Tuareg leadership of Ansar Dine. In March the same year, things shifted again, as FLM, together with Ansar Dine and the Sahara-branch of AQIM (at that time also including al-Murabitun merged to create JNIM. With that, the group ceased to exist as an independent actor in UCDP data.
