SUMMARY
NPFL (National Patriotic Front of Liberia), was a rebel group operating in the West African state of Liberia. The group was formed in 1989, and engaged in a rebellion against the government of Liberia in December of the same year. The NPFL name had previously been in use, being the name General Quiwonkpa used for an insurgent group that in 1985 attempted to oust Liberian President Samuel Doe in a coup. It is however unlikely that the group that followed was an institutional successor to Quiwonkpa’s group. NPFL formed around a clique of Liberian exiles, all opposed to the military regime of President Samuel Doe, which congregated in the countries that neighboured Liberia. Many of these exiles, of which many had been politicians or soldiers in Doe’s regime, took up on Libya’s offer of revolutionary military training and travelled to the Benghazi (Libya), where the NPFL leader Charles Taylor also made his acquaintance with RUFs (Revolutionary United Front) leader-to-be Foday Sankoh. Before beginning the rebellion in Liberia, several of the most prominent members of the NPFL took part in the coup in Burkina Faso that brought Blaise Compaoré to power, winning the support of the coup maker. Having won the support of Libya and Burkina Faso –and also some support from the Ivory Coast- NPFL launched its rebellion into Liberia from the neighbouring Ivory Coast in late December 1989.
The goal of the NFPL insurrection was to oust the autocratic President Doe, against which Charles Taylor (and also some of his patron countries) held a personal grudge after being indicted for embezzlement during his time in Doe’s government. As was the case in regard to Sierra Leone’s RUF, NPFL had no elaborate political platform beyond the removal of Doe and the reinstatement of democracy. In addition to engaging the armed forces of Liberia (AFL) in state-based combat, NPFL also became active as a one-sided actor during the conflict, in the end primarily along ethnic lines. NPFL committed a wide range of atrocities against civilians as they pushed to seize territory, engaging in murder, plunder, the burning of villages and rape. The group also engaged in the forced conscription of children, incorporating thousands of young boys (and to a lesser extent girls) into notorious ‘Small Boys Units’, that were fiercely loyal to Taylor. When NPFL, a few years into the conflict, had established control of most of the Liberian territory the group also engaged in illicit logging and mining using forced labour, as well as earning money from national and Sierra Leonean ‘blood diamond’ smuggling. Earnings were used primarily to further fuel the NPFL war machine and Taylor’s ambitions for a ‘Greater Liberia’.
At the time for the initial attack on Liberia NPFL was composed of no more than approximately 100-200 fighters; mainly those trained in Libya. NPFL however made use of the ‘ethnic card’ from the outset of the conflict, swelling its ranks with Gio and Mano men and women who wished to take revenge on the ethnic Krahn and Mandingo patrons of the Doe regime. Many were forced to join NPFL, but most analysts would agree that a large number of civilians joined the ranks of the NPFL freely to exact revenge, or for personal gain through looting. At the peak of its power the NPFL ranks probably contained up to 15,000 men and women, though not all were actual combatants. This peak in manpower coincides roughly with NPFL’s zenith as a movement, when it controlled almost the entire Liberian territory (with the notable exception of the capital city of Monrovia), and maintained a parallel administration in what Taylor termed ‘Greater Liberia’. This peak in dominance was surpassed only when the group’s leader Charles Taylor became the elected president of Liberia in 1997, following several failed peace agreements.
During the conflict with the government of Liberia the NPFL suffered two significant splits. Firstly when Prince Johnson (a former AFL officer and the man in charge of NPFL’s training) left Taylor in early 1990 with a group of well-trained commandos to form the Independent National Patriotic Front of Liberia (INPFL). His outfit however disbanded in 1991, and Johnson went into exile. Secondly, in 1994 a group of high-profile NPFL members and cabinet ministers -Samuel Dokie, Laveli Supuwood and Tom Woewiyu- split from the main NPFL due to an internal power struggle and formed CRC-NPFL (Central Revolutionary Council), which opposed NPFL. These two splinter factions however did little to decrease the overall influence of the main NPFL branch.
During its time in existence NPFL has had links to several African states and rebel groups. As was also the case for Sierra Leone’s RUF NPFL, through Charles Taylor, received revolutionary military training in Libya, and presumably also supplies of arms and financial resources. Taylor also maintained a good relationship with Burkina Faso’s Blaise Compaore, whom he had helped gain power in that country, receiving weapons and training also from that source. In the initial years of the conflict the Ivory Coast also supported NPFL, allowing the group to invade Liberia from its territory, and probably aiding the group in other ways as well (training and military advice). The Ivorian interest however waned once the Ivorian president Félix Huouphouët-Boigny had accomplished his personal goal of getting rid of Liberian president Doe (with whom he had personal issues dating back to Doe’s military coup in the 1980s).
NPFL and Charles Taylor also had a vibrant relationship with Foday Sankoh’s RUF in Sierra Leone. The two had first met in Libya, and later in West Africa, and Taylor supported RUF’s invasion of Sierra Leone by supplying Sankoh with battle-hardened troops and bases in Liberia. As conflict progressed in both Sierra Leone and Liberia the two groups created expansive illicit commercial relationships, smuggling diamonds, mineral ores, drugs and weapons across the Liberia-Sierra Leone border, to the advantage of both organisations’ financial and military resources. The presence in eastern Sierra Leone of Liberian militias opposed to NPFL also led to tactical and strategic military ties.
The leader of NPFL throughout its existence was Charles Taylor, a Liberian of Americo-Liberian ethnic descent who had briefly worked within the government of President Doe. He was however dismissed on embezzlement charges, and was briefly sent to jail because of this while in the US; laying the foundation for his personal grudge with Doe. He was selected as president of NPFL at its inception, mainly because of his strong and important personal ties with the international backers mentioned above. The youths that swelled NPFL’s ranks once the conflict had begun were immensely loyal to Taylor, whilst the military and political elites within the movement were less supportive; as is shown by the splinter factions led by Johnson (military) and CRC (political). At the end of Liberia’s first civil conflict (approximately 1989-1997) Taylor was elected president of Liberia, and thus took control of the government. He was however ousted from government at the end of the second civil conflict (2000-2003) and took refuge in Nigeria. As a consequence he was also indicted for war crimes and crimes against humanity for this involvement in the Sierra Leonean civil conflict.
NPFL has been involved in the intrastate, non-state and one-sided categories of UCDP organised violence.
ULIMO – K (United Liberation Movement for Democracy in Liberia- Alhaji Kromah faction) was an anti-Taylor militia, active in combating Charles Taylor’s NPFL (National Patriotic Front of Liberia), which had begun an attack on the government of Liberia in 1989. The group was active during the first Liberian civil conflict, which took place approximately 1989-1996.
ULIMO – K was an offshoot, or rather a splinter faction, of the original ULIMO group. ULIMO was founded in May of 1991, in Conakry (Guinea), by prominent Krahn and Mandingo politicians that had escaped the NPFL onslaught against the Government of Liberia and the Krahn and Mandingo ethnic groups. The group became composed (mainly) of these politicians, along with soldiers that had left the AFL (Armed Forces of Liberia), and members of the large Krahn and Mandingo refugee populations that had fled to Guinea and Sierra Leone. Alhaji Kromah, a Muslim and a member of the Mandingo ethnic group, joined forces with the ULIMO movement early in the Liberian conflict, bringing with him from Guinea scores of Mandingo fighters from his relatively low-profile Redemption of Muslims group, hoping to gain a prominent seat within the movement’s hierarchy. Supported by these new recruits the ULIMO launched its campaign in the south-eastern regions of Sierra Leone, where the NPFL and the RUF (Revolutionary United Front) were making joint combat efforts against the government of Sierra Leone. The conflict however soon shifted also to Liberian territory.
Rivalries along ethnic lines soon burst into the open within ULIMO though, with the movement splitting in two as Alhaji Kromah attempted to make himself the overall leader of the movement, or at least lure over to his side those Mandingo who were loyal to the Krahn leadership that was dominant during the first years of the movement’s existence. Control over the valuable natural resources of the Sierra Leone-Liberia border territories was also a factor contributing to this split. The split became official in April of 1994 (but had been in effect since at least some time during 1993), with one faction becoming the ULIMO-Johnson faction and the other the ULIMO-Kromah faction, split generally along Krahn (ULIMO-J) and Mandingo (ULIMO – K) lines.
ULIMO – K is not recorded in UCDP data as being involved in a state-based conflict, since it opposed not the Government of Liberia, but the NPFL. Animosity between these two movements partially grew out of the NPFL’s persecution of the ethnic Mandingos, in turn a consequence of the perceived benefits that the Mandingo people had received during the regime of Liberian President Samuel Doe. Doe’s regime controlled the Government of Liberia in the early years of the conflict, and had at many times cracked down on the NPFL’s main constituents, the Gio and Mano ethnic groups, spawning inter-ethnic rivalry. ULIMO – K fought to stop the NPFL from taking control of Liberia, but like nearly all of the factions in Liberia’s first civil conflict the group became embroiled in illicit commercial activities, plunder, factional rivalry and one-sided killings of civilians.
As stated above, the ULIMO – K was composed mainly of Mandingos, an ethnic group which is generally Muslim and dominated by business and trade professions. Unlike the ULIMO-J, which could boast having many veteran soldiers of the AFL in its ranks, the ULIMO – K relied mainly on Mandingo refugees (assembling in Guinea and Sierra Leone) for manpower, with the leadership being composed primarily of politicians from the Doe regime and prominent businessmen. At the peak of its power the ULIMO – K maintained an organisation of perhaps as many as 12 500 men and women in its organisation (not all under arms), and controlled large portions of Liberia’s north-west, where valuable agricultural and timber resources could be utilized. The ULIMO – K at one point also entered into the power-sharing government stipulated by the Abuja accords of 1995 and 1996, taking up mainly the financial portfolios of the transitional government. The ULIMO – K was finally disbanded when demobilization was completed after the second Abuja accord of 1996 (in preparation for the 1997 elections).
ULIMO – K maintained good relations with Guinea throughout its existence, dating back to when the group was part of the original ULIMO movement. The Mandingo-dominated ULIMO – Ks relationship with Guinea was in part based on the perceived ethnic kinship with the Malinké people (constituting a large portion of Guinea’s population) and shared Muslim beliefs, but also based on Guinea’s strategic goals in the region. ULIMO – K's excellent relationship with the Guinean army, which provided the movement with an abundance of weapons and ammunition in addition to training its soldiers, was built also on illicit commercial ties the movement had across the Liberian-Guinean border. ULIMO – K also had some ties to ECOMOG peacekeepers stationed in Liberia, engaging with ECOMOG in arms deals and illicit commercial activities. As was the case for most of the factions involved in the Liberian civil conflict the ULIMO – K however shifted its allegiances and alliances during the conflict, sometimes obscuring its actual goals of fighting. For example the movement was initially opposed to the NPFL, but at one time joined this adversary to attack the ULIMO-J.
ULIMO – K was led by one Alhaji Kromah, a Mandingo politician who had worked within the Government of Liberia under the Doe regime, amongst other things as Minister of Information. As the NPFL launched its invasion of Liberia in 1989, Kromah attempted to display himself as the leader of the Mandingo people of Liberia, calling for them to rally to the support of Doe’s government. After fleeing the country as the NPFL pressed onwards into Liberia he established the Redemption of Muslims movement as a refugee in Guinea, using ethnic rhetoric to rally people to his anti-NPFL cause. He then merged the Redemption of Muslims group into the ULIMO movement, before attempting to gain full control of ULIMO. When the ULIMO split into the Roosevelt Johnson and Kromah factions was complete he subsequently took control of the Mandingo faction, once again making use of ‘the ethnic card’. When the conflict ended with the Abuja accords of 1995 and 1996, Kromah attempted to make the transformation from warlord to politician and was a candidate in both the 1997 and 2005 presidential elections as the representative of the ALCOP (All-Liberia Coalition Party). He however never gained enough votes to seriously challenge either Charles Taylor (1997) or Ellen Johnson-Sirleaf (2005).
ULIMO – K has been involved in the non-state and one-sided categories of UCDP organized violence.
