SUMMARY
ARLA (Armée Révolutionaire de libération de l’Azawad: Revolutionary Army for the Liberation of Azawad) was a Tuareg rebel group that emerged in the context of the armed conflict over the Azawad territory in northern Mali, fought in the first half of the 1990s. The group had its roots in the armed group that launched the armed conflict in the first place – MPLA, later MPA – but broke away in November 1991 due to internal differences over the ultimate aim of the struggle, as well as inter-clan tensions within the movement.
MPLA’s, and subsequently ARLA’s roots can be traced to the migration of large numbers of young Touaregs from both Mali and Niger to Libya and Algeria due to severe draughts during the 1970s. Those in Libya received military training, as General Muammar Gadaffi incorporated some into his regular military forces and others into his Libyan-sponsored "Islamic Legion". They also became politically active, and during the 1980’s, the so-called Tanekra movement emerged, having a separatist outlook. In 1990, the Malian part of Tanekra took the name MPLA (Mouvement Populaire de Libération de l’Azaouad: Popular Movement for the Liberation of Azawad) and launched an armed struggle against the Malian state. Negotiations were initiated soon after the rebellion started. This served to unearth ideological differences in the movement concerning the ultimate aim of the armed conflict; while some were hardline separatists who refused to bulge from the idea of creating an independent Azawad, others turned out to be more open to compromise, and to remaining within a unified Mali. When the Tamanrasset peace agreement was signed in January 1991, these rifts caused the movement to split in two, as MPLA signed the agreement under the new name MPA (Mouvement Populaire de l’Azaouad: Popular Movement of Azawad), dropping the contentious "Liberation" and limiting its aim to autonomy, whereas the hardliners launched FPLA. Trouble continued to brew within MPA and in November ARLA was formed and left the mother organization.
While ARLA sided with FPLA when it came to the ultimate aim of the armed struggle, this was not the only cause of contention between the new group and MPA; the rift was also caused by inter-clan tensions within the Tuareg community. Tuareg society has traditionally been hierarchical, with nobility- and vassal clans, and while the long history of competition between them had been overcome with the creation of Tanekra, and later MPLA, the cracks soon started to show again. The main fault line ran between the Ifoghas sub-group, which is the Touareg nobles, who have ruled over other Touareg groups since the colonial era, on the one hand, and the non-Ifoghas on the other. The leadership of MPA was dominated by Ifoghas, whereas those leaving to form ARLA were mainly from the ranks of the vassal Imghad and Tillaqqiwin sub-groups, and one of ARLA’s main aims – aside from an independent Azawad – was a complete change within Tuareg society. ARLA used a discourse of social revolution and brought forward ideas of equality and democracy. The sub-groups making up ARLA inhabit the same territory as the Ifoghas, and its area of operation was, just like MPA, the Adagh, a mountain area in northern Mali. In fact, the group was able to oust MPA from its main base in Mont Tigharghar, and subsequently used it themselves. . The troop size of ARLA is not known. A little less than a year before its creation, in late 1990, then MPLA was said to number some 3000 fighters, but it is unclear how many of these joined ARLA.
ARLA was led by Abderrahmane Galla, a veteran from Gaddafi’s Islamic Legion. After the conflict ended, he became advisor to the the Malian ambassador to Saudi Arabia until 2007, then adviser to the consul of Mali in Tamanrasset in Algeria. Another important figure in the group was El Hadj Ag Gamou, who later came to rise in the ranks of the Malian army, becoming Deputy Chief of Staff in 2010. After a new phase of the conflict erupted in 2012, Gamou went on to create GATIA, a mainly Imghad pro-government self-defense group.
While many of the fighters in ARLA had received arms and training in Libya during the 1970’s and 1980’s, this had ceased before the launch of the rebellion, and sources agree that no other state stepped in to assist the rebels with arms later on. Instead, the rebels relied on conducting raids on the Malian army to build up their military strength. As for cooperation with, and assistance from other rebel groups, this was a complex issue. The rebel landscape of northern and central Mali became increasingly scattered as the conflict progressed. As indicated earlier, ARLA was not the only group that broke away from MPA, also FPLA and FIAA came into existence this way, so by late 1991 there were four groups jockeying for influence. These four groups did attempt to support one another in the diplomatic field by joining forces in the umbrella organization MFUA (Mouvements et Fronts Unifiés de l’Azawad: United Movements and Fronts of Azawad), but militarily alliances shifted quickly and there were a number of instances of in-fighting in the rebel camp.
On 27 March 1996, the so-called Flame of Peace ceremony was held in Timbuktu. Conducted to mark a final conclusion to the conflict, the ceremony saw some 3 000 decommissioned weapons be destroyed symbolically in a giant fire. Furthermore, FPLA leader Zeidane ag Sidalamine, representing all four rebel groups, as well as the Songhai MPGK militia, announced their formal dissolution.
The Malian rebel group FIAA (Front islamique arabe de l’Azaouad; Islamic Arab Front of Azawad) was formed in late 1990 in northern Mali by the Arab members of the MPA (Mouvement populaire de lAzaouad, Azawad People’s Movement), formerly known as MPLA (Mouvement populaire de libération de lAzaouad, Popular Movement for the Liberation of Azawad). MPA had launched an intrastate conflict in June that year and was the first rebel group formed to represent the demands of the nomads inhabiting northern Mali.
One reason for the formation of FIAA appears to have been the concern of the Arabs in the rebel movement that they would receive too small a share of the benefits from government negotiations that commenced soon after the armed conflict had started. In particular one Touareg group, the Ifoghas from Adagh in northern Mali, dominated MPA to the dissatisfactions of other tribal groups that were hardly represented at all in leadership positions. It has also been suggested that FIAA formed as a response to the persecutions of the Arab and Touareg population by the Malian Army that took place from the early beginning of armed conflict in 1990. The movement was the first to take an explicitly ethnic and religious title.
According to Malian army sources, FIAA was supported by Libya and Mauritania. The latter was accused of sheltering FIAA leader Zahaby Ould Sidi Mohamed. It has also been suggested that the FIAA received support from ethnic Tuaj Arabs in Niger. This has, however, not been possible to confirm. Together with other northern Malian rebel groups, FIAA in 1991 formed an umbrella organisation, MFUA (Mouvement et fronts unifies de l’Azaouad, Unified Movements and Fronts of Azawad) comprising MPA, FIAA and two other organisations, ARLA (Armée revolutionaire pour la liberation de l’Azaouad, Revolutionary Liberation Army of Azawad) and the FPLA (Front populaire de Liberation de l’Azaouad, Popular Front for the Liberation of Azawad). MFUA represented the rebels in the negotiations with the government from 1992. However, the political goals of the group comprised by MFUA differed and in 1994 FIAA broke away.
FIAA took part in peace negotiations with the Malian government, but in 1994 continued the intrastate armed conflict as the only northern Malian group officially fighting. It announced an end to its armed struggle the following year and accepted to rejoin the peace process.
FIAA has been involved in the intrastate and one-sided categories of UCDP organised violence.
FPLA (Front Populaire pour la Libération de l’Azaouad: Popular Liberation Front of Azawad) was a Tuareg rebel group that emerged in the context of the armed conflict over the Azawad territory in northern Mali, fought in the first half of the 1990s. The group had its roots in the armed group that launched the armed conflict in the first place – MPLA, later MPA – but broke away due to internal differences over the ultimate aim of the struggle.
MPLA’s, and subsequently FPLA’s roots can be traced to the migration of large numbers of young Tuaregs from both Mali and Niger to Libya and Algeria due to severe droughts during the 1970's. Those in Libya received military training, as General Muammar Gadaffi incorporated some into his regular military forces and others into his Libyan-sponsored "Islamic Legion". They also became politically active, and during the 1980's, the so-called Tanekra movement emerged, having a separatist outlook. In 1990, the Malian part of Tanekra took the name MPLA (Mouvement Populaire de Libération de l’Azaouad: Popular Movement for the Liberation of Azawad) and launched an armed struggle against the Malian state. Negotiations were initiated soon after the rebellion started. This served to unearth ideological differences in the movement concerning the ultimate aim of the armed conflict; while some were hard-line separatists who refused to bulge from the idea of creating an independent Azawad, others turned out to be more open to compromise, and to remaining within a unified Mali. When the Tamanrasset peace agreement was signed in January 1991, these rifts caused the movement to split in two, as MPLA signed the agreement under the new name MPA (Mouvement Populaire de lAzaouad: Popular Movement of Azawad), dropping the contentious "Liberation" and limiting its aim to autonomy, whereas the hardliners launched FPLA. The use of the term “front” in FPLA’s name was a conscious choice, aimed to stress the military nature of the new group. FPLA’s leader gave the following rationale for the group’s creation: “We have created (the FPLA) after the failed treason of the Azawad people and we have called it Front Populaire de Libération de l’Azawad, in reaction to what is called “the Tamanrasset Agreement” which seems to us to be a treason of some kind to our revolutionary principles: It is a reactionary position, our objective being the liberation of the people of Azawad from the oppression it is suffering since the French have left”.
Aside from the ideological differences within MPLA, the group had also been beset by intra-Tuareg clan divisions. Tuareg society has traditionally been hierarchical, with nobility- and vassal clans, and while the long history of competition between them had been overcome with the creation of Tanekra, and later MPA, the cracks started to show again during the fall of 1990. The main fault line ran between the Ifoghas sub-group, which is the Tuareg nobles, who have ruled over other Tuareg groups since the colonial era, on the one hand, and the non-Ifoghas on the other. It was the Ifoghas that remained in MPA, while the other sub-groups broke away, and formed three new organizations during 1991, one of which was FPLA. FPLA, in turn, drew support mainly from the Kel Intessar, the Chemennamas, the Ishidenharen, the Dabakar and the Doussahak sub-groups. These groups had their home regions in the Azawad and Tamesna plains, an in the so-called Niger Bend area, i.e. the area around the great turn to the southeast that the Niger River makes at Bourem. FPLA established its headquarters at I-n-Taykaren at the extreme eastern part of the Niger Bend, which was under the control of the Chimennamas, and initially most of its military operations were carried out in these areas. However, its area of operation expanded over time, spreading further south and west, and by May 1991, the group struck as far south as Gossi and Lere. The troop size of FPLA is not known. On the eve of its creation, in late 1990, then MPLA was said to number some 3000 fighters, but it is unclear how many of these joined FPLA.
While the leadership of the group was clear at the outset, it became more muddled as time passed. At the time of its creation and through at least the next two years, FPLA was led by Rhissa ag Sidi Mohamed, a Chimennamas with a history in Gadaffi’s Islamic Legion. Staunchly against a negotiated settlement short of independence, Rhissa ag Sidi Mohamed was the rebel leader that held out the longest when it came to properly joining the peace process. However, the group did join MFUA (Mouvements et Fronts Unifiés de l’Azawad: United Movements and Fronts of Azawad), an umbrella organization set up with fellow rebel groups MPA, ARLA and FIAA in order to present a united front in negotiations. With this, a more political leadership emerged, not necessarily in agreement with the militants in the field, who it claimed to represent. FPLA’s representative in MFUA was Zeidane ag Sidi Alamine, a relative of Rhissa, who some also say was deputy secretary-general of FPLA. Rhissa and Zeidane came head to head in 1992, when a new peace agreement was on the table. Rhissa continued to refuse to sign, but Zeidane took matter into his own hands and travelled to Bamako to sign it on behalf of FPLA, something that has been described as a coup against the former. However, FPLA continued to launch attacks, so it seems as if Zeidane had little influence over the fighters on the ground at this point in time. By 1994 it was Zeidane that was referred to as Secretary-General of the group, but when Rhissa came around to support the 1992 accord the same year, that was also hailed as a big step forward in the peace process.
While many of the fighters in FPLA had received arms and training in Libya during the 1970s and 1980s, this had ceased before the launch of the rebellion, and sources agree that no other state stepped in to assist the rebels with arms later on. Instead, the rebels relied on conducting raids on the Malian army to build up their military strength. As for cooperation with, and assistance from other rebel groups, this was a complex issue. The rebel landscape of northern and central Mali became increasingly scattered as the conflict progressed. FPLA was not the only group that broke away from MPA, also ARLA and FIAA came into existence this way. As has been noted above, the four groups attempted to support one another in the diplomatic filed by joining forces in MFUA, but militarily alliances shifted quickly and there were a number of instances of in-fighting in the rebel camp.
On 27 March 1996, the so-called Flame of Peace ceremony was held in Timbuktu. Conducted to mark a final conclusion to the conflict, the ceremony saw some 3 000 decommissioned weapons be destroyed symbolically in a giant fire. Furthermore, Zeidane ag Sidalamine, representing not only FPLA, but all four rebel groups, as well as the Songhai MPGK militia, announced their formal dissolution.
