This dyad belongs to the conflict Nicaragua: Government

Summary of conflict Nicaragua: Government

In 1979 the socialist Sandinistas, a revolutionary coalition, took power and threw out the Somoza dictatorship. The regime dissolved the National Guard and replaced it with the Sandinista People’s Army. Somoza supporters fled but former National Guard members recruited peasants for counter revolutionary forces, known as contras. Negotiations led to a number of agreements that paved way for elections in 1990 and demobilisation processes on both sides. The conflict has not been active since 1989.

Background

Nicaragua gained independence from Spain in 1821 and the following decades were plagued by civil wars and foreign interference. Liberal and Conservative elites, based in the cities of León and Granada respectively, struggled with each other for control over the national government. At the same time, Britain and the U.S. maneuvered against each other in an attempt to insert themselves into the power vacuum left by Spain. During the first three decades of the twentieth century the U.S. maintained an occupation force in Nicaragua. By the end of this period the Nicaraguan government gave in to U.S. pressure and created a combined army and police force.

A movement under the leadership of Augusto C. Sandino sprang up in 1927 to resist U.S. occupation. Since the U.S. marines could not put down Sandino’s resistance, a Nicaraguan National Guard (Guardia Nacional) was established to assist in the struggle. The war was a standoff and the U.S. finally withdrew its troops at the end of 1932. The National Guard then became the vehicle by which its first Nicaraguan commander, Anastasio Somoza García, created the Somoza family dictatorship, which was to oppress Nicaragua over the next four decades. Throughout this period, the Somoza dynasty enjoyed strong support from the U.S., as well as from the National Guard. By the time the Somozas were overthrown, their National Guard was the most heavily U.S.-trained military establishment in Latin America.

The Sandinista revolution

FSLN (Frente Sandinista de Liberación Nacional; The Sandinista National Liberation Front) was formally organized by José Carlos Fonseca Amador, Silvio Mayorga, and Tomás Borge Martínez in 1961. Sprung from a group of students, the organization had, by the end of the 1970s, gathered enough support from peasants and fellow students to launch a military initiative. The FSLN was considered to be a Leninist-oriented vanguard organization, willing to form alliances with a multitude of anti-Somoza groups. With international support; namely from Cuba, the FSNL leadership managed to transform the fledgling guerilla struggle into a successful popular insurgency.

The main strategic objectives of the FSLN were a military takeover and the establishment of “a revolutionary government based on a worker - peasant alliance.” Further, the new government would “eliminate foreign policy submission to Yankee imperialism” and “support authentic unity with the fraternal peoples of Central America”; this would be achieved by coordinating “the effects to achieve national liberation”.

The initial strategy of the FSNL concerning military operations was to conduct kidnappings, in order to receive ransom payments and also to get fellow revolutionaries set free from jail. There were several high-profile, and from the FSLN’s point of view, successful kidnapping operations. The highly visible character of kidnapping and taking prominent government officials hostage ensured the FSNL a broader reputation as an alternative to the peaceful efforts towards political change in the dictatorship of Nicaragua under the Somoza family regime. The public nature of the high-profile hostage takings and kidnappings had a two pronged effect; firstly the FSLN got an opportunity to get publicity, via national radio and newspapers, and secondly, the reaction from the Somoza regime towards the increased FSLN activity was to intensify the censorship of the media, and the use of torture, intimidation and murder perpetrated by the government, a course of action that further strengthened the FSNL’s resolve and public support.

The incumbent president, Somoza had been able to rely on support from the U.S., this was however subject to change during 1977. The Carter regime conditioned the U.S. military aid stating that improvements in terms of human rights had to be achieved. These actions further empowered the FSLN movement as a credible alternative concerning any change in the upper echelons of Nicaraguan politics. The repression of civil liberties however continued and even worsened. The newspaper La Prensa was particularly affected; its government-critical editorials were more often than not subject of censorship. The repression culminated when its editor, also opposition politician, Pedro Joaquín Chamorro Cardenal was assassinated. The killers were not identified, there was however substantial evidence that pointed in the direction of President Somoza’s son and other members of the National Guard.

This event proved to be one of the single most defining moments for the opposition, as it turned the tide concerning public opinion and it was followed by several kidnappings and hostage takings during 1978; the most notable occurred on the 22 August 1978. It was on this date that the national palace was overtaken by individuals affiliated with FSLN. Approximately 2000 government officials and members of Congress were held hostage for two days. After mediation efforts by both the archbishop of Nicaragua, Miguel Obando y Bravo, as well as the Panamanian ambassador the crisis was solved. The outcome of the hostage situation was a resounding victory for the opposition, the FSLN; most of their demands were met, the release of imprisoned companions, a ransom of $ 500 000, safe passage for the hostage takers to Panama and Venezuela, and a broad media coverage opening up for a popular debate concerning alternatives for the political leadership in Nicaragua. These events, as well as several external ones contributed to the FSNL’s success. The Carter administration’s reluctance to back the Somoza regime, the support, in terms of war material that was given to FSLN by Cuba, Panama, Venezuela, and private sources within the U.S.

Given the background and extensive media coverage, combined with the ever increasing repression by the Somoza regime the FSLN gained a larger popular following. The OAS (Organization of American States) supervised attempted negotiations during 1979. These attempts, however, proving to be futile, as Somoza had no intention of resigning and enable a democratic order in Nicaragua. Thus fighting continued during the spring of 1979. By the end of June most of Nicaragua was under FSNL control with the exception of the capital. Parallel to the fighting within Nicaragua between the FSLN on the one hand and the National Guard on the other, there had been set up an exile government for Nicaragua in bordering Costa Rica. The government in exile, which was recognized by Panama, demanded the resignation of President Somoza, an option that seemed more likely given the military advances of the FSLN. The resignation of Somoza and the end of the insurgency that had plagued the country during the last year was officially conducted on the 17 July 1979. Two days later the FSNL troops entered Managua and brought a definite end to the Sandinista rebellion. The rebellion left approximately 50 000 dead and 150 000 Nicaraguans in exile.

Nicaragua under Sandinista rule

The country that the FSNL movement was left in charge of was one in ruins. The national economy was in shambles, 50 000 had died during the insurrection, 150 000 Nicaraguans lived in exile and approximately 600 000 were homeless. Foodstuff and fuel was scarce, international aid organizations tried to curb the spread of diseases due to lack of medical supplies.

The initial period after Somoza’s ouster was positive in respect to economic growth and increasing openness concerning politics and government. The major changes that were proposed and carried out by the Sandinistas after their taking over power were mainly concerned with changing the Nicaraguan government and policies to consolidate the revolution; this meant that the country was effectively run by a nine member junta under the leadership of Mr. Daniel Ortega. To replace the National Guard that was loyal to and heavily associated with the former regime a national army (Ejército Popular Sandinista; the Sandinista Peoples Army) and a police force (Policía Sandinista) was created immediately after the consolidation of power by the Sandinistas.

In the aftermath of the violent revolution there was little attempt to challenge the Sandinistas, their ability to gather large scale support through mass mobilization left little room for oppositional political viewpoints. By 1980 Sandinista organizations embraced over 250 000 Nicaraguans.

Contras

Despite the strong popular support for the Sandinista rule there were however some parts of the country where the attitude towards the new leadership was quite skeptical, namely in the area of the Caribbean coast. The inhabitants of these areas were mainly ethnic minorities and indigenous population that had long been marginalized. They demanded a larger amount of self determination and/or autonomy. These demands were met with force by the government, forceful relocations and a continuation of the marginalization led to further deterioration of the attitudes, and proved to be the breeding ground of the guerrilla movement that fought the Sandinista Government during the better parts of the 1980s.

A major turning point concerning the situation in the Central American region was the change of leadership in the White House. The Carter administration tried, from late 1979 through 1980, to work with the FSNL; something that changed in January 1981 when Ronald Reagan was sworn in as President of the United States. Reagan claimed that the Sandinista government posed a threat to the U.S. and the whole Caribbean region due to its close affiliation with Cuba and the Soviet Union. Reagan consequently worked to isolate the Sandinista government; one aspect of this was to encourage anti-Sandinista movements both within Nicaragua, and abroad. One of the results of this stance from the White House was the funding of groups that in one way or another represented anti Sandinista views.

Among these groups that considered themselves marginalized were former National Guards. These soldiers, in many cases still loyal to Somoza, were mainly living in exile in neighboring Honduras. These different groups joined together, with the common goal of removing the Sandinista government in Nicaragua, and were commonly and popularly referred to as Contras. The Contras initially lacked any popular support due to the fact that they were mainly made up by former National Guards. The tactics used by the Contras were mainly that of “hit and run” attacks carried out in the vicinity of the Honduran border, where rebels would cross the border and launch attacks and then retreat back into Honduran territory. These attacks prompted the Government to increase defense spending. Leading to a situation where in an already strained economy more than half the budget was allocated to defense. Another effect of the cross border raids was the migration of farmers who lived on, or close to the border. This development added further tension to the already precarious situation in Nicaragua. As the Contras intensified their struggle, backed by the U.S., the Nicaraguan government grew less tolerant of oppositional voices within Nicaragua. Once again newspapers were censored and the media in general was on the receiving end of a more stringent control.

The Sandinista regime had planned for a general election and passed legislation in 1983 enabling an election in the following year. The elections took place on the 4 November 1984. The process prior to the election was highly controversial and several of the eight contestants withdrew their candidacies after alleged pressure from the Sandinistas. FSLN won 67% of the vote with a voter turnout of 74%. The result meant that the FSLN’s presidential candidate Daniel Ortega was to be sworn in as President of Nicaragua. The inauguration was commenced on the 10 January 1985, on the seventh anniversary of the assassination of La Prensa editor Chamorro.

The period following the election was dominated by uncertainty, violence and economic hardship. Due to the poor security situation, a larger portion of the Nicaraguan budget was allocated to defense sectors; there was also a shortage of manpower concerning the agricultural portion of the Nicaraguan economy. The coffee crops, substantial to the Nicaraguan economy, were left to rot in the field while the men were enlisted in the army defending the same coffee crops from sabotage.

U.S. involvement

During times of economic hardship the situation in Nicaragua deteriorated even further. The U.S. imposed a trade embargo on Nicaragua; as a consequence Nicaragua became even more dependent on aid from Soviet in general and from Cuba in particular. This east – west aspect of the conflict proved to be of utmost importance. Since the U.S. administration saw it as a paramount issue to contain communist influences the establishment of a communist regime so close to its borders, and more importantly so close to the Panama Canal was a scenario that prompted immediate action by the U.S. leadership.

The action taken was, as mentioned above, that of financial aid to the Contras, but the support did however not stop at just monetary aid. It was discovered that the U.S., through the Central Intelligence Agency (CIA), had assisted the Contras in training and military advice. Books or pamphlets later surfaced in which the CIA gave hints and tips on how to conduct a counterinsurgency and how to best perform sabotage and terrorist acts. The manuals, entitled: Psychological Operations in Guerrilla Warfare directly contradicted an executive order signed by President Reagan, in which he stated that: “no U.S. government employee shall engage in, or conspire to engage in assassinations, and that no intelligence agency shall participate in, or request any person to undertake activities forbidden by this order”. The discovery of these “manuals” in combination with the fact that the Contras had carried out political assassinations as early as 1982 led to an uproar in the U.S. Congress. Prior to the distribution of the guerrilla manuals by the CIA this agency was involved in a more tangible way, by sanctioning and participating in the mining of commercial harbors in Nicaragua. The U.S. involvement in the mining of the harbors was disclosed in early April 1984 when a letter to the Senate Select Committee on Intelligence revealed that CIA agents directed an operation in 1983 from a “mother ship” stationed outside the 12-mile territorial waters limit. The actual raid was carried out by “unilaterally controlled Latino assets” which meant agents controlled by the CIA. The coming to light of these activities generated a certain amount of concern in the U.S. Congress concerning the extent of U.S. covert operations in Central America.

The aftermath of the uncovering of the covert CIA involvement in the efforts to topple the Sandinista regime was a substantial decrease in the financial aid provided by the U.S. Congress to the Contras. The funding of the Contras proved to be a controversial issue. Congress voted to suspend all non-humanitarian aid for the Contras. Despite the Congressional ban on non-humanitarian aid, the Contras were supplied with arms and other material directly from the CIA. Funds that the CIA obtained through arms sales to Iran were diverted to the Contras rebels. The covert funding of the Contras with money obtained by selling arms to Iran took place during 1985. The highly covert operation which was brought into the open during 1987 became known as the Iran – Contras affair. The scandal ended several careers within the CIA and the National Security Council (NSC) and the approval ratings of President Reagan took a deep dive.

The funding of the Contras was restored during the later half of the 1980s although the aid was directed exclusively towards humanitarian efforts for the Contras. The armed struggle concerning the government of Nicaragua continued throughout the 1980s. The guerrilla-style insurgency continued despite efforts from regional peace plans to curb the violence and return Nicaragua to a society without conflict. The efforts did not make any substantial headway during the 1980s.

Peace efforts

During the course of the conflict several attempts to alleviate the dire situation were made; the OAS, the UN and the U.S. were all involved in trying to reach a peaceful solution to the Nicaraguan conflict. Yet another peace effort that was instigated during the conflict was the Contadora peace efforts. The Contadora group consisted of delegates from neighboring Central American countries, it was a revival of the Condeca group that was formed in 1963 and acted as a defense council for the Central American countries. The revived Contadora Group worked from its re-creation in early 1983 and throughout the course of the conflict to reach a peaceful solution. There was in fact, in 1986, a peace accord drafted by the Contadora group, the document was at the last minute rejected by Nicaragua and was therefore not implemented.

The efforts to end the guerrilla war and the hardships that followed in the wake of it carried on, despite the sometimes grim outlook that there would be no common ground to reach a settlement from. The Contadora Group in a series of meetings held in Esquipulas, Guatemala in May 1986, managed to produce a signed document concerning guidelines for “firm and lasting peace in Central America”. In short the Esquipulas Peace Accords was a signed document stating the signatories’ desire to sign the Contadora peace treaty and to establish a Central American Parliament, but acknowledged that they had not resolved the outstanding central issues of arms control, military exercises, and the need to ensure compliance with the agreements.

A peace initiative launched in 1987 by newly elected President Arias of Costa Rica stressed the importance of establishing a democratic government within Nicaragua. President Arias stated that: “There will be no peace in Central America without democracy in Nicaragua…. The day the Sandinista government can say it has been elected freely by the majority of Nicaraguans there will be no more problem.” President Arias devotion to the Central American Peace process and the peace plan that evolved from it, popularly referred to as the “Arias Peace Plan”, was in 1987 awarded the Nobel Peace Prize. However these efforts focused largely on the Nicaraguan state, and the neighboring states concerning issues such as funding the Contra rebels and providing safe havens for the rebels. The Contras were themselves not involved directly in the negotiations.

The fact that Contras failed to achieve a decisive military victory and the eventual end of U.S support prompted them to enter into peace negotiations.The 1989 Tela Accord, in which Central American leaders agreed to deny territorial access to irregular forces and set up internationally-sponsored demobilisation procedures, pulled the rug out from under Contra forces that had operated freely in Honduras and Costa Rica. Following the elections in 1990 the Nicaraguan Army was reduced from 90 000 to 15 000 troops. By the end of 1990, virtually all of the Contra troops had demobilised and the war had ended. One could say that the war in Nicaragua simply collapsed and negotiations were defined as simple scripts to guide disarming and demobilization processes.

The resettlement into civilian life of both former Contras and former Sandinista soldiers proved problematic. Moreover, promises guaranteed in the Esquipulas Accords to provide land; social services and credit to facilitate this process were not fulfilled. In 1996, Arnoldo Alemán Lacayo, representing the Liberal Alliance (AL - Alianza Liberal), was elected President. Alemán, associated with the Somoza family, had an openly anti-Sandinista agenda.