SUMMARY
The electoral confrontation between UNP (United National Party) and PA (People’s Alliance) was the 1994 incarnation of the classical electoral patterns of Sri Lanka. Since independence, right-wing UNP and left-wing Freedom Party (FP), the main constituent party of PA, were the two main Sinhalese parties contesting elections in Sri Lanka. Violence was a mainstay of the Sri Lankan electoral process, having been common before 1994 in rallies organized by both PA and UNP.
During the 1994 elections, Supporters of UNP rallied around an anti-negotiation campaign as a policy to end the ongoing civil conflict, mixed with support for ethnic minorities, claiming that the war was a matter of terrorism, not a matter of ethnic dissension. This platform was combined with a traditional push for free markets and open trade. At the same time, Supportersof PA rallied around an anti-war, pro-negotiation, welfare-centered, center-left platform, pledging to end 17 years of UNP rule. The campaign heated up significantly due to four different factors, unique to the 1994 context.
First, the raging civil war triggered significant violent action from the Tamil LTTE (Thamil Eelam Viduthalai Puligal: Liberation Tigers of Tamil Eelam) against both PA and UNP, seen as enemies (both being Sinhalese parties). This led to further escalation of violence, as supporters from each party would respond to LTTE's violence with further violence, directed both at LTTE and at their traditional political rivals.
Second, UNP’s surprise loss of the 1993 local elections put the party in disarray, forcing campaigners to step up the pressure both towards UNP and towards the opposition, as expectations were of a tight race.
Third, Sri Lanka was experiencing a faltering economy, facing significant pressure from multi-lateral lenders (both the IMF and the World Bank). This triggered significant expressions of discontent at the ruling party, whose lengthy rule was considered the reason for the bad situation.
Fourth, the campaign was highly charged, with vitriolic messages, containing extremely strong claims and counterclaims (such as PA’s falsely claimed intent to return to centralized, socialist economic practices, or PA’s electoral message of end to corruption, end to terror, end to assassinations, alleging that they were all perpetrated by both the LTTE and UNP). These were all ingredients for one of the most contested and violent campaigns in Sri Lanka.
Violence occurred throughout Sri Lanka – mainly in Sinhalese areas, as neither UNP nor PA was allowed to campaign in LTTE territory. Violence was initiated and instigated in rather spontaneous outbursts, run by various agitators or local leaders rather than being centrally controlled in any way.
Further, the assassination of UNP’s presidential candidate Gamini Dissanayake by an LTTE suicide bomber on 24 October 1994, just 2 weeks before the presidential elections gave impetus for further violence, especially given the closeness of the election date.
The non-state conflict between Supportersof PA and Supporters of UNP is first included in UCDP data in 1994. By August of that year, fighting between the two parties had resulted in more than 25 battle-related deaths.
