SUMMARY
PUSIC (Parti pour l’unité et la sauvegarde de l’intégrité du Congo, Party for Unity and Safeguarding of the Integrity of Congo) was an armed group and political-military faction active in Ituri District in eastern DR Congo (Zaire). It was formed as a splinter from the UPC in late 2002 or early 2003, under the leadership of Chief Mandro Panga Kahwa. Like the UPC, PUSIC was predominantly associated with the Hema community, but it drew mainly on southern Hema networks from the south of Ituri.
PUSIC emerged during the fragmentation of the Ituri war, when local armed groups, ethnic militias and foreign backers competed for control over territory, trade routes, gold resources and political authority. The group split from the UPC after the UPC leadership moved closer to Rwanda, while Kahwa and his faction remained aligned with Uganda. The split was linked to the wider regional rivalry between Uganda and Rwanda in eastern Congo, but also reflected local Ituri dynamics, including Hema-Lendu tensions, competition among Hema leaders, and disputes over control of Bunia, Irumu, Djugu and the Lake Albert trade routes.
PUSIC sought to defend and advance southern Hema interests, maintain influence over territory and resources, and compete with rival armed actors in Ituri. It fought against Lendu-associated forces and other rival groups, and at times cooperated with the UPC despite having split from it.
PUSIC operated mainly in Ituri, especially in parts of Irumu and Djugu territories. It also controlled or contested important areas around Lake Albert, including the ports of Tchomia and Kasenyi. These locations were significant because they connected armed control, taxation, trade and cross-border links with Uganda. PUSIC was also involved in fighting in and around Bunia, Ituri’s capital, including through short-lived alliances with other Hema-aligned forces.
The group recruited mainly among southern Hema communities and drew on local militia networks linked to Kahwa’s authority as a customary and political figure. Its constituency was therefore narrower than the broader Hema identity often associated with the UPC. PUSIC’s recruitment and mobilization were shaped by ethnic insecurity, local patronage, and the militarization of community leadership in Ituri. As with other Ituri armed groups, its forces included combatants who moved between militia structures, foreign-backed factions and later army integration processes.
PUSIC had a political-military structure built around Kahwa’s leadership, but it also included other political and military figures. Kahwa was the dominant leader and was reported to have commanded a force of several thousand combatants, with estimates ranging between approximately 2000 and 5000 troops. Floribert Kisembo served as chairman of the group until 20 December 2004, when he was replaced by Deo Pimbo. Another senior figure, Ychali Gonza, later received the rank of general in the Congolese army, reflecting the partial incorporation of PUSIC-linked commanders into national military structures. Chief Mandro Panga Kahwa was PUSIC’s central leader. He came from the Mandro area and was an influential southern Hema chief and militia leader. Before forming PUSIC, he had been linked to the UPC and to Hema mobilization in Ituri. In June 2003, Kahwa spent two weeks in Libya, where he reportedly converted to Islam. Congolese judicial authorities arrested Kahwa on 9 April 2005.
PUSIC reportedly received support from Uganda at times, and some sources also alleged that it benefited from Libyan funding after Kahwa’s 2003 visit. Like other Ituri armed groups, PUSIC operated in an environment where control over gold, taxation, transport routes and local administrative authority formed part of armed group financing. PUSIC’s relations with other Hema-aligned groups were unstable. Although it had split from the UPC, it remained close enough to cooperate with it at times. In May 2003, PUSIC formed a short-lived alliance with the UPC to fight against Lendu forces in Bunia, but the alliance lasted only a few days.
PUSIC declined after the main phase of the Ituri war and the arrest of Kahwa in 2005. Parts of its leadership and combatant networks were absorbed into the Congolese army or into post-war political and military arrangements, while other elements lost independent organizational relevance.
