SUMMARY
Since the uprising against Muammar Gaddafi in 2011, Libya had been in political and military disarray, and local militias and warlords controlled large parts of the country. Many Libyans also travelled to Syria to fight in the ongoing conflict there. In early 2014, Libyan returnees from the war in Syria set up the Islamic Youth Shura Council in the eastern town of Derna. The Islamic Youth Shura Council later pledged allegiance to IS, alongside several of its allied factions. This pledge was accepted by IS leader Abu Bakr al-Baghdadi on 13 November 2014, which formally marked the creation of three IS provinces (Fezzan, Cyrenaica, and Tripolitania) in Libya.
After its creation in Derna, the Libyan IS branch quickly expanded its territorial reach and began launching attacks across the country. Most notably, IS was able to establish control over the town Sirte by the end of 2015. In 2016, the conflict between the Government of Libya and IS escalated dramatically, culminating in the Battle of Sirte, where Libyan government forces - aided by airstrikes from the United States - was able to recapture the town in December. During 2017 and 2018, the conflict activity dropped considerably and IS no longer controlled any major towns; remaining IS forces operated out of the Libyan desert.
IN DEPTH
Background
In 2011, an armed uprising against Libya’s long-standing ruler, Colonel Muammar Gaddafi, erupted amid the so-called “Arab Spring” that swept the Middle East and North Africa. The Libyan uprising was headed by a plethora of militias and makeshift brigades - comprised of “revolutionaries”, commonly referred to as thuwwars - drawn from various towns and regions across Libya. The various anti-Gaddafi groups were organized under the umbrella of the NTC, which succeeded in capturing the capital Tripoli in August 2011, and thus became the new Government of Libya; Gaddafi himself was killed in October. Following the uprising, the new NTC-led Government of Libya struggled to restore order in the country, and many of the various thuwwar groups refused to disarm. Therefore, the Libyan government allowed most militias to retain their arms, in return for nominally aligning themselves with the government as part of either the Supreme Security Committees (SSC) or the Libya Shield Force (LSF). However, many militias established themselves as local or regional powerbrokers that in practice remained outside the government’s control. Many Libyans also travelled to Syria and joined the various armed groups involved in the conflict going on there at the time. In 2012, Libyans fighting in Syria created the “Battar Brigade”, which later affiliated itself with the Islamic State (IS).
By 2014, Libya was again engulfed in political chaos. In western Libya, the Libya Dawn coalition were engaged in fighting Zintani militias, and in Benghazi the LNA – a militia comprised of both regular military units and auxiliary forces – had launched an offensive to purge the city of a coalition of several extremist Islamist groups. In late 2013 and early 2014, many Libyans who had been fighting in Syria had also begun to return home. Amid the escalating chaos, members of the Battar Brigade travelled to the coastal town of Derna in eastern Libya during the spring of 2014. In Derna, the Battar Brigade and individuals from other Islamist groups reorganized themselves as the Majlis Shura Shabab al-Islam (MSSI, or “Islamic Youth Shura Council”). However, MSSI was not the only Islamist group present in Derna, as more established groups - like the Derna-branch of ASL and the Abu Salim Martyrs Brigade – were also active in the town. Within the local power struggle between these two groups, the MSSI began cooperating with the ASL against the Abu Salim Martyrs Brigade.
Emergence and Expansion of IS’ Libyan Province
In late June 2014, IS announced that it had established a caliphate in parts of Syria and Iraq. The leader of the group, Abu Bakr al-Baghdadi, was appointed “caliph”. Sharia law was imposed in areas under its control, and governors (wālī, or wulāt in plural) were appointed for different geographical locations. In September 2014, two representatives from IS - Abu al-Bara al-Azdi and Abu Habib al-Jazrawi – arrived in Derna, where they were received by the MSSI. In October, MSSI together with parts of the ASL Derna-branch made a formal pledge of allegiance (bay’ah) to the IS leader al-Baghdadi via al-Azdi and al-Jazrawi. On 13 November 2014, al-Baghdadi accepted the bay’ah from groups based in Yemen, Egypt, Saudi Arabia, and from MSSI in Derna. Following this, IS announced the creation of three wilayah (or “provinces”) in Libya: al-Barqa (east Libya), al-Tarabulus (northwest Libya), and al-Fizan (southwest Libya). The geographic boundaries of these wilayah were based on the three historical Libyan provinces – Cyrenaica, Tripolitania, and Fezzan respectively - of the Ottoman Empire.
During 2015, IS gradually began spreading its activities outside of Derna. Between January and March 2015, most of this resulted in non-state violence in the Derna and Benghazi districts; for more information about this, please consult the Forces of the House of Representatives – IS conflict page. IS also committed one-sided violence in January and February, including the killing of 21 Christian Copts from Egypt. The first confirmed clashes between forces loyal to the Government of Libya and IS were recorded by the UCDP in the Surt district in early March 2015.
By early 2016, IS had established its presence in and around several towns, particularly along the Libyan coast. The group’s largest success was the capture of Sirte, a coastal town with a population of around 100 000, in mid-2015. The successful capture of Sirte was in part explained by the fact that IS was able to absorb into its ranks local militants already present in the town. For example, much of what had been the Sirte-branch of ASL – originally known as Katibal al-Farouq, a militant group from Misrata – pledged allegiance to IS; this group had established itself as one of the most influential armed groups in Sirte already in 2013-2014. Following the capture of the town, IS moved its headquarters from Derna to Sirte. Mimicking a pattern seen before in for example Syria and Iraq, IS attempted to impose a governance structure based on its extremist interpretation Islam in Sirte. This – alongside severe repression against the civilian population – led to considerable resentment against IS in Sirte, which eventually caused an armed uprising against the group in the fall of 2015. IS also captured several villages and smaller towns around Sirte, such as Harawa and Nofaliya. While the group maintained its strongest presence around Sirte, IS also attacked government targets in other parts of Libya. In one of its more notable attacks, an IS suicide bomber launched an attack against a police training center in Zliten in January 2016, killing more than 60 police recruits. IS also launched attacks against government-affiliated forces stationed in the so-called “Oil Crescent”, a region containing a large share of Libya’s oil infrastructure.
Aside from geographic expansion, IS also attempted to procure the support of other Islamist groups and coalitions in Libya. For example, considerable efforts were directed towards convincing the Benghazi Revolutionaries Shura Council to pledge allegiance to al-Baghdadi. Although it refused to do so, some Benghazi Islamist fighters did join IS. Even if IS failed to facilitate a complete merger with the Benghazi Revolutionaries Shura Council, the two groups appeared to have been able to forge, at least, a superficial tactical alliance. This was in contrast to IS’ conflictual relationship with the Derna Mujahideen Shura Council, which in 2015 escalated into open conflict. At the height of its power in 2016, IS in Libya controlled a swath of territory along the coast from Sirte towards Misrata, the far-western town of Sabratha, as well as parts of Benghazi and Derna.
Battle of Sirte
A critical turning point in the conflict came in May 2016, when IS fighters attacked government-loyal militias from the town of Misrata at Abu Grein. While IS first appeared victorious, the newly created Misratan-led “Bunyan Marsous Operations Room” launched a vicious counter-offensive that drove the militants back towards Sirte. By June, the Misratan forces loyal to the Government of Libya were deeply engaged in fierce street battles against IS inside Sirte. Even though Bunyan Marsous Operations Room was able to capture significant parts of the town, the battle had turned into a stalemate by July, as the Misratans were unable to overrun the heavily fortified IS positions. As Bunyan Marsous Operations Room was not a regular army unit, it lacked the necessary training and equipment to break the final pockets of resistance and achieve victory.
When the battle of Sirte began, several Western countries were already contemplating whether to support the newly formed Libyan “Government of National Accord” (GNA) in an offensive against IS. The West had applied considerable pressure on Libya’s rival political factions for the creation of the GNA, as it was seen as a crucial step towards stopping the expansion of IS in Libya. However, the unexpected Misratan offensive meant that an Italian and British plan to train the pro-government militias into a new Libyan army was not yet set into motion. Instead, the United States decided to initiate an air campaign in order to revitalize the Bunyan Marsous Operations Room offensive. On 1 August, US aircraft and naval forces began bombing targets in Sirte, which allowed the Misratans to capture the strategically important Ouagadougou Conference Centre, which had been used as a fortress by IS.
The fighting continued for several months, amid more US airstrikes, before the Bunyan Marsous Operations Room finally captured Sirte on 6 December. The fighting in Sirte had been intense, and the high number of fatalities on both sides meant that the conflict between the Government of Libya and IS exceeded 1000 battle-related deaths for the first time in the UCDP data. Aside from the fighting in Sirte, militias loyal to the Government of Libya also captured Sabratha from IS during 2016.
Decline and Changing Conflict Dynamics
In parallel to the defeats in Sirte and Sabratha to government forces, IS had lost Derna to the Derna Mujahideen Shura Council in April 2016, and had been forced from Benghazi by the Forces of the House of Representatives in early 2017. Following these defeats, the nature of the IS insurgency in Libya changed drastically. As the group no longer controlled any major towns, it was forced to retreat into Libya’s remote southern desert. In 2017, the UCDP recorded only a few conflict events involving the Government of Libya and IS. In fact, this applied also to the Forces of the House of Representatives – IS non-state conflict. However, IS was not entirely defeated in Libya, and there were signs at the end of 2017 that the group was attempting to reorganize itself.
