SUMMARY
Rapid Support forces (RSF) was a Sudanese paramilitary force led by Mohamed Hamdan Dagalo, widely known as Hemedti, hails from the Arab subdivision of the Rizeigat tribe in Darfur. The RSF emerged from the Janjaweed militias and was officially established in 2013 by then-President Omar al-Bashir, initially under the authority of the National Intelligence and Security Services (NISS). In 2017, the RSF was made independent security force, formally recognized as a regular military body under the presidency. Although it remained formally part of the Sudanese state, tensions between the RSF and the Sudanese Armed Forces (SAF) intensified over plans to integrate the RSF into the regular military. These tensions culminated in the outbreak of war in April 2023, when the RSF broke with the state and engaged in fighting against the SAF.
The RSF’s origins trace back to the Darfur War, which erupted in 2003 when SLM/A and JEM started armed rebellions against the government, accusing it of political and economic marginalization of Darfur. In response, the al-Bashir regime mobilized Arab militias, commonly referred to as the Janjaweed, predominantly drawn from nomadic tribes such as the Rizeigat. The Janjaweed were equipped and supported by the government and played a central role in the brutal counterinsurgency campaign. This included widespread atrocities such as systematic killings of civilians, sexual violence, and the destruction of villages. The Janjaweed were gradually restructured and institutionalized into the RSF, which continued counterinsurgency operations in Darfur and was later deployed in other regions.
Under Hemedti’s leadership, the RSF expanded in size, operational capacity, and political influence. The group developed its own independent command and recruitment structures and gained control over lucrative gold mining operations in Darfur and other regions, providing it with significant financial autonomy. Although formally under state control, the RSF operated with considerable independence and was widely criticized by repeated human rights violations.
In December 2018, widespread protests broke out in Sudan, initially over economic hardship, but they quickly spread into a nationwide call for President Omar al-Bashir’s resignation. On 11 April 2019, Bashir was overthrown in a military coup jointly led by General Abdel Fattah al-Burhan of the Sudanese Armed Forces (SAF) and Hemedti of the RSF. Together, they established the Transitional Military Council (TMC), assuming control of state.
Later in 2019, under pressure from civil society and international mediators, a transitional power-sharing agreement was signed, leading to the formation of the Transitional Sovereignty Council, composed of civilian and military leaders, with al-Burhan as chairman and Hemedti as deputy. However, the power-sharing agreement was inherently unstable, as mistrust ran deep between the civilian and military factions. The military resented attempts to reduce its influence, while civilians viewed the military as an obstacle to democratization.
In October 2021, the fragile civilian-military partnership collapsed when al-Burhan and Hemedti jointly orchestrated a second coup, dissolving the council and detaining key civilian leaders, effectively ending Sudan’s democratic transition.
In December 2022, a Framework Agreement was signed between military leaders and civilian factions, aimed to restore Sudan’s path toward democracy after the 2021 coup, and was brokered by international actors, including United Nations, African Union, and Intergovernmental Authority on Development (IGAD). Tensions between the RSF and SAF subsequently escalated, particularly over the issue of security sector reform, which was a core component of the proposed transition to civilian rule outlined in the 2022 Framework Agreement. Central to the dispute was the timeline and structure for integrating the RSF into the SAF. The RSF favored a delayed integration over a ten-year period, allowing it to retain its autonomous command, while the SAF pushed for rapid integration and centralized military control. This agreement ultimately triggered to outbreak of a new armed conflict in April 2023.
On 15 April 2023, heavy fighting broke out between the RSF and the SAF in the capital, Khartoum, marking the beginning of a full-scale war. The clashes quickly spread to other parts of the country, including the Darfur region and Gezira state. In Darfur, the RSF and allied Arab militias were accused of renewed ethnic cleansing campaigns, particularly targeting non-Arab communities such as the Masalit. Massacres were reported in and around the city of El Geneina in West Darfur. In December 2023, the RSF captured Wad Madani, the capital of Gezira state, in one of its most significant territorial gains.
On 23 February 2025, the Sudan Founding Alliance (SFA) was established, bringing together the RSF, the Sudan People’s Liberation Movement/Army-North (SPLM/A-North), Darfur-based armed groups, and a range of civilian and political organizations. The alliance sought to challenge SAF dominance and reshape Sudan’s political system through a new governance model. With the formation of the SFA, the RSF ceased to exist as an independent actor in UCDP data.
